

CITY COUNCIL
CITY OF NEW YORK

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES

of the

COMMITTEE ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

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June 21, 2013
Start: 11:00 am
Recess: 3:59 pm

HELD AT: Council Chambers
City Hall

B E F O R E:

ELIZABETH S. CROWLEY
PETER F. VALLONE
FERNANDO CABRERA
Chairpersons

COUNCIL MEMBERS:
Mathieu Eugene
Vincent J. Gentile
Ydanis A. Rodriguez
Daniel J. Halloran III
Rosie Mendez
Erik Martin Dilan
Helen D. Foster
Daniel R. Garodnick
James F. Gennaro
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A P P E A R A N C E S

COUNCIL MEMBERS:

David G. Greenfield
Gale A. Brewer
Letitia James,
G. Oliver Koppell
Mark S. Weprin

A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)

Cas Holloway
Deputy Mayor for Operations
The City of New York

Mike Flowers
Chief Analytics Officer
The City of New York

Michael Fitton
Chief of Emergency Medical Dispatch
The City of New York

Charles Dowd
Chief of the NYPD Communications Sections
The City of New York

Robert Boyce
Chief of FDNY Communications Sections
The City of New York

Steve Cassidy
Uniformed Fire Association

Lieutenant Eddie Boles
Uniformed Fire Officers Association

Israel Miranda
Uniformed EMTs' Association

Vincent Variale
Uniformed EMT Lieutenants' Association

Faye Smyth
President
Uniformed Fire Alarm Dispatchers Benevolent
Association

Eddie Rodriguez
President
DC 37 and Local 1549

A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)

Alma Roper
First Executive Vice President
Local 1549

Tracy Whitehead
911 Dispatcher

John Armstrong
911 Dispatcher

Sophia Russo
Mother of Ariel Russo

Sanford Rubenstein
Attorney for the Russo Family

Susana Troy
Concerned Citizen

Barbara Ruther
Concerned Citizen

2 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Good morning.

3 My name is Elizabeth Crowley, and I am the chair
4 of the Fire and Criminal Justice Services
5 Committee here at the City Council. Today's
6 hearing is jointly held with the Committee on
7 Public Safety chaired by Council Member Peter
8 Vallone, Jr. and the Committee of Technology,
9 which is chaired by Council Member Fernando
10 Cabrera. We are joined today by Council Members
11 Oliver Koppell, Council Member Letitia James,
12 Council Member Lew Fidler, whose bills we will be
13 hearing today and Council Member James Oddo. The
14 main purpose of this hearing is to examine the
15 city's emergency call taking process and to hear
16 three bills that would accurately measure what the
17 true response time is to both fire and medical
18 emergencies. Beginning in 2004, the city embarked
19 on a major project called the emergency
20 communications transformation project also known
21 and ECTP, and this was in order to improve
22 emergency call taking and dispatch operations.
23 The ECTP called for the construction of a public
24 service answering center, known as PSAC. PSAC is
25 currently in Brooklyn, sometimes referred to as

1 PSAC 1, where NYPD, Fire, EMS call takers and
2 dispatchers are situated in the same building, and
3 the construction of a backup center is currently
4 under way the Bronx, known as PSAC 2. The ECTP
5 has also established a unified call taking system
6 known as UCT in which NYPD call takers process an
7 emergency call and electronically transfer
8 incident information to the Fire Department if the
9 incident involves either a fire or medical
10 emergency. This project has cost the city more
11 than two billion dollars and to date, it appears
12 to be no more reliable than the system we had in
13 place ten years ago. The ECTP has been plagued by
14 technical problems since its inception and is one
15 billion dollars over budget, the New York City
16 Comptroller's Office conducted an audit of the
17 ECTP and found that an alarming lack of decision
18 making by City Hall led to major technical
19 missteps and poor vendor performance. I believe
20 that the mayoral administration has been more
21 focused on technology in hopes that it would
22 reduce the need for emergency personnel, and that
23 the most recent glitches reported over the last
24 couple of weeks show that we cannot rely on
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1
2 computers to take the jobs of call takers and
3 emergency dispatchers. Most importantly, we
4 cannot rely on a system that has not been properly
5 tested. Before I mention the tragic death of
6 Ariel Russo, I would like to extend my condolences
7 and the condolences of the City Council to the
8 Russo Family. On June 4th, a four year old girl
9 named Ariel Russo was struck and killed by an SUV
10 on the corner of West 97th Street and Amsterdam
11 Avenue. Reports that there were a four minute
12 delay in dispatching an ambulance to the scene.
13 The administration contends that the delay is
14 attributed solely to a human error and the
15 dispatchers disagree. Today we need to evaluate
16 the call taking and dispatching protocols that led
17 to this tragic death and ask why the
18 administration was so quick to blame before a
19 thorough investigation was conducted. In
20 evaluating the response times, it is important to
21 note that response time is currently calculated
22 from the time the Fire Department is notified of
23 an emergency. That is after a sometimes lengthy
24 911 call taking operator conversation. After that
25 conversation, fire dispatchers are either

1 telephoned in or electronically given a command
2 communication to the time a fire unit or an
3 ambulance arrives at the scene of an emergency.
4 Numerous Council Members as well as myself and the
5 Windborn [phonetic] consulting report, which is a
6 study conducted by an independent organization
7 paid for by the Bloomberg Administration. They
8 believe as we believe that response times should
9 include the call processing time, which is the
10 time an NYPD call taker spends collecting incident
11 information in order to obtain a truly accurate
12 response time. As we sit here today, the mayor
13 has proposed a budget for the city that would
14 eliminate 20 fire companies. A reason that the
15 mayor uses is that he states response times are at
16 an all-time low. We know that this information is
17 deceptive. Additionally, I believe that response
18 times to medical emergencies should be calculated
19 from the moment an NYPD call taker answers an
20 emergency call to the time when a medical service
21 personnel arrives at the actual individual in need
22 of assistance. Currently, EMS has to stop the
23 clock not when the patient contact is established,
24 but rather when they arrive at an address of the
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2 emergency. More accurate response time data will
3 help the Fire Department, the mayor's office, the
4 Council to ensure that scarce resources are
5 devoted to appropriate communities. Introductions
6 143 and 189 would amend New York City law to
7 include call processing time in calculating the
8 emergency time and Introduction 265 would amend
9 New York City law to require the Fire Department
10 to track emergency response times using the
11 patient contact method. Before we hear from
12 Council Members Vallone and Cabrera, I would like
13 to extend my gratitude to police, fire and EMS
14 dispatchers and the hard work that they do because
15 we know they have a difficult job, and they are
16 performing under very difficult circumstances, and
17 I would also like to acknowledge the work of our
18 fire and EMS and police and the first responders
19 the difficulties they have and the difficulties
20 that have been created by this ECTP system. I'd
21 like to now recognize Council Member Vallone for
22 his opening statement.

23 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Thank you,
24 Chair Crowley. As many people know this is the
25 third, fourth, fifth hearing on this topic alone.

1 We have had many other hearings on the incident
2 command system, you name it, that have
3 tangentially touched on this topic. This system
4 came in seven years late, one billion dollars over
5 budget. You would think that when it came in, it
6 would work, but it has been plagued by problems.
7 What the administration calls glitches, I call
8 lives lost. The system has crashed. It has
9 frozen. There are different computer maps, which
10 can't read the same address. You have had
11 emergencies transmitted on pieces of paper and on
12 top of that you have for an undermanned,
13 overworked staff that sometimes puts in two to
14 three shifts of overtime every week. Almost
15 everything that can go wrong with this system has
16 going wrong and while the City Council today is
17 going to look at some truth in advertising type of
18 laws when it comes to response times, it appears
19 the administration has already enacted Murphy's
20 Law. Now as my Co-chair said, if the city is
21 going to use better response times to justify cuts
22 that are going to make us less safe and they admit
23 that, then those response times better damn well
24 be accurate. So I am going to attempt to again
25

1 explain what our Co-chair did--the situations
2 regarding these response times and how they are
3 calculated in terms that hopefully we can
4 understand. In past when the call came in the 911
5 operator would take it and say, "What is your
6 emergency?" They would say, fire, where, Brooklyn,
7 boom, it went over to the Fire Department. That
8 processing time was not counted, so the
9 administration is technically correct. We never
10 counted processing time, but under this new system
11 the 911 call takers are supposed to take much more
12 information before they transmit it. Now that
13 time is still not counted, but it is all
14 information that would have had to be taken by the
15 Fire Department, so more information is being
16 taken and not counted than happened in the past,
17 so while the administration is technically
18 correct--we never counted processing time--the
19 processing time is longer now. The people on the
20 street don't care who is taking what information.
21 They don't care how we calculate it. They care
22 how long it takes to get an ambulance or a fire
23 engine or a police car to the scene. That is what
24 they care about, and that is what we need to know,
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2 and that is what this hearing is about today, so I
3 want to also thank everyone who has been involved
4 in working with us prior to today--all of the
5 unions, the press has done a great job, the city
6 has also worked with us and provided us with
7 information, and I want to thank my Co-chairs for
8 this hearing and now turn it over to Council
9 Member Cabrera.

10 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Thank you to
11 both the Co-chairs, and good morning. Welcome to
12 this joint oversight hearing that concerns
13 examining recent problems with the city's
14 emergency 911 system. 2004 the city initiated the
15 emergency communication transformation project,
16 ECTP, which was designed to address short comings
17 in the city's emergency public call taking and
18 dispatch operations by overhauling the way
19 operations are managed and supported. ECTP's
20 purpose is to centralize and integrate the call
21 taking and dispatch operations among the NYPD,
22 FDNY and EMS to reduce emergency response times,
23 improve the city's capacity to coordinate multi-
24 agency responses to emergencies and ensure the
25 city's system are fully redundant. Recently a new

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2 computer dispatch system known as the Intergraph
3 computer aided dispatch known as ICAD was rolled
4 out as part of the ECTP. This system reportedly
5 had critical, critical breakdowns since its
6 introduction including malfunctioning on at least
7 four occasions, including the day that it was
8 introduced, and this is why today, I am
9 recommending for an independent investigation of
10 the glitches on 911's system. this is really
11 worse than a GPS. This is worse than my GPS
12 system in terms of these breakdowns that are
13 taking place. The Committees look forward to
14 hearing about the extent to which 911 response
15 times are being impacted, the current status of
16 the 911 system and what is done to ensure the
17 system's effectiveness going forward. Thank you
18 so much. I turn it back to Co-chair Crowley.

19 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
20 Co-chair Cabrera. I am going to now let Council
21 Member Lew Fidler give a statement on behalf of
22 his bills that are going to be heard, and Council
23 Member Fidler?

24 COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Thank you,
25 Chairwoman Crowley and before I give that

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2 statement, I would like to welcome the mother of
3 Ariel Russo here to our proceedings and offer on
4 behalf of everyone sitting here our heartfelt
5 condolences on your loss. I am a parent and I can
6 only imagine the pain you must be going through
7 having lost a child, and anything we can do to
8 give some meaning to that we will try and do, and
9 I am glad you are here with us today. We are
10 hearing three bills that I sponsored I believe
11 seven years ago, seven years ago, and I want to
12 take a moment to thank in particular Chairwoman
13 Crowley for her persistence because I doubt we
14 would be hearing these bills today if not for it,
15 and so I thank all three chairs for the hearing on
16 this bill. Chairwoman Crowley mentioned the term
17 true response time. I want you to think about
18 that for a second. If you are a New Yorker who is
19 in need, do you really care about anything other
20 than what happens from the moment you call for
21 help until the moment actual help arrives?
22 Anything less than that doesn't really tell you
23 what is going on in our response system, and these
24 bills would require--and they overlap a bit, I
25 will acknowledge that--that they require that

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2 actual true response time, time from the call for
3 help until the time for help arrives will in fact
4 be calculated, will in fact be measured so we can
5 look at our response system and see what parts of
6 it are working, what parts of it aren't working.
7 Now clearly that has become a much more timely
8 issue with the unrolling of the new system. that
9 is what makes this bill even more important now.
10 We need to know whether or not this multi-billion
11 dollar investment is working. The taxpayers have
12 a right to know that, citizens who need help have
13 a right to know and that and I frankly would think
14 the administration would want to know that. I
15 hope we are going to pass these bills. Certainly
16 in the end we may morph them into a single bill,
17 and I would like Ms. Russo to know that at her
18 request whatever bill we pass as a result of these
19 hearings will be named after Ariel so that perhaps
20 some solace can be given to you that a death had
21 some meaning. Thank you very much.

22 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
23 Council Member Fidler. I too would like to
24 express my condolences to the Russo family and the
25 condolences of the entire Council. I cannot

1
2 imagine the grief, the frustration that your
3 family has been going through in recent weeks
4 since the death of your beautiful daughter, and it
5 is our goal here today to search for the truth to
6 make sure that something like this doesn't happen
7 to any other family ever again. Before we hear
8 from the Deputy Mayor, I would like to mention
9 that we have been joined by Council Member Mark
10 Weprin, Council Member Melissa Mark-Viverito.
11 Deputy Mayor, before you begin, do you know how
12 long your testimony will run approximately?

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I would
14 guess--I don't know, an hour or so?

15 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: How long do
16 you have on your calendar to be here today?

17 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: As long as
18 it takes.

19 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: There are a
20 lot of people here from the public that are
21 frustrated that the hearing was somewhat delayed,
22 and I would ask if you could deliver your
23 testimony as quickly as possible, and I am sure we
24 will have a lot of time to go over what you
25 prepared with the questions that I and my

1
2 colleagues have.

3 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I'll do my
4 best.

5 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: When you are
6 ready, please begin.

7 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Good
8 morning, Chairpersons Crowley, Vallone, Cabrera
9 and members of the City Council Committees on
10 Fire, Criminal Justice Services, Public Safety and
11 Technology. I am Cas Holloway, Deputy Mayor for
12 Operations. I am joined today among others by
13 Bruce Gaskey, director of the mayor's office of
14 citywide emergency communications, chief of the
15 NYPD communications sections, Charles Dowd, FDNY
16 chief of communications, Robert Boyce and the
17 city's chief analytics officer, Mike Flowers and
18 members of their teams. Thank you for the
19 opportunity to testify on New York City's ongoing
20 efforts to upgrade and enhance the city's
21 emergency 911 system and on proposed legislation
22 regarding the reporting of certain response times.
23 Public safety is Mayor Bloomberg's top priority.
24 That is the foundation upon which any successful
25 city rests and New York City is the safest big

1
2 city in America thanks to the dedication of the
3 tens of thousands of police officers,
4 firefighters, emergency medical technicians and
5 911 call takers and dispatchers who respond to
6 30,000 911 calls every day, more than half of
7 which result in dispatching a police office, fire
8 company, ambulance or a combination of the three
9 somewhere within the five boroughs. Success in
10 this sense means that people want to live and work
11 in New York City and by that measure we are doing
12 better than ever. The 911 call taking and
13 dispatch system is the foundation of public safety
14 for New Yorkers who are injured or are the victim
15 of a crime or who find themselves involved in a
16 fire. That is because without them the first
17 responders would not and could not know where they
18 needed to go. The nearly 1800 men and women who
19 take calls send our resources, conduct medical
20 triage and send an ambulance have stressful jobs
21 that require complete dedication and I want to
22 particularly single out the approximately 1100
23 NYPD 911 call takers who are truly on the
24 frontline of emergency response in New York City.
25 They handle 30,000 calls every day, more when

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2 extraordinary events happen, and over the past two
3 years as we have transitioned from an antiquated
4 end of life technology to new modern 911
5 technology infrastructure these dedicated city
6 workers have ensured that the system has continued
7 to run at the same time that they have been
8 training to transition to new technology that will
9 better serve them and 8.4 million New Yorkers.

10 The critical need for a modern state of the art
11 911 system is particularly evident when events
12 like the recent tragic death of Ariel Russo--and
13 let me just pause and extend my condolences to
14 your family, Ms. Russo and to you. Ariel was a
15 four year old girl walking with her grandmother on
16 June 4th and on behalf of the city I want to extend
17 my condolences. She was killed by an unlicensed
18 driver who had fled from police that morning.

19 Reckless criminal behavior caused this tragic
20 death, but a critical question is whether the
21 city's emergency response was as fast as it could
22 have been and if not, why not? We are conducting
23 a full investigation to answer that question and
24 you have my commitment on behalf of the mayor that
25 we will report the results of that investigation

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2 as well as any steps that we are going to take,
3 technology or process or otherwise if they are
4 necessary to address any issues with the emergency
5 response to this incident so that it doesn't
6 happen in future incidents. I am personally very
7 sorry for your loss. New York City's 911
8 emergency response system is the largest in the
9 country. It takes more than 12 million calls a
10 year. The overhaul and upgrade of New York City's
11 emergency 911 system through the ECTP that you
12 described, Chairwoman Crowley, is the top public
13 safety information technology program undertaken
14 by the Bloomberg Administration. No one takes the
15 effectiveness and the reliability of the city's
16 emergency response system more seriously than the
17 mayor. ECTP is the first substantial effort to
18 modernize 911 since the system was created in
19 1968. That overhaul is underway, but a few facts
20 are clear. Response times to life safety
21 emergencies in New York City have been dropping
22 steadily for the last few years and have never
23 been better. That includes fire responses and the
24 evidence is not just in the time on the stopwatch,
25 which I will go through in detail momentarily, but

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2 in the fact that fire fatalities are at an all-
3 time low as are large multiple alarm fires and
4 that is because FDNY is getting there faster and
5 containing the fire faster than ever. Those
6 outstanding results are attributable to the
7 outstanding work of the men and women of the FDNY
8 and the technology upgrades and call process
9 changes that we have invested hundreds of millions
10 of dollars to make since 2004. The bottom line is
11 that the new 911 technology systems that are in
12 place are faster and more stable than ever and
13 have capabilities like mapping and the ability to
14 calculate response times and locate emergencies
15 more quickly, and as I will show our measurement
16 of response time and will be going forward more
17 accurate than ever before, and we are far from
18 done. But before getting to the heart of my
19 presentation, I would like to point out two
20 things. First, after my testimony, you will hear
21 testimony from a number of other people. Some
22 which you may have read about in the press will
23 make totally baseless assertions about response
24 times or parts of response times and what they
25 were are certain points in time. They will likely

1
2 claim that the "old system was faster" or that the
3 administration has been "underreporting response
4 times." These claims are simply not true. As I
5 will show, the city has consistently measured and
6 reported response times using the methodology that
7 has been essentially unchanged since 1977 when the
8 MMR [phonetic] first reported them. Moreover, in
9 many cases, the people making these assertions
10 have never taken a 911 call or dispatched
11 resources to an emergency and while they may be or
12 have been emergency responders and served the city
13 well, they are not qualified or in a position to
14 speak authoritatively on response time measurement
15 and reporting. So I ask the committees to
16 carefully consider the source of the information
17 you will hear and read today. I also ask that you
18 consider the motivation of the parties testifying
19 today, many of the false and misleading claims you
20 will hear and that have pretty amazingly been
21 misleadingly reported in certain press outlets
22 have nothing to do with public safety, but are
23 being used as a scare tactic to protect union jobs
24 even if that means keeping slower, inefficient
25 systems and processes in place. Soon after Mayor

1
2 Bloomberg took office, it became clear that
3 although the city had one single number to call
4 for emergency assistance., the architectural
5 backbone and infrastructure of the 911 system was
6 incredibly antiquated and rapidly deteriorating.
7 New York City's emergency response system was
8 strained by increasing call volume and obsolete
9 technologies that were becoming more and more
10 difficult to maintain. Behind the single 911
11 number there were three separate and highly
12 dispersed operations being managed in silos by
13 three first responder services, incredibly capable
14 but fundamentally separate, NYPD, FDNY and EMS.
15 The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks and the
16 2003 blackout further highlighted serious
17 operational and technical vulnerabilities of the
18 911 system. as a result the administration
19 prioritized the wholesale replacement of the
20 system and infrastructure with the creation of the
21 ECTP program in 2004. I am just going to
22 transition to the screen.

23 [long pause]

24 [background conversation]

25 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Rather than

1
2 simply read testimony, I am going to go three
3 fundamental parts of a presentation, and I will go
4 through it as efficiently as possible, but I want
5 to note at the outset that this is fairly
6 complicated and complex, and when we talk about
7 the 911 system as has been reported in the press,
8 what we are really talking about is an integrated,
9 highly complex set of systems. I am going to go
10 over the basics of the ECTP project and it had
11 three core elements. Number one was the co-
12 location of police, fire and EMS response, call
13 taking and dispatch. Two, and probably the most
14 important and certainly the most reported has been
15 the comprehensive technology overhaul of the 911
16 system that is still underway, and three is
17 redundancy and putting the city on a path to be
18 able to do next generation 911 'cause for as far
19 as we have come, there is a lot further that we
20 are going to be able to go in the near future. I
21 am then also going to hit briefly on two process
22 changes to the way we take calls that have also
23 been discussed at length, but are also part of
24 ECTP what we so call pre-release of dispatch and
25 unified call taking and in that context, I am

1
2 going to talk a little bit about response times
3 and call business process. And then I am going to
4 go through what you referenced, Chairwoman
5 Crowley, the CPR, the Windborn report and
6 recommendations. We have done a comprehensive
7 review of those. I am going to go over the
8 principal findings and our response to that and
9 some of the things we are going to do including
10 the measurement of end to end response times going
11 forward, and I am also going to explain why until
12 basically about three weeks ago it wouldn't have
13 been possible for us to do that and in the next
14 six to eight weeks we will then reporting that on
15 a regular basis. That is from the time that the
16 caller who needs helps picks up the phone to the
17 time units arrive on the scene and we will be
18 reporting that going forward, and I am sure or
19 hopeful that the next administration will continue
20 to do that.

21 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Deputy Mayor,
22 before you go to the next page, can you give us a
23 roundabout time that you feel that you will be
24 able to present this in? You think you can do it
25 in under ten minutes?

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DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Do what?

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Your
PowerPoint presentation.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No.
Absolutely not, but I said I will be as fast as
possible.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Okay.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: So the 911
call process I just want to start with what is it,
how does it work? Basic overview, a caller picks
up a phone, they need help. Let's say there is a
fire. They call 911. The call first goes to
Verizon infrastructure. It is then switched into
PSAC 1, which is in Metrotech. The new Police
Department system called ICAD, the Intergraph
computer aided dispatch, is the interface that the
911 operator uses to enter information about the
call. They find out where the fire is, what it
is, and then they send the information to one of
these three agencies or a combination of the three
into their dispatch units and systems. So in the
case of a fire, certainly it goes to FDNY
dispatch, and then a dispatcher picks up and looks
at the information that has been entered and sends

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2 out the nearest company. They will also in most
3 cases also send an NYPD response and depending on
4 what the fire company reports, they in some cases
5 will also send--many cases, but not all cases--an
6 EMD response as well. Then the information
7 remains in the dispatch system and the responders
8 on the ground then continue to communicate with
9 PSAC 1 over the radio. That in addition to
10 calling 911 emergency calls can also come in from
11 the field. They can come in from a police officer
12 in a car accident. They can come in from a
13 firefighter in the field doing an inspection.
14 They can come in from a NYPD box. If that
15 happens, the initial intake through the Verizon
16 system doesn't happen. It gets called in over the
17 radio and gets directly entered by a dispatcher,
18 and I am going to explain that in more detail in a
19 minute. Now the ECTP program just a little bit of
20 history was started because the further away we
21 get people seem to forget why we did this all in
22 the first place. NYPD, FDNY and EMS were all in
23 seven or eight different locations around the
24 city, totally siloed [phonetic], no back up
25 capacity as a general matter for their technology

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2 and in 2004 if people remember the New York Times
3 reported, and I think the Daily News as well one
4 night a Verizon technician was doing repairs, and
5 they accidentally switched three out of five borough
6 911 calls to a bank, and so for about an hour and
7 a half , 911 calls from those three boroughs were
8 going to an answering machine at a bank. Now
9 luckily there was one major fire during that
10 period. You can go back and read it. I think
11 Winnie Hugh [phonetic] was the reporter who wrote
12 the story. Nothing serious happened, but the
13 reason that that took place was because we did not
14 have a dedicated switch for 911. We were using
15 the same commercial lines that everybody uses in
16 the city. In addition to that, the technology and
17 the power capacity and the redundancy that we had
18 was totally insufficient, so the ECTP program as I
19 noted has three fundamental elements, co-location,
20 technology and redundancy. First, co-location.
21 Before this was the state of the 911 system before
22 the ECTP program got underway. The Fire
23 Department was dispatching resources for each
24 borough, borough specifically from communications
25 offices in those boroughs. EMD, the medical

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2 dispatch had one place in One Metrotech with no
3 backup. The Police Department was on the first
4 floor of Metrotech and had some backup in One
5 Police Plaza. The state we want to get to is a
6 PSAC 1, which is now in place and went live in
7 2011, partly in 2009, but 2011 all the way and we
8 have under construction PSAC 2 in the Bronx, and
9 in bringing all of the call taking and dispatch to
10 one building, we are also bringing the three
11 agencies to the building. This is a picture of
12 PSAC 1 right now. It looks like a bunch of
13 screens and call takers. What it is is here you
14 have EMS, Fire and NYPD all dispatching resources
15 in the same place. They are able to get together
16 and confer when big events happen. This happened
17 during Sandy recently where they were all in the
18 same place and able to do the triage for 911
19 calls. That is also detailed in several of the
20 reports that have come out. So that is co-
21 location, and that was critically recognized that
22 bringing all of these experts together in the same
23 place would make dispatching resources more
24 efficient. Technology, the technology for 911 was
25 going to be overhauled whether it was called ECTP

1
2 or not, whether we co-locate or not and that is
3 because it was antiquated when Mayor Bloomberg
4 took office. In fact, the newest system that we
5 had was called the Verizon Pinnacle system. That
6 is the initial system that takes in the 911 call.
7 That was set up in 1995. The Sprint system, the
8 system that was just replaced by the Intergraph
9 ICAD system, that system was put in place in 1969,
10 and it was based on an airline mainframe
11 reservation system. it essentially was incapable
12 of being upgraded. It is incapable of being
13 supported. It had to be replaced. The Fire
14 Department is still operating on a system called
15 Star Fire [phonetic], also computerated [phonetic]
16 dispatch. It was put online in 1980. EMS is
17 using what is called the EMS computer aided
18 dispatch system. that went online in 1983. These
19 systems--as did Sprint before ICAD went online--
20 have hundreds of components that break down more
21 frequently than you would want. You don't see it
22 transparently because of back up systems that are
23 in place, but you just know with technology cycles
24 that now go over 18 months--what are we on? The
25 iPad 5? The custom mainframe 1969 dispatching

1
2 technology had to be changed. So the plan for
3 ECTP in 2004 was to go from the Pinnacle software
4 to VESTA [phonetic] which is now in place. That
5 is what it is called, and in doing that, we also
6 went from the shared switch that led to the
7 forwarding of 911 calls to a bank to dedicated
8 switches. That can't happen now. NYPD was moving
9 from its 1969 system to the ICAD system which went
10 online on May 29th, approximately three weeks ago.
11 Intergraph also recently won the solicitation and
12 is in the design phase for doing a single
13 integrated computerated dispatch system for EMS
14 and Fire, and as far as the agencies are
15 concerned, that can't come online fast enough, but
16 I assure you we are putting the resources in
17 necessary to keep these systems going. In
18 addition to that, we have also replaced all of the
19 radio consoles that are used to talk to units in
20 the field for Fire and EMD and as part of PSAC 2,
21 we will do it for NYPD, so when we talk about the
22 911 system, we are talking really about seven
23 separate, but integrated technology systems that
24 are all incredibly complex. They were never
25 integrated because all of those systems were

1 developed separately. If people remember, EMS was
2 its own agency as part of HHC until 1996. Where
3 are we today? The VESTA system which takes all of
4 the 911 calls coming in, all of the 30,000 calls
5 that hit the switch, that went online for FDNY.
6 They moved into the new PSAC in 2009. FDNY moved
7 into the new PSAC in 2011. That has also been
8 much discussed. Why the delay? The testing of
9 that technology showed us that it was not capable
10 of taking the high volume of calls that we wanted
11 to be able to have it take before we switched over
12 to the new technology. That delay lasted about 18
13 months. We kept the 911 system going obviously
14 during that time and we switched over in 2011.
15 Since the switchover, the new system has
16 successfully handled 15 and a half million calls,
17 50 percent of those at least result in dispatches--
18 --that is more than eight million dispatches. Now
19 the NYPD CAD system, which replaces the 1969 good
20 vintage old system -- ICAD was replaced on May
21 29th. Now I am going to talk about that switchover
22 in a minute, but since that went online with new
23 mapping capability, new database query capability,
24 715,000 calls have come through the 911 switch to
25

1
2 that dispatch system. 375,000 as of this morning
3 or 380,000 have resulted in dispatches, all of
4 which have been successfully handled and gone
5 through the switch as designed to dispatch. Now
6 as I said a minute ago, we are still in the design
7 phase to switch the Star Fire and the EMD CAD
8 systems over to a new CAD system. That is part of
9 the development. We are going to go from two to
10 one, so we will have three CAD systems that we
11 used to have are going to be down to two, a
12 unified system for FDNY and EMD plus CAD, but it
13 will all be the same software. That will be done
14 in 2015, and I talked about the radios. I just
15 want to note on the radios we have also done a
16 total radio consult overhaul. That is something
17 that is not talked about, but it was incredibly
18 important. It brought in touch screen technology
19 for Fire and EMD, redundancy in central control,
20 mapping capability, all kinds of modern
21 technology--things that you would expect that our
22 system would have. Now how has this technology
23 been performing? The two systems that are in
24 place, VESTA for the 12 million 911 calls and NYPD
25 ICAD. I will start with VESTA. The bottom line

1 and we track this rigorously and the system
2 enables us to track it to a level of detail that
3 we have never had before has basically performed
4 at 100 percent availability with 100 percent work
5 station availability since it started, and that
6 means that even during big events like Hurricane
7 Sandy--and there were issues on the Verizon side
8 of the switch and we are working with them on
9 that--but in terms of the availability of the
10 system, the queuing of calls, which before was on
11 separate switches and happened depended on which
12 switch you came in, delays were longer. This now
13 lines up the calls correctly, and of those, we
14 have not had a material delay or a problem taking
15 any calls since the system went online in 2011,
16 and that is not happenstance. That is 15 and a
17 half million calls. Well, I have 30,000 more
18 calls as evidence today. Let's talk about ICAD.
19 This is the system that has been written about
20 recently, including the purported glitches that
21 have been much reported. So what happened? Well--
22 -and let me just say one more thing about VESTA.
23 Before VESTA went online, and it was supposed to
24 go online in 2009, we tested it. We did what is
25

1
2 called a network large system test because one of
3 the big things we wanted to make sure was that the
4 volume of calls that went in could match high
5 volume events like 9/11 and it didn't meet our
6 standards, so we waited. We had Verizon build a
7 lab. They built a testing lab. They tested it
8 with us and we embedded our own teams there for 12
9 months and then ultimately they passed the test,
10 and we saw in Hurricane Sandy that 20,000 calls an
11 hour came in, a higher volume than 9/11 or the
12 2003 blackout and were successfully queued. Now
13 wait times went up because there is only so many
14 people who can answer a call, but in terms of the
15 system handling the calls unlike what happened in
16 the blackout, we saw the availability was there,
17 and that was 18 months of testing. Before VESTA
18 went online we did six months of testing. Here is
19 the thing about testing. The test environment and
20 the live environment no matter what you do are not
21 the same. When you go live, you need to plan
22 carefully for months because there are 1,000 call
23 takers, 365 hours a day who are both trained to
24 take calls and do dispatches. You have to
25 coordinate all of that training, so you want to

1
2 make sure that the system you are going to turn on
3 is going to be able to handle the volume and the
4 accountability. Now the same people and some of
5 them are here today who decided that we were not
6 ready to go live with the VESTA system were the
7 ones testing the ICAD system. After six months of
8 testing, we had all of the data that we could
9 possibly having from testing and went live. Now
10 what has happened since we have gone live, well,
11 on the 29th, we took the system down on purpose to
12 cut over to the new system. when you go to a new
13 CAD system, you want to do it all at once because
14 if you stay half on the old system and half on the
15 new system you basically have defeated the purpose
16 of having the system which is supposed to have all
17 of the resources that you can dispatch in a single
18 place. It creates all kinds of problems. There
19 is good literature on this. We cut over. At that
20 time, we went to a backup procedure that has also
21 been written about. Slips, this is an example of
22 the slip. Now this paper slip and there is also a
23 slip for FDNY and a slip, this is for EMS, this is
24 for Fire, all three agencies have this backup
25 procedure exists in case the technology goes down.

1
2 The incidents are entered on these slips, and they
3 are taken to the dispatchers who then use them to
4 dispatch resources. When we went live on the 29th,
5 we went down on purpose, went over to the slip
6 system, brought the new system up. we had two
7 incidents. One less than 24 hours after it went
8 live for 18 minutes. That happened at noon. The
9 day after the next day we had another incident
10 that lasted for--the first one lasted for 16
11 minutes, the second one for 18 minutes. Now what
12 happened during this period? We had to dispatch
13 850 incidents using these slips. Now the
14 implication of all the reporting is that these
15 slips--it almost sounds like they would be post
16 its. Obviously they are not, these have been in
17 place since the 911 system went online in 1969
18 this back up system has been in place and it has
19 been in place for all three agencies. Not only
20 that, under the old system, the Sprint system,
21 every other week for 30 years, the system has been
22 intentionally been taken offline for one hour
23 every Tuesday at six a.m. during that period they
24 move to the paper slips, so that maintenance can
25 be performed on the system. The reason that is

1
2 necessary is because the Sprint system is so old
3 that it cannot stay online and maintained at the
4 same time. The good news is that ICAD system can.
5 Now what does that mean in terms of dispatching
6 incidents? For one hour every other week a year
7 adds up to 26 hours. Based on the number of
8 incidents that come in that means approximately
9 15,000 incidents a year for decades have been
10 dispatched on these slips on purpose because the
11 technology wouldn't allow us to keep the system up
12 and running. Now with the new system, we don't
13 have to take it down. In fact, last week the
14 first maintenance was performed on the new ICAD
15 system and it stayed live, and it went fine, and
16 in fact since the second incident which was less
17 than 48 hours after we went live there have been
18 no incidents requiring them to go to slips, and in
19 fact what these incidents were were a certain
20 number of screens froze up and because it was a
21 new system, and they had not yet had the
22 experience of a screen freezing up, which happened
23 on Sprint all the time. As a precaution they went
24 to the slip system, but later figured out that a
25 simple resent of the screen which takes less than

1
2 60 seconds would have brought it back up, but they
3 went to slips as a precaution because that is why
4 they had the backup system. Now since then, that
5 second incident, the ICAD system has handled
6 715,000 calls that have resulted in 345,000
7 dispatches. They have not going to slips. They
8 have done maintenance without going to slips, and
9 because of the new technology and how robust it
10 is, the old system where they went to slips every
11 other week and dispatched 15,000 incidents a year
12 on paper is gone. All of that maintenance now
13 will be performed and the system will remain live
14 and that is good because that means that all of
15 the data that you are capturing for those events
16 the increased mapping capability for events, all
17 of the additional technology enhancements that you
18 couldn't don Sprint because it was a mainframe
19 system that made airline reservations has been
20 replaced. Just another shot at the slips. Now
21 Star Fire and EMD CAD, and I will move through
22 these at the same time. They are being replaced.
23 Okay? They also go to slips. In fact, the star
24 fire system, not every other week, it is every
25 week that they go to slips. It's for a short

1
2 period of time. It is for a few minutes every
3 Tuesday, but it is every week because the system
4 cannot run based on this old technology that was
5 put in place in 1980 and still operate and be
6 maintained. Under the new system which we are
7 doing right now, you will be able to do that, and
8 so we are moving forward and continuing to develop
9 the CAD system for EMD and FDNY. Now to sum up
10 the technology piece of the two other pieces of
11 the presentation. The 911 system is actually
12 seven systems. Within those seven systems are
13 subsystems. In fact there is more than a dozen
14 technology systems including logging and recording
15 and other elements that make it much easier to
16 replay 911 calls, make it much easier to measure
17 response times and so forth that were absolutely
18 necessary, and so when it comes to why did we
19 undertake the ECTP project, we had to replace
20 wholesale this outdated technology, some of which
21 was more than 40 years old, and it created an
22 opportunity for us to co-locate these emergency
23 responder services, establish redundancy and an
24 institutional framework so that these agencies
25 could be together in the same environment and that

1 means that during big responses like Sandy they
2 are actually able to communicate with each other
3 and triage better and moving forward we are going
4 to be able to do additional process and technology
5 changes some of which I will go through in a
6 little bit. Redundancy. The third part of ECTP.
7 It was co-location, technology, redundancy. The
8 backup systems for the 911 system that we
9 inherited when we came into office were beyond
10 inadequate. The EMD system for dispatching
11 ambulances, which by the way is the most used
12 system in terms of emergency response, 1.2 million
13 responses a year compared to 500,000 fire
14 responses had no backup. If it went down you had
15 to. They basically had a training room and the
16 system would have been overwhelmed immediately and
17 we got lucky that that didn't happen. now we have
18 a backup system because they left the old - - in
19 place, EMD is in place on PSAC 1. We have fire
20 backup capacity at the two COs all while we wait
21 for the full backup redundancy capacity of PSAC 2,
22 which is ten stories out of the ground up in the
23 Bronx, and we are not only going to use it as
24 backup, we are actually going to co-balance the
25

1
2 loads. Half the calls will be taken at PSAC 1,
3 half the calls will be taken at PSAC 2, and if
4 anything happens you will be able to switch to one
5 or the other, and so we have more redundancy now
6 than we ever did, and we will have complete
7 redundancy in a couple of years when this is
8 finished. Now I am going to get to unified call
9 taking. In addition to the technology that I just
10 talked about we also did process changes because
11 part of the reason that we undertook ECTP was to
12 reduce response times. So unified call taking
13 went into effect in approximately 2008. Before
14 unified call taking and these times are all taken
15 from the mayor's management report, okay? NYPD
16 call taker picks up the call, asks information
17 about the emergency. The average time that they
18 would be on that call was between 125 and 135
19 seconds, and we know that. 2007 between 125 and
20 135 seconds. 2008, 125 and 135 seconds. They
21 would conference in an FDNY call taker and then
22 the call taker would ask some of the same
23 questions--

24 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]

25 I am sorry, Deputy Mayor. Can you repeat that?

1
2 When the call came in, how long did it take for
3 NYPD to process?

4 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: About 120
5 seconds. I will show you more. I am going to do
6 the whole response time breakdown in a second.
7 The FDNY call taker would then be conferenced in
8 and then resources would be dispatched by the
9 FDNY. We wanted to shorten that so we did two
10 things. First we did what is called pre-release.
11 NYPD call taker takes down the basic information
12 conferences in the FDNY call take because that
13 information was sufficient to make a dispatch of
14 resources. The FDNY call taker would hit a button
15 on their side, dispatch the resources and then
16 continue to talk to the caller and get additional
17 information and between 2007 and 2008 when we made
18 that change we saw about an eight second drop in
19 response time. We then took that what is called
20 pre-release, the dispatching of resources and
21 moved it into the blue so that the NYPD call taker
22 who takes that additional information takes the
23 initial information is able to release those
24 resources. Now additionally when we made this
25 change we had the NYPD call taker take the

1
2 information and dispatch the resources and based
3 on feedback from the field, we decided to
4 reintroduce into the process conferencing in a
5 call taker after the resources have been
6 dispatched and we are still doing that, so unified
7 call taking is the 911 call taker, the NYPD call
8 taker takes the basic information, hits a button,
9 sends it to FDNY dispatch so the resources are
10 rolling to the fire and then they are conferencing
11 in a fire call taker to take addition information
12 and sometimes adjustments are made as the
13 resources are rolling. As a result, we have seen
14 a drop in response time from 4:29 to 4:05 to 4:01
15 in fiscal year 2012 based on mayor's management
16 report numbers. Now mayor's management report
17 numbers have serious limitations in terms of the
18 amount of response time that they measure.

19 Because this is all part of the Windborn report, I
20 am going to just give a little bit of background
21 before I go into the whole response time. In 2011
22 shortly after the snowstorm, the mayor brought in
23 and did an independent review of the 911 call
24 taking process. This was not fundamentally about
25 technology. It was about business process, and

1
2 that is what unified call taking is who in the
3 room asks what and does what to get resources to
4 an emergency. That report came out last May. I
5 kicked off a review of that with all of the
6 agencies that are here. We broke into four
7 working groups, performance and metrics, call
8 process protocols, data and technology, training
9 and quality assurance. This is going to sound
10 like it isn't true, but it happens to be. October
11 29th, the day of Hurricane Sandy happened to be the
12 day that we were going to be in Gracie Mansion
13 reviewing the final recommendations so that we
14 could release this report. Of course, the storm
15 hit, and we decided to incorporate in the review
16 making sure that if we had to do anything with our
17 big event protocols that we would put it in that
18 plus all of the response has delayed putting out
19 the report, but what I am going to show you in
20 terms of the response time calculations that we
21 are going to put in place is what we have been
22 working on for months because that is what it
23 takes. So what were the primary recommendations?
24 In terms of looking at it we want to make sure
25 that first responders get to emergency calls as

1 quickly as possible and second that we deploy the
2 appropriate first responders to the locations.
3
4 There will be 20 recommendations overall, but here
5 are the key ones, number one recommendation is to
6 develop the means to report end to end response
7 time--I am going to explain that in a minute--
8 standardize the GO files for locations that are
9 used in our IT systems, refine call taker
10 questioning by the 911 call taker to reduce
11 unnecessary steps as much as possible, standardize
12 flip cards so that the transaction is the same for
13 every call--obviously with medical triage you have
14 much more detailed protocols, public awareness,
15 unified protocols and then some training and
16 quality assurance, but the big one here is
17 response time, and so we are this summer within
18 the next six to eight weeks we will release the
19 first prototype of this that will go out, but I am
20 going to show it to you right now. Before
21 explaining what that is, I want to explain what
22 response time measures right now. Okay? This bar
23 shows the anatomy of a 911 call. It has basically
24 four segments, pick up time, call taking time--
25 that is the 911 call taker figuring out what the

1
2 incident is, is it a fire, is it a heart attack,
3 is it a person on the street who slipped and fell,
4 then there is dispatching time once the
5 information is taken and it is shipped the agency
6 that is going to do the response, Fire, Police,
7 EMS or some combination of the three, and the
8 dispatch decides which companies or resources from
9 the agency are going to go. They send them to the
10 fire company, the precinct, all the different
11 resources that are out for these agencies. That
12 is travel time, so there are nine segments here
13 and four components. That is the anatomy of a 911
14 call. Now how long does all of that take? This
15 is what end to end response time is. The MMR just
16 to give you the latest July 2012 preliminary
17 mayor's management report reports this. NYPD
18 critical crimes in progress 4 minutes and 42
19 seconds, FDNY structural fires 4:08--by the way
20 that includes Sandy. We saw a slight uptick
21 there. EMS life threatening medical emergencies,
22 6 minutes and 31 seconds. Now that response time
23 does not include and never included the pickup
24 time or the call taking time not just for 911
25 callers, but for a portion of FDNY call taking and

1
2 emergency medical dispatch call taking, and what
3 the mayor's management response time measures the
4 time that it takes to get to an incident from the
5 time that the incident creation is created in the
6 computerated dispatch system, so it would have
7 been in the Sprint system, in the Star Fire system
8 or in the EMD CAD system, all three. So these
9 times only included the measurement of the
10 response from the moment the incident was created
11 to the time the units arrive on scene. Now we in
12 looking at this and the Windborn report was
13 helpful in looking at this. We knew we were not--
14 the Police Department would measure internally and
15 so would the Fire Department some of these
16 processing times but it was not being reported.
17 Now in the case of the mayor's management report
18 has always said what it measures and we have
19 always said that we did not measure or include in
20 response times the 911 call taking time, but part
21 of that was technology limitation. The Sprint
22 system you could not get a time stamp out of it
23 and remember, it has been online since 1969 for
24 when the call was picked up. the same is true of
25 the call taker for the EMD CAD system and the same

1
2 is true for the FDNY system. the time stamp under
3 the old methodology or the current methodology
4 that we are going to change, and I will explain in
5 a minute, was based on the fact that when a call
6 taker when it is fire 'cause fire creates the
7 incidents for fires after it is shipped over or
8 EMD, not just 911 call takers, once the hit the
9 button to the dispatch that creates the incident,
10 that is when the clock starts and that is what has
11 been reported in the MMR since 1977. Now how do
12 we change that? Well, first of all the new VESTA
13 system allows you to do a time stamp when the 911
14 call taker picks it up. it also allows time
15 stamps for each of the FDNY and EMD CAD and that
16 is because of the Police Department ICAD that we
17 just put in. What do I mean by that? Here. ICAD
18 the ICAD system takes in all of the incidents and
19 is shipped to each of these three agencies, so the
20 start time for all three, Fire, Police, EMS is in
21 the ICAD system, and it was only when that system
22 was brought online three weeks ago that we could
23 reliably collect the data to do this, but we have
24 been working on it with test data since last July.
25 We took data from the system because there are 71

1
2 different data elements that need to be combined
3 to string all of these time segments together, so
4 what do we have now for end to end response time?
5 Because of the work of the mayor's chief analytics
6 officer Mike Flowers who is there on his team and
7 this is really more computer programming than it
8 is emergency response, we have been able to put
9 together all of those 71 data elements for 911
10 calls and we will be able to report and we are
11 still--the reason we are not releasing the whole
12 thing today is because the ICAD system we are
13 still working out making sure that we have the
14 automated lengths to get all of these segments,
15 but here are the nine steps. We can now measure
16 the pickup time, how long does it take from the
17 time I dial the number to Verizon for NYPD to pick
18 up, the call taking time, this is the time that
19 the 911 call taker is on the phone. The
20 dispatching time, this includes EMD call taker
21 time, not just--and I will show you that in a
22 minute, but this is for NYPD, so this is just an
23 NYPD call, which goes right from the call taker to
24 NYPD dispatch, so now we can measure all four
25 segments of the call. Before what this red line

1 shows is these were the two segments in the MMR,
2 these are the two segments that we were measuring
3 for response time. If you look at FDNY--now
4 because of unified call taking, you would have
5 seen also a segment in here that would have been
6 an FDNY call taker. That is eliminated because
7 what we care about is the resources getting to the
8 emergency, so it goes right from NYPD to the FDNY
9 dispatch and so you will see these are the two
10 elements that were measured in the MMR now we see
11 the FDNY call processing time. Let's just talk
12 about EMD for a minute. EMD is a little more
13 complicated. First of all note the red line is in
14 the same place. It is only when the EMD
15 dispatcher has a call that in the MMR response
16 time was measured, and that is all we could
17 measure. The EMD CAD system could not time stamp
18 this period of time when the EMS call taker is
19 doing medical triage, which is a very important
20 part of the call because you want to figure out
21 and be talking to the patient, one of the
22 resources that they need, but now thanks to the
23 new system which enables us to timestamp all of
24 these segments and thanks to our data analytics
25

1 team that can put them all together because as I
2 said, it is seven separate systems really that you
3 are tying together. We can measure pick up time,
4 call taking time. Then it goes to an EMS queue
5 and that is ring time, and just so that you can
6 keep in mind, a phone ring takes about six
7 seconds, so generally speaking six seconds, one
8 ring, six seconds, two ring, and the average ring
9 time prior to the new system for fires for example
10 was three rings. And then of course there is the
11 conference call of triaging and then dispatch and
12 they arrive at the site. Then there is the relay.
13 What is the relay? Well, once the 911 call taker
14 knows that an ambulance is needed, they will dial
15 for an EMD call taker. If the EMD call takers are
16 busy after six rings--and this has been in place
17 for 20 years--the call will go to the relay and
18 EMD has somebody sitting watching the relay and
19 will see the incidents come up and they will be
20 categorized in terms of their level of urgency,
21 and if it is a life threatening medical emergency
22 then resources will be dispatched even though
23 somebody didn't pick up the phone and then they
24 will do the triage and then it is still at the
25

1
2 dispatch point under the MMR that the time was
3 measured, so I just want to show that because that
4 term relay has been in the news. So how do these
5 compare? Your slides are a little out of order,
6 so I apologize for that, but for the NYPD. MMR
7 response time critical crimes in progress and this
8 is from July to October 2012 we had 4:42, 4:08 for
9 structural fires and 6:31 for life threatening
10 medical emergencies end to end, 6:49, 5:01 for
11 structural fires, 9:20 for medical emergencies and
12 you can see the time differences. Now what is in
13 these two minutes? For the PD it is the call
14 taking time and then the dispatch queue because
15 depending on the urgency of the call, the NYPD
16 won't necessarily dispatch the resource right
17 away. For the 2:49 that also includes now the EMS
18 call taking time that I showed you right here. So
19 you are talking about all of the entirety of the
20 call. What this shows--so what does this all add
21 up to? Well, in terms of reporting end to end
22 response time, what we were reporting in the MMR
23 was really just three or four basic numbers--life
24 threatening emergencies, structural fires and the
25 critical crimes in progress. There are actually

1
2 12 different specific call types that come in and
3 the segments matter in terms of comparing apples
4 to apples because the FDNY and EMD will dispatch
5 resources to medical emergencies first like a
6 cardiac arrest, no matter what, sprained ankle
7 comes in and then another cardiac arrest comes in.
8 the cardiac arrest is getting the resources first,
9 same with critical crimes in progress, but what
10 you have been seeing in the MMR and this is also
11 due to the technology limitations was this blended
12 rate or only looking at the one segment. This is
13 a prototype of the report that we are going to be
14 putting out in six to eight weeks.

15 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Mr. Holloway,
16 we are almost at an hour. Are you ready to wrap
17 up?

18 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am close.
19 The critical crimes in progress this shows though
20 for each of these segments we can now measure from
21 the pickup time from the time the units arrive on
22 scene. Okay? And that really couldn't have been
23 done until about three weeks ago, and this is what
24 will we will be releasing. You have the sheet.
25 If you have questions about the individual ones, I

1
2 am sure we will talk about them. I can move
3 quickly to the end here. In addition to this the
4 CPR recommendations there are other ones here.
5 What we have done here is you can see all of the
6 different databases that have street map files and
7 so forth. They were going to the three different
8 agencies separately, they were going through this
9 together. As a result, the agencies were using
10 totally different databases with different
11 abbreviations. That impacts getting to the right
12 location at the right time. We are in the process
13 of now streamlining all of that. That was a
14 recommendation that came out of the CPR report.
15 Refinement of call taker questioning, there were
16 some things that were pointed out in the Windborn
17 report, the 911 call taker number, the EMS call
18 taker number requesting a call back number for a
19 cardiac emergency or other EMS that could take
20 time. All of those things have been changed, the
21 automatic greeting has been changed. We think we
22 have cut off about 15 seconds to the call taking
23 process. We have standardizes flip cards and
24 guide cards for each of the three different
25 services so that all of the transactions are the

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2 same, and that is also going to save time. We are
3 putting together a public awareness campaign for
4 so called short calls, the accidental dialing of
5 911. I am sure everyone here has had experience
6 with that. I am going to get to the bills in a
7 second, but I want to point out one thing about
8 this. What this enables us to do, this new end to
9 end response time, is basically go to each segment
10 of the call and try to improve the time or reduce
11 the time in each segment so things like moving the
12 911 call taker number to the back and dispatching
13 the resources before that shrinks the blue bar.
14 Positioning resources differently shrinks the
15 green bar. The standardization of flip cards and
16 guide cards can shrink the red bar, and for all of
17 these things, this is going to enable us at a much
18 higher level of granularity and with all different
19 manner of ways of doing it to reduce response
20 times. Now in terms of the bills, I can be brief.
21 The first bill, which would require call
22 processing time and response times we agree that
23 it should be measured. We have the capability to
24 do it. It is not just the 911 call taker. It is
25 the EMD call taker, and it used to be the fire

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2 call taker before pre-decision dispatch. Now the
3 resources are dispatched so that time we measure
4 it, but it is not as relevant at getting the units
5 to the scene, but we don't think it is necessary
6 to legislate it. We can do it. We are going to
7 do it. We have the technology. The other two
8 bills measuring to the patient time and water on
9 the fire time, from our perspective they don't
10 meaningfully add to what you can consistently
11 measure with response time. Water on the fire is
12 not--that is really more of a--it is not an
13 element of--it is only one of dozens of elements
14 of what happens when you get to a fire. You may
15 assess the situation and decide that water is not
16 appropriate right away. It may not be the first
17 priority, so it is a misleading number that we
18 think certainly shouldn't be legislation and will
19 not improve the public's understanding of how fast
20 resources are getting to a fire and to the patient
21 time, same thing. Wide variability in getting to
22 patients, especially because the city is so
23 vertical and it is just not a statistic that is
24 going to meaningfully add to people's
25 understanding of getting to these locations

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2 quickly, so we agree and have now spent a year
3 putting together the ability to measure end to end
4 response time, and we are going to be continuing
5 to implement the technology through the ECTP
6 project process and I can tell you that just in
7 terms of the overall response time, we have been
8 reporting response time the same way that it has
9 been reported since the 70s. we are now going to
10 change it. We did not have the capability of
11 doing that before, but we do now, and I think the
12 overhaul of this system and the reliability of it
13 which I have demonstrated not only when you look
14 at the paper slips, which we had 850 slips when we
15 went to the new system and we had 15,000 a year
16 under the old system, and so from our perspective
17 this is a success and we are going to continue to
18 implement these systems and changes across the
19 emergency branches. And with that, I am sure you
20 will have questions.

21 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
22 Deputy Mayor. If you could keep the bills up
23 there, I just want Council Members to be reminded
24 that we also have this oversight hearing on those
25 bills before we get in the depths of the 911

1 system. Thank you for your thorough testimony. I
2 will get into the questions, and I know a lot of
3 my colleagues have many questions. First, Deputy
4 Mayor, are you going to be sitting down? Earlier
5 in your written testimony, you criticize unions
6 saying that they are making a lot of noise or you
7 know, I am not exactly saying what your words were
8 verbatim, but you were saying that the 911
9 response time is quicker than ever before, and
10 that is why fire fatalities are at an all-time
11 low, and then you know, you say one thing, the
12 union says another thing, but after the snowstorm
13 the city commissioned an independent report, which
14 you referred to - - the CPR or the 911 report or
15 the Windborn report, but the fact of the matter
16 was that was an independent report, a report that
17 you only released to the union last week after
18 four different court dates and four different
19 decisions by judges ordering you to release the
20 complete study. My questions are in regards to
21 what the study said, and I will just read a little
22 of it, and I would like for you to answer
23 questions in regard to that. It said the NYPD,
24 FDNY together did not successfully employ critical
25

1 prerequisites in their effort to initiate the
2 unified call taking system in New York City, which
3 led to a multitude of problems causing the UCT
4 project to fail. Your independent study said UCT
5 was a failure. You knew that and were still
6 using UCT. It also said the process was
7 dangerous, and the consultant recommended that the
8 UCT initiative be discontinued as soon as
9 possible, yet we still continue to use it and
10 unfortunately on June 4th when that emergency call
11 came into 911 the computer may have glitched, may
12 not have, but at no point during that call was an
13 EMD, an emergency medical dispatcher, conferenced
14 in, so the caller reporting the emergency didn't
15 know if they ever spoke to an emergency medical
16 dispatcher, and when the call ended, no ambulance
17 was sent out for at least four minutes. Now my
18 question is why are we continuing to use the
19 unified call taking system? Today you agreed to
20 let the Council and the city of New York truly
21 know what the processing time is; however, you are
22 still using computer aided dispatch before you
23 conference in the medical dispatchers or the fire
24 dispatchers. If case after case tells you it
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2 doesn't work and your own independent study calls
3 it a failure, says it is dangerous and we
4 shouldn't use it, why are we still using the
5 unified call taking system?

6 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Okay. I am
7 going to get up just because I want to be able to
8 show you a couple of things. first of all,
9 unified call taking, the report and I am happy to
10 go over the version that was released and what you
11 are referring to with the unions, were drafts and
12 they have them, so that is fine, but the report
13 did not say to stop unified call taking. The
14 report actually says that unified call taking did
15 have some issues on implementation. Those issues
16 should be addressed and unified call taking should
17 continue to be pursued, and in fact, because it is
18 a best practice in the country, and in fact, when
19 I explained this--here is the slide--I said when
20 we put this in place initially, we had 911 call
21 takers enter the information as they had before,
22 and then do the pre-release of resources, which is
23 having the 911 call taker make the decision to
24 send it to dispatch, and I said that there were
25 some--

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CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
- - clarification, point for clarification. Did
at any time--now we understand and New Yorkers
don't really understand because the briefing of
the finished report came out about a year after
the initial report was commenced or the
investigation began. It came out maybe a year and
a half after the snow storm. It came out last
May, but there were drafts beforehand, and those
were the drafts that the union got ahold of last
week. So is it true that in those drafts it said
to stop using, to discontinue using the UCT as
soon as possible? It's a yes or no question. You
saw the drafts.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: All I can
tell you is that the report, which is released and
I would appreciate it if you let me finish. When
we initially implemented this, the NYPD call taker
dispatched the resources and we didn't have the
FDNY call taker as part of the process. We did
have some instances as the report noted where
things were dispatched to the wrong location and
so forth. As a result of that, and in part due to
the report, we modified the UCT process that the

1
2 911 call taker still dispatches the resources and
3 we conference in the FDNY call taker and they
4 continue to talk to the call taker and make slight
5 adjustments and also start to do medical triage--

6 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
7 100 percent of the time?

8 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: --with the
9 caller. I am sorry?

10 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Does that
11 happen 100 percent of the time?

12 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes.

13 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: The majority
14 of the time.

15 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Always.

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: It didn't
17 happen on June 4th.

18 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am going
19 to get to June 4th in a minute. Okay? That is
20 UCT. Now June 4th--

21 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
22 According to many dispatchers and people on the
23 front line, our emergency responders, they are
24 saying it often doesn't happen that the
25 dispatchers are not conferenced in and that the

1
2 call takers, the NYPD call takers are dispatching
3 without the conferencing.

4 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: There is
5 evidence. No one has complained of that
6 internally. There is no evidence of that. If
7 they are telling that to you, then I want to know
8 about it.

9 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: There is
10 evidence from June 4th.

11 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No,
12 actually.

13 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: No? No
14 emergency medical dispatcher was put on that call.

15 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Sorry. Let
16 me just get to the end here. Okay. we have done
17 the technology analysis of this call, and it has
18 nothing to do with unified call taking, and I want
19 to say at the outset that this investigation is
20 still underway, and interviews are being
21 conducted, and I am not going to speak to that,
22 but the FDNY has concluded the following based on
23 the records of the timestamps in the system: we
24 took the call, we recreated the call in the
25 system, and this is what it shows. First of all,

1
2 this call did not come in through the 911 switch.
3 It was not a caller.

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
5 Was a 911 operator on the call?

6 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No. No. A
7 police officer in the field--and if you recall at
8 the beginning I showed--I am not going to go all
9 the way back to the beginning. There. I showed
10 that there are some calls not many segment one
11 calls, most of the big emergencies come in like
12 this and go to the 911 call taker. Some calls
13 come in from the field. Those calls do not go to
14 the 911 call taker. They go right to the NYPD
15 dispatcher. That is what happened in this case.
16 Do you mind if I just finish? I want to make sure
17 that I at least get it out, and then we can ask
18 questions. The timestamp shows and we have
19 recreated this, that the radio--when this happens
20 and it goes to the dispatcher, not the 911 call
21 taker, it is all happening over the radio, so the
22 police officer is in the field, he calls a call
23 in, and it could be any call from the field, so it
24 doesn't have the be this case, but I am going to
25 use this case because you asked about it. That

1 transaction during which time the dispatcher, not
2 the 911 call taker, is on the radio and the
3 entering into the ICAD system this incident and
4 then sending it to EMS took 32 seconds. Now
5 because this came in to the dispatcher there is no
6 conferencing. It goes right to the relay. When
7 it comes in from the field, it goes right to the
8 relay because the dispatcher is past the part in
9 the process where they actually have the caller on
10 the phone and part of that reason is there is no
11 called. It is a police officer. The timestamps
12 show, and we have recreated it, that after 32
13 seconds, this incident was on the relay screen.
14 Now when a call is on the relay screen there is
15 someone assigned in EMS to look at the relay and
16 assign those calls, and I explained that. They
17 make decisions based on what the severity of the
18 call is, and then EMS will pick up and create the
19 incident and dispatch the resources. Here from--
20 you have read reports in the paper, there was one
21 operator there. They were logged out, new
22 operator logs in, within five seconds they send it
23 and an incident is created immediately. This is
24 what the time stamps show. Resources are
25

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2 dispatched and they travel to the incident. The
3 one conclusion that we have reached in this
4 investigation as far as the technology is
5 concerned is that the ICAD system sent the
6 incident as the technology is designed to do.
7 Part of the investigation that we don't know is
8 this time longer than it should have been, and if
9 so, why? We are conducting a full investigation.
10 Interviews are being conducted. Sal Cassano is
11 going to issue a full report, but this had nothing
12 to do with unified call taking, and in fact, a 911
13 caller had nothing to do with the call. I just
14 want to get back to--these are the most urgent
15 kind of incidents, and so we are investigating
16 this fully, and I commit to you that you will have
17 our full report and we are going to do everything
18 to get to the bottom of this. Depending on what
19 happened here if we need to make changes in our
20 process, we will, but I can't speak to that right
21 now.

22 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: So on that
23 particular day, no EMD, emergency medical
24 dispatcher was conferenced in, which--no one was
25 conferenced in. that is what you said in your

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testimony.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: The conference doesn't happen. in 32 seconds, the call went to the relay, and--

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: - - there a problem when there is an emergency responder, a police officer at the scene where a child is hit by a car, don't they need to talk to a medical dispatcher? Aren't they trained as EMTs and can't they help the situation? Doesn't it make sense to conference in the medical dispatcher as soon as possible when a call like that comes in?

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Because this is a radio to radio call, it has been deemed the quickest way to get the resources out are to send it to the relay, put it down as a segment one call, which it was indicated as and send out the resources.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: The resources weren't sent out for at least four minutes.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I understand that, but that is what we are investigating.

[crosstalk]

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2 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Council
3 Member, let me just point out something here.
4 Okay. This is the most recent report. I have the
5 EMS relay, life threatening medical, that is on
6 the relay where a conference call is not made, and
7 I have EMS, life threatening medical, here is the
8 red bar, this is where the call is made. The
9 relay calls are faster. The relay call response
10 is faster by 30 seconds, so the relay, it is not a
11 question of conferencing in the EMS caller. It
12 say on the relay for a period of time.

13 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: If something
14 sits on the relay from what has been reported and
15 what I have learned for three minutes, it gets
16 highlighted in white, it goes up on everybody's
17 screen. The call did not get answered.

18 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: That
19 happens.

20 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Did that
21 happen that day?

22 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes.

23 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: It happened
24 that day.

25 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes.

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2 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Why did it
3 take another minute longer?

4 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:
5 Commissioner Cassano is interviewing everybody
6 involved in the incident. We don't know. I don't
7 know. I can't tell you.

8 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: You know for
9 sure that that was highlighted and there was
10 upwards of 30 or more emergency medical
11 technicians and supervisors in that room and
12 nobody saw that, and as reported in newspapers,
13 all of them say they did not see it, and it was a
14 glitch in your new ICAD system.

15 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Listen, I
16 have showed you--

17 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
18 But can you say for a matter of fact that it went
19 up and it was highlighted?

20 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I can say
21 for a fact that there were many people that were
22 in EMS that day, and there are interviews that are
23 being conducted, and the short answer to your
24 question about did they see it or not, I don't
25 know. That is what we are asking them, but the

1 first question is did the technology work? Yes.
2 Did the ICAD system have anything to do with it?
3 No.
4

5 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: You don't
6 know that.

7 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes, I do.

8 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: You just said
9 you don't know that.

10 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No, I do
11 because I know that the call went--the technology
12 is separate from what the people who do with the
13 information.

14 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: The
15 information wasn't displayed.

16 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am not
17 sure how--

18 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
19 You are not sure that the information was
20 displayed. Correct?

21 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am
22 because we recreated the call.

23 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: But countless
24 emergency workers in that command center told
25 people of the public, the press, that they didn't

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see anything.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: They are not countless, and I can't account for what is in the press. I can tell you that a lot of it is not true.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: City was quick to criticize an emergency call taker.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: There was no criticism.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Without a thorough investigation.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: The investigation is under way. The technology works.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: The city was quick to criticize an emergency medical dispatcher without a thorough investigation.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Well, we were able to put together the basics of these time stamps.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: At no time did that police office talk to an EMT on the phone. That police officer was under the impression an ambulance was on its way. An ambulance was not on its way. You relied too much

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on technology that day.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: You know what? We are talking about apples and oranges here. All I can tell you is we have an investigation that is underway. The technology worked. We have to find out what--and it's not countless. There are two dozen people that have to be interviewed, and we are going to do that, and the results of the investigation are going to be released. Those are the facts.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Well, similar to what happened that day and happens according to the Windborn report, at least 15 percent of the time medical dispatchers or fire dispatchers are not conferenced in. these calls are sent out and that through the unified call taking system information is lost, emergency responders are sent to the wrong address and critical time is wasted during life emergency events.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: The data shows that the responses are faster. FDNY call takers are conferenced in in every case.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: The data doesn't show that. Not the data you showed us

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today.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: The time stamps show--yes, they do--that we dispatch the resources. The 911 call taker dispatches the resources. That is the unified call taking event, and conferences in the FDNY call taker to continue talking to the caller. That has improved response.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Prior to UCT, somebody witnessing an emergency situation calls up 911 and the first question the police operator asks is what is your emergency and what borough is it in, said earlier by my colleague, Peter Vallone.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am sorry?

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: And then the call goes over the fire or medical dispatcher and then the clock begins. Before it couldn't have been much more than five seconds. Today you are saying to the Council Committees here that often it is 53 second for structural fires, two and a half minutes for life threatening medical emergencies.

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Okay, this

1
2 five seconds, which is a quote from a news
3 article--

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I don't know.
5 How long does it take to say what is your
6 emergency and what borough is it in?

7 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: First pre-
8 release and unified call taking the NYPD call
9 taker takes the call. This is measured. They
10 conference in the call taker. At this point the
11 resources still have not been dispatched. The
12 average ring time because they actually hit a
13 speed dial number was three rings, a single ring
14 is six seconds, so by definition, it is not five
15 seconds--

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
17 Going forward, the new process--your new response
18 time calculating process will calculate the time
19 the phone rings?

20 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I'm sorry?

21 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Will you
22 calculate the time the phone rings when you are
23 calculating your new response times? 'cause you
24 bring that up.

25 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Well, you

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don't count the ring time at all because this operator is dispatching the resources.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: That was just a distraction when you said ring time?

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: You say before UCT.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Before UCT once the operator picks up the phone, what is your emergency, what borough is it in?

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Before UCT, the time of this call is basically stayed in the same area of about 125 to 135 seconds.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Can you prove that?

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes. That was before UCT and after UCT. Once you--

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing] I find that hard to believe because once the call takers are taking so much more information, so how could it be less time or the same amount of time?

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: They are not taking considerably more information--

[crosstalk]

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: They are

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2 taking enough information and dispatching the
3 resources--

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
5 I just want you to be honest today. If a police
6 operator is asking more questions than before on
7 average any given call is going to take longer.
8 More questions take a longer amount of processing
9 time.

10 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Within five
11 to six seconds, this amount of time has been the
12 same before and after unified call taking. What
13 has been eliminated are the three rings plus the
14 beginning of a conversation with the call taker
15 before resources are dispatched. That is the
16 fact, and the time stamps show it.

17 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Since we
18 started questioning, Council Member Ulrich,
19 Council Member Mendez, Council Member Gentile,
20 Council Member Rodriguez, Council Member Gennaro
21 have all attended the hearing and Council Member
22 Greenfield and Council Member Garodnick. I am
23 sure my colleagues will ask more questions about
24 the UCT. I hope that we can work this out. We
25 are going to have more time for questions later,

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2 and I'll ask probably more questions about it
3 because I still think that you are not doing what
4 needs to be done to fix the problem. I want to
5 get into questions about the overall ECTP project
6 before I let some of my colleagues answer
7 questions. Can you tell us why we are here today
8 nearly ten years after the mayor embarked on this
9 project and the project is still not reliable, is
10 it not complete and it's over a billion dollars
11 over budget? So years behind schedule and over a
12 billion dollars over budget.

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: First of
14 all, yes, I can answer those questions. The new
15 systems that have been implemented as I showed and
16 as our performance data shows, and I will give you
17 reams of it for every day if you want, the system
18 is more reliable than the old system. the slips
19 that we would go to every other week for NYPD are
20 basically going to be eliminated as are the slips
21 once we implement the processes for ICAD. Now the
22 delay, the project was started in 2004. It is
23 initially the--I'll talk about the budget in a
24 second. In terms of the technology, which I think
25 I explained two or three times during my

1
2 presentation initially NYPD was supposed to go
3 online with the new VESTA system that is the basis
4 for this--

5 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
6 While you explain this if you could tell us how
7 many of the calls that come into 911 you know--I
8 imagine every call that goes to EMS or fire is an
9 emergency where every second counts, but there are
10 calls that go into 911, people get into fender
11 benders, they call 911, how many of the police
12 calls are actually emergency where every second
13 counts? Crime - - pursuit. You seem to have
14 built this system based on an NYPD model.

15 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I don't
16 understand what that means. I don't understand
17 what that means.

18 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: In the city
19 there are two major agencies that respond to
20 emergencies. There is the NYPD, the Police
21 Department and then there is the Fire Department,
22 which includes fire suppression units and the
23 emergency medical technicians. So usually, when
24 there is a fire or a medical emergency every
25 second counts. Sometimes when people call 911 if

1
2 not critical time situation where somebody may be-
3 -that one second or that 20 seconds or that minute
4 longer, their life may now depend upon it, so what
5 I'm getting at the heart of is here you have a
6 system that falls under NYPD. They got the new
7 CAD system. You are saying in a few years you
8 will have fire and EMS CAD system, but someone
9 they are going to work with Sprint or Star Fire or
10 the other system that the EMS operators use. It
11 seems like those emergency services, which every
12 second counts were thought of after the NYPD.

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am not
14 sure how you draw that conclusion from what I said
15 at all, but I will try to explain it one more
16 time. Every call--you are asking me six questions
17 at a time. Can I answer? Every call that comes
18 in goes to a 911 call taker. Yes, it is true.
19 They are employees of the city of New York through
20 the New York City Police Department. There are
21 1,000 of them. The pickup time for a 911 call on
22 average is under 30 seconds for your average 911
23 call. They get picked up very fast. It is
24 entered into the CAD system regardless of what it
25 is, and it is dispatched to the appropriate

1
2 agency, and so if it is a heart attack or if it is
3 a structural fire it goes right to the dispatcher
4 for the agency that is supposed to respond to it
5 so they can focus on their core competency. So
6 when you said it is focused on NYPD, that just
7 doesn't make any sense. It is not how the system
8 works at all.

9 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Deputy Mayor,
10 can you just--this is the last question before I
11 let some of my colleagues ask questions, I would
12 like to know what you think of the audit that the
13 comptroller has done on what I believe was the HP
14 contract which was before you had Intergraph,
15 which was one of the first contracts to fix this
16 911 system? I believe he has notified the
17 Manhattan District Attorney and the Manhattan
18 District Attorney is investigating the contracts
19 that the city was overbilled by upwards of 163
20 million dollars. Can you speak to that please?

21 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes.
22 Number one, I am not aware of any investigation by
23 the Manhattan District Attorney. Number two, that
24 audit which I believe there is a letter over my
25 signature responding to it. It was shall we say

1
2 grossly overstated the billing issues with that
3 system, and had nothing to do with Intergraph. HP
4 came in as the systems integrator. They actually
5 delivered what they were paid to deliver, which is
6 the integration of the new VESTA system and new
7 PSAC, which has taken 15 and a half million calls.
8 After the audit came in, we did an independent
9 review. We hired an independent accountant, KPMG,
10 one of the big four, to look at the billing and in
11 2010 we created the Mayor's Office of Emergency
12 Communications to institute more oversight over
13 the whole project generally--

14 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
15 I am glad you did that, but how much was HP
16 originally contracted to build the VESTA system?

17 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: They came
18 in 45 million dollars under budget.

19 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: They did?

20 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes.

21 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: And then why
22 did you need Intergraph to finish off what they
23 started?

24 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: They were
25 two different systems. Like I said, there are

1
2 seven different systems. HP was actually doing
3 systems integrator work among what the VESTA
4 system, which Verizon was building and making sure
5 that it was properly integrated with the Sprint
6 system, which is the Police Department system, the
7 Fire Department's Star Fire system and the EMS
8 CAD. That is what an integrator does. It had
9 nothing to do with ICAD. We always had to have a
10 separate company come in and do ICAD.

11 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: So you
12 disagree with the comptroller's report?

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: In the
14 main, yes.

15 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Council
16 Member Peter Vallone for questions.

17 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Thank you. I
18 will try to be brief. I am going to start where
19 Council Member Crowley left off. As I stated in
20 my opening the city was going to say that they
21 have never included the pickup time and the call
22 taking time in their figures, and that is true,
23 but let me add my voice to Council Member
24 Crowley's and say that it is very, very difficult
25 to believe that under the old system, which was

1
2 designed basically to say what is your borough and
3 what is your emergency and the new system, which
4 was designed to transmit an entire package of
5 information by pressing a button to the Fire
6 Department, which was designed to have address,
7 call back number, the name of the person, all of
8 this information that the old system wasn't
9 designed to do to take, to say that those--

10 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:

11 [interposing] That is not true.

12 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Explain to me
13 why that is not true.

14 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: That is not
15 true. I have actually tried to explain this.
16 When the call comes into the system whether it was
17 a fire or an ambulance care or an NYPD case, the
18 average processing time in the blue box has been
19 for the last six years and before UCT, after UCT
20 between 125 and 135 seconds, and that is because
21 the 911 call taker takes the location and always
22 has--

23 [crosstalk]

24 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: They did
25 for fire before UCT as well. This time has not

1
2 significantly increased or decreased. In fact we
3 decreased it more now because we cut 15 seconds
4 out by changing the order of the questions. There
5 is an assertion that has been made that under the
6 old system, this was a five second transaction. A
7 phone ring takes six seconds. That is just not
8 true. It is not based on any facts. I have spent
9 the last hour and 40 minutes walking through
10 methodically exactly how the system works. I have
11 shown you timestamps based on millions of calls,
12 and so for you to just say that it is hard to
13 believe, I don't know what that means. I am
14 trying to give you the data that you need to
15 explain how the system works.

16 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Let me say
17 again it is hard for me to believe that the old
18 system and the new system are exactly the same
19 amount of time within a few seconds of each other,
20 and by the way, this is not--

21 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:
22 [interposing] The new system is actually faster.

23 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: The new
24 system is faster. Well, we have spoken to many,
25 many people who take these calls who say the

1
2 opposite, and they don't say five seconds--maybe
3 if you are relying on a report someplace. Nobody
4 said five seconds. It takes just a little longer
5 than that just to get borough and emergency and
6 have the phone to ring.

7 [crosstalk]

8 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: That was
9 before UCT and after UCT. No change. I agree.
10 That is what I have been trying to explain.

11 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: You are the
12 only person in this room who feels that way.

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am saying
14 respectfully that feeling has nothing to do with
15 this. Facts, this is a highly technical system.
16 it is seven deferent systems. The data's
17 timestamps for millions of calls have been
18 analyzed to put together the response time
19 reporting and to understand exact what the
20 segments of this call is. Now the source of these
21 other claims which are based candidly on nothing
22 that is substantive other than the fact that
23 people who are afraid that they tie somehow fire
24 company closings to making the 911 system better
25 or I don't know what else, but I can tell you that

1
2 the certain unions in the call taking side of this
3 in the fire side have tried to stop and frustrate
4 every single aspect of this--

5 [crosstalk]

6 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: We could have
7 ended this argument if we just--

8 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:

9 [interposing] If you are going to credit them and
10 not all of this data, I can't help it.

11 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: We could have
12 ended this debate if we would have tracked
13 response times from the time somebody called it
14 in. we wouldn't have this debate. We wouldn't
15 have to rely on your analysis and numbers if we
16 just tracked the response times from when somebody
17 picked up the phone and called and said I needed
18 help. We wouldn't have this debate anymore. We
19 would know exactly ten years ago, five years ago
20 and today how long it took, but we don't.

21 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Council
22 Member, respectfully, again, I explained to you
23 that in 1969 the Sprint system went into effect.
24 It could not measure that time. It hasn't been
25 replaced since that time because the 911 system

1
2 has to continue to work while it is replaced and
3 you have to build the new technology to put it
4 into place. We only recently have the
5 technological capability to do this, and by the
6 way, what I just showed you in terms of the new
7 way that we are going to be able to calculate
8 these response times, we called 20 of the biggest
9 cities in the United States and we also did
10 anecdotal phone calls with law enforcement, no one
11 is doing this. No one is reporting to this level
12 of detail and I would submit that you will not
13 find anywhere a more rigorous analysis over a
14 longer period of time that is better grounded in
15 the facts, and so to say that someone who has an
16 ulterior motive says that it took five seconds and
17 have that be the basis for the 911 system not
18 working when I have 15 million calls, 345,000
19 responses and a lot of safe New Yorkers that say
20 otherwise, I don't understand.

21 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Now you want
22 us to believe that it was not possible to come up
23 with this system to track it accurately from the
24 time a phone call came in since 1969, but it is
25 possible just as we are all about to leave office.

1
2 Alright. We will take that as gospel too. I am
3 going to let--the unions will have a chance, and I
4 will move on. You have also claimed that the
5 system worked--the situation the tragic death of a
6 little girl, and you said that the evidence that
7 the city working is again, we have to take your
8 word for this, but you said that the backup--you
9 said that the system worked the way it was
10 supposed to, and that there was a blinking screen
11 on the 911 operator's desk, and that the backup to
12 that was at least 24 other screens were supposedly
13 blinking with this emergency call.

14 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: That is
15 correct, and we are interviewing. We are
16 conducting interviews and a full investigation
17 into that.

18 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Well, there
19 has already been a trial in the papers where an
20 operator was accused of getting up off of his or
21 her desk and allowing that to blink for however
22 long it blinked for, so for us to again believe
23 that scenario that the technology worked, we would
24 have to believe that the operator did that and
25 that 24 other operators failed to see a blinking

1
2 light on their screen. That is what we would have
3 to believe to listen to your assertion that the
4 system worked the way it should have.

5 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: First of
6 all, I am not asserting anything. An assertion is
7 something that is totally unsupported by fact.
8 Okay? There are two elements to this case and
9 every case by the way--the technology that
10 transmits the information and then what people do
11 with the information when they get it, and both of
12 those things are being investigated. The
13 investigation is not concluded; however, we have
14 concluded based on recreating this particular call
15 that the transmission of the information to the
16 places it was supposed to go happened. Now let's
17 talk about the trial in the papers. The only
18 thing that was said is that the officer got up,
19 and that was based on a signed statement, and now
20 the fire commissioner has reopened the
21 investigation, so I can't say what the final
22 conclusion will be of what happened in the room,
23 except I can tell you today that the data was
24 properly transmitted, but the papers, okay, so
25 here we have a prominent paper that has put a

1
2 screen shoot of an EMS call on its cover and said
3 that the 911 system is in chaos. We have looked
4 at each of these calls. We investigated each one
5 of them. All of them in each case, the data came
6 in through the 911 system or through the radio,
7 went over the system as was designed and was
8 responded to in the appropriate amount of time,
9 and there is one case where there is 27 minutes.
10 This shows the PD side, and then this down here
11 shows how long it takes for the EMS to get there,
12 and the reason for the 27 minutes is because that
13 involved a domestic dispute or an argument in a
14 house where the police arrived and they were
15 dealing with the situation and then after a
16 certain amount of the time one of the people in
17 the house said they wanted medical attention, so
18 they called the EMS. That happens all of the
19 time. This is an example of the system working
20 fine but the press based on assertions, no facts
21 has tried this system and you are crediting it,
22 and I am just not sure what else I can do but give
23 thousands of hours of analysis--

24 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: [interposing]

25 You have said many times that you were positive

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2 that there is no doubt in your mind that the
3 system works and for us to believe that we would
4 have to believe that the operator didn't see it
5 for whatever reason and that 24 other operators
6 didn't see it if the system worked. That is what
7 we would have to believe. I am a former
8 prosecutor.

9 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: We will
10 have to see what the investigation shows. I don't
11 know that they didn't see it.

12 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: The
13 investigation may very well show that the system
14 didn't work, but you have already asserted that it
15 absolutely worked.

16 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I said the
17 technology worked. We have done that part of the
18 analysis.

19 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Alight, well,
20 if the technology worked, there were 24 blinking
21 screens that were ignored, and by the way, it has
22 been 17 days. If you interviewed one person a
23 day, you would be almost done now, so I don't know
24 why we are having a hearing we don't know the
25 answers to these questions.

1
2 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I can't
3 answer that. The investigation is under way. We
4 have done many investigations and they take time.

5 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Okay.

6 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: And by the
7 way, we want to get it right because believe me, I
8 will be back here--

9 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: [interposing]
10 Yes, we all want that. We all want. Nobody more
11 than the people over here. You mentioned that
12 PSAC 2 is not finished and that is something I
13 have been talking about for years now. In fact
14 Ray Kelly must have testified about ten years that
15 that was his top priority. Now you showed a map
16 that showed all of the prior redundancy we had
17 before this new system, and the new system has
18 PSAC 1 and PSAC 2. PSAC 2 is supposed to be the
19 backup. It still doesn't exist. I saw some
20 pictures of it being built finally. When is it
21 going to exist and what is the backup right now?

22 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: When we
23 talk about redundancy first this is just from
24 March, and I was there three weeks ago, so this is
25 going up. this will be the load balanced, fully

1
2 redundant PSAC. The state of redundancy for the
3 911 system has actually dramatically improved over
4 the course of the ECTP project. When the project
5 was started in 2004, the Fire Department was
6 dispatching fire trucks within each borough from
7 each borough and did not have the ability to
8 dispatch incidents in other boroughs, the Police
9 Department--so they had essentially some small
10 back up capacity--no back up capacity for the
11 dispatch. For 911 call taking we had 11 Metrotech
12 on the third floor, they were on the first floor
13 and we had some backup capacity for 911 call
14 taking in One Police Plaza. Today we have PSAC 1,
15 we have additional backup capacity at One Police
16 Plaza that we billed out as part of ECTP, so we
17 have strong redundancy in addition to the fire
18 call takers and dispatch who are in PSAC 1 we
19 totally re-outfitted two of the old communications
20 offices so that they had the capability of--they
21 are handling calls live now because you don't want
22 to go from cold to hot. You want to just keep it
23 hot. That is what we are going to do with PSAC 1
24 and PSAC 2. They have the capacity to handle all
25 of the backup redundancy now and EMD was at One

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2 Metrotech, now is at 11 Metrotech, and when they
3 were at One Metrotech they had no backup. When we
4 came into office in 2004, they had no back up, so
5 if the system went down, we had a training room
6 where we could have basically one terminal. Now
7 we have backup. All of these are interim backups
8 because it takes years to build what is going to
9 be one of the most technologically sophisticated
10 public safety answering call centers in the world
11 when it is finished, and it will be finished we
12 expect to be able to have the building done in
13 2014 and be in the building by 2015.

14 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: It has been a
15 long long time we have been waiting for PSAC 2 and
16 I am glad you have all of those backups. That is
17 a great job, but what we are talking about is one
18 complete center where if that goes down everything
19 is gone. Under the old system if the Queens
20 command was down, the Queens command was down, and
21 everything else was still working--

22 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:
23 [interposing] But then Queens wouldn't get
24 response.

25 [crosstalk]

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2 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: There was
3 no backup for EMD, so let's just say for ambulance
4 calls, which is most of the calls, 1.2 million
5 calls a year, no back up. they were all in One
6 Metrotech period. Now there are two setups One
7 Metrotech and 11 Metrotech. There is back up.
8 there was not before. We did that. In the
9 boroughs, each borough had its own communications
10 office. They responded within the borough that
11 911 call, there was some capacity to dispatch in
12 other calls. This is how the system worked. 911
13 call taker tries to conference in a dispatcher
14 from the borough. If they get six rings and
15 nobody picks up, they hang up the phone, they dial
16 another CO, six more rings, dial another CO. Now
17 they are all co-located and two of the COs act as
18 full backup for dispatch, so we have backup
19 capacity now that is robust enough to get us into
20 the new system that will be on the new technology,
21 and that is a good thing, so the answer to your
22 question is we have a lot more redundancy now than
23 we did in 2004.

24 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: It is strange
25 that Ray Kelly would have said that that was his

1 top priority about ten years ago, but that's okay.
2 Let me end up with two quick questions. You said
3 the FDNY is still on Star Fire and the cut over
4 isn't until 2015. Star Fire is from the 80s as
5 you mentioned. Is that the source of the
6 information that we are getting that when
7 information is transmitted between different
8 agencies that the computer sometimes reads
9 addresses differently. Is it because the Fire
10 Department is still on Star Fire?
11

12 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: It's more
13 complicated than that. The GO files, which are
14 pulled from databases are he spaghetti plate
15 diagram just shows that these three responding
16 agencies when they were siloed before ECTP doing
17 their own responses, they also developed their own
18 conventions for addresses and buildings, called
19 them different things, put the renamings in,
20 sometimes the borough presidents rename stuff.
21 This shows all of the different sources of naming
22 of streets and properties in the city of New York.
23 I spent time trying what we have done with this
24 now is under the ECTP program and thanks in part
25 to the work that our chief data analytics officer

1
2 is doing, we are moving to this model. All of
3 this is going into what is called the citywide
4 street centerline database that is going to be the
5 database for all three agencies. We have also
6 standardized all of the GO files, and by the time
7 we are finished, we will have what is essentially
8 a totally clean and consistent data set that is
9 used by all three agencies and that is going to be
10 a great thing.

11 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Okay, so but
12 the question was now before we get to that
13 database that everyone uses what is the source of
14 the problems that we are hearing concerning
15 computers reading different addresses, and I think
16 everyone knows how I feel about renaming things,
17 so I agree with you on that, but we are getting
18 information that there is a computer problem
19 recognizing addresses.

20 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: What you
21 are hearing is this problem is that you would have
22 for example the borough president, topographical
23 index was going not only into the centerline
24 database, but also independently the NYPD, and so
25 the agencies were pulling inconsistently from

1
2 different data sources, and they also developed
3 their own independent naming conventions and so
4 yes, there was some significant issue with
5 everybody calling the same place the same thing.
6 It is surprisingly, and as a layperson I was
7 certainly surprised, but a surprisingly
8 complicated thing to standardize all of that
9 particularly when so many systems are pulling live
10 data from those sources, and so we are doing it.
11 Mike, do you want to break down what we are doing?

12 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: When will it
13 be done?

14 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: We are in
15 the process of doing it. Mike, do you know the
16 answer? You can come to the table.

17 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: You have to
18 identify yourself.

19 MIKE FLOWERS: Mike Flowers. Sir,
20 I am the chief analytics officer for the city of
21 New York. It is an ongoing process frankly. The
22 city is very dynamic. Its addresses are very
23 dynamic. Its buildings are very dynamic, so it is
24 like a constant upgrade. We believe that we will
25 be--already there are components of this in place.

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2 So I can't give you a finite time line, we feel
3 very confident that we will be in a position to
4 know everything we need to know about our location
5 conventions very shortly.

6 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Okay. Thank
7 you. The last thing, a question I want to follow
8 up on Council Member Crowley's questioning about
9 the Windborn report. I am reading from a draft.
10 I wish I knew when it was from, but it is a draft
11 on Windborn letterhead, and it says, it is our
12 recommendation that the UCT initiative be
13 discontinued as soon as possible and that the NYPD
14 and FDNY implement new 911 call taking and
15 dispatching businesses processes that will improve
16 communications center operations. Have you seen
17 that draft?

18 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am not
19 sure if I have seen that particular draft, but I
20 will tell you this. The final report does not
21 recommend the discontinuance of UCT, but it does
22 recommend adopting new businesses processes to
23 address the problems with UCT, which we did. We
24 now conference in after the resources are
25 dispatched, the fire call taker, and that has

1
2 worked well. That was a change in business
3 process as was recommended by Windborn, and that
4 has also resulted as you can see from here based
5 on our standard measurement dramatically reduced
6 response times.

7 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: So you are
8 conferencing in the dispatcher in the way we used
9 to before this whole system--

10 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:

11 [interposing] Before the resources were sent and
12 in fact, before UCT, NYPD call taker would ask
13 where and what is your emergency and put in the
14 information, call in the FDNY call taker and ask
15 the same information. You can listen to 911 calls
16 where the caller is clearly frustrated by this,
17 and they should be because it is a waste of time.
18 Now you get enough information here to get the
19 resources out of the fire company, you conference
20 in the subject matter expert, the FDNY call taker,
21 he doesn't ask these questions anymore because we
22 changed the business process as was recommended,
23 the resources are already rolling and slight
24 adjustments can be done in addition to medical
25 triage, so I would submit that the process we did

1
2 what was recommended. We fixed the process. UCT
3 is universally recognized nationally as the
4 standard best practice because it gets the
5 resources to the emergency the fastest, and we are
6 seeing the results of that.

7 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Okay. You
8 have said that a few times, and the last thing I
9 am going to say is you said you have not seen the
10 report.

11 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No, I said
12 I hadn't seen that draft.

13 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Draft, I am
14 sorry. Did the consultants ever inform you that
15 they wanted to end UCT?

16 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I worked
17 closely with the consultants, but the process--I
18 don't know when that draft is from. The process
19 started--I was in - - City for a while as DEP
20 Commissioner. I came back in 2011. The report
21 wasn't finished. We finished it. We took a lot
22 of the recommendations. We spent a year
23 developing a way to calculate end to end response
24 time, and we needed new technology to be in place
25 to do that, and you will see, there are 20

1
2 recommendations coming out of the Windborn report
3 in the - - . There is no recommendation that we
4 did not take either in full or in part and when a
5 consultant gives you a report, they are
6 recommendations. We take them very seriously. I
7 have personally accepted recommendations and made
8 recommendations and implemented them following
9 very serious incidents for the last seven years,
10 so I can tell you that we have spent hundreds and
11 hundreds of hours reviewing those recommendations,
12 getting together and investing tremendous
13 resources to develop these methodologies, fix the
14 guide parts, fix business processes, calculate the
15 savings and response time, and this is one of the
16 results.

17 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Obviously,
18 there is 1,000 follow ups I can ask to that, but I
19 do want to get to my colleagues. I do want to
20 point out that many of those recommendations came
21 from us years ago, like getting a fire dispatcher
22 back on the line, which we took from some of the
23 experts, and there is a draft that is at some
24 point was changed for reasons unknown at this
25 point that did call for eliminating the UCT.

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DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:

[interposing] I am sorry, Council Member, I do have to interrupt. I just noted and you should independently call Windborn after this, UCT is recognized nationally as the best practice nationwide. The report fundamentally recommended changing our business process so that we would improve response time and the accuracy of responses. We did that.

CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Okay. it

doesn't change what I said, and I should be specific--eliminate the recommendations UCT initiative be discontinued, not the entire UCT, but whatever initiative you were working on, and perhaps from the date that this you can convinced them that you made the changes that made it work. I don't know, but I would like to know down the road. Deputy Mayor, I want to--

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:

[interposing] We tried to talk about why there are drafts, but...

CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: I want to

give you a lot of credit because a lot of people don't know that you were before my committee

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2 yesterday discussing the rebuilding after
3 Hurricane Sandy, and you were just as
4 knowledgeable then as you are today of the facts,
5 and so many people would have said, I can't
6 testify two days in a row. I can't do this. - -
7 obviously, we didn't agree on everything
8 yesterday. We don't agree on everything today,
9 but it is very impressive that you are here with
10 this wealth of knowledge and with all of these
11 people. You could have tried to delay this again.
12 You did not. I just want to thank you for being
13 here and for having all of this information. We
14 don't agree on a lot of these things, but we are
15 going to continue to work with you. I have only
16 got a couple of months left. Some of the other
17 Council Members may have more, but it has been a
18 pleasure to work with you.

19 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Council
20 Member, thank you. The feeling is mutual. Let me
21 just say to you and Chairwoman Crowley and all the
22 members of the committee, I am more than happy to
23 sit down for as long as it takes to go through all
24 of the sources and the data and the way that we
25 are doing all of this to listen to specific

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2 issues, complaints, concerns, explain them, but
3 also look into them in depth and even though we
4 only have a few months, I have a few months as
5 well--I think 193 days, and I think you can tell
6 that the mayor's direction is we are going all the
7 way to the end and this is a critically important
8 thing. Maybe there is no more important thing
9 than getting this right.

10 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Thank you.
11 Council Member Cabrera?

12 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Thank you so
13 much and first, I want to give condolences to Ms.
14 Russo. I know what it is to make that 911 call.
15 When my son was four years old, and the scariest
16 moment of my life and the greatest relief of my
17 life is to see the Police Departments - - got
18 there first. You were talking about the facts. I
19 need a couple of more facts here, and I like to
20 talk about facts. Did anybody else make a call on
21 June the 4th using 911?

22 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I don't
23 know for certain whether someone also would have
24 made a 911 call into the system. if there was,
25 that will also be as part of the investigation.

2 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: I would think
3 that would be important to know. You know why,
4 right? I mean if we have somebody--I appreciate
5 your illustration, and to be honest with you, it
6 was very helpful to understand the process that
7 you - - . So the police officers made a call to
8 the dispatcher. I get it. My question is if
9 somebody had called 911 would the process--go
10 ahead. Please.

11 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am just
12 consulting with Chief Fitton [phonetic]. To my
13 knowledge, no, but there certainly was a lot of
14 communications about the incident once it was in
15 the system. I mean the first communication
16 clearly came from the field. I have shown you how
17 it came to be that the resources were dispatched,
18 and it was a relay call, and that is a--

19 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: [interposing]
20 And I get it. I really get it. I am not knocking
21 the process. I am just trying to get some facts
22 here. So my question is if somebody would have
23 called directly to 911, and I am assuming that we
24 have never based on the information given today
25 that no one ever had to wait four minutes before a

1
2 unit was dispatched. Let's say if I was in that
3 incident, I would call 911. How would I have
4 gotten there quicker because as far as I
5 understand we have never had based on your
6 testimony--I am just going to take you for your
7 word--there has now been other glitches, but they
8 use the slips. The screens went blank and you
9 used the slip and you have a backup system, but if
10 I would have been there, and I would have called
11 911 the dispatcher would have received that phone
12 call, they would have immediately called a unit.
13 - - child I understand that immediately a unit
14 would have dispatched, somebody would have gotten
15 there quicker. Is that a good assumption?

16 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No. the
17 facts are the facts and you are dealing in
18 hypotheticals. What is the best proxy for
19 answering your question because the call came in
20 from the police officer to the dispatch an one
21 thing you can see--you of the things you would
22 intuitively think with that is police officer to
23 dispatch that actually cuts out your first step,
24 which is the 911 caller and the conferencing in,
25 so that should be faster. These calls are the 911

1
2 system calls. The radio call because they are not
3 in the system, it is radio to radio, those
4 response times are measured in, but they are
5 counted in the overall calculation of response
6 times, but they are not included here. What this
7 is measuring is the calls that come in through the
8 911 system. the time stamps though are the same,
9 so the time for this radio call was 8:42. The
10 average time of a 911 call if it had come in
11 through the system, which is what this shows for a
12 relay call--in other words if there had been six
13 rings and it had gone to the relay was 8 minutes
14 and 53 seconds, so based on that, it was actually--
15 -8:42 is less than 8:53 and in fact, the time for
16 the non-relay calls where the EMS dispatchers
17 actually conferenced in is longer. It is 9
18 minutes and 20 seconds, so I can only go--the best
19 proxy for what would have happened, I can only go
20 by the aggregate data for the six month period,
21 and it doesn't suggest that what you are
22 suggesting is the case.

23 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: I see that--
24 and I appreciate your answer. I see that there--
25 and I can't read that far, but I see the FDNY non-

1
2 structural fires is five minutes and I see some
3 that are lower. When it comes to life threatening
4 situations why is it taking longer to go save a
5 life versus a fire? Both very--I am not
6 minimizing. It is just they are both critical
7 incidents. Why do we find that less in those
8 situations versus a little child's life that is on
9 the line?

10 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Well, the
11 short answer and Chief Fitton can elaborate on
12 this, but when you are going to a fire, or you are
13 going to a location, obviously the location
14 doesn't talk. When you are conferencing in, you
15 are doing medical triage and trying to understand
16 what are the resources that the patient needs, and
17 that is an upfront investment in time to find out
18 what they actually need in terms of medical
19 attention, and so these EMS responses in all
20 categories, so you have life threatening medical,
21 9:20, non-life threatening medical 12:40, relay
22 life threatening medical, 8:53. They are all
23 categorically with the exception of the least
24 serious NYPD, they are categorically longer, and
25 that is because you are actually interacting for a

1
2 continuous period of time with the patient. Maybe
3 you are giving guidance to the person who is
4 calling for the patient. Chief, any other?

5 CHIEF FITTON: Chief Michael
6 Fitton, chief of emergency medical dispatch. I
7 will say that when we are on the line with a call
8 taker, we are working on a balance of accuracy and
9 speed, and we are trying to get the most accurate
10 call type based on our dialogue with the 911
11 caller. That takes some time. Whereas when we
12 get it from relay, we get the limited information
13 that the Police Department is able to get without
14 our medical algorithms. It may be quicker, but it
15 may not be as accurate, so that is why it takes a
16 little bit longer when we are on the phone with
17 someone. Relay when it works correctly it gets
18 sent and it gets put in immediately within
19 seconds, so the processing time is short. The
20 drawback is that it may not be as accurate and we
21 don't get to give pre-arrival instructions.

22 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: So help me
23 understand, I am trying to stay to the facts here.
24 The police officer calls in. he speaks to a live
25 dispatcher. Right? Am I correct so far?

1
2 CHIEF FITTON: The police officer
3 speaks to a police dispatcher. Correct.

4 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: And this
5 process when he receives, the dispatcher receives
6 the information what happened? Exactly what
7 happened?

8 CHIEF FITTON: The police
9 dispatcher enters it into the computer and sends
10 it to the EMD relay terminal immediately.

11 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: And that is
12 where the four minutes...?

13 CHIEF FITTON: And that is where
14 the call sat. it was displayed.

15 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: So in those
16 four minutes, are there video recordings around
17 your 911 caller establishment just seeing what is
18 going on in--

19 CHIEF FITTON: [interposing] No.

20 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: No?

21 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Let me just
22 say, every available media is being reviewed for
23 this investigation, as it is for any
24 investigation, and so there are not cameras that
25 are trained on the screens, but every available

1
2 interviews, the technology data that we have
3 gotten--we have gotten that from multiple sources.
4 We have got lots of information, but I want to--
5 this is still an active investigation of what
6 exactly happened in the EMS side .

7 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Does your
8 system, maybe your tech person could answer this
9 question or maybe you know--does the system have
10 like a recording? Is there a way to verify what
11 happened in those 3 minutes and 53 seconds. Is
12 there like a...?

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I think it
14 just is without going into the detail since the
15 investigation is still ongoing I think it is just
16 worth saying we have the stamps for the actual
17 transmission of the information, and we have
18 recreated that. We are reviewing all of the
19 scripts and all of the interactions, and in terms
20 of what is available. That will be fully
21 explained when the investigation reaches its
22 conclusion.

23 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: So you can
24 100 percent say today that there is technological
25 evidence that whether the dispatcher received

1
2 information or not? Do we have--

3 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:

4 [interposing] I can't speak to what the
5 dispatcher, the person did. I am saying that we
6 have concluded, the FDNY has concluded based on
7 not only the timestamps, but the recreation of the
8 entire call that the data was transmitted through
9 ICAD. It was entered into ICAD and 32 seconds
10 later it was transmitted to the relay. It was on
11 the relay, and that is what happens with a relay
12 call.

13 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: This is all
14 about the details.

15 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Many of
16 which we don't yet have, but we will.

17 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: So you
18 already know the information went in, the data was
19 put forth, it was relayed. Is there like a
20 technological recorder so to speak for lack of
21 better words, let me just use that metaphor, to
22 show forth that indeed they were able to see this
23 on the screen and that the 24 people who were
24 looking at the screen that they were able to all
25 see the same information at the same time?

2 CHIEF FITTON: What we were able to
3 determine is that there is a stamp on the
4 complaint history that indicates that the job was
5 electronically transmitted to the relay monitor to
6 confirm that. That situation was recreated with
7 all of that data that was being transmitted at
8 that time. It was recreated in a test
9 environment, and in fact it displayed on the relay
10 monitor, and we do not have anything that you
11 describe to identify or a camera that actually saw
12 it happen.

13 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Yes, Deputy
14 Mayor, please.

15 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: So let's
16 just say what happened next because this is the
17 timestamp for this. We also know that a second
18 dispatcher logged into the system and within five
19 seconds dispatched resources, and the only way
20 they could have done that is if it was there. And
21 here is the thing. Yes, there were other people
22 there. Commissioner Cassano is investigating this. I
23 have spoken to him about it. They are answering
24 calls. We get 30,000 calls a day. The EMS calls,
25 it is a high volume of calls. There is a lot

1
2 going on in EMS, but I assure you every one of the
3 people who could have been in a position to have
4 seen this information is going to be questioned
5 about it and this is going to be a very thorough
6 investigation, and it is underway, and in fact, it
7 is going to take some time.

8 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: So just for
9 point of clarification, we--and I appreciate the
10 ongoing investigation and of course it needs to be
11 done, and done properly and with time, but what I
12 hear today there is no way other than the fact you
13 just pointed out somebody else, and this is new
14 news to me, somebody else saw the information and
15 they responded other than the primary dispatcher,
16 but there is no way to electronically confirm that
17 they got it 3 minutes and 53--that that particular
18 dispatcher got it at 3 minutes and 53 minutes
19 before. It could have happened three minutes
20 afterward. We just don't know. Do you understand
21 what I am saying? We know for sure--if I may
22 Deputy Mayor, and I appreciate your patience. I
23 know this is not easy, but at 353, the other
24 dispatcher got to see it, but what I can assess
25 here for sure that he was able to see it three

1
2 minutes before, two minutes before because we
3 don't have the technological "recorder" whatever
4 you want to call it to be able to know if indeed
5 they were able to see that before. Is it possible
6 that at that particular moment, he saw it for the
7 first time?

8 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Again,
9 everyone involved in the incident is being
10 questioned. Look, you try in an investigation to
11 figure out what is knowable with certainty. What
12 we have done so far is looked at the stamps of the
13 call when it came in and all the electronic
14 evidence. We recreated it. We put it through in
15 a simulation, and it went through. The conclusion
16 is that the transmission of the data worked. What
17 people saw, paid attention to, did, what they were
18 doing in the room, otherwise there were other
19 responses that were happening at that time, we are
20 going to find out, but we don't know.

21 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: One last
22 question, I definitely want to hear what our
23 colleagues have to ask. In the event hopefully we
24 will never have to go through this--I have been
25 through a few of those--an event let's say of an

1
2 earthquake or a major catastrophe that PSAC 1 and
3 let's say PSAC 2 will go down. Can we revert back
4 to going borough by borough? How would 911 be
5 handled if those were to go down let's say maybe a
6 terrorist or whatever, and so what would happen in
7 that unfortunate case if it were to happen, God
8 forbid?

9 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am going
10 to answer that question for three certain
11 scenarios. One is before 2004. Before 2004 let's
12 just say, the same building is where the PD's 911
13 call taking was, and you had FDNY and all the
14 buildings, so a hypothetical scenario that
15 building before PSAC 1 is on the third floor gets
16 taken out. That means that you have lost your 911
17 call taker capacity in the building. As of pre-
18 use ECTP they had a certain number of stations in
19 One Police Plaza and could deal with call volume.
20 It would be slower, but there was some backup
21 capacity. In the boroughs each of these, there
22 were five communications offices that FDNY had.
23 911 would be conference in a fire call taker in
24 the right borough, so I have a fire in Brooklyn.
25 I conference in the guy from Brooklyn. If I get

1
2 six rings and nobody answers then I will hang up
3 and I will try to conference in maybe someone from
4 Staten Island depending where in Brooklyn the
5 incident is or it could be Queens--to try and do
6 the dispatch. If any one of those got taken out,
7 there was a capacity to do some redundancy in
8 there, but you had inherent issues with having to
9 redial the separate COs from 911 because the calls
10 didn't line up in terms of the way the technology
11 set up. The biggest issue was EMD, emergency
12 medical dispatch. They were in One Metrotech and
13 had no backup. So were at what is called a single
14 point of failure. Now the same thing is true of a
15 switch, right. The Verizon technician who routed
16 the 911 call for three boroughs to a bank is
17 because we were on one commercial switch. We
18 didn't even know. If you go back and read the
19 articles, it didn't even register as problem
20 because the system is just handling the calls that
21 are coming in. That cannot happen now. We had no
22 redundancy there now. Now let's say between now
23 and 2015 when PSAC 2 goes online we now have PSAC
24 1, full 911 call taking redundancy one PP also has
25 that redundancy, but we have totally redone it and

1
2 added a whole bunch of stations. We have some
3 additional stations also in PSAC on a different
4 floor of PSAC, but the place we want to get to is
5 a fully replicated, fully redundant set up in PSAC
6 2, but for now, if PSAC 1 something happened to it
7 the backup would be One Police Plaza. For fire
8 dispatch, the backup would be the Bronx and Queens
9 where we revamped the CO so that they can be back
10 up and they are taking calls right now. Chief
11 Boyce, can they also take the 911 calls?

12 [background conversation]

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: And then
14 for EMD, they are in One Metrotech and they are in
15 11 Metrotech. Now that is not ideal because all
16 of these things right here for Lower Manhattan,
17 PSAC 1, One Metrotech at a minimum are in close
18 proximity, and that is not ideal. That is why we
19 are building PSAC 2 in the Bronx, and in fact we
20 are building it as a standalone building, and one
21 of the questions you asked, Chairwoman Crowley,
22 that I didn't get back to was the budget.
23 Initially we were going to do PSAC 2 in a regular
24 commercial building in Queens on Queens Boulevard.
25 It was determined that that was not going to have

1
2 sufficient security, sufficient standoff that we
3 wouldn't control the building because it would be
4 a lease, and on and on. We looked at ten
5 different things. I was here, and ultimately we
6 ended up buying a piece of property at - -
7 Metrotech Center, to build a whole new thing that
8 is separate and secure and is about as far away as
9 you can get and still be in the city, so that it
10 is in a totally different place. So I think if
11 you ask Commissioner Kelly and Commissioner
12 Cassano, is it important that we get there?
13 Absolutely. Full speed ahead and we are doing
14 that. There had been some delays. We also looked
15 at trying to reduce the size and reduce the cost,
16 and we did some of that, but at the end of the
17 day. I am confident now that as long--we are on a
18 very good trajectory to keep going.

19 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Deputy Mayor,
20 let me just in closing thank you for the
21 information you have given us. The following
22 statement I am going to make is a judgment call.
23 Everything else I think we have talked about as
24 facts back and forth, and I have to agree with my
25 Co-chairs, that it just seems odd at very best

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2 that 24 callers or 20 whatever it was that nobody
3 else caught it, especially something so important,
4 and dealing with children. I know that is a
5 sensitive spot, whatever you want, and I am sure
6 that is a flag for you as well, and for those who
7 are doing the investigation, but I just wanted to
8 share with you my sentiment and my judgment.

9 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Thank you.

10 That does bring me back to part of my opening
11 statement. I mean everyone that is part of this
12 process wants to get the resources--1700 people,
13 1800 people, there are 1,000 call takers and then
14 7 or 800 dispatchers and supervisors. They all
15 want to get the resources to the emergency as
16 quickly as possible, and looking back on an event
17 and analyzing it of course we need to figure this
18 out, but I think it is the case and important to
19 remember that it is a dynamic, live environment
20 and a kit of other events are happening, but the
21 fact remains, we are going to figure out what if
22 anything here if the response should have been
23 faster, why it wasn't and what we need to do about
24 it.

25 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Thank you so

1
2 much. I will turn it back over to Co-chair
3 Crowley.

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
5 Co-chair Cabrera. We have four Council Members
6 who are on the list now for questions, and before
7 we get to the Council Members, I just want to make
8 sure that we stay aware that this is also an
9 oversight hearing. We appreciate that you now
10 have agreed to the one bill, which will measure
11 the call processing time. I still believe it
12 needs to be legislated. Although your
13 administration will adhere to that, we are not
14 sure if other administrations will, so we will
15 continue to pursue that as well as an EMS
16 emergency time processing bill, which calculates
17 when we actually get to the person in need of an
18 emergency and the third bill is when you have a
19 structure fire calculating the time each unit gets
20 to the emergency and when water actually gets put
21 on the fire. Council Member James?

22 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Thank you,
23 Madam Chair, so Deputy Mayor, I understand and
24 recognize that the administration had decided to
25 prioritize the wholesale replacement of the 911

1
2 system and infrastructure dating back to 2004. I
3 know that I understand that and can appreciate
4 that; however, I would argue that blaming labor
5 leaders and arguing that they have ulterior
6 motives unfortunately does nothing to advance this
7 discussion relating to the safety of New Yorkers
8 and getting to the root cause of the death of Miss
9 Ariel Russo, and again, my hearts and prayers are
10 with you and your family during your time of
11 suffering, as well as ensuring that there is cost
12 benefits to all New Yorkers, and I would hope that
13 we could continue--I would hope that this--I
14 wanted this hearing to serve as a meaningful
15 dialogue analysis of all of the data and all of
16 the contracts, and systems that have been put in
17 place thus far to ensure that in fact we are
18 reducing response time and that we are keeping New
19 Yorkers safe, and you talked a little bit about
20 facts, but the only thing that I know that is
21 factual, which is pretty disconcerting, and that
22 is a draft report, several draft reports that I
23 have reviewed which have unfortunately been
24 edited, which have been sanitized, whitewashed,
25 redacted, airbrushed resulting in a final report

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2 which was released, and that is disturbing, and in
3 one of the earlier draft reports. It said the
4 following, it said that the system was dangerous
5 to citizens and first responders, and that it
6 introduced new acceptable risks for them. It was
7 poorly planned, inefficiently run and lacked clear
8 command structures and there were major errors in
9 the system particularly as it relates to
10 electronic mapping and that it posed risks. That
11 concerns me. I know that was a draft that has
12 since been changed but nonetheless that language
13 is still there in an earlier report, and so do you
14 agree with that earlier draft and with those
15 sentiments that were in fact reflected in an
16 earlier report, and that is factual.

17 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Well,
18 first, I mean I would quibble based on the last
19 three hours that that is the only fact that you
20 have, but I certainly agree that the 911 system
21 that we inherited has risk. We had systems that
22 dated from 45 years ago. We put in place a
23 comprehensive plan to overhaul them. We put in
24 place a process called unified call taking that we
25 amended on the basis of recommendations and the

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2 final version of that report, and the results in
3 terms of our ability to measure response times, to
4 know that response times are faster, and let's
5 remember, fire fatalities are at an all-time low.
6 Two alarm fires are at an all-time low. They are
7 down 27 percent from last year. That only can
8 happen if you are getting there faster. The data
9 that I am showing you on these time stamps, these
10 are not individual calls. These are aggregations
11 of hundreds of thousands of calls, so do I agree?
12 I agree that a business process had to be
13 adjusted. That is fundamentally what we did.
14 Unified call taking is still the national best
15 practice. Windborn will say that. We made an
16 adjustment to our business process and retained
17 unified call taking and the results are excellent,
18 and I would say that 15 and a half million
19 responses are good evidence of that.

20 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: So Deputy
21 Mayor, I don't think I or any member of the City
22 Council has any problem with you updating a system
23 which is outdated and outmoded. I don't think any
24 of us have a problem with that. The question that
25 we currently have is whether or not the current

1
2 system that you have adopted most recently whether
3 or not it is producing that result.

4 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: And I have
5 presented you with two and a half or three hours
6 of evidence that it has, and it is based on
7 mountains of data and hundreds of thousands of
8 pieces of evidence that we have analyzed over the
9 course of years, spent hundreds of thousands of
10 dollars to do, and so if you are not convinced, I
11 would be interested to see what the counter
12 evidence is.

13 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Well, Deputy
14 Mayor, you have the advantage of having spending
15 more time with this system, and I am not going to
16 challenge you on that. We don't have the
17 advantage of having all of that data and being in
18 a position to in fact review all of the
19 information that you have reviewed thus far. All
20 that we have is information from individuals on
21 the ground who have indicated to me that the
22 system is flawed, and it has some significant
23 problems. In fact while I was sitting here,
24 someone e-mailed me a recent incident and they
25 said that when an accident takes place and when

1
2 there is more than one person that calls 911 in
3 their experience the first operator gets the call
4 and starts the job and a second caller gets a
5 second operator and that second operator tries to
6 update the job and often time the screen buffers
7 and freezes and sometimes the screen goes blank.
8 What would you say to that dispatcher?

9 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Well, first
10 of all any individual case of a screen that froze
11 up or anything that happened under the old system
12 and with the new system, I think the good news is
13 we are not going to have to be taking the system
14 down, going to slips and doing those things, but I
15 would be interested to know in any incident they
16 are supposed to report all of these things to
17 their supervisors and I would say that it is hard
18 to respond to a single e-mail--

19 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
20 We have received evidence, I did, City Council,
21 from people who were working in that room that
22 there is a sign that says dispatchers--there is a
23 current sign, not the old system, but what is
24 happening currently with your Intergraph system,
25 your ICAD system, dispatchers, if you receive an

1
2 error message on your screen or an hourglass or a
3 grayed out screen, do not click screen.

4 Intergraph--now you have consultants moving about
5 the room--must handle the situation. Is there
6 anybody who is here who is in that command center
7 that can tell me if that is the case?

8 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: What is the
9 question?

10 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: My colleague
11 asked about screens freezing or going down--

12 [crosstalk]

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: There is no
14 evidence of systematic freezing of screens or this
15 buffering issue--

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Is this not
17 up on the wall in the command center? Is there
18 anybody here that can testify whether it is or it
19 is not?

20 CHAIRPERSON VALLONE: Identify
21 yourself.

22 CHIEF DOWD: So again--Chief Dowd
23 of the Police Department, in answer to your
24 question, council woman, the answer is yeah, the
25 sign is there, and the purpose of it is that on

1
2 the rare occasion when there is a screen freeze we
3 want an Intergraph person, who is on site--

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
5 Thank you. That is it.

6 CHIEF DOWD: Let me finish my
7 answer. Who is on site to go over and investigate
8 it so that we can determine whether it is a
9 serious problem or just a reset.

10 [crosstalk]

11 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Just in the
12 interest of time, Deputy Mayor, - - my colleague,
13 Council Member James, asked the question you
14 referred to the old system, but currently the
15 system that is in place it does crash, it goes
16 down--

17 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:
18 [interposing] No, not correct. Incorrect. It
19 does not crash.

20 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Sorry.
21 Council Member James, I will let you finish your
22 questioning, and if I could also ask all Council
23 Members and Deputy Mayor if you could try to
24 answer the questions as briefly as possible in the
25 interest of time, we have a number of people from

1
2 the public and a number of Council Members that
3 still want to ask questions.

4 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: I am going
5 to move on since we disagree that the system
6 crashes. Let me talk to you about the ACAD
7 system. As you know, there were problems in San
8 Jose. There were problems in Nassau County. And
9 it is my understanding that vendex reported that
10 the current system had--there were some problems
11 with regards to the ACD prior to the
12 administration issuing an RFP. Was the
13 administration--

14 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: ACD?

15 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: ICAD, excuse
16 me.

17 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Oh, the
18 Intergraph?

19 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Yes. Was
20 the administration aware of these problems in
21 other jurisdictions? And was the administration
22 aware that in fact vendex had reported that the
23 system had some problems?

24 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am sorry.
25 Tell me about the vendex again.

1
2 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Vendex had
3 reported--

4 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:
5 [interposing] When?

6 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Prior to the
7 issuance of the RFP by the administration.

8 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Okay. I
9 mean we do rigorous integrity checks, and vendex
10 and look at all that stuff, they were not--they
11 have been on the ground since 2008 developing this
12 system. The Police Department and I myself have
13 met with them. They passed all integrity checks,
14 and by the way, the system works. We have had
15 715,000 calls and 375,000 dispatches. I explained
16 in a lot of detail I think exactly what happened
17 during the first--during cut over when we went
18 down on a plan basis and then we had two
19 incidences in less than 48 hours, a total of 850
20 incidences that were dispatched on slips, and we
21 haven't had once since. So I just want to point
22 out that regardless of what a vendex might have
23 shown somewhere and I will look at the vendex
24 form, they have worked on the ground, they have
25 worked very diligently. They have put all of the

resources in to addressing the issues that did arise and which were screen freezes, and the system has worked.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Thank you. Thank you, Deputy Mayor.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you, Council Member James. Thank you, Deputy Mayor. Council Member Oddo?

COUNCIL MEMBER ODDO: Deputy Mayor, thank you for your presentation. It has been a while since the witness is engaged in a PowerPoint to this degree. You mentioned during your testimony that we have 193 days left in this administration. I have 193 days left in what will be a 15 year career in this body, and at the beginning of my time here, I sat in a hearing similar to this where Commissioner Von Essen [phonetic] testified about technology and some difficulties. It was technology with the walkie talkies, technology and communication between agencies, and we had an oversight hearing, and tried to impact the issue, and sadly, some of those issues came home to roost on 9/11. So as I sit here today at the end of my Council tenure

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2 with the similar technological conversation, I
3 can't help but have some of the heaviness of what
4 happened early on, and I have sat in many hearings
5 and quite frankly many of them have been B.S. I
6 was supposed to be in BNT [phonetic] this morning.
7 I was supposed to be in leadership this morning,
8 but I think this is so important that I blew that
9 off, and I know how critical it is to get this
10 right, and we may or may not have lost a young
11 child to this system, but history shows that if
12 there is a flaw we will see it, we will feel it,
13 we will have to deal with it, so I appreciate your
14 time. I am interested in what these numbers mean
15 in the real world in our communities with the 53
16 seconds of additional time whether you couch it as
17 it's a more accurate read, whether you couch it as
18 we have been doing it the wrong way--however.
19 There is 53 additional seconds for fire apparatus
20 to respond under the new system.

21 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No, that
22 time has always been there. It just hasn't been
23 reported.

24 COUNCIL MEMBER ODDO: We haven't
25 acknowledged--

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DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:

[interposing] Not additional time, and in fact the time has been reduced.

COUNCIL MEMBER ODDO: Well, we haven't acknowledged it. We are acknowledging today that what we said previously it took to respond the real world experience is longer. Correct?

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: no, I am going to disagree with you there. I am showing you here exactly the segments of the call that were reported in response time since 1977. We didn't have the technological ability. Wait a minute. We have always been clear about what was included in the response time, so it is not new time. It is time--there was always a call processing time, and by the way, what has been put forward is the idea that is just 911 call taker process time. That is not true. There has been unaccounted for or unreported, pardon me, call taker time for both fire and EMD as well because the system did not allow. And by the way just to give you an average for EMD call taking the average amount of existing, but unreported time

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2 due to technological limitations was 80 seconds.
3 80 seconds of EMD call taker time. The average
4 time at a minimum even for the faster transfer
5 from a 911 call taker to an FDNY call taker, the
6 average ring cycle time was 18 seconds, and so at
7 a minimum - - transfer, and that is after asking
8 where they are and what the emergency is. The
9 reason I am focusing on this is because there is
10 an underlying premise that for some reason, and it
11 seems to be in the face of all evidence to the
12 contrary that the time somehow was much faster
13 before, and it is just not true. I also want to
14 point out, Council Member, because one of the
15 things we take extremely seriously here is why we
16 did this project and you bring up I don't think
17 this hearing is like that hearing at all. I
18 understand the issues that have been raised and
19 this is to look at so called glitches. I have
20 explained the exact number of calls that were on
21 slips. That wasn't even a glitch. It was a
22 backup procedure for a switch over. Now ECTP
23 after the black and after 911 improving our
24 operability and coordination among public safety
25 agencies, we are co-located established interfaces

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2 between all of the agencies, did dual band radios
3 for NYPD, new stations for FDNY. We improved the
4 call taker distribution system. We implemented
5 UCT. We have new guide card. We put a new system
6 design that can handle 50,000 calls an hour. That
7 is--we have two dedicated switched. We didn't
8 have that before. we have three or four separate
9 line feeds coming into the building. We have oil
10 and gas that keeps it alive on its own. We had no
11 single points of failure. We have automated
12 mapping capability that we didn't have before that
13 just got better when we put in the ICAD system.
14 we have an entirely new system. it is still being
15 implemented, but the idea that we are in the same
16 place that you were, and I agree with you, a lot
17 of improvements and changes needed to be made, and
18 they are being made, and the result is a much more
19 reliable system with faster response time.

20 COUNCIL MEMBER ODDO: Can I go back
21 to the 53 seconds because I don't want to get
22 caught up in the verbiage. Here is what I am
23 concerned with. My brother was lieutenant in the
24 Fire Department in the job for 25 years. I talked
25 to chiefs and commissioners for 15 years. I

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2 talked to friends on the job. I come to hearings
3 like this. I know one truth that you and I can
4 agree on, and that is seconds in fires mean a lot.
5 Seconds in fires are the difference between a
6 small fire and a big fire, between a big fire and
7 a fatal fire. And while you--

8 [crosstalk]

9 COUNCIL MEMBER ODDO: And now I am-

10 -

11 [crosstalk]

12 COUNCIL MEMBER ODDO: Let me finish
13 like you asked the Chair. I do know that you have
14 overtly ascribed motivation to some of the unions,
15 self-serving motivation, and that may be true. It
16 may be not true. It is not my job to litigate,
17 but I do know some of those same unions are
18 concerned with those seconds because those seconds
19 means the difference between life and death for
20 their membership and for the people of the city.
21 I happen to represent a borough that has some of
22 the highest response times, so when I say now that
23 I have to go back and tell my constituents the
24 number is actually this number. I want to
25 understand it, and I want to know is if my

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2 constituents are at an even greater disadvantage
3 than we thought they were coming into this
4 meeting. That is why I am focusing on the 53
5 seconds.

6 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Okay, the
7 shorter answer to that question is no. They are
8 not at a greater disadvantage. The time that is
9 now being reported, which is time that was always
10 there but as not measured as part of the response
11 time because we didn't have the technological
12 capability to do it is essentially the call taker
13 who is now sitting in a centralized location, the
14 EMS call taker and the 911 call taker and then
15 there is some time in a dispatch queue. That was
16 there anyway. Okay? So the 53 seconds that you
17 are referring to is actually the least amount of
18 time that a 911 call taker spends on the phone,
19 and is part of the response in part because of the
20 pre-decision dispatch and in terms of what you
21 just said, fatal fires and large fires, we are at
22 an all-time low in fatalities and an all-time low
23 of second alarm and above fires, and that has to
24 be because we are getting there faster, Council
25 Member.

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2 COUNCIL MEMBER ODDO: I understand
3 that, and that is great until that one fire that
4 happens that does take a life, so let me ask you
5 this.

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7 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I don't
8 understand what that means.

9 COUNCIL MEMBER ODDO: Well, you
10 know what? We will have a beer afterwards, and I
11 will explain it to you. The 53 seconds is an
12 average. What does it mean to Queens and Staten
13 Island? Can you give us those numbers after the
14 hearing? Queens and Staten Island, the areas that
15 traditionally have had higher response times. It
16 may not be 53 seconds for me, correct? It may be
17 a minute and a half.

18 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I can do my
19 best to break out by borough, but those calls all
20 come into a central location, so intuitively,
21 there isn't a reason to - -

22 [crosstalk]

23 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: But yes, I
24 will get back to you. Yes.

25 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: A very

2 important point that Council Member Oddo does
3 raise, and although you said, Deputy Mayor, his
4 constituents are not at a disadvantage, they are
5 because Staten Island has the highest response
6 times, much higher than these ones, and Queens
7 comes in second longest response times. I am
8 going to recognize Council Member Rodriguez for
9 questions followed by Council Member Brewer.

10 COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: Thank
11 you, Chairman. Deputy Commissioner, the good
12 things about today's technology is that even in
13 this room whatever we do and say is recorded, so
14 were that particular room where the dispatchers
15 were working that day were they also on the
16 surveillance cameras? Were there surveillance
17 cameras in that room?

18 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No. That
19 is a question that Council Member Cabrera and I
20 discussed. No, but I assure you as part of the
21 investigation every available media and every
22 available piece of data for what was happening in
23 the room will be - -

24 COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: As a
25 former teacher that I was in order for me to use

1
2 any computer from the school, I had to log in.
3 Does the dispatcher have to log in before the
4 start working?

5 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes.
6 Correct. In fact, it was when the second
7 dispatcher logged in that they immediately sent
8 the call to dispatch and within five seconds of
9 logging in, the resources were rolling.

10 COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: Is there
11 a system in place that records what all
12 dispatchers are doing?

13 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am sorry?

14 COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: Do you
15 have a system in place, a central system in place
16 where you record all the phone calls and the time
17 it took for anyone to respond to the 911 phone
18 calls?

19 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Yes. All
20 calls are logged and recorded. All calls, there
21 are timestamps for all calls. In fact it is the
22 timing measured that is the basis for all of the
23 measurements that I have presented today.

24 COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: So you
25 say that you - - after three minutes it went up in

1
2 white. How can you prove that?

3 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: we have
4 recreated the call, and it shows that the data
5 was transmitted and that the system functioned as
6 designed.

7 COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: Is there
8 something recording what that is on the screen?

9 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: if you are
10 asking if I have a screen shot, no.

11 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Council
12 Member, to interrupt, you have your slides here.
13 We don't have the slide about that call. It
14 wasn't included in the packet. Can you submit it
15 to the Committee?

16 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Sure.
17 Absolutely.

18 COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: As you
19 said, there is an investigation going on. My
20 concern is that sometimes you have the answers to
21 some of the questions, but when the question is
22 not easy to respond then your response that there
23 is an investigation going on. As the
24 investigation is taking place right now are we
25 leaning at looking at the human error or

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technological error?

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am sorry?

COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: As the investigation is going forward right now, are you leaning toward the possibility of a human error or a technical error?

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: As I have shown, and I won't go back and show it again, but you are absolutely right. There are two basic paths for this investigation--there is the technology, which basically can be summarized as did the data get transmitted so that it could be acted upon, and based on a review of all of the available time stamps and evidence and a recreation of a call in the system FDNY has concluded, that yes, it was transmitted. The technology functioned as designed. What we don't know is what was happening in terms of acting on that information once it was there. That is the focus of the investigation and interviewing the people. I have 24 people--everybody who had something to do with this is being interviewed.

COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: Thank you. I would like to end saying that I know how

1
2 much the Russo family cares for children, and I
3 know much they have been working including in my
4 community, and I know that only the - - for
5 children is what provides them their strength to
6 be here with us today. I know this is not easy -
7 - probably one of the more painful situations for
8 them and for anyone including those of us who have
9 children to be here. I know that they are here
10 because they would like to avoid this situation
11 for any other children in our city. - - I expect
12 - - expectations of the committee so that we learn
13 from this, so there is not going to be another
14 mother or father coming to a hearing knowing that
15 nothing we will do will bring back the life of
16 that child. Thank you.

17 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
18 Council Member Rodriguez. Council Member Brewer?

19 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you
20 very much. I have just an overall question and
21 then maybe more specific. I have always been
22 opposed as you know to this PSAC 2 and the vast
23 cost. Just so I understand how would the
24 situation had been different if there was the PSAC
25 2 in the Bronx, out of curiosity? We wouldn't

1
2 have had paper? How would it be different?

3 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Which
4 situation?

5 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: The
6 situation for Ariel Russo, would it have been
7 different? I don't know. I am asking.

8 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: That
9 specific case wouldn't have been different. PSAC
10 2 is about redundancy and about having a situation
11 where we have in two different parts of the city a
12 capacity to respond to emergency calls and then in
13 the event that an event happens as we know that
14 they can you are able to still perform that vital
15 service, and that has been a finding that the
16 mayor acted on almost as soon as he got into
17 office.

18 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: This
19 hearing is not about the backup, but I just wanted
20 to understand it. Number two is how when you--I
21 don't know the answer. I live right around the
22 corner from the Russos and I know that the 100th
23 Street fire station is where many of the EMS
24 vehicles come out of. Does it matter in a
25 situation that there is a closer vehicle? How

1
2 does that play into the phone calls that go into
3 911?

4 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I will let
5 Chief Fitton answer that question.

6 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you.

7 CHIEF FITTON: Could you repeat the
8 question please?

9 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Sure.
10 Since I live in the neighborhood right around the
11 corner from the Russos, I know the neighborhood
12 and the EMS station is really close to the
13 horrible accident, so I am just wondering if you
14 call 911, how is it different or the same in terms
15 of response if the station is nearby?

16 CHIEF FITTON: It makes no
17 response. We do not respond from ambulance
18 stations. We respond from cross street locations.
19 We are dynamically placed throughout the
20 neighborhood. We don't respond from ambulance
21 stations. Strategically we have ambulances on
22 cross street locations on corners, and that isn't
23 a static situation. I can just tell you that
24 most times on busy days the ambulances are moving
25 throughout the city, and we use AVL and GPS to

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2 know exactly where those ambulances are and use
3 the closest available resources.

4 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: So where
5 was this ambulance, all of that will come out in
6 the investigation this particular situation?

7 CHIEF FITTON: The ambulance that
8 responded to this call? That is correct. Yeah.

9 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: That will
10 all be part of the investigation?

11 CHIEF FITTON: Absolutely.

12 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: I always
13 thought that the ambulance that was closest would
14 be the one that would response, but I guess I am
15 not correct; it depends.

16 CHIEF FITTON: The ambulance that
17 is closest would respond. The closest available
18 ambulance. As a matter of fact there was an
19 ambulance that was en route to the hospital that
20 saw the accident and actually got there prior to
21 the ambulance that was eventually assigned. As I
22 said, it is a very dynamic situation out here in
23 the streets. Ambulances are constantly moving.
24 EMS is a very busy service so because we talk
25 about these cross street locations even more

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 2 dynamically we have an AVL and GPS on every
 3 ambulance that is out there in the street. We
 4 know where they are at all times, and that is
 5 integrated into our computerated dispatch. When a
 6 call location comes in, a priority call location,
 7 it is dispatched to the closest ambulance
 8 depending upon where they are at the moment.

9 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Okay. How
 10 many 911 operators do we currently have and how
 11 many do you really think are needed for the
 12 system? that is more of an oversight question
 13 than a specific?

14 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: You mean
 15 911 or...?

16 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: 911.

17 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: 911 we have
 18 current about 1100 911 operators, call takers who
 19 are also cross trained to do dispatch, and at any
 20 given time there are between 50 and 100 active
 21 stations depending on a normal day. Chief if you
 22 want to add anything? Chief Dowd?

23 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: 1100 cross
 24 trained.

25 CHIEF DOWD: You have 1100 police

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2 communications technicians. That is the current
3 authorized staffing level. Now I can tell you
4 that we are looking at that. Based on some of the
5 comments that some of the members made at other
6 oversight hearings, we are now studying to see
7 whether or not that number needs to increase.

8 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Alright, of
9 course, most of us think it should, but would
10 there be some reason why it shouldn't or you are
11 still looking at it?

12 CHIEF DOWD: It is under study. I
13 believe that there will be some recommendation for
14 some increase. I could not tell you what that
15 would be at.

16 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: What is the
17 timing on that recommendation?

18 CHIEF DOWD: We are trying to
19 expedite that as quickly as we can. We have been
20 in discussions with the unions, and also with the
21 Deputy Commissioner for Labor Policy at the NYPD
22 to look at that.

23 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Alright.
24 How many calls can the system handle? I think you
25 said 50,000...

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: 50,000.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Were there more than that during Sandy or that was--

DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY:

[interposing] No, there were 20,000 an hour during Sandy. That was the highest volume that we have had. I believe higher than 911 and higher than the blackout for a one hour period, but it was less than half of the capacity of the system.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: And so PSAC 2 won't expand it. It will just make sure that the backup is there?

MALE VOICE: What would happen is the sites would run simultaneously, so you will have roughly 225 call taking positions between the two, and the systems acts in effect as one, so you would have a maximum of 225 call takers sitting at any one time to answer 911 using both centers at the same time.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: If you are a call taker and you get an error message, an hourglass or a gray screen, call Intergraph. What does that mean?

MALE VOICE: Again, it is a new

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2 system, and we are constantly reviewing it. We
3 are having meetings every day with Intergraph to
4 review any issue that we see. You have work
5 stations where the screen will freeze up, and so
6 rather than have them reset it themselves, which
7 they could do, we want an Intergraph person to
8 take a look at that and reset it themselves so we
9 can take that data and analyze it to see what
10 caused it?

11 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: How long
12 will Intergraph be on site in order to get this
13 problem solved do you think?

14 MALE VOICE: As long as it takes

15 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: That could
16 be years. I ask 'cause--the Deputy Mayor is
17 having a heart attack there. We ask that because
18 we are constantly dealing with outside consultants
19 versus city workers doing the job. That is the
20 tension that you are used do and this deputy mayor
21 is sick of the question, but I would like to
22 understand how long they are going to be there.

23 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am not
24 sick of the question. I am not sick of any
25 questions. First of all, the screens--we are

1 tracking the number of screen freezes. There have
2 been less than a handful a day. On some days
3 none, less. There was one yesterday, and that is
4 in a time period of 30,000 calls. So that is an
5 issue, which they are here to solve. Intergraph
6 it is part of their contract in delivering the
7 system to ensure that the system works, so we are
8 not looking to have Intergraph move in full time.
9 In fact the Office of Emergency Communications,
10 Bruce Gaskey and his team, we are developing what
11 is the long term sustainable plan that we need to
12 do in terms of bringing the right resources inside
13 to run these systems. That is true for Verizon.
14 That is true for the ICAD system. we are doing
15 that across the board because I fundamentally and
16 the mayor agree. You do not want to be at the
17 mercy of outsourced resources to be able to run
18 these systems, and I think Chief Dowd who is the
19 person responsible for ensuring that that system
20 is running is cognizant of that as well. There
21 will continue to be--I don't know if you will ever
22 have the perfect system. The Sprint system, all
23 of these systems are dynamic.

24
25 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you.

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2 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: And
3 contractually they have to be on site for at least
4 a year, so three weeks in.

5 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Alright.
6 Thank you.

7 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
8 Council Member Brewer. We are almost finished
9 Deputy Mayor. I have been promised by Council
10 Member James that she is going to ask a really
11 quick question, and we hope that your response can
12 be just as quick.

13 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Thank you,
14 Madam Chair. Deputy Mayor, do you think we have
15 an adequate number of dispatchers to handle the
16 volume of calls coming into the system?

17 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I think as
18 a general matter right now based on response times
19 for an average day, yes, but I think we are as
20 Chief Dowd said, the staffing level is something
21 that we are always looking at and especially now
22 with the new dispatch system in place, it's under
23 study and if there are recommendations for call
24 takers who are cross trained as dispatchers, we
25 will try to expedite that quickly.

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2 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Very, very
3 last. Can you just go down the line? You
4 indicated earlier that in fact this system is
5 really seven systems. As of to date, what is the
6 cost per system to taxpayers?

7 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am going
8 to have to give you a line breakdown. I am going
9 to just have to give that to you overall. I am
10 going to have to hand it over. System by system
11 I don't have that memorized. Well, the overall
12 budget for the transformation program is 2.301
13 billion dollars.

14 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Since 2004?

15 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: That is
16 since fiscal year 2009, and there was an increase,
17 a significant increase in the cost when we decided
18 to go and build an independent new PSAC in the
19 Bronx rather than use an existing building. That
20 added 600 million dollars to the cost, and it was
21 50 million dollars for the land. I can give you a
22 detailed breakdown. PSAC 1 the systems that have
23 been replaced, Bruce Gaskey, I think we are at
24 about 700 million dollars? For PSAC 1--I am
25 sorry. Just to answer your question specifically.

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2 The whole thing for PSAC 1 which was a dozen
3 systems, seven main systems, but there are five
4 subsystems, 700 million dollars.

5 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: So we are
6 over three billion dollars. Yes?

7 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: No, two
8 billion dollars is the price of the whole project.
9 700 million--

10 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
11 Thank you, Council Member James. I believe in the
12 first part of Council Member James' question and
13 Council Member Brewer they asked about staffing.
14 It is clear the number of operators are lower
15 today than you had a few years ago, and that in
16 putting together your ECP there is a goal to have
17 less even more. The day of June 4th reports were
18 that--the reports--I am sorry. I am not sure what
19 you are discussing. There have been reports that
20 the overtime in the NYPD includes the amount of
21 hours that have been spent with your call takers
22 in overtime because there are not enough operators
23 to staff the positions that are needed by the
24 city, and not to mention what happens in emergency
25 situations. Just I think it is important to note

1
2 that more and more we are relying on technology
3 and less on people. The day of June 3rd there was
4 a call that went unanswered by an EMD. I don't
5 know why an EMD was not available. My assumption
6 is that we just don't have enough working on given
7 shifts. I want to wrap up. In terms of wrapping
8 up today--and stay in touch. I know we all have
9 the same goal. We want the safest New York City.
10 Many of us feel, and I certainly do that money has
11 been wasted, time definitely, and I do not believe
12 that this system is more reliable today. I know
13 when we had super storm Sandy many New Yorkers
14 were calling up and they could not get through,
15 and that was after the snowstorm where the same
16 situation had happened. We are nearly ten years
17 since the blackout and I don't want for you to
18 answer the question. I just want if you could
19 briefly speak to Intro 265 and Intro 189 since you
20 do agree Intro 143 should be enacted.

21 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Sure, well,
22 in brief and I am going to ask Chief Boyce also to
23 come up here to add to what I am going to say.
24 Intro 265 and Intro 189 both seek to mandate the
25 reporting of specific parts of the firefighting or

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2 EMS procedure that are not standardized across
3 incidents in any way. It also--let's just talk
4 about water on the fire for a minute--highlights
5 that particular part of firefighting above others
6 in a way that is misleading because it may be
7 that in a certain case getting water on the fire
8 is not the top priority. In the same way if you
9 look at the MD cases, once you are at the scene
10 you might have to go up 30 floors to get to a
11 patient.

12 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
13 Right, but the person in need--

14 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Let me just
15 turn it over to Chief Boyce to elaborate.

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Just to
17 clarify the two bills for the public that are here
18 and for the process of the bills to be heard
19 fairly, when you look at Intro 189 water on the
20 fire, it doesn't necessarily have to be every time
21 a fire suppression unit is dispatched unless it is
22 actually a structural fire or some type of fire.
23 If you look at what happened during Sandy when the
24 whole city seemed to have not nearly enough
25 resources, fire suppression resources, and you had

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2 a huge fire at Breezy Point when the first - -
3 Breezy Point got there, he stopped the clock, but
4 previous hearings have down that that first
5 apparatus there was not a fire suppression
6 apparatus, but a chief, and then you stop the
7 clock, and you stop counting at that point. And a
8 lot of times when you have big fires in the city,
9 it takes a number--it definitely takes more than
10 one fire engine now that you have fewer than five
11 firefighters on those engines. So New Yorkers
12 deserve that if there is a structural fire, we
13 deserve to know when it is that that fire received
14 the water that would put it out, and that is what
15 Intro 189 would do.

16 CHIEF BOYCE: Specifically what is
17 your question?

18 [crosstalk]

19 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Let me just
20 make the question specific. Does the Fire
21 Department have the capability of measuring the
22 response to a structural fire to the point where
23 you stop the clock when water is put on the fire?
24 You don't need to necessarily say that is the
25 response time, but at least let your reports, your

1
2 mayor management reports, indicate when water goes
3 on the fire. It is just more information I
4 believe New Yorkers deserve to know, especially
5 when we are looking at a budget that is due next
6 week that is cutting 20 fire companies.

7 CHIEF BOYCE: In order to fix
8 anything you want to measure it accurately and
9 objectively, so to answer your question, for a
10 specific type of fire, for a specific fire, you
11 could measure all these segments that the Deputy
12 Mayor testified to we can measure objectively.

13 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Say it one
14 more time.

15 CHIEF BOYCE: The segments that the
16 Deputy Mayor testified to we can measure
17 objectively. To measure water on the fire
18 objectively for a specific fire, which is a very,
19 very small percentage of our responses where water
20 goes on a fire--sure, they are the most important
21 ones, but they are a very small percentage of our
22 responses, so yes, we could measure for a specific
23 fire, which is very small from all those segments
24 when they get onto the scene and then measure from
25 when they get onto the scene when there is water

1
2 on the fire, but water on the fire could mean a
3 two and a half gallon--

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
5 I just wanted to make sure the Department could
6 measure it, and the answer is yes.

7 CHIEF BOYCE: - -

8 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Final
9 question that I have and my colleague, Council
10 Member Cabrera has a question, and then we are
11 going to end the testimony from you, Deputy Mayor.
12 As it relates to an EMS emergency I'm a caller, my
13 family member is in need of an EMT. I live on the
14 fifth floor of a building. I place my call. Now
15 at least we will know what the call processing
16 time is, but the fire department stops the clock
17 when that EMT gets to the building, not when the
18 EMT gets to the person in need of emergency
19 services, will you be able to? If we vote on this
20 and pass this legislation, will the department be
21 able to accurately track that response time?

22 CHIEF BOYCE: Water on the fire and
23 to the patient is the same scenarios,

24 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: This is a yes
25 or no question.

1
2 CHIEF BOYCE: Sorry. It is not a
3 yes or no question.

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: You answered
5 the first one and then you compared the second one
6 to the first one. I am not talking about that
7 bill anymore. I am talking about emergency
8 medical services. are you able to measure
9 response times once you get to the potential
10 patient?

11 CHIEF BOYCE: All the segments that
12 the Deputy Mayor testified--

13 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]
14 Yes or no, can you measure it?

15 [crosstalk]

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: There are a
17 lot of people from the public that would like to
18 testify. I am sorry if I seem impatient. Can you
19 measure the time?

20 CHIEF BOYCE: You can measure from
21 when the ambulance gets there until you make
22 patient contact.

23 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you.

24 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I just want
25 to add one thing here. As the mayor's management

1
2 report, which is something that has hundreds and
3 hundreds of indicators in it, we have spent a
4 tremendous amount of time working with
5 commissioners who one of their primary
6 responsibilities is how do you measure success,
7 how do you measure successful outcomes for your
8 core mission? Now the Department has considered
9 these metrics. We always want to put data out,
10 and this mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, who has a screen
11 in his bullpen that has six independent screens
12 all giving data all of which he is very aware of
13 is the most data driven mayor probably that we
14 have ever had, but this is a data point that has
15 been specifically considered, and the issue is not
16 whether it can be measured. The issue is what
17 does it show and would it tend to help clarify and
18 assist in the interpretation of the understanding
19 of getting resources to emergencies or not, and
20 the considered judgment of the Department is based
21 on the fact that it is very subjective in both
22 cases and very situation dependent and could vary
23 widely that--and also, for water on the fire that
24 is a very small percentage of responses that it
25 would do more to mislead than to help, so that is

1
2 really the fundamental objection.

3 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I respect
4 your response, Deputy Mayor and chief. I respect
5 your response, but I disagree respectively.
6 Council Member Cabrera?

7 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Yes. I will
8 kick myself if I don't ask this question, Deputy
9 Mayor. Was there an Intergraph rep on June 4th on
10 site that day?

11 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I am sorry.
12 Was there a...?

13 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Intergraph
14 representative there on June the 4th. Do you
15 happen to know?

16 MALE VOICE: There were a couple
17 dozen.

18 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: So a couple
19 dozen. Did they happen to miss the white screen
20 also?

21 MALE VOICE: They are not seeing
22 it--

23 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: - -

24 MALE VOICE: No, they are not
25 looking at the screen, but they are looking at the

1
2 data related to that.

3 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Thank you so
4 much.

5 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Is that it?

6 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: That is it.

7 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: I just
8 wanted to make sure that there aren't any more
9 questions because I did want to say two or three
10 quick things. One, thank you for the opportunity
11 to testify today. Two, I hope it is evident from
12 the presentation not only that we have taken
13 extremely seriously your desire to look deeply
14 into these issues. We have also tried to be
15 responsive. We have gone to great effort, and I
16 think we are good to make good improvement in the
17 measurement of the way we measure response times
18 and that this new measurement is going to give us
19 the ability to attack segment by segment of the
20 call and try to continue to improve response time,
21 which I know is a goal that we share. I have to
22 note that we have gone to great pains to try to
23 put the data, the conclusions that we have drawn
24 closely tied to facts, and while I understand,
25 Chairwoman, that as you said you believe that the

1
2 system doesn't work or something to that effect I
3 would suggest that there is simply no evidence to
4 support that. The evidence shows that from a
5 reliability perspective, from a speed perspective,
6 from a capability perspective including the
7 ability to measure the very things that you want
8 that you are suggesting that we legislate which we
9 can now do are a result of this new system, and
10 you are going to hear a great deal of additional
11 testimony, and I would simply request that you do
12 consider what is the factual basis for claims and
13 is somebody even in a position to have data to
14 know. Anecdotal evidence is as useful as
15 anecdotal evidence is--a single e-mail and so
16 forth. We have 15 and half million calls. We
17 have 375,000 dispatchers through the new NYPD
18 system. we have analyzed in terms of the last six
19 months to create those end to end response times,
20 hundreds of thousands of calls, and we have gone
21 painstakingly through to make sure that they are
22 tied together correctly. That is what we are
23 using to draw these conclusions, and finally, I
24 would just like to reiterate what I said at the
25 beginning. This is about life and death and Ms.

1
2 Russo, I am terribly sorry for your loss, and
3 again, you have our commitment. We are going to
4 get to the bottom of what happened, and we will
5 approach any changes if they need to be made in
6 our process or otherwise with the same rigor that
7 we have tried to approach this entire project and
8 we will give you a full accounting of what we are
9 going to do, and I know that has limited value,
10 but that is our commitment.

11 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
12 Deputy Mayor. I appreciate your time today and
13 those who came from the respective departments,
14 Fire Department, Police Department, EMS of the
15 Fire Department. We have plenty of work to do to
16 make this system the system that the New Yorkers
17 deserve it to be and the emergency workers who are
18 on the front line whether they are taking the
19 calls, dispatching or responding. This has to be
20 the best system that it can possibly be and the
21 only way that happens is if we work together. I
22 know that there is much work ahead of us to
23 achieve those goals. Thank you.

24 DEPUTY MAYOR HOLLOWAY: Thank you.

25 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: We are going

1
2 to hear from the public. The first panel will be
3 union representatives who are--we are basing that
4 on the thousands of members of the union and then
5 after we hear that then we are going to hear
6 testimony from Ariel Russo's family and then we
7 will go to the general public, and the lists of
8 the order of the requests to speak and testify
9 today were received. The first panel is Steve
10 Cassidy, Uniformed Fire Association; Lieutenant
11 Boles, Uniformed Fire Officers Association; Israel
12 Miranda, Uniformed EMTs' Association, and Vincent
13 Variale, Uniformed EMT Lieutenants' Association.
14 Because the first panel relates to the Fire
15 Department it is important I believe that we also
16 have the union that represents the dispatch
17 workers up, and I would ask the president of that
18 union, Faye [phonetic] - - to come up to the first
19 panel. President Cassidy, when you are ready,
20 please begin your testimony.

21 STEVE CASSIDY: Thank you. There
22 is a lot to discuss that was said here that I
23 don't believe is even close to accurate, but let
24 me start with a couple of things that popped into
25 my head. I love the word assertion, and Deputy

1
2 Mayor Holloway said assertion many times. It
3 really is an assertion that UCT is recognized
4 nationally as the best system, and therefore they
5 have to implement it here. When he said fatal
6 fires are down because response times are better,
7 that is just a stupid statement. That is not even
8 an assertion. That is a stupid statement. Fatal
9 fires are down for several reasons. One, the
10 total number of fires are down. Number two, early
11 warning detection, i.e. smoke alarms, are made
12 available to virtually everyone even the poor. In
13 the 70s and 80s when people were poor and did not
14 have smoke detectors they resulted in many of the
15 fatalities in fires. As a firefighter for 25
16 years, I can tell you that what he said doesn't
17 make any sense and for the people who were sitting
18 around him from the Fire Department to let him go
19 on like that is quite ridiculous. Let's go to
20 some facts, and let's talk about credibility. The
21 Bloomberg Administration hired Windborn after the
22 December 2010 debacle, the snowstorm debacle, and
23 then they hid that report and legally fought the
24 UFA and the UFOA for two years, two years. and
25 then when they turned it over after they lost

1 every single court battle and were forced to turn
2 it over, they turned over 30 copies, 5,000 pages.
3 I am pretty sure if you are paying the bills and
4 you get the first copy and you don't like it you
5 are going to continue to pay me, I will write
6 another one. They wrote 30 drafts before they
7 finally gave them the report which they wanted,
8 and by the way, the report they wanted is still
9 very critical of the Bloomberg Administration, but
10 when you look at the early drafts which Deputy
11 Mayor Holloway said he never saw, he wasn't sure,
12 I mean they destroy UCT. UCT does not work for a
13 lot of reasons, so Windborn, two years. Now they
14 are talking about end to end response times, and
15 they say, let me tell you, for structural fires,
16 they are up 53 second. That is a dramatic number.
17 I don't know if that is true because they have
18 mislead us about response times year after year
19 after year, but they are admitting to 53 seconds,
20 and he is saying we just got this technology three
21 weeks ago. Well, on May 22nd I held a press
22 conference, and I held up a secret report that I
23 got from somebody at headquarters that listed two
24 week periods, last week of February, first week of
25

1
2 March that showed end to end response times, and
3 yet the Deputy Mayor comes here and says that only
4 three weeks ago--literally a week after I outed
5 them as lying--the fire commissioner came here and
6 he said he answered your question. We don't have
7 that and we have never had that. They had to
8 backtrack a week later, so here he comes and he
9 says just three weeks ago and we are being upfront
10 about it. It is preposterous for them to say that
11 response times are really 5:01 and they have
12 probably been that way because we never counted it
13 in the past. I will say the reality is simple.
14 Former deputy mayor Ed Scala [phonetic] was here
15 three or four years ago, and he said when talking
16 about UCT, I know that Steve Cassidy said five
17 seconds and then they transfer the calls pre-UCT,
18 but we don't know how much that is. And now
19 Deputy Mayor Holloway walks in and says 125
20 seconds to 135 seconds per UCT. How is that
21 possible? I am pretty sure he was sitting behind
22 Ed Scala when Ed Scala gave that testimony. The
23 whole thing is a cover. They are covering
24 themselves up for the mistakes that they have
25 made, and they got caught in the last six months

1
2 of their administration. Does anybody really
3 believe that they would be giving you this
4 information if some of these things that have
5 happened over the last few months didn't happen?
6 I don't believe that. Just like I don't believe
7 that they were having a meeting the day Sandy
8 struck, otherwise we wouldn't have had this
9 information last year. Maybe you believe it.
10 Maybe some other people believe it, but I don't
11 believe it. They institute UCT and Deputy Mayor
12 says we went from 429 to 415 to 408 and now we
13 have gone back to 501, but don't worry about it
14 because fire fatalities are down. The truth of
15 the matter is they have not been reporting real
16 response times. I don't know if their 5:01 is a
17 real number. I know one thing that he said that
18 is true. The public deserves to know. If your
19 family member is having a heart attack, needs
20 medical attention, if your home is on fire, if you
21 have some disaster that you need the New York City
22 Fire Department from the time you dial 911 'till
23 they show up and show up to help you--right, if
24 you are on the 30th floor and they show up in front
25 of the building, it takes them another ten

1
2 minutes. The Fire Department says we were there
3 in six minutes, but you are dead, and it took us
4 ten minutes to get up there. Don't worry about
5 it. We are going to report it as six minutes.
6 The facts are the facts. They are afraid of the
7 facts. They have misrepresented the history of
8 them reporting these facts and now they have this
9 we don't know. I want the Council to know that
10 several years ago the UFA asked for from the city
11 pre-UCT 911 phone conversations, a whole bank of
12 them, hours of them, so we could go through and
13 find fire emergencies and see how long it took the
14 operator to transfer the call, the 911 operator to
15 the fire department. Do you know what their
16 answer was? We didn't save any of those. We
17 can't give them to you. We FOIL-ed them, and they
18 told us they don't have them. My assertion, which
19 I will say again today, based on 911 operators
20 that the UFA has interviewed pre-UCT when you
21 dialed 911, the operator would say what is your
22 emergency and where are you calling from. When
23 you said you wanted to report a fire or medical
24 emergency, you were transferred within five
25 seconds to that borough. Deputy Mayor Holloway is

1
2 talking about six seconds for phone rings. They
3 never mentioned that ever before. Did they find
4 out now that their system years ago didn't really
5 work? Is that what they are trying to tell us?
6 Five seconds was the average to transfer the call,
7 and then the clock started. They didn't count
8 those five seconds. For the last four years, they
9 haven't been counting the minute, minute and a
10 half, two minutes and now they are here saying
11 technology allows us to do end to end response
12 times and we are asking you to trust us. Well, I
13 can tell you that the public I don't believe
14 trusts them, and their story today was
15 preposterous. Thank you.

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you.
17 Thank you, Steve Cassidy. I appreciate your
18 testimony. I agree with a lot of what you said in
19 response to the Deputy Mayor's testimony
20 especially as it relates to response times being
21 the reason why fire fatalities are at an all-time
22 low. You mentioned smoke detectors. Smoke alarms
23 that are free that are given--there is a lot of
24 money the department is now spending on fire
25 prevention as well as sprinkler laws that have

1
2 been put in place and enacted only a few years ago
3 and that has a lot to do with suppressing fires.
4 I know that your department is working harder--
5 your members of the department, your firefighters,
6 than ever before, and I know that this unified
7 call taking system has made it more difficult a
8 job for them to do. I believe that today we will
9 at least get to the bottom of the real response
10 times, the work that the administration is
11 promising to do, the measurement and again, I
12 thank you for your advocacy. I am going to move
13 to Lieutenant Boles followed by Israel Miranda.

14 LT. EDDIE BOLES: Thank you for the
15 opportunity. My name is Lieutenant Eddie Boles.
16 I am the treasurer of the Uniformed Fire Officers
17 Association. I share in the frustration of
18 Council Member Jimmy Oddo. I have been sitting
19 here for eight years, and that was probably one of
20 the most incredible shows that I have ever seen in
21 regards to being displayed--a real disservice to
22 the public, to the City Council, to the family
23 that is sitting here next to us and my heart and
24 soul and the members that responded that day, our
25 heart and soul goes out to you because the real

1
2 story is that our brothers and sisters in the
3 Police Department they responded. They are from
4 the precinct that is attached to the firehouse.
5 It is three and a half blocks away. They were
6 responding. Our guys were sitting going what is
7 going on and they didn't get the ticket until
8 almost 4 and 20 after. Over four minutes
9 afterward, that is the truth, not assertions that
10 were portrayed earlier, those are truths and for a
11 system--Steve said it. What were they hiding?
12 Both of our unions spent time, energy, money,
13 attorney fees in order to seek the truth. It's
14 not the truth for us. It is not the truth for our
15 members. You know who it is the truth for? It's
16 the truth of the people that we serve. We take an
17 oath, a sworn oath to save property and lives in
18 this city. That is our oath. That is our
19 obligation. That is the dedication of our
20 members, both firefighters, fire officer and it is
21 a big team. It starts with the 911 call takers.
22 The 911 call takers are part of that team. They
23 get the call. Then in years past what happened
24 was--what is the emergency, where is it? Fire?
25 Good. Boom. Transferred to the fire alarm

1
2 dispatchers. They got the information, clock
3 starts, then they triage it, and it is very
4 specific and we have talked about this for years.
5 It is very specific. Fire calls are happening at
6 that minute. I am in a back bedroom of an
7 apartment on the 5th floor and my apartment is on
8 fire and I need help. Now this--a majority of our
9 calls are life threatening calls that it is
10 happening at the moment, and it is critical that
11 we get resources there as quickly as possible, and
12 I agree, yeah, let's get them rolling, but at what
13 degree? The system has repeatedly failed. You
14 see two boxes in front of you. Two heavy boxes.
15 Elizabeth Crowley, I don't know if you have been
16 working out lately. I dare you to lift one of
17 these boxes. These are UCT forms. These UCT
18 forms have been generated since 2009 when they
19 said, yeah, there is a problem, and our members
20 are having a problem, and let me tell you. My
21 members don't like to do paperwork. They are up
22 to here with paperwork. Every day we get UCT
23 forms. Every single day, so that stack that was
24 two years ago might have been two feet high is now
25 four feet high. Every day we get them. What does

1
2 that tell you? That tells you that something is
3 going wrong. Now when we asked for the report,
4 why didn't we just get it? Why didn't you get it?
5 Why did we have to go to court, and not only that,
6 it had to go to appeals in order to get the truth.
7 What are they hiding? I ask you that. What are
8 they hiding? That is one point. I am also glad
9 that Jimmy Oddo brought up the technology thing in
10 regards to radios. 100 firefighters died in the
11 North Tower on 9/11 'cause radios failed. Radios
12 failed that day. This system is failing. How
13 many more lives have to be lost before this system
14 is corrected properly. In the report as was
15 stated, it is our findings that current UCT
16 process is dangerous to the citizens of New York
17 City and personnel. And they had 20 critical
18 recommendations. I was hoping that someone would
19 ask if any of those recommendations were fully
20 implemented. Now they said it was implemented,
21 but I didn't hear what the recommendations were.
22 I didn't hear how they followed up. please I
23 would follow up on that. In regards to fire
24 apparatus. Are we responding any faster? Do the
25 citizens of New York want our apparatus to go even

1
2 faster than we are going now? We are not going
3 any faster. We are going as fast as we can in a
4 safe manner so our members can get there and get
5 the resources to help the people in need. They
6 call us up. we respond as safely and quickly as
7 we can because we want to help anyone who is in
8 need of our services. that is what we do. That
9 is what we do day in and day out. I am really
10 upset when I hear that, oh, this is all about
11 saving jobs. This has nothing to do with saving
12 jobs. This has to do with again our obligation to
13 the citizens of New York to save lives. In
14 regards to water on the fire, well, you know, I
15 don't know how many hallways that our deputy
16 mayors crawl down. I don't know how many
17 hallways--can assume how many hallways brother
18 Cassidy has crawled down. I can tell you I have
19 crawled down a bunch. Brother Faro [phonetic] who
20 is here with me... Water on the fire, it is in the
21 books. You read our books. Steve was from an
22 engine company. More lives and property is saved
23 by water on the fire than any other tactic that we
24 have. It is imperative. It is important to know
25 that if there is a fire, the time that we can get

1
2 water on that fire is incredibly important and the
3 amount of lives we are going to save and the
4 amount of property we are going to save. So to
5 dismiss it is really disingenuous. Civilian
6 injuries, yeah, you know what, a great thing is
7 fire fatalities have gone down, unbelievable
8 thing. They use two measurements in regards to
9 keeping firehouses open, right? They say well,
10 the response times are faster and fire fatalities
11 are down, and that is great. it is great that fire
12 fatalities are down. Certain things were
13 indicated. I want to add more that are indicated
14 why they are down. They are down. What about
15 medical treatment? All of our members are now
16 trained in CFRD, so if a civilian is in danger at
17 a fire, we are able to provide medical treatment
18 right away. Our EMTs and our paramedics, they are
19 there right with us at a fire. We bring them out
20 of a fire, we see the brothers and sisters from
21 EMS and paramedics there. We pass them to them.
22 Boom. There is immediate medical treatment being
23 done right on the scene, and then what about
24 medical technology? Medical technology has
25 increased significantly over the years. what they

1
2 haven't pointed out and what I pointed out in the
3 budget testimony was this: civilian injuries are
4 up. Civilian injuries are increased. I don't
5 have the number in front of me. Firefighter
6 injuries are increased because we are getting
7 their later, and that means the fires are burning
8 hotter because of the system. The system is not
9 working. When we get the call, we are getting
10 delayed responses. I used an example yesterday--
11 well, I will use two examples. In 2009 when I
12 testified in--

13 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: [interposing]

14 - - .

15 LT. EDDIE BOLES: Listen, we have
16 been here for four hours.

17 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: One minute?

18 LT. EDDIE BOLES: When I testified
19 in 2009 there was a fire in Woodside. It was at
20 UCT the wrong address was given and I saw a member
21 last night, and he is still upset over it. The
22 fire was a few blocks away from the firehouse.
23 They were given the wrong address so they went a
24 different route. When they got there, there were
25 three people in the basement screaming and they

1
2 couldn't get them out. And then you saw the
3 investigation and everything - - the UCT system.
4 Yesterday in Brooklyn there was a fire, the first
5 response to that fire went to Queens went to 124th
6 Street and Beach Avenue in Queens, wrong address.
7 The second one went to another location in
8 Brooklyn. Guess what? Wrong address. They
9 finally got the right address on the third
10 location. The third location they were sent to
11 the proper location and when they got there they
12 immediately called for additional resources
13 because of the elevation of fire. It is not the
14 fault of those hardworking people, 911 call
15 takers. They are doing the best they can with
16 limited resources. The system has to be revamped,
17 has to be looked--and look at the Windborn report.
18 The Windborn report says it should be discontinued
19 because it doesn't work. In Westchester they had
20 UCT, and they stopped using it, and I believe the
21 same happened in Chicago, but I can get back to
22 you. Thank you.

23 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
24 Lieutenant. I want to thank you and the
25 Firefighters Association for the work you have

1
2 done together to bring about these draft reports.
3 They are damning, the reports scathing, and I have
4 never doubted the work that you have done as a
5 union, most importantly the members that are out
6 there every day risking their lives for the people
7 of the city of New York. So I want you to know
8 that I am incredibly grateful to our firefighters
9 and fire officers. I am going to now ask Israel
10 Miranda and Vincent Variale. Israel, please begin

11 ISRAEL MIRANDA: Good afternoon,
12 Committee Chairs and distinguished members of the
13 committee. I will get right to the point. My
14 testimony today should not be considered harsh
15 criticism of EMS policies; it should be construed
16 as an effort to enlighten committee members to the
17 reality that is the result of the EMS response
18 time matrix. I will attempt to remove the
19 camouflage the response matrix provides to the
20 mortality and morbidity of New York City residents
21 as reported in the annual mayor's managerial
22 report. Response times as reported by the bureau
23 of EMS are a standalone concept that is grossly
24 inaccurate and misleading. It is therefore
25 essentially meaningless. The response times are

1
2 inaccurate because they are gathered using a
3 flawed methodology. The reported response times
4 are meaningless because they are never correlated
5 to other statistics as reported in the mayor's
6 managerial report. When compared to stats
7 contained in that report, the response times
8 become a cause of major concern and demonstrate
9 the need for more accurate reporting and more
10 importantly, a redirection of how and why
11 resources are deployed. The response times as
12 currently reported are politically motivated and
13 mathematically indefensible. During 2012, the EMS
14 response times in segment 1, 2, 3 call types was
15 six and a half minutes. These calls are cardiac
16 arrest, choking, heart attacks. A response time
17 of six and a half is most admirable and the
18 Department - - financial as well as personal
19 resources towards improving it; however the time
20 as reported is essentially inconsequential. The
21 cardiac death rate in New York City as reported by
22 the Bureau of Vital Statistics has absolutely no
23 relationship to this much touted response time.
24 The Department would have you believe an
25 exceptionally quick response time - - exceptional

1 reports. It is simply not true. As you can see
2 in chart number one of your package, EMS response
3 time is totally disjointed from the overall rate
4 of cardiac mortality and morbidity. The cardiac
5 death rate is totally independent from the
6 response times. The reason may be inaccurate
7 reporting of the response time for the most
8 serious of emergencies. Current response time is
9 measured from the moment the dispatcher receives
10 the assignment and continues until the unit
11 transmits an on scene signal when arriving in
12 front of a given street location; however, first
13 patient contact or treatment initiation may still
14 be precious minutes away as crews often must walk
15 winding courtyards, ride high rise elevators,
16 climb down subway stairs and even climb up
17 apartment building stairs. All these are
18 environmental impediments and adversely affect the
19 true response time. The time the caller spends
20 with the 911 operator or call receiving operator
21 is not included in the reported response times.
22 Multiple studies from the 70s have demonstrated
23 the relationship between early pre-hospital
24 intervention and a decrease in cardiac mortality;
25

1
2 however, these studies are predicated on accurate
3 response time measurements. Accurate response
4 time measurements is not employed by the FDNY.
5 The only truly accurate measurement of response
6 time is derived from calculating the time first
7 contact with the 911 operator and the practitioner
8 arriving at the patient's side. - - New York
9 City - - between cardiac mortality and response
10 time cannot be accurately measured, and any
11 attempt at improvement is just a pig with
12 expensive lipstick. The stats as contained in the
13 FDNY section of the annual mayor's managerial
14 report also camouflages the consequences of
15 fluctuating EMS response times to many life
16 threatening emergencies. NYPD reports yearly
17 homicide deaths, FDNY reports yearly fire deaths,
18 DOT reports yearly traffic deaths. Those
19 incidents when called into 911 are usually
20 reported as a shooting, stabbing or structural
21 fire with people trapped, motor vehicle accidents
22 or pedestrian involved incidents. These call
23 types are then triaged into a broader category of
24 one, two, three. There is no reported delineation
25 for response times to the incidents in these

1
2 categories. If an ambulance crew reaches a
3 gunshot victim in a reasonable amount of time,
4 that person becomes a surviving patient or an
5 assault, if the response time is extraordinarily
6 long, that gunshot victim becomes a homicide
7 state. Look at chart number two - - clearly
8 demonstrates the relationship between EMS response
9 and the homicide rates, yet the Department fails
10 to accurately report the response times to these
11 types of incidents and is not able to - - on the
12 policy bases appropriate resources to achieve a
13 reduction in the death rate. When the citizen is
14 struck by an automobile, cars collide - - a quick
15 EMS response time is of the essence, the quicker
16 the incidents are responded to the better the
17 patient outcome. Chart three again demonstrates
18 the relationship between these incidents and the
19 response time of EMS ambulances. Again, the
20 Department does not delineate these instances, and
21 again any response adjustments are not possible as
22 the Department cannot vet [phonetic] the resources
23 in order to reduce the number of fatalities.
24 Rather than repeat what I have already testified
25 to, I will refer the committee to review chart

1
2 number four and draw the same conclusions
3 regarding fire deaths as previously outlined with
4 other entities. One method of achieving a low
5 mortality rate for the accepted performance - -
6 putting an end to what I call triage tricks.
7 During my last testimony before the Council, I
8 spoke about the policy of call queuing . Soon
9 after that hearing, the practice was discounted
10 only to be replaced by a new trick. Currently any
11 citizen that contacts EMS a second time with
12 regard to change in patient's condition has that
13 assignment re-triaged to a higher priority. The
14 initial call is then closed out and the response
15 time clock is restarted as if the second call was
16 actually the first notification; thus,
17 administratively reducing the reporting response
18 time for that incident. Now going to the new ICAD
19 system--I know there are a lot of people here to
20 call, so I am just going to--

21 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I appreciate
22 your testimony, Mr. Miranda, which is very good
23 because it was about the bills, and we haven't
24 heard a lot of the bills, and I will take into
25 consideration what you have alleged about the

1
2 second time a call gets put in. That is very
3 interesting. We will definitely follow up with
4 the administration. If you could tell us--I know
5 it was your member that was accused by the Fire
6 Commissioner of not doing their job property that
7 day.

8 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: That is what I
9 wanted to get to from the beginning. - - really
10 didn't want to read that - - read it on your own
11 time. I am very frustrated and so are all of my
12 members because we all know for three weeks going
13 back that these problems were happening with the
14 system. It did crash. Information was going into
15 cyber space and showing up on people's screens 15
16 minutes later, ten minutes later. On that day
17 there was nothing on that member's screen. The
18 Commissioner got in front of a news camera and
19 accused this member of not doing her job, and
20 getting up and walking away from her chair when at
21 no time did this member walk away, and that was
22 been proven. Now they talk about these interviews
23 that they are doing. They are not interviews.
24 They are interrogations under oath, Gestapo style.
25 11 people will be interrogated this week coming

1
2 up. Four people have been interrogated already.
3 The member in question has been interrogated twice
4 and then yesterday I get a call from her that she
5 has been tested for drugs. She came up on a list
6 tested for drugs. What a coincidence that
7 everything is happening to this girl while they
8 are investigating her. This is the kind of
9 harassment--

10 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: How many
11 years did this call dispatcher have on the job?

12 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: 23 years on the
13 job, 20 years working in that trusted position.

14 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: And without a
15 doubt you believe it was a computer error that day

16 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: I know there was
17 a computer error and they are never going to admit
18 it. The problem here is if you have an agency
19 investigating itself, what do you think the
20 outcome is going to be of that? What they want it
21 to be. We need an independent investigation, not
22 just into this problem, but some of these other
23 problems.

24 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: You are
25 absolutely right. We will push for an independent

1
2 investigation.

3 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: I appreciate to
4 be able to get that off of my chest, and I hope
5 that on your free time you can read the rest of my
6 testimony.

7 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Absolutely.

8 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: Thank you very
9 much.

10 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Vincent
11 Variale followed by Faye Smyth [phonetic].

12 VINCENT VARIALE: Good morning,
13 Chairwoman Elizabeth Crowley.

14 [crosstalk]

15 VINCENT VARIALE: It's been a long
16 day. No problem. Chairwoman Elizabeth Crowley,
17 Chairman Cabrera, distinguished panel City
18 Council, my name is Vincent Variale. I am
19 president of the Uniformed EMS Officer's Union of
20 the FDNY. I represent 500 EMS captain and
21 lieutenants of the New York City Fire Department,
22 EMS Command, some of those who happen to work in
23 the emergency medical dispatch and who also were
24 there that day. In this latest incident regarding
25 911 emergency communications system, the

1
2 Commissioner stated human error was the cause of
3 that delay. That contention is a lie. Rather
4 than spending time fixing the blame, the
5 Commissioner's time would be better spent fixing
6 the problem. The problem of the calls vanishing
7 into cyberspace is not unique to our dispatch
8 system. The call relay issues plague all systems
9 currently employing ICAD. The agencies in San
10 Jose, California and Nassau County are
11 experiencing the same glitches that result in the
12 death of the innocent four year old girl, Ariel
13 Russo. In previous testimony before the City
14 Council, I outlined the failure of the Department
15 to adequately establish contingency plans. The
16 inept decisions and chaos that ensues in this
17 Department is a direct result of failed
18 leadership. The torch of the leadership failures
19 of EMS Chief Abner Lamode [phonetic] has now been
20 passed onto Commissioner Cassano as witnessed by
21 his false accusations and irresponsible comments.
22 The members of the Uniformed EMS Officers' Union
23 stand with the dispatcher being faulty held
24 responsible for the documented glitches in the 88
25 million dollar - - known as ICAD. The overriding

1
2 concern I am expressing is for the safety of our
3 members and the lives of the people in New York
4 City. This is not about jobs. The truth of the
5 matter is, there are major flaws in the 911 system
6 and they need to be addressed before another
7 innocent life is taken from us. The Fire
8 Commissioner and I do agree on one thing. The
9 Fire Department EMS command is non-compliant with
10 the national, state and city regulations regarding
11 span of control. When discussing the issue of
12 response times, the mandate of span of control is
13 always ignored despite the fact that adequate span
14 of control plays a major role and a demonstrative
15 impact on a mortality and morbidity rates.

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Mr. Variale,
17 sorry to cut you off.

18 VINCENT VARIALE: - - response
19 times - - paragraph left.

20 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: How does it
21 relate to your members? Your members are doing
22 the responding as well and then if you could
23 briefly get into what you believe happened that
24 day on June 4th.

25 VINCENT VARIALE: Absolutely.

1
2 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I know your
3 members were in the room as well.

4 VINCENT VARIALE: Yes. Absolutely.
5 The reason I bring up the response times, the
6 impact of the span and control and all of that is
7 because whenever an EMS captain or lieutenant
8 responds to a cardiac arrest, if we had the
9 sufficient staffing for span of control, the Fire
10 Department's own statistics have shown the
11 survival rate increases by 23 percent, yet they
12 have done nothing to follow the federal, state and
13 city regulations that state they should have a
14 span of control out there, and it continues and
15 the Fire Commissioner has admitted that at one of
16 the hearings.

17 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: We agree.

18 VINCENT VARIALE: Now, I will move
19 on to what has been happening. On that particular
20 day I have spoken to my members. There were five
21 officers present that day. There was a captain
22 and four lieutenants. I have spoken to three of
23 the lieutenants and the captain. No one has seen
24 this on the screens. No one has said they have
25 seen it. This call actually came over as what is

1
2 considered a low priority, and I am not sure why
3 PD 1013, which is an officer call for help, and it
4 was on the screen. My officers have told me that
5 they have seen that, the PD 1013 on the screen.

6 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: There was
7 never an EMS dispatcher put on the line to talk to
8 the police officer.

9 VINCENT VARIALE: No. The call
10 came from police operators and it was sent to EMS
11 to the relay. Originally it was sent as a PD
12 1013, and that is all everybody knows. - - struck
13 after that was when it was sent out.

14 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: When that has
15 happened in the past, have they conferenced in EMS
16 dispatchers?

17 VINCENT VARIALE: When a police
18 officer asks for help? No, I don't believe they
19 do that. I think with calls they do that, but not
20 with a radio call from a police officer in the
21 street. Now I have also received complaints from
22 members operating in the field that messages
23 between police and EMS are getting lost in the
24 system. it is actually a daily occurrence where
25 motor vehicle accidents, major incidents out in

1
2 the field, requests for police--we have units
3 waiting on scene for five hours, four hours for
4 police assistance, and then they go back and look
5 at the messages and they are gone. They are in
6 cyberspace somewhere. This is a serious problem
7 because it affects the health and safety of all of
8 our members and most of all the safety and the
9 lives of people in the city.

10 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
11 Mr. Variale. I want to make sure that all the
12 fire unions stay just for a few more minutes. We
13 are going to listen to the testimony from the Fire
14 Dispatcher's President, Faye Smyth, and then I
15 know a few of my colleagues have questions before
16 we hear from the police call takers unions and
17 then the family and then the general public.

18 FAYE SMYTH: Thank you, Chairperson
19 Crowley, your co-chair, Mr. Cabrera. I have heard
20 a lot of testimony here today. I was taking notes
21 when Cas Holloway was there. I remember sitting
22 here when Skylar [phonetic] was testifying about
23 the 911 system and we were up in the gallery and
24 we almost got kicked out because of the comments
25 we were making because we were so outraged. This

1
2 pilot program that they call UCT, it doesn't
3 exist. When the originally put it online, they
4 tried to do it without having us on the calls, and
5 now they have been augmenting it. We are still on
6 the phone calls. We are still then. When they
7 connect to us, we are still there. When they say
8 it is a unified call taking system, that is a
9 myth. It doesn't exist. The 911 consolidation.
10 Well, we were in five different locations for the
11 Fire Department. EMS was in another location. PD
12 was already existing in 11 Metrotech. The
13 consolidation into one location, they took us out
14 of city-owned buildings that the Fire Department
15 owned and put us into a leased building that we
16 pay rent in. When they say things are going on
17 inside there, and it is a better thing where all
18 the agencies can talk to each other, they have no
19 idea what they are talking about. That is not how
20 it works. It has never been how it works. The
21 false response times. I can tell you that even
22 with this new system--and we haven't gotten this
23 system yet. I don't know if everyone is aware of
24 that. We used to have the Sprint system, and EMS
25 had Sprint, which they still do and PD had Sprint.

1
2 Fire Department had the CAD system, which was Star
3 Fire. Now that they have changed over to
4 Intergraph, now we have three systems not talking
5 to each other. So their improvement has actually
6 made it more complicated. The Fire Department has
7 purchased this system. We have nothing against
8 technology. A reported outside had asked us if we
9 were just bitching 'cause we are losing jobs. We
10 haven't lost one job because of this system. We
11 haven't lost one job because of it. It is a
12 failed tactic what they are doing. We are getting
13 20 to 30 screens extra coming over through the
14 system that bottleneck and there is no
15 prioritization when we get these incidents into
16 our computer, so we are still getting that
17 problem. The Windborn report tells you everything
18 everybody has been talking about, and I am not
19 even going to mention that. The five seconds that
20 you mentioned and I think that Cas Holloway had
21 said 120 to 135 seconds, I will give you an
22 example. Somebody count. Fire Department,
23 Dispatcher so and so. What is the address of your
24 fire? They will say either the address or they
25 won't and they will say fire. As soon as they say

1
2 fire, it doesn't matter whether they gave the
3 address or not, the police dispatcher before UCT
4 would say, what borough, as soon as they said,
5 what borough, hold on for the Fire Department.
6 That is it. Most cases they wouldn't give an
7 address. They would sit on the phone while the
8 Fire Department was there and listen to the call
9 if anything was needed for the police department
10 to respond to. It was pretty effective. Now they
11 are doing it in the reverse and saying it is new.
12 Now the police dispatcher is giving a precursor
13 interview and then sending it over and then we are
14 on the phones anyway, so I don't know where they
15 are going with that.

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: The old
17 system wasn't broken dispatching fire to the--

18 FAYE SMYTH: That is correct. They
19 fixed something that wasn't broken. I just need
20 to comment on what he was talking about. They
21 fixed a non-broken system. They took all of the
22 fire--not all, they say that we are in a unified
23 system. we are not. There are three boroughs
24 that are in Metrotech at this time--the Queens
25 office and the Bronx office are still located

1
2 where they are in the Bronx and respectively in
3 Queens. They have this 2011 switchover that they
4 said was 15 million, that it was successful. I
5 have no idea what they are talking about with
6 that. The redundancy. They say we didn't have
7 backup? We had backup for years. It just wasn't
8 technologically advanced, but we depended on
9 people, we depended on their geography skills, we
10 depended on them looking at the paper, going over
11 to what we had--we had a direct connection into
12 the firehouse, which we still do. So they know
13 where they are going. We give them the box
14 number. We would tell them what they had, and
15 that is all they needed. They went. In answering
16 little Ariel Russo, when we got that, we had a
17 fire engine dispatched in six seconds when we
18 finally got it on the fire side.

19 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: - - do you
20 know who was first on the scene? Was it an
21 engine?

22 FAYE SMYTH: 76 engine. 76 engine
23 is right around the corner, so yes, within six
24 seconds. They were sitting in the fire house.
25 They couldn't understand what all the sirens were

2 about because they didn't get it because we didn't
3 get it. I can only say - - Sophia and Alan Russo,
4 I am so sorry for your loss. We have always had
5 this backup, so if all boroughs failed--if any
6 borough failed in the past in the fire Department,
7 any borough failed, we can switch over the another
8 borough, so where they are located has nothing to
9 do anything. They bought a 50 million dollar
10 property in the Bronx and they have a 600 million
11 dollar building. Now I can tell you that three
12 months ago at least I wrote an e-mail to Cas
13 Holloway. They had sent people down to Fairfax,
14 Virginia to look a state of the art facility to
15 put people in, and to this day, the facility that
16 they have in the Bronx doesn't even come close to
17 it. I think in New York City we should be
18 embarrassed, and I am sorry that we are here again
19 today because we keep testifying and nothing is
20 done.

21 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I understand
22 your frustration. To all of the unions that will
23 testify, I know you had to condense your
24 testimony. Your entire testimony will be a part
25 of the record. I am sorry to have to cut you off,

1
2 but in the interest of time and the number of
3 people here--

4 FAYE SMYTH: [interposing] But P.T.
5 Barnum took four hours. I just wanted to let you
6 know.

7 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I know. I
8 know your frustration.

9 COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: I am sorry
10 I missed part of the hearing because we were
11 negotiating the budget, but witnesses just said
12 two things that I really have to take some umbrage
13 to, and maybe I misheard Mr. Variale say that
14 everyone saw a low priority call come up on the
15 screen, officer needs assistance. If that as a
16 low priority call, we need to hold another
17 hearing. I don't get that. I mean cat in the
18 tree that is a low priority call. Officer needs
19 assistance, I think that is pretty important, no?

20 VINCENT VARIALE: I would agree
21 with you. Yes. I don't know why it is a priority
22 7. I am not sure I understand that.

23 COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: So officer
24 needs assistance comes up on the screen, and you
25 go to something else 'cause it's not important?

2 VINCENT VARIALE: - - I don't have
3 an answer to give you. I don't know why it is a
4 priority 7. It should be given a higher priority.
5 I agree with you.

6 COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Madam
7 Chairwoman, I think we need to have a hearing
8 about that, and the other I am afraid I have to
9 take a deal of exception to. The prior witness
10 complained that the agency was investigating what
11 happened, interrogating each and every person to
12 find out what happened that day. This woman lost
13 her child. She is entitled to answers. What
14 would we be saying here today had they not
15 investigated it? We would be wondering what they
16 were covering up. Now we may get to the point of
17 an independent report, maybe we should. I have a
18 feeling Mr. Rubenstein [phonetic] will get to that
19 somebody in court, but quite frankly, I would be
20 offended if they weren't asking everybody what
21 they thought happened. Let's wait until we get
22 the report we decide that it is biased and
23 improper. The facts will ultimately come out. I
24 have every confidence of that, but she is entitled
25 to answers, and if they were sitting on their

1
2 behinds not asking the questions I would be
3 outraged.

4 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: I appreciate
5 that, and I feel so bad for the family. I have
6 two kids myself, 11 and 5 and the person in
7 question is also a mother. You know, the truth
8 has to come out. If everybody is saying that this
9 call was not on their screen, it wasn't there. To
10 put the blame on a human person, when it has to do
11 with the system--I don't understand what kind of
12 person--

13 COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Where I
14 agree with you is that any conclusions that have
15 been reached before a full and proper
16 investigation is done. I am not offended for
17 someone who is working for 23 years who is asked
18 what happened. Somebody died. That is what is
19 should be happening. If they weren't doing that
20 we would all be very upset.

21 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: What did happen
22 was that they accused the person without doing an
23 investigation in the public, and that is wrong.

24 COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: That is
25 wrong.

2 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: Any agency, if
3 you don't know the Fire Department, any agency
4 that investigates itself we know what the answer
5 is going to be. They are not going to take the
6 blame for it. You need an independent group of
7 people to investigate this.

8 COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: I think
9 ultimately you will have your independent report,
10 but I think the first order of business is for the
11 agency itself to try and figure out what the heck
12 happened here that a child died. That to me is
13 priority number one, and I don't think anyone who
14 is working that day should be offended at being
15 asked that question. I agree they should not have
16 jumped to a conclusion. People need to cooperate
17 because she is entitled to answers.

18 ISRAEL MARTINEZ: I understand what
19 you are saying, and - - offended in that way. You
20 maybe took it out of context. They are offended
21 that they were accused with an investigation first
22 in public, which was unfair to them. Maybe that
23 clears up the misunderstanding on what you are
24 thinking.

25 MALE VOICE: I would like to add to

1
2 that too. They are not offended. Obviously, you
3 are right. They should be questioned, but the
4 fact is the way they are being treated as if they
5 are guilty already by this Department because this
6 Department wants to put this on them - - started
7 blaming them. I just wanted to add to that.

8 Thank you.

9 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: I have a
10 question. Have you ever had a similar situation
11 where there is a call from the field to the
12 dispatcher and it was not--the information was
13 nowhere to be found or it was delayed by two,
14 three, four minutes?

15 FAYE SMYTH: I can tell you on the
16 fire side, we received calls through this new
17 system--I said we don't have it, but we do have
18 some screens that come over that are new. When--

19 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: [interposing]
20 No, no because otherwise--I need to know from the
21 field, not the 911 call, but from the field, has
22 there been a call from the field from police
23 officers or for any other person in the field
24 calling in and then there was a four minute delay
25 or anything similar to that?

1
2 FAYE SMYTH: I think you are better
3 off asking the police department union that
4 question because they are the only ones that have
5 that so they would be able to answer that for you.
6 I am telling you as the user on the fire end side
7 that we have called the police department for
8 something that they have already sent to us and
9 they have said, we have no record of it. It's
10 gone in cyberspace. It is gone.

11 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: And that is
12 useful information. I thought I heard--maybe I
13 just missed it, but not only the police department
14 can call from the field, but EMS and FDNY. Is
15 that incorrect what was presented?

16 FAYE SMYTH: I think I
17 misunderstood you. Are you talking about this new
18 system or are you talking about from the field in
19 general? Any time one of our field units can
20 call.

21 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: I am talking
22 about--you remember this one--from the field from
23 the system--

24 FAYE SMYTH: [interposing] I can't
25 see it. Is that with ICAD, the new one?

1
2 COUNCIL MEMBER RODRIGUEZ: It says
3 here 911 process the PSAC 1, NYPD ICAD.

4 FAYE SMYTH: I am being told that
5 is ICAD, which I cannot comment on because we
6 don't have that yet. That is the system that they
7 have at the police department.

8 [crosstalk]

9 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Beautiful.
10 Thank you.

11 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you. I
12 am sorry that we had to cut your testimony short,
13 and I am sorry that you had to wait so long today,
14 but the conversation, the testimony it just does
15 not end here. We have our work ahead of us.
16 Thank you for being here. Our next panel before
17 we hear from Ariel Russo's family--and I think is
18 important that the family hears from all of the
19 unions because they have a different side of the
20 story--is the Police Call Taking Union, and we
21 have four representatives that would like to come.
22 I imagine that only one will testify. I imagine
23 that Eddie Rodriguez will testify, but Alma Roper
24 [phonetic] will also be available for questions,
25 John Armstrong and as well as Tracy Whitehead.

1
2 These are the 911 call takers who are the first to
3 receive the phone call. Once you are ready to
4 begin your testimony, Mr. Rodriguez, please--

5 EDDIE RODRIGUEZ: Good afternoon,
6 everybody. My name is Eddie Rodriguez. I am the
7 president of Local 1549 that represents the 911
8 operators and dispatchers and I am also president
9 of the Council DC 37. I am going to say a few
10 words. Alma is going to testify. We have my
11 colleagues that does the 911 dispatch that are
12 also going to testify. I have been hearing all of
13 this testimony how frustrated we are, not just
14 1549 members, the New York Police, FD, EMS. You
15 hear all of this testimony how frustrated. This
16 system do not work. We know that. We have been
17 hearing over and over and over again. The
18 public's safety is at risk. - - . Every time
19 when something happens, when it is a death or
20 something happens in the city of New York, that is
21 when they want to get involved. What does it
22 take? It is sad what happened to the family that
23 lost a child. For us to come here knowing that
24 this system has not been working - - frustration
25 my members working hard, the overtime they do. -

1
2 - 42 hours a week doing over times, sometimes
3 more. That is overwhelming. I am so angry, but I
4 am going to have Alma Roper who comes from 911,
5 understands 911, she is going to testify, so let
6 me give you Alma Roper, the first executive vice
7 president of Local 1549.

8 ALMA ROPER: Good evening, Council
9 Chair Crowley and Cabrera and all of the other
10 Council Members that are here this afternoon. I
11 have got to calm down because I am very upset
12 about a lot of things that have been said here
13 this afternoon, but before I start I must give
14 condolences to the Russo Family. What can you say
15 to the loss of a child? God bless you in this
16 time of your sorrow, and that is on behalf of all
17 of the 911 operators and District Council 37. God
18 bless you. Like Eddie said, my name is Alma
19 Roper, and I am the executive vice president of
20 Local 1549, also District Council 37 vice
21 president representing 16,000 clerical,
22 administrative employees in nearly all city
23 agencies in New York. We all know that this
24 system has a lot of malfunction. I sat here today
25 and heard the Deputy Mayor stand here and speak on

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2 the 911 system. It is amazing how someone can
3 speak on something that they have never ever
4 worked on and say what should be done and what
5 should not be done when they didn't come to the
6 members that do the system, work the system each
7 and every day. When Council Member James asked
8 did 911 need any additional operators I wanted to
9 just stand up and say when he said no, he didn't
10 think so, I wanted to say my members is working
11 12, 16, 32 hours a week and that is not the
12 regular times that they work. They work 35 hours,
13 the normal work week. This is additional, and
14 they have been doing this for almost six months
15 now. Since February now they have been doing
16 this. So what makes him think that we are
17 understaffed? We are totally understaffed. We
18 have spent so far--the city has spent over four
19 million dollars in overtime on 911. Today my
20 members wanted to be here, but they couldn't.
21 They held three squads and they have been doing
22 this on a regular basis to the 911 operators.
23 That day, that tragic day that this woman's child
24 was mowed down the police was chasing--let me go
25 back so you can understand exactly what happened

1
2 because I am hearing some things that are not
3 right. Everyone is saying called in, called in.
4 When the dispatcher gets the job, the police
5 officers do not call that job. They radio that
6 job in. it is not like they are on the phone.
7 They are on the radio. The police officer was on
8 a car stop and they radioed the car stop in, and
9 that is how they got that job. When it came in
10 that the child was hit, the dispatcher inputs the
11 job into the system. there is a difference
12 between the 911 operator and the dispatch
13 inputting a job into the system. when the
14 dispatcher inputs the job into the system, the
15 dispatcher cannot go on to EMS and give EMS the
16 information, so the job has to be routed into EMS.
17 There is a button now that they push for EMS.
18 Okay. Before with the old system we used to route
19 it A and F and it would go right into EMS. It is
20 still supposed to do the exact same thing. I
21 don't know if it does--

22 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Would you
23 agree that there is a problem with that system if
24 the police officer cannot talk to an EMT?

25 ALMA ROPER: Yes. I feel so. That

1 has always been with the radio dispatcher.

2 Whenever we get a job like the police officer in
3 the field would radio, center be advised. I need
4 an R and P here. I need an EMS here.

5
6 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: What makes
7 matters worse is that when that police officer on
8 June 4th made that call and communicated all of the
9 information, he thought an ambulance was on its
10 way.

11 ALMA ROPER: Yes, he did, and he
12 was waiting there, and waiting there and kept
13 calling back for that ambulance to come, and that
14 ambulance never came. Now the difference between
15 when the ACD operators police communication
16 technician, which is better known as a 911
17 operator, gets the call through 911 when the
18 public calls that job in that operator gets the
19 pertinent information, which is the address, the
20 cross streets, the telephone, the callback number,
21 the apartment number, wherever it is, they take
22 that job and immediate and immediately go into
23 EMS. They immediately go into EMS and then they
24 exchange operator numbers, if they are still doing
25 this, exchange operator number, EMS comes on and

1
2 gives the medical words. We don't do that. We
3 don't sit there and tell any medicals. We don't
4 know that. We have not been trained for that. So
5 EMS does that, but as they are doing that, we are
6 typing everything into the system. So it is
7 totally different when you get it on 911 over the
8 phone, the landline than when a police officer
9 calls it in.

10 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: We understand
11 that and I appreciate you testifying the amount of
12 overtime that your members are working, which I
13 believe is outrageous and dangerous not to mention
14 wasting city resources. It is not fiscally
15 responsible, and I don't want to have to cut your
16 testimony, but I would appreciate it if you could
17 wrap up.

18 ALMA ROPER: Okay. One other
19 thing. The Deputy Mayor stated here and said that
20 we always went on the slip system. I have never
21 heard of that. We did slip system only when the
22 system went down, not every week or every month
23 did we go on the slip system. that is not true.
24 With this new system, this system went down four
25 times when we first started this new system. It

1
2 went down four times. He said one for 16 minutes,
3 one for 18 minutes. It was one day that it went
4 down for one hour and nine or ten minutes, so he
5 is standing here saying all of these things, and
6 it is not true. It is not true.

7 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: What about
8 when the term event held is put on?

9 ALMA ROPER: I am sorry?

10 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Event held.
11 We had an operator say that there are times that
12 that could be put on a screen. If you could just
13 introduce yourself.

14 TRACY WHITEHEAD: My name is PCT
15 Tracy Whitehead. That is when the system freezes
16 and you can't get any calls or there is nothing
17 working, so they have to come and reset the
18 system.

19 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: How often
20 does that happen?

21 TRACY WHITEHEAD: That could happen
22 any time 'cause you don't know when it is going
23 to happen. It could happen at any time

24 JOHN ARMSTRONG: If I may add--I am
25 sorry. My name is John Armstrong. I am the

1
2 Chapter Chair. Also, I am a dispatcher call taker
3 911. Also, when it happens you may have event
4 held, and the dispatcher cannot receive a call
5 from the call taker. What happens is we have an
6 ICAD personnel come by and reset the system and it
7 comes right through, but like Roper said a little
8 while ago, and I don't want to jump on her
9 testimony that the system goes down constantly,
10 and a lot of times what happens is they will come
11 by every two hours--they say the system do not go
12 down--the come by every couple of hours and ask us
13 to exit the system to reset it to keep it from
14 going down. - -

15 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I can't
16 imagine how frustrating that is to an operator.
17 Ms. Roper?

18 ALMA ROPER: Just to wrap up, the
19 introduction of this new system has added a new
20 layer of stress and frustration to the workforce
21 that has already been stretched to its physical,
22 mental and emotional limits. My operators, the
23 911 operators are exhausted. They are tired.
24 They need help. We need additional operators, not
25 next week, not next year, now. We need them as

1
2 soon as possible, and I thank you.

3 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you.

4 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: I have a
5 question. Have you talked to your counterparts in
6 Westchester County? That was a big red flag for
7 me, which I did not know that Westchester County,
8 which I know they are very picky about their
9 systems have taken themselves off of UCT, and what
10 are they using instead if they are not using UCT?

11 ALMA ROPER: We had no
12 conversations with anyone in regards to this
13 system. This is the police department, the brass
14 that is doing this. The union had nothing to do
15 with this.

16 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Here is my
17 other question that I asked the Deputy Mayor. Did
18 somebody else call in from the street? Do you
19 happen to know? Did anybody at the scene call in
20 about the incident straight to 911?

21 JOHN ARMSTRONG: I will do the best
22 that I can with that. To be honest with you, I
23 don't have it documented that it was called, but
24 you have to look at this. You are talking about
25 where - - . You are talking about the time it

1
2 happened, 8:32 in the morning. You are speaking
3 of the amount of people who have cell phones now
4 who call everything in whether it is a cat on the
5 street dead or somebody that is injured very
6 severe. Now I can imagine not more than one call
7 coming in especially from just the police officer
8 call in over the radio. I cannot imagine that
9 happening, so I would say yes, there were other
10 calls that were coming into 911.

11 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Have you
12 spoken to your members, anybody who said that
13 they--this is important 'cause if somebody else
14 took that call in 911 that means there was a
15 dispatch, right? I would assume it maybe had
16 gotten there a little quicker. I am intrigued by
17 this. I have been at scenes where everybody is
18 calling in. Something happens, everybody begins
19 to call in, and did it go through the system. Let
20 me ask you this question, what do you think
21 happened?

22 ALMA ROPER: I don't think that we
23 can answer that.

24 EDDIE RODRIGUEZ: I think that is
25 not fair. We can't answer that because we are not

2 doing the investigation. We can say this, the
3 system is not working. That is your answer.

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: We
5 understand, and I thank you, my colleague, Council
6 Member Cabrera for searching for the answer. We
7 all want - - . We are going to hear from Council
8 Member James very briefly, and then we will have
9 the family testify.

10 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Low staffing
11 is a major issue. You know that I was walking in
12 Manhattan and two of your members approached me on
13 the street and described to me their current work
14 situation and in fact, one broke out in tears.
15 That is what brought to my attention that we have
16 got a problem in the city of New York when two
17 individuals approach a Council Member on a given
18 street and continue to complain about their work
19 conditions. Do you have any recommendations,
20 which I am sure would include hiring more
21 dispatchers?

22 ALMA ROPER: Yes. Mm-hmm. We sat
23 down with the police department with our executive
24 director, Ms. Lillian Roberts [phonetic] last
25 week, and then we sat down with them again on

1
2 Friday to propose some things to them.

3 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: What were
4 some of the recommendations?

5 ALMA ROPER: Well, we asked for 400
6 new 911 operators to be hired as quickly as
7 possible, and Commissioner Byrnes [phonetic] did
8 state that he would take that back to Commissioner
9 Kelly and have a conversation with him with Chief
10 Dowd, so we are waiting for some answers to come
11 back at this particular time. I have one of my
12 members right here. She was one of the members
13 that went out sick for three days. She was
14 dehydrated because of this overtime that she has
15 been performing.

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: We understand
17 the concerns of the union. We know the need. I
18 don't disagree with that. We are going to
19 advocate. We will make sure Commissioner Kelly
20 knows the need too. He probably knows it already.
21 [off mic] at this time. I do appreciate your
22 being here and communicating the situation that
23 your members are going through.

24 EDDIE RODRIGUEZ: On behalf of the
25 members and the leadership of Local 1549, we thank

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you.

ALMA ROPER: Thank you so much.

JOHN ARMSTRONG: [off mic] Can I just say one thing?

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Very, very quickly.

JOHN ARMSTRONG: As a matter of fact, it has nothing to do with the 911 situation right now. I just want to turn to the Russo family here just for a moment and just convey my condolences with your family. I have children. I have five grandchildren. Two of them are four years of age already. Just came from the graduation of my four year old yesterday, and I thought about this family so much yesterday. Everyone is conveying to the family how they feel, especially to the mother, but I am looking at this gentleman's face right here. I feel his pain.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: The whole city is feeling his pain.

JOHN ARMSTRONG: I just wanted to say I am so sorry for what happened to your child. It brings tears to my eyes.

CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Sophia Russo.

1
2 Sophia is the mother of Ariel Russo, whose
3 daughter passed away and was killed on June 4th.
4 She is here with her attorney, Sanford Rubenstein.
5 I am not sure in what particular order either
6 witness would like to testify, so I will leave it
7 up to both witnesses. I want you to know that
8 please take as much time as you need, and then we
9 will probably have some questions. In the order
10 in which you would like to testify once you are
11 ready.

12 SOPHIA RUSSO: First, I want to say
13 thank you for the opportunity to speak at this
14 very important public hearing. As I am sure all
15 of you know, my family and I have suffered one of
16 the worst tragedies any family could suffer. On
17 the morning of June 4th, my mom was walking my four
18 year old daughter, Ariel, to her pre-school class
19 when both were struck by a car being pursued by
20 police. My mom is slowly recovering, but we lost
21 our beautiful Ariel. Please let me tell you a
22 little bit about her. Ariel was an illuminating
23 presence filled to the brim with love. From the
24 very first moment I saw her, she filled my soul
25 with warmth and pure joy. As Ariel grew from my

1
2 tiny baby to my playful toddler and finally my
3 very girly preschooler, her little heart always
4 spoke volumes. My husband Alan and I are the kind
5 of people who live and breathe every moment that
6 our children make. Nothing could have prepared us
7 for this loss and this pain. Ariel was here to
8 fill us all with love and inspiration. She was
9 here to illuminate our talents and magnify our
10 purpose. She was here to open our eyes and guide
11 us to make this world better. I am here speaking
12 out so that what happened to my child does not
13 happen to any other beautiful child who is growing
14 up in the city. On that morning, time was of the
15 essence as it always is in such emergencies, but
16 Ariel waited eight minutes for an ambulance to
17 arrive. I am haunted by the fact that she was
18 alive as those long minutes passed. Numerous
19 press reports have indicated that before my
20 daughter was killed there were many complaints
21 about the glitches in our 911 system. Israel
22 Miranda, the president of the union that
23 represents EMTs, has been reported as saying that
24 the call to send an ambulance to save my
25 daughter's life never appeared on the screen of

1
2 the 911 dispatcher and that in the weeks leading
3 up to this tragedy there were many problems with
4 the city's 911 system. The fire commissioner,
5 Salvatore Cassano, has said that the 911
6 dispatcher sitting at the screen failed to read
7 the message to send an ambulance to Ariel and my
8 mom on time. Whether the cause is human error or
9 a technological glitch, the end result is the
10 same. The lifeline we all count on does not
11 arrive in time. In this case, it was my daughter
12 who waited and I believe the delay may have been a
13 substantial factor in her death. This must not
14 happen to anyone else. I look to you, the elected
15 officials the city to make sure that in the future
16 the 911 system works properly. Please do whatever
17 it takes to ensure that New Yorkers' calls for
18 help are not unheard or ignored. Only you can
19 ensure an independent evaluation of the system.
20 only you can ensure we have technology and
21 procedures that work every time. I am pleading
22 with you to fix this before another grieving
23 mother has to come before you. You owe it to the
24 residents of the city who elected you to solve
25 this problem now. I am also asking you to look at

1
2 the issue of police chases in school zones at
3 times when innocent children are walking to
4 school. Should police be allowed in the future to
5 engage in high speed pursuits in these zones
6 putting the lives of our children at risk?

7 Finally I ask you to consider the sentencing
8 guidelines for drivers who kill bystanders as they
9 evade police. As the elected representatives of
10 the people of the city of New York you can send a
11 message to the state legislators that we need to
12 toughen the penalties in such cases. I understand
13 that under the current law the penalty for
14 reckless killing is five to 15 years. As a mother
15 who has lost her child, I do not believe that
16 penalty is severe enough in this case. It must be
17 changed for the future. Thank you for the
18 opportunity to bring you this testimony. I pray
19 no parent will ever have reason to repeat it.

20 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Sophia, I
21 cannot imagine what you have been going through
22 since you lost your daughter. I really appreciate
23 it. I know the whole panel in the City Council
24 appreciates that you are here today to testify.
25 We will take every one of your recommendations and

1
2 work to see that we are able to make a change to
3 make the system better so that no other parent--
4 and I say that as a parent with two boys of my
5 own--has to feel what you have to feel right now.
6 We want to make sure also that the person who did
7 this gets prosecuted to the fullest extent of the
8 law. Our city is grieving with you right now.

9 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Sophia, - - I
10 know you are in pain, and we are all feeling the
11 pain with you. You are very brave--I was just
12 telling the staffer here--for you to come 17 days
13 after the tragedy that happened to your daughter
14 you are a very courageous person, and even more
15 amazingly you are turning your pain into purpose,
16 and I commend you. You have a full army of
17 legislators going to stand behind you. We are not
18 going to go away, and we are going to stand with
19 you, and we are going to get to the bottom of this
20 to make sure that true justice takes place and at
21 the same time that you receive all of the support
22 services that you truly need during this time.
23 Keep us posted. Let us know. Every step of the
24 way we want to be there with you. We don't want
25 to give you lip service. We really want to be a

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2 people of action, and what you have asked of us is
3 not only reasonable, but it is the right thing to
4 do, and so thank you. Thank you for being here
5 today on behalf of all the other mothers that have
6 gone through this as well. Our prayers are going
7 to be with you and I believe that God is going to
8 take care of you as well.

9 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: To the Russo
10 Family and to Ms. Sophia, I speak to you now not
11 as a politician, not as a member of the City
12 Council, but as someone who loves children,
13 particularly children throughout the city of New
14 York and who has a niece who is four years old,
15 and I speak to you as today someone who knows that
16 you are a family of faith and that what will keep
17 you during these hours is your belief in God, your
18 closeness together as a family, and knowing that
19 when you feel your heart and when you touch your
20 heart and when you close your eyes, Sophia is
21 going to be with you always. She has joined the
22 angels now, but she is still alive in all of us,
23 and it is the memories that carry you through and
24 we will do whatever we can to ensure that this
25 never happens again, but just know that God will

1
2 see you through and that we will continue to pray
3 for you now and always. Bless you.

4 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: At any time
5 after this hearing that if maybe we forgot to
6 mention something or you read something in the
7 paper, if you have any questions or if you just
8 want to communicate we are here, council members.
9 I will make sure you have my contact information.
10 We want to work together to make a difference, so
11 this never happens again to no other family.
12 Thank you for being here. Mr. Rubenstein, do you
13 have testimony? If you could put your microphone
14 on and just identify yourself for the record.

15 SANFORD RUBENSTEIN: First on
16 behalf of the Russo Family, I would like to thank
17 you for giving Sophia the opportunity to speak
18 with you from her heart and tell you while she is
19 grieving how she feels with regard to her real
20 concern that this not happen to anyone else
21 looking to this legislative body to take action.
22 With regard to the original purpose of this
23 hearing, statutes to have the time of response
24 recorded from the time a victim is actually seen
25 or the time water is on a fire, I can't understand

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2 why the administration opposes this. It seems to
3 me that from the point of view from the public
4 that is what we really want to know. I think you
5 should pass it. Now with regard to this tragedy,
6 I will be brief. Simply put, it seems that we see
7 two different views as to what happened that
8 caused this tragedy--the failure of a dispatcher
9 to get the appropriate call that came in and relay
10 it to get an ambulance. That should be the
11 subject of a criminal investigation if that is
12 what happened. If it's a glitch in the technology
13 then the technology needs to be corrected. The
14 lives of all the people in this city are dependent
15 on that, so is a fire department investigation
16 adequate? The fire department investigating
17 itself--you make that determination, and if an
18 independent investigation is needed, let's have
19 one. Secondly, with regard to the issue of
20 glitches, failures of the technology in the system
21 we hear the Deputy Mayor said, oh, it's working
22 great. It worked perfectly. A child is dead, and
23 if a child is dead because the system didn't work,
24 then it has to be corrected. Maybe we need
25 outside consultants to come in now to tell us what

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2 to do, but something has to be done. This body is
3 now charged with the responsibility as the elected
4 officials of all the people in the city of doing
5 it, and thank you for allowing me to speak.

6 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you,
7 Mr. Rubenstein, I couldn't agree with your whole
8 entire testimony. We will ask and persist until
9 an independent investigation is had, and hopefully
10 that investigation will produce the truth which we
11 are all in search for, and that ultimately a
12 glitch in the system or human failure, whatever it
13 may be does not happen again. Council Member
14 James?

15 COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Mr.
16 Rubenstein, let me apologize. You and I spoke. I
17 indicated to you that in likelihood the Russo
18 family would be able to testify at 12 o'clock.
19 What we saw earlier was nothing more than an
20 official filibuster. That is all that we saw. It
21 was an attempt to distract all of us. So on
22 behalf of the City Council, we apologize for them
23 delaying your testimony. It was a complete act of
24 disgrace.

25 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I agree.

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2 Council Member James put it well. What is
3 frustrating for me is to know that you had to wait
4 four hours or even longer at this point. I
5 thought it was important that you heard from the
6 unions because they gave you a different
7 perspective, an opposite perspective. The true
8 filibustering [phonetic] that was happening was one,
9 the delay of when this hearing started and two,
10 over an hour of testimony that was meant to
11 confuse the Council Members and was quite
12 redundant. It was almost as bad as the entire
13 system that we are trying to find answers on how
14 to fix. Thank you. We have Robert Gordon here
15 from the public to testify. Susana Troy
16 [phonetic], the People of New York City, here to
17 testify and Barbara Ruther [phonetic],
18 representing herself and her neighbors. If the
19 three could testify in the order in which you were
20 called up, I would appreciate that. Are the three
21 witnesses still here to testify. Alright, if
22 there is only one that is still here--

23 FEMALE VOICE: It looks like there
24 is two.

25 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: I forget the

1
2 exact order I called you up, but you probably
3 remember when your name was said. Please, if you
4 could identify your name for the record before you
5 begin your testimony and begin once you are ready.

6 SUSANA TROY: Hi. My name is
7 Susana Troy. I am here testifying. I feel that I
8 am representing all of New York City. My
9 heartfelt condolences to Ariel Russo, Mark Carson
10 and everyone who has lost a loved one because of
11 our 911 tech system. John Liu heroically called
12 for a criminal investigation May 30th, 2012 - -
13 where is it? I believe a correlation between
14 ambulance response time and 911 corruption, but
15 first I want to testify that August 20th I called
16 the FBI warning them that the 911 tech system
17 would collapse again, and it did during Hurricane
18 Sandy along with 311. I told the FBI on August
19 20th, 2012 about John Liu's audit, and still there
20 was no criminal investigation. Right after I
21 stumbled on Mayor Bloomberg having a press
22 conference. Again that was August 20th, 2012. I
23 yelled at Bloomberg at the press conference about
24 City Time and 911. I said 2,014,000,000 dollars
25 and the 911 system does that work properly. The

1
2 press never challenged the mayor on what I yelled.
3 The NYPD I believe tried to remove the video.
4 Google sided with me and the video has over 1,000
5 views. I have set a world's record in blog posts
6 and YouTubes calling for a criminal investigation
7 into 911. Number one, I put all the 911 call
8 ambulance responses for the FDNY, NYPD and EMS on
9 the New York City government website. I am going
10 to repeat that. Why are ambulance response times
11 more top secret than NSA prison information?
12 Number two, we had a meeting at City Hall with
13 Christine Quinn in 2012. We asked for ambulance
14 response times for the West Village because Saint
15 Vincent's had closed. Where is Ms. Quinn? Ms.
16 Quinn, why are you more secretive than NSA?
17 Commissioner Kelly and Christine Quinn, NSA
18 transparency, how about you? Why also can't I
19 learn the name of the badge number of the NYPD
20 officers involved in fixing a violent crime where
21 I was assaulted? I will get to that in a moment,
22 and how 911 played a role in that. Please note
23 that Christine Quinn--we had a meeting with her at
24 City Hall with Normal Siegel [phonetic] and
25 community members. Christine Quinn and Chuck

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2 Meara [phonetic] refused to investigate an
3 ambulance ride across the street here, 250
4 Broadway that took close to a half hour. They
5 told me I was wrong. Chuck Meara said I checked
6 with my pal at the first precinct. There was no
7 ambulance. There were 200 of us standing outside
8 250 Broadway to testify. We demand a hospital
9 where Saint Vincent's was, and Meara told me I was
10 wrong. Here is the FOIA report for the ambulance.
11 It went to the wrong place. Chuck Meara and
12 Christine Quinn will not investigate was this a
13 human error or was this technology, and shame on
14 Cas Holloway for that terrible infomercial, a pack
15 of lies, and he said that people like me are
16 liars. He is saying that the union are liars, the
17 New York Daily News are liars. Here is more
18 proof. I wanted to tell you that no one is
19 talking about Mark Carson. He is the gay man that
20 was murdered in the West Village. I asked for an
21 ambulance response time. Do you know what the
22 FDNY said to me--excuse me, sir, I want to wait
23 until you are done talking.

24 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Excuse me.

25 They are allowed to have conversations. Go ahead.

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2 SUSANA TROY: This is about life or
3 death. This young man was murdered. He is not a
4 beautiful four year old. I don't know if people
5 discriminate against homosexuals. His life
6 counts, and I don't like it when someone is
7 talking when I am trying to get this answered--

8 [crosstalk]

9 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Excuse me.
10 People are allowed to have conversations--

11 [crosstalk]

12 SUSANA TROY: If I was talking
13 about Ariel, he wouldn't do that.

14 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Excuse me.
15 We are listening to you right now, and whoever
16 chooses to listen can choose to listen. Whoever
17 wants to have a conversation, they are allowed to
18 do so.

19 SUSANA TROY: That's three times.
20 I am trying to talk about someone who was murdered
21 who is gay. May I please continue?

22 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: You may
23 continue.

24 SUSANA TROY: Thank you, sir. So
25 the FDNY said to me the only way I can get this is

1
2 if I get Mark's permission. He is dead. That
3 would take a Ouija board or a séance. It sounds
4 like a cover up. Mark Carson's death in my mind
5 is an LGBT hate crime that I lay at Christine
6 Quinn's--I blame Christine Quinn for closing Saint
7 Vincent's hospital. The hospital was two blocks
8 from where Mark Carson was murdered and - - luxury
9 condos are there instead. It is shameful. Then
10 when he got to Beth Israel, I want to know how
11 long that ride took, and I hope that Ms. Crowley
12 and Mr. Cabrera where I have left off to find out
13 that answer because is not as stunning and
14 beautiful as Ariel, God bless her soul, but he
15 counts too. Even if people are homophobic and
16 hate gay people, he counts. Number two, Quinn and
17 Meara, NYPD FOIA, I have already submitted for the
18 record. He told me that I was wrong. Here it is.
19 Number three, I am just going to say briefly I was
20 violently assaulted at Dr. Andrew Fagelman's
21 [phonetic] by his receptionist. I did not call
22 911 because my last 911 call was involving the
23 first precinct and took 40 minutes. No one at the
24 doctor's office called 911. I called the first
25 precinct. No one answered. You might think this

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2 is not a big deal, but without surgery, I would
3 have going blind in this eye, and I am still
4 getting care and I may lose this vision again.
5 There is scar tissue. I also have cervical
6 damage. The NYPD fixed that violent crime. I am
7 asking everyone to Google Dr. Fagelman assault.
8 Watch the YouTube. It has 13,375 views. I want a
9 full investigation and only Bill de Blasio, public
10 advocate, is called internal affairs. Eight
11 months. What is going on? Why all the secrets?
12 Commissioner Kelly talks about transparency.
13 Number four, there is a two billion--I count it as
14 14 million dollars, and the 14 million went to
15 NASA. Why? Is the NYPD going to answer 911 calls
16 on the moon? We cannot text 911. I am asking for
17 the option with 2,014,000,000 dollars to please be
18 allowed to test 911. I want all ambulance and 911
19 responses on New York City government website.
20 You can hide people's names to protect their
21 identity, but all of us are entitled to know. We
22 care about each other, and we want answers.
23 Number five, and I am almost done. This is City
24 Time, but it is far worse. This is our lives and
25 our rescue workers lives on the line. In my

1
2 opinion even the Board of Election Tech disaster I
3 call City Time Jr., NYCAPS [phonetic] I call City
4 Time III, it goes on FDNY Wireless [phonetic].
5 Even 311, I cannot get the price tag. Mayor
6 Bloomberg and Christine Quinn pushed through an
7 illegal third term, a tsunami of community-
8 crushing development and the largest in my
9 opinion, white collar crimes, tech overrides in
10 the total of billions, including high priced
11 consultants. Even Mike Bloomberg's favorite non-
12 profit CCO [phonetic] was caught stealing close to
13 two million dollars. Bill Thompson [phonetic] and
14 Christine Quinn could have stopped City Time and
15 911. Everyone knew that in my opinion Hewlett
16 Packard had no experience and I want to praise
17 John Liu as a hero because he did something
18 amazing. He called for a criminal investigation
19 into City Time, and his press releases understate
20 the theft of City Time, and he called for it with
21 the 911. Paul Cosgrove was the head of DoITT, he
22 called for a termination of our contract with
23 Hewlett Packard; he was terminated. I also want
24 to know how much we paid Gardener Group
25 [phonetic]. I was told 90 million dollars for

1
2 their advice on the 911 tech corruption. A fourth
3 grader doing math on 911 could tell us we were
4 being robbed. City Time, 311, across the board.
5 Bloomberg and Quinn could have been prevented.
6 This has got to stop. Bloomberg and Quinn
7 rewarded a culture of failure and a revolving door
8 of corruption. It is amazing there are no arrests
9 of New York City government officials on City Time
10 and 911...maybe after Mayor Bloomberg and Christine
11 Quinn are showed the door. I want to know what is
12 the price tag of 311? What have we paid Gardener
13 Group since Mayor Bloomberg came into office? How
14 many people have died or suffered or worse because
15 of 911 tech corruption? Thank you.

16 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: That you.
17 Take your time. Introduce yourself. Please sit
18 down and introduce yourself.

19 BARBARA RUTHER: My name is Barbara
20 Ruther. I am a resident of the West Village since
21 1955. I graduated from college and I lived in the
22 village all of that time. I agree with some
23 things that Susana said very well. Actually, the
24 statement I brought was a little bit off the
25 target of the specifics of the 911 in one way, but

1
2 in another way, it is a fuller look at what you
3 call response time. I consider response time--I
4 am not going to go into the statement because I
5 think my language in there is going to be better
6 and more clear, but I was trying to understand and
7 I looked up on the web the various--what do they
8 call them--rulings, the administrative code. And
9 I said it is so bare, and it has nothing to do
10 with survival. Survival is when you get to the
11 house and you take care of the patient or the
12 victim and then when you live in the West Village
13 or you live in Brooklyn where the hospitals are
14 closing, how long does it take to get you to care?
15 Who is measuring that? That to me is the question
16 because I am 79. I could have a heart attack. I
17 could have sepsis. I could have a stroke. I
18 could be little Ariel--that kind of thing. Very
19 quick. Children, you need quick action and time
20 is care in a doctor's vocabulary. Any action that
21 needs to be quickly done when you live in my
22 neighborhood, you get stuck in traffic. Who is
23 calculating, where is it accounted what the
24 response time is and outcome of the result of
25 somebody calling the ambulance and the ambulance

2 getting there in time? I would use the post
3 office as an analogy. You call, the pickup and
4 deliver. They deliver, but you always know where
5 the package is and you always know the outcome.
6 Pickup and delivery. What is missing in the EMS
7 system and 911 is delivery. You have got the
8 response, but you don't got the delivery, and that
9 is my comment.

10 CHAIRPERSON CABRERA: Thank you so
11 much.

12 BARBARA RUTHER: I just wish you
13 had a way of doing the counting because Christine
14 Quinn will not give us the time even to get to
15 pickup, but the response time to get to the
16 hospital, which is the critical time if you are
17 critically ill, we need to know that. Thank you.

18 CHAIRPERSON CROWLEY: Thank you.
19 Thank you to the Committee staff who worked so
20 hard putting this committee together. Thank you
21 to my Co-chairs and my colleagues and to all of
22 the members of the public that are still here and
23 those that have testified. This concludes the
24 Fire, Criminal Justice Committee hearing and the
25 Public Safety and the Technology hearing of June

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2 21st, 2013. Thank you.


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[gavel]

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Kimberley Campbell certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. I further certify that I am not related to any of the parties to this action by blood or marriage, and that I am in no way interested in the outcome of this matter.

Signature

Date 7/21/13