CITY COUNCIL
CITY OF NEW YORK

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES

of the

COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS

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April 14, 2011 Start: 1:04 pm Recess: 4:38 pm

HELD AT: Council Chambers

City Hall

BEFORE:

ERIK MARTIN DILAN

Chairperson

#### COUNCIL MEMBERS:

Gale Brewer
Leroy Comrie, Jr.
Elizabeth Crowley
Lewis A. Fidler
James F. Gennaro
Robert Jackson
Letitia James
Brad S. Lander

Melissa Mark-Viverito

James S. Oddo Joel Rivera Eric A. Ulrich

Jumaane D. Williams

# APPEARANCES

COUNCIL MEMBERS:

Ruben Wills

### A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)

Ruthanne Visnauskas Deputy Commissioner HPD

Michael Smith President/CEO New York Bankers Association

Bruce Bergman Attorney Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Peddy and Fenchel

AnnMarie Santiago Chief of Staff of Enforcement HPD

Robert Edman Assistant Commissioner Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

Oda Friedheim Staff Attorney Legal Aid Society, Queens

Elizabeth Lynch Staff Attorney, Foreclosure Prevention Project MFY Legal Services

Michael Hickey Executive Director The Center for New York City Neighborhoods

Betty Harville Concerned Citizen

Jean Andre Sassine Board Member New York Communities for Change

# A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)

Skip Roseboro New York Community Organizing Fund, Inc.

Moses Gates Association for Neighborhood Housing Development

Steven A. Ludsin Founder Easy Escrow

2.	COUNCIL MEMBER	DILAN:	Good

afternoon. My name is Erik Martin Dilan. I'm the Chair of the City Council's Housing and Buildings Committee. Today the Committee will hear for an initial hearing of Intros 531, which is in relation to the installation of window guards, and three bills related to mortgage foreclosures, Intros 494, Intros 500 and 501.

According to a report published last month by the New York State Controller's Office, between the years 2006 and 2009, the number of foreclosure filings within the City of New York rose approximately 32%, to 22,866.

Queens had the largest number of foreclosure filings, approximately 9,000, followed by Brooklyn, with approximately 7,000, the Bronx with 3,000, Staten Island with 2,600, and Manhattan with close to 1,200.

In its 2010 State of the City's
Housing and Neighborhood Report, New York City's
Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy
stated that foreclosures are associated with a
substantial uptick in housing code violations,
which indicates that tenants are likely to

experience deteriorating building maintenance and physical conditions while a building's finances are in distress. The foreclosure crisis has been considered by this committee and this Council on numerous occasions as well as the Committee on Community Development, which has held foreclosure related hearing, as well as—that Committee as well has held hearings on topics such as the effectiveness of foreclosure prevention programs and the impacts of foreclosure on community development.

This Committee has conducted oversight in the past of subprime lending in the foreclosure crisis, and in April of 2009, held a hearing on legislation similar to the bills that are part of today's hearing. The legislation before the Committee today addresses the concerns relating to the maintenance of buildings that are in foreclosure proceedings.

Today the Committee expects to hear testimony regarding this legislation from representatives of HPD, housing advocates, representatives of real estate and banking and any other persons interested in these bills. At

approximately 3:00 p.m., the Committee will hear

Intro 531, which will amend the administrative

code of the City Of New York, adding the

installation of window guards, adding to the

6 enforcement of housing maintenance code.

Just very briefly, Intro 494 would require anyone who begins a foreclosure proceeding or already has begun a foreclosure proceeding, to contain a compliance bond, which would be used to reimburse the Department of Housing Preservation and Development for repairs made and any fines or civil penalties imposed during the time, the time the foreclosure action is pending before the court. And that bill is sponsored by council member Brad Lander, who will be joining us shortly. And I'll allow him to make a statement on this item when he does arrive.

Intro 500 requires the bank or the financial institutions under the mortgage agreement to maintain the property, which is being foreclosed upon, in accordance with multiple dwelling law, the housing maintenance code and all other relevant laws providing essential services for tenants.

Intro 501 requires an entity that files a foreclosure action with the courts to register with HPDs within ten days of the filing. HPD would be required to publish a list of foreclosed upon properties on its website. This bill also carries with it the failure to register would be subject to a civil penalty for each week that an entity fails to register.

In a different vein, intro 531, which is the window guard bill would allow HPD to become an enforcement arm that property owners who are currently required to install and maintain window guards in their rental apartments. This ordinance is currently within the purview of the City's health code and is enforced by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. This will now give HPD the authority to enforce this ordinance as well.

During today's hearing, again, we expect to hear testimony from representatives of HPD, who I believe are here and ready to testify. And I'll say again, if anyone wishes to testify on any of the items before the committee today, please see the Sergeant-at-Arms, and fill out an

2 appearance card. It looks kind of like this one,

if you're ready to testify. And indicate whether
you're interested in speaking out in favor of the

5 items on the calendar today or opposed.

We've been joined by Council Member Brad Lander, who is a sponsor of an item on the calendar today, the majority leader Joel Rivera, as well as Council Member Ruben Wills, who is the predecessor of the author of similar legislation that this Committee considered. And I hope this Committee today, in his honor, Council Member Thomas White, whose commitment I gave to hearing this bill, and was proud to see that the Speaker of this body made this part of her State of the City address.

So, if Council Member Lander is ready, I'll allow him to make a brief statement on the item that he has on today's agenda.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Thank you very much, Chair Dilan and other members of the Committee. And I also want to honor the memory of our colleague, Tom White, who was a champion on this issue and who we're thinking of today.

So, you know, all around us we

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unfortunately see evidence that the lenders have really failed to step up and take responsibility for the mess that they've made. You know, and that's whether you look around the country or whether you look around our neighborhoods. In our neighborhoods we continue to have a dramatic number of foreclosed properties, whether single family homes or into four-family homes, multifamily buildings, where credit was extended on completely unrealistic terms in a range of ways-some predatory, some not predatory--and families and communities all around this country, all around this city, are continuing to feel the 14 impacts--home owners and borrowers themselves, their tenants--where they have tenants--and their neighbors who have to live with properties that no 18 one is maintaining.

> At the same time, at the broader federal and national level we see a real failure to have held banks accountable. You know, many of us saw a few weeks ago when Inside Job won the Cannes Film Festival and we were reminded that not one person has been held accountable for a crisis that not only caused foreclosures but took the

economy off a cliff. And then more recently I was interested to see just a couple of weeks ago in the New York Times the very federal inspector who oversaw the TARP program, Neil Barofsky, resigned in protest saying, we have done little to nothing to use even the money that we invested through the TARP program to get the banks to modify loans to help homeowners or to extend new credit to help our communities.

And then we read today in the newspaper that JP Morgan Chase, even though it had the most profit—you know, record profit quarter—is neither modifying mortgages, nor extending credit or making home loans or multi-family loans in our community. And we're deeply frustrated.

We're hopeful that the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau under the leadership of Elizabeth Warren and the great work of our New York State Attorney General will start to hold people accountable, but we cannot wait. And that's why I'm so honored to be a part of this hearing. I think the two bills that Chairman Dilan is sponsoring are smart bills for addressing the challenge of foreclosed buildings in our

2	neighborhood. And I'm especially proud to have
3	worked with New York Communities for Change, ANHD
4	and NEDAP on Intro 494. That bill would require
5	that when a lender commences a foreclosure
6	proceeding they have to post a bond that would be
7	available to make sure that if fees, fines accrue
8	during that time, because the property was not
9	maintainedif an owner walks away or if it's a
10	multi-family building and they don't meet their
11	obligationsrather than the tax payer being
12	expected to bail out the lender in that case, the
13	lender's got a bond that the City can use to make
14	sure the tax payers are kept whole and have a
15	better chance of being sure that that property
16	will be maintained for its tenants and for its
17	neighbors. It will also, I believe, provide an
18	incentive for lenders to work things out with
19	homeowners who would like to achieve a workout and
20	get more modifications, rather than have the
21	expense of making sure that the taxpayers won't be
22	stuck with those fees and fines.

So, I'm honored to be the sponsor to be working with advocates. And I'm especially pleased that it dovetails so well with the

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you for the time.

legislation sponsored by Chairman Dilan, who has
been a great champion on this issue, like on so
many housing issues around the City. And I thank

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: We've also been joined by Council Member Tish James, and I just would like to thank at this time the Committee Staff, who has worked hard on putting this legislative package together. Baaba Halm, the Counsel to the Committee, to my right; Laura Rogers, Legislative Attorney to the Committee, who is sitting in the back; as well as Ben Goodman, the Policy Analyst to the Committee, sitting immediately to my left.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Mr.

Chairman, can I just add my thanks to them and also to Michael Friedman-Schnapp on my staff, for his work as well. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: We've also been joined by Council Member Comrie. And at this point we would like to call up Ruthanne Visnauskas from HPD to testify on the foreclosure portion of the hearing. And before you begin, just--did you submit copies of your testimony to the Sergeant-

At-Arms? Okay, if you could give that to the Sergeant-At-Arms so that the Committee Members can follow along. And I'll just ask you to hold on a moment. Thanks. We've also been joined by Council Member Lewis Fidler, of Brooklyn. Okay, why don't you begin?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Great, thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Dilan and members of the Housing and Buildings Committee. I'm Ruthanne Visnauskas, Deputy Commissioner for Development at the Department of Housing Preservation and Development. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the merits of Intro 494 sponsored by Council Member Lander and Intro 500 and 501, sponsored by Chairman Dilan. All three pieces of legislation focus on the important goal of minimizing the impact on local communities when a lender initiates foreclosure on a property in New York City.

As you know, the foreclosure crisis continues to have a significant impact on property owners across the nation. In New York City and other dense urban areas, the crisis has had a distinct impact on distressed single-family homes

versus that of multi-family residences. To

address those specific issues in New York City,

HPD has worked with all levels of government,

including the banking industry and our non-profit

partners to evaluate the unique circumstances that

we have here in New York, and to try to find

effective ways to prevent the distress that often

times accompanies foreclosure or the threat

thereof.

As the local agency in charge of housing maintenance and code enforcement, we have strategically realigned our resources and programming to assist in mitigating the distress that often results in unsafe living conditions.

And although this effort provides assistance and guidance for at-risk properties, the impact of our enforcement efforts is seen more on a multi-family level.

In January of this year, we unveiled with Speaker Quinn and Chairman Dilan HPD's Proactive Preservation Initiative, which is set out on a mission to evaluate at-risk multifamily residential buildings in an effort to prevent further physical and financial distress.

So, through a variety of statutory and
programmatic means, the Proactive Preservation
provides both an incentive and also an enforcement
mechanism for landlords to keep their properties
financially sound and properly maintained.

Evaluation and maintenance of this at-risk
portfolio of multi-family buildings is of course
essential to protecting the families and the

communities that reside in them.

One of the bills before us today,
Intro 501, which would require any lender
commencing a foreclosure action regarding a
property located in New York City to register with
HPD within ten days of filing the action. This
registration would include such information as the
name and contact information of all the parties
and the relevant block and lot number in question.
Further, the agency would be required to post and
update this information on our website within ten
days of any changes in the action. Failure to
register with the agency would carry a maximum
liability of \$1,000 in civil penalties. And the
notice requirement in Intro 501 would allow HPD
the opportunity to examine the circumstances

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surrounding the foreclosure action and thenintervene where appropriate.

4 As a local housing agency, HPD

doesn't have oversight over the terms of a mortgage transaction. And although the notice proposed in 501 would provide us with a basic opportunity to examine the circumstances of a particular foreclosure, in order to conduct a thorough review of the transaction, we would suggest taking the registration requirement even further. In conjunction with the notice requirement, we would suggest requesting information from the lender, including information on the principal balance owing on the mortgage, interest and principal arrears, late fees, any other sums due, the interest rate, the maturity rate, any amount that would be required to reinstate the mortgage. This other helpful information, this other information would be really helpful and importance to us in sort of assessing the foreclosure.

In addition we would be interested in requesting both a copy of the note and the mortgage that's being foreclosed on, a copy of the

summons and complaint filed in the action, a copy of any agreements encumbering the mortgage, a list of all subordinate mortgages and liens of records, and finally a copy of any audited financial statement that would be required under the loan agreement. We would also suggest focusing the notice requirement on multiple-dwellings of ten units or more, which is where HPD can have the most significant impact.

This additional information would allow for a more comprehensive review of the foreclosure circumstances and will assist us in finding the best possible solution, protecting the tenants of the troubled asset, and then allowing an opportunity to use the qualified purchaser list as a resource.

So, in 2010, HPD released a request for qualifications to preservation developers who are looking to purchase at-risk properties.

Through the RQ process, we were able to review the holdings of entities that showed an interest, and we came up with a list of developers that are qualified to purchase distressed property and rehabilitate them for the benefit of the existing

2 and future tenants.

Although not a requirement, we've offered this list as a resource to local banks who are looking to foreclose on troubled assets. The RFQ is rolling, so we continue to encourage developers to submit qualifications in the hopes of compiling as broad a list as possible.

Both Introductions 494 and 500 present a similar concept in addressing the potential of magnified distress for property when a foreclosure action has been commenced, although they are distinct in their execution.

Intro 494 would require any lender who commences a foreclosure on a New York City property to post a compliance bond of a minimum of \$10,000 to reimburse HPD for the cost of any emergency repairs, fines or civil penalties imposed as a result of violations of the housing maintenance code.

Intro 500 proposes a similar requirement for lenders commencing a foreclosure action to assume all financial responsibility for building maintenance and code compliance, although it does not require the posting of the compliance

bond. The obvious intention of both of these
proposals is to ensure that the buildings are
maintained properly for the duration of the
foreclosure action and tenants are protected from

potential neglect and physical distress.

bills fits well within HPD's mission to protect
the quality of the housing stock in New York City.
Imposing financial requirements may deter lenders
from foreclosing altogether. Many overleveraged
properties begin to deteriorate because the owner,
with no hope of recouping its investment, has
neither the financial incentive to make the
necessary repairs, nor the ability to obtain
financing for those repairs. For such properties,
foreclosure is a necessary measure to put the
building back on a firm financial footing.

And policies which discourage banks from foreclosing have the potential to harm such properties and the tenants who live in them. If we erect barriers that cause lenders to postpone or forego foreclosure, the overleveraged property is left in an extended state of limbo in which deterioration becomes more and more likely. This

financial distress.

scenario not only becomes a safety hazard for

tenants in those properties, but also forces HPD

to make emergency repairs to maintain the

habitability of the property. The cost for these

emergency repairs are converted to a lien on the

property, as are the real estate taxes and water

sewage charge, that if left unpaid lead to further

Although foreclosure is an unfortunate outcome for any owner, in the case of multi-family buildings, it can be the best outcome for the tenants who may be in an uncertain financial climate.

In addition to potentially discouraging foreclosures, the obligations imposed by 494 and 500 may discourage lenders from providing mortgages, so the bills imposed significant obligations on lenders who commence foreclosure actions, including obligations of questionable legality.

So 494 and 500 also raise a few legal concerns. One concern is whether a lender or a lendee has a legal authority to ender a building, let alone repair any housing maintenance

conditions. Under existing law, the property

owner has the obligation to maintain the property

and they lender has no legal authority to enter

the property or perform repairs unless the

mortgage explicitly authorizes it to do so.

The bills raise a doubt as to the owner's continuing responsibility regarding the property, if the maintenance obligation is imposed on the lender.

Second, both bills propose lender responsibility for civil penalties incurred as a result of housing maintenance code violations, which according to law can only be enforced against the owner of a property. Mortgagees do not have title to the property unless and until a foreclosure action is resolved in the mortgagee's favor. Prior to that point it is questionable whether a mortgagee can be responsible to the property or civil penalties relating to the property, which would typically be enforced against the owner. Recent changes to state law have imposed on a plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action a duty to maintain the foreclosed property. But this obligation exists

only after the plaintiff obtains a judgment of
foreclosure and sale. There is no obligation to
maintain the property prior to the judgment, so
even if a maintenance obligation could be imposed
on a mortgagee prior to the judgment as intended
by Intro 500, it's questionable whether this

obligation could be imposed by local law.

In addition, the City sometimes

acts as lender and brings actions to foreclose,

but insufficient distinctions are made in the bill

12 between the City and private lenders.

The foreclosure crisis presents a challenge for all of us. It requires an approach that can only be successful with the cooperation and participation of all levels of government, and our partners in the private and non-profit sectors. We look forward to working with the council to continue the effort to address the crisis now and into the future. We thank you for your time and are happy to respond to any questions that you have.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Thank you for your testimony. Just a little housekeeping.

We've been joined by Council Member Gale Brewer of

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Manhattan. I saw the Republican Leader, Jimmy
Oddo, who was here, or still is here. There's a
seat available for you if you want. As well as
Council Member Eric Ulrich of Queens. I know
where he's from. All right. Well, let's get back
to focus, gentlemen.

So, I just want to--just some general questions, and then we'll get into the substance of the bills. Could you just please just describe the foreclosure process and how long such proceedings generally take to conclude?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: I'm certainly not an expert on foreclosure, but my understanding is in the state of New York foreclosures often can take up to two years to complete.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Okay. And in this city, how many residential properties are currently involved in foreclosure actions, and how many of these properties are one-and two-family homes, and how many are multiple dwellings?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: So in 2010, there were approximately, and this is information largely from the Furman Center study, there were approximately 14,250 mortgage related lis pendens

You asked for a lot more stuff.

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exempt.

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RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: I believe it does. And I just -- could you just expound on that and why you think--you know, philosophically I agree in some regards. If the owner is still responsible of the building, the owner at that point should be responsible for the repairs. What I'm trying to get at is at what point--and I know the bill says something different, and right now that's where I'm at. I just want to make it clear 12 that it's my bill, I'm 100% supportive. But am I 13 open to discussion and negotiation? Sure.

> Philosophically, right, the owner is in trouble and can't afford to make repairs. And that part is clear because the foreclosure action has commenced. Right? The bank has taken over. Now at this point let's say the bank has taken over. At this point, in your mind philosophically, should the bank follow the City's housing maintenance code?

> RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Well, I think legally, right, they don't have the ability to actually go in the building. I think there's a question about whether they can legally go in and

repairs. And if the responsibility for them was

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2	to do	that,	whether	then	that	would	prever	ıt th	ıem
3	from	actual	ly initia	ating	a for	reclosi	ıre, wh	nich	we

see in many cases is actually a useful tool.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Okay. Well, I think that part, at least in my mind and in the Speaker's also, is heavily interested in these bills. In my mind it's up for discussion. I'll have to consult with her. And I can see how that, you know, could be a problem. But I think it's clear that this institution and this committee, you know, wants somebody to be accountable for these properties, because of the potential for blight, and in many cases the actual blight that happens and the affects that it has on the surrounding areas.

So, I'll end with that statement, and I'd like to go to my colleague, Brad Lander, if he has any questions?

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Sorry. After that, the list is open, so if any other members have--just to get the attention of Council. So we've got Council Member Lander followed by James.

2	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Thank you,
3	Mr. Chairman and thanks, Ms. Visnauskas for your
4	testimony and also for HPD's work on the
5	foreclosure issue. Let me start with the legal
6	questions. I think I understand the legal
7	concerns you raised related to 500. But I don't
8	see at all how they apply to my bill, the 494.
9	The whole idea of requiring the posting of a
10	compliance bond is that while the responsibility
11	remains with the owner during the period between
12	lis pendens and judgment, if fees and fines are
13	growing on those buildingssome of which may
14	attach to the property and some of which may not
15	but if they do at judgment, the taxpayers don't
16	want to be left holding the bag. And this would
17	protect the taxpayers against that, but it
18	wouldn't give the lender responsibility for
19	repairs, a requirement to enter the building. So
20	I'm just notI at least understand that as a
21	legal objection to 500, but I don't understand it
22	as a legal objection to 494.
23	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: So, I think
24	on 494 the issuewell, I think there's two. I

think one is the violations related to the housing

maintenance code can only be filed against the owner and not against the mortgagee. So, I think that may be the legal issue. And then I think sort of the policy concern is if the banks feel that they are going to be subject to all the fines and violations, then that may sort of prevent them for actually initiating the--

### COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER:

[Interposing] So I'll get to the policy concern in a minute. But I guess at least your first issue is this concern. So, there's no issue of entering the building created by 494.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: That would be for--right.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: And I mean,
I guess we can go take a look back at the civil
penalties. Obviously anything which winds up as a
lien on the building--right? I mean, that's what
I really want to go to in a minute. It's true
that's an obligation of the owner, while they own
the building. But at foreclosure judgment, when
the bank is going to step in, wipe the liens, I
mean what happens to the ERP liens at that point?
RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: So, I think--

addressing the earlier par	t of what you're saying-
-I think, yeah, the civil	penalties can't go
against the mortgagee. I	believe, according to
the Housing Maintenance Co	de, they would have to
go against the owner. But	I think you're right.
In the end, when the forec	losure judgment is
eventually paid in the end	, City liens are
priority and would end up	being paid.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Okay. So that legally at least a compliance bond could be posted against the payment of those liens.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Uh-huh.

Because they do get paid at the end of the foreclosure.

I'm not sure we're clear whether they do or don't, but I mean, if you have information that suggests they do, great. I think one thing that I'm concerned about, my sense is that there are plenty of times when the City winds up with unpaid liens in these situations. But in any case, what the bond would do is help make sure that we were going to get paid.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Uh-huh.

2	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: So now I
3	want to go to this question of trying to figure
4	out what the right incentives are. Because
5	obviously when and whether to foreclose is a
6	complex decision that a lender is making, and
7	we've seen that. Right? There's a whole set of
8	questions. Are they afraid of marking down to
9	market? Do they have the paperwork that enables
10	them to? How are they judging the timing? How
11	are they judging how long it's going to take?
12	What do they think the upside is? I think in most
13	cases we're assuming that if they believe that the
14	asset has value, eventually they're going to want
15	to complete the foreclosure action. I mean, there
16	may be some situations where they believe the
17	property has so little value relative to their
18	loan that they would just walk away from it
19	forever. But in most cases I think we believe
20	that there's some residual value in the building
21	given what was lent. And at some point they
22	cannot get to that value without either reaching
23	some arrangement with the owner to modify the
24	mortgage and enable them to continue paying or to
25	foreclose, right?

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 34
2	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Or to sell
3	the loan.
4	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Correct.
5	Okay. Then some other lender is going to have the
6	same decision; presumably that lender is only
7	going to buy the loan if they believe there's some
8	value there. Again, either through modification
9	or through foreclosure. Right?
10	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Uh-huh. Yes.
11	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: So, I mean
12	I guess it seems to me then we're asking a series
13	of questions about who is on the hook when and
14	what the risks are. So, you just said that this
15	period of foreclosure can be on average a two-
16	year
17	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: [Interposing]
18	Up to a two-year, I believe.
19	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: And
20	especially in the multi-families. I wanted to
21	come back and distinguish multi-families from one-
22	to fours, as I understand from HPD's point of view
23	why the multi-families are the ones that you sort
24	of wind up dealing with the tenants in. So, right
25	now, is it fair to say that that two-year period

between lis pendens and judgment is the time in the multi-families anyway where we face the most problem?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Right.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Where there's the least responsibility being taken for a building when HPD or the City's most on the hook for ERP when tenants and neighbors are most without any recourse to any—to getting, you know, getting repairs done or getting the building maintained.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Uh-huh. Yes, certainly.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: So, I guess
I want to understand how--there's no doubt if you
put--and we'll come back to how much it would
really cost--but if you put a compliance bond
requirement in place, I mean, you might be able to
persuade me there would be a few cases where
foreclosure would be delayed or where they might
not do it and they might look to sell the loan to
a new lender who would make the judgment. But,
against the possibility that during the two-year
foreclosure period we would have a little better

2	likelihood of getting satisfaction, are you saying
3	that you've kind of done that analysis and

4 concluded that the harm done in the pre-

foreclosure, the pre lis pendens period is so great that it offsets the need to do something

7 about the period between lis pendens and judgment?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: I think we

9 have seen in the buildings that we've been looking

at, that when the foreclosure is initiated, that's

often one of the triggers that we find out that

there is a financial situation in the building.

And also, I think probably from a regulatory

14 perspective is also sort of the signal to, you

15 know, people's varying levels of regulatory, that

16 | there's a problem. So, I think without the

foreclosure, oftentimes we wouldn't necessarily be

aware of a level of distress. You know, as folks

are aware of, when we went to look at the Milbank

20 Buildings, this is a portfolio of buildings that

21 did not have a huge amount of 311 calls, because

22 they were not a series of tenants that were sort

of used to calling 311, and when we went out and

looked at the buildings we issued 1,000 violations

in about a week of roof to cellars. So, I think

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2	we don't always know whereto the extent of the
3	physical and the financial are linked, we don't
4	always see them. And something like a foreclosure
5	filing is one thing that triggers for us. So, I
6	think we are worried about ever sort of impeding a
7	bank's desire to foreclose, because that's sort of
8	an important way that we get information about
9	what's going on in the multi-family stock. And
10	then I think second to that is that we haven't
11	seen banks on multi-family buildings take a lot of
12	them REO. So I think your question about the
13	timeframe, that timeframe is long. But a lot of
14	what we've seen is note selling prior to judgment
15	and that banks don't necessarily want to take the
16	properties' REO and be responsible for the
17	maintenance of multi-family occupied buildings in
18	the city.
19	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Right.
20	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: So, things
21	trade.

22 COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: But isn't that a good--that can be a good outcome. 23

> RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Absolutely. But I think also they trade subject to--what we've

it. And your incentive to move to judgment to

2	that	it'sI	mean,	yes.	I	mean,	right,	it	doesn'	t
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3 have to be an equally good incentive to achieve a

4 good work out, or to achieve a work out, as you're

5 arguing it is a disincentive to begin the

6 foreclosure proceeding at all.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Right. As long as it doesn't do that, then I think it

9 wouldn't have a negative impact.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Okay.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: But I think

it's hard to know. Right?

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Well, at one level it's hard to know. At another level it seems to me that the--I mean, I get that you're saying that it's not a fair--it seems to me that most of the problems we see are in the post-filing, post lis pendens pre judgment or sale period. That's the period of time in which the owner no longer essentially feels responsibility for the building. They may be, you know, distressed and start to be walking away prior to that, but prior to that they haven't had a lis pendens filed. So in my experience the bigger problem is in that post notice, post lis pendens

2	time period. So, if we agree that the bond, that
3	having the bond in place is a modest disincentive,
4	it would therefore be exactly the same as a
5	positive incentive in the post lis pendens period.
6	And so, I'd rather have it then, and we might have
7	a chance to achieve a workout. I guess I'm
8	skeptical, to be honest, relative to all the other
9	factors, let me just ask you about its cost.
10	Because I'm skeptical relative to all the other
11	factors that we've talked about, that it would be
12	much of a disincentive to foreclose. I mean, the
13	bank still can't move toward the value in that
14	property without doing it. So, as long as it's a
15	relatively modest cost, I find it hard to believe
16	that the banks would just choose to let that
17	property float out there
18	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: [Interposing]
19	Right.
20	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER:for the
21	small cost. So, I mean, let me just ask that. Do
22	you have a sense of what a compliance bond would
23	cost at the level that we're talking about?
24	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: I don't
25	really.

then my last questions relate to the difference

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between single families or one- to four- or multi-2 families. Or maybe I should say buildings with 3 4 tenants and buildings without tenants, since 5 obviously some of those one- to fours might have and might not have. The vast majority of the lis 6 pendens actions in 2010 are from one- to four-

family buildings. So, we don't have the tenant

concern in that situation, right?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Primarily. Ι mean, again, let's just talk about, well all right. We may have a few tenants in the one- to fours, but by and large we're talking about homeowners. There it seems to me that the argument that this would function as a disincentive and that that would be bad for the City is even weaker. You know, what you have is-it's true, I guess the bank could just not foreclose, but then you've got a homeowner by and large living in the home. So there's somebody to maintain the building, and do their best. they're struggling, but I don't think they're going to let the building entirely deteriorate as it would when it's vacant. So, if they don't bring the lis pendens action, I don't see the

harm. Let the homeowner continue. When they
bring the lis pendens action, that's the moment at
which the homeowner, you know, often decides, you
know, it's time to walk away. And now the
neighbors are stuck with the problem. So, in this
instance, I don't really see it as a small
problem; I see it as a good. If it serves as an
incentive to work something out with a borrower in
place, but then post this bond backstop once you
have the foreclosure—I'm just not sure why that
would be bad for us.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Yeah. I think our testimony was focused primarily on the larger multi-family buildings. I think on the one- to fours we wouldn't necessarily disagree with the caveat that, and I don't think the bill says this, but to make sure that the charges don't sort of get passed to the homeowner would be our concern.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Absolutely.

No, that I--that's an amendment that I actually would like to see to the bill, so I completely agree that we need to amend it to say that the charge related to this can't be passed on--

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES:

Thank you.

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 46
2	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Followed by
3	Wills.
4	COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Thank you.
5	Msam I pronouncing your name correctly, Ms.
6	Visnauskas?
7	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Visnauskas.
8	COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Visnauskas.
9	Can I just call you Ruthanne?
10	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Sure.
11	COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Thank you.
12	Thank you, Ms. Ruthanne. So, you know, in New
13	York City the number of, unfortunately, the number
14	of foreclosures have increased, particularly in
15	the borough of Queens and in the borough of
16	Brooklyn. I argue that all over the city of New
17	York. And they've had a deleterious effect on the
18	conditions not only in the neighboring
19	communities, but overall in the city of New York,
20	particularly as it relates to one- to four- where
21	there's tenants. I am in the midst of dealing
22	with a judge on a one- to four- where you have an
23	absentee landlord and tenants just recently, just
24	last week in fact, were given notices with regard
25	to shutting off their water and their gas and

their lights. And I also know that in the law in the City of New York and the state of New York there's all types of bonds; there's performance bonds, there's bonds to guarantee payment. It's all written in either case law or in statute. And so I am at odds with the position of the administration and the position of HPD, since there's all these types of bonds that are already in place to perform.

It took me literally a week and a half to get to the judge. And at that time, the order to have the lights turned on was basically sitting on our desk. And we adverted the lights being shut off in this particular building and the gas being shut off, and that really should not be the case. So, I guess legally I really don't understand the objection. I don't think that—and I want to join the comments of Council Member Lander. I do not believe that this is going to be a disincentive. And also, and in the case, and in my case and other cases in the City of New York, you have absentee landlords and or individuals who have basically walked away from the property because it's under water. And so, invariably the

case goes to judgment. After lis pendens has been
filed, usually a judgment. They get the judgment
and then at that point in time under the law
they're legally obligated. I don't understand why
they can't be legally obligated prior to that
judgment, particularly since most of the
foreclosures that are filed usually go to judgment
and the banks usually end up with the property. I
don't understand why we can't impose the
obligation upon them in advance.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Well, I think that we've found that in most of the mortgage documents that we've seen, that the banks don't have the right to go in and make the repairs, so that's obviously one issue. And then as I was saying to Councilman Lander, I think the--where we issue fines and civil penalties, those also I believe only can go to the owner, not to the bank.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Exactly.

They do. And we have not seen in the multi-family that the banks have really taken the properties back, so I think it impacts them in a slightly

on the property sometimes.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: But they go

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different way, but you're correct. And again, I
think our main concern is just not putting
something in the way of preventing folks from
doing the foreclosure, because it is a really
important step to resolving buildings that where
there isn't an owner that has any sort of
resources or willingness to make repairs, and it's
sort of the only way that they can get out in some
cases, even though foreclosure isn't really a
pleasant process for anybody.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: But I guess why should HPD, the City of New York taxpayers, take on their responsibility as opposed to the banks, who in some cases were responsible, you know, for this condition?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Right.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: And in all likelihood, given the numbers, invariably these cases go to judgment and they get these properties back. And so, I mean, I don't understand the legal objection. And I recognize that you think that this is going to be a disincentive, but that's really a philosophical objection. Other than that, I believe that those concerns can be

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overcome just based on what is happening in the market, and just based on what is happening in the

4 courts.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: You know, again, I think we also want to make sure that folks are still lending too, right. So I think it's always a--it's a balance between making sure people are responsible and the banks are doing the right things, which is certainly something we all want, and then also making sure that they're still providing capital.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: And though I recognize that, particularly since we find ourselves in a recession and banks are not lending, but I also am concerned about individuals living in the dark.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Yes. I agree.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: And having water and very serious violations pending. To me that's more of a priority in the immediate, even though I recognize the big picture. So I think HPD, and I know you share our concerns, because HPD has been ally to me and to my office and to my

who really did a lot of work to this cause.

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You've shown not only respect to him but to me and the people in our district that are mostly impacted. And I appreciate HPD's work to this point in my district. You worked with us in joint with Council Member Comrie and DOB last summer to close down two homes that had fell into vacant absentee landlords, and there was prostitution and drugs. And some people were just homeless, we understand that, but there were those elements in the house, which brought down a lot of the community. But, saying that, I know that you had made a comment that foreclosure is a necessary step in many of these cases. And you said that you wanted to make sure that we need to make sure that banks are still lending. But in the district that I represent, banks are not lending. are holding up credit; they're not lending to homeowners and they are discontinuing an egregious action, or actions, that they have started when they started doing these predatory loans. I have a lot of issues with JP

I have a lot of issues with JP

Morgan Chase and other banks like them. I think

that the City needs to pull our money out of

Chase, as did the town of Hempstead recently. But

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to go toward this, you know, I don't understand how we can worry about the banks and them being in good standing or helping them when they got a bailout of billions of dollars of taxpayer money. They actually made profits. And the people who are here and the people who are in my district have to deal with homes that are in disrepair, multi-families that are--I want to know what--not you, but the agency and the administration says to those people who have to live with that every day, to those people who the homes are fallen in disrepair, those people who have to walk by these homes and have other elements moving into the homes. What does the agency or the administration say to those people in the community, the people who have to deal with the peripheral negative impact?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: I mean, I think we have two primary sort of activities in the neighborhoods on that. One is obviously we have a huge housing and maintenance code inspector unit that's out in the neighborhoods every day, walking through buildings, responding to 311 calls, writing violations for everything that they

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see when they go in those buildings. And so 2 that's a really, you know, sort of large force 3 4 that's out in the neighborhoods responding to

5 issues and making sure that there's a record of the violations in the building and that the owner

corrects them. And if the owner doesn't correct

them when they're hazardous, then we step in and

9 do it instead of the owner and lien the building

for that amount. So, we spend an enormous amount 10

of staff and resources doing that. 11

> And the other effort that we have, which was announced a couple of months ago, which I referred to in my testimony is the proactive preservation initiative, which is sort of another smaller kind of SWAT team within our code enforcement unit, that is going out and proactively doing roof to cellar inspections on buildings that we believe are sort of trending towards distress. So, we have the AEP program, which has been tremendous at identifying the worst of the worst, and now we're trying to make a large scale effort to look at buildings that are heading that way, and going out and doing roof to cellars and documenting all those conditions, so that they

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 55
2	can be, if not corrected by the owner, corrected
3	by us.
4	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLS: But wouldn't
5	the bonds or the actions from this bill help you
6	and the staff and resources that the city is
7	allocating are totally responsible for in these
8	actions?
9	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: If the idea,
10	I think, is that the bond would be posted and then
11	we would perform the same ERP work that we do now,
12	and then that would then, we would draw down on
13	that to pay for those.
14	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLS: Right. So
15	then the answer would be yes.
16	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Yes.
17	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLS: All right.
18	Thank you very much.
19	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Council Member
20	Comrie, and then after that the list is open if
21	anybody wants to ask questions, get the attention
22	of the Council Member. Okay.
23	COUNCIL MEMBER COMRIE: Thank you.
24	You don't mind if I address you as Commissioner as
25	opposed to

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2 RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: I might not,

3 but someone else might.

COUNCIL MEMBER COMRIE: All right. I'd rather call you Assistant Commissioner than your name, because I think that while you have articulated the administration's point of view in a concise way, I just want to appeal to you that dealing with the one- and four-family homes are key. We have so many that are open and vacant and are attracting negative elements. You know, in Queens especially and in other parts of the borough where we have so many children that are without resources, without after school programming, we are already getting reports of them squatting in these vacant properties. And so the need to get them sealed up and safe is critical. I know that HPD is using its emergency repair program on these properties now. Can you give us a breakdown or do you have a breakdown with you on what types of repairs were made to do the seal ups for the homes in the one- to fourfamily homes? Because I would appeal that that is a critical part of making sure that the communities are safe as well.

2 RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: I don't have
3 that data with me, but I can follow up on that in
4 addition to I previously was asked how much ERP
5 we're spending on properties subject to
6 foreclosure citywide. So we can provide that
7 broken down by one- to fours, multi-family and as

well as one- to fours not in foreclosure.

COUNCIL MEMBER COMRIE: And if the presidential budget stays as is, we're going to lose even more money for youth programs and after school programmings, leaving them more loitering.

So, we don't want to have any vacant buildings for them. And I know it's going to be a major setback to HPD also, because the community block development program I believe has been cut by over \$600 million so far. Hopefully we get that restored before we get to June. And it's going to be a major impact.

I think that it's even more important therefore that we get the banks to step up and claim these properties and do what they need to do to protect the property. Because on the other hand, the real estate market is starting to become stronger. And if they can protect and

2	preserve the property so that it's not stripped,
3	so the properties are not ripped out of its
4	plumbing and supplies and whatever's of value in a
5	property, I think is critical. So, I would just
6	want to say that we need to make sure that these
7	compliance bonds and opportunities for the banks
8	to step up early to protect their own property I
9	think is critical. And I would hope that HPD does
10	whatever they can to reconsider that. And I'm
11	sure, Commissioner, or Deputy. I'll call you
12	Commissioner, because I want you to influence the
13	decision-making to make sure that that happens. I
14	think that all three pieces of legislation need to
15	be considered as vital to the mission of HPD,
16	especially if you're going to lose over \$500
17	million in your budget and not be able to do the
18	repair programs that you're doing now.
19	So with that, Mr. Chair, I'm going
20	to be concise and brief, because I have Cultural
21	Affairs Committee that also started at 1:00, so I
22	have to split myself. So, thank you very much.
23	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Thank you,
24	Council Member Comrie. Council Member Williams?

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Thank

And some of the things you said, it may deter landlords from foreclosing altogether, or postpone the foreclosure, discourage lenders from providing mortgages -- these things are

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happening anyway. That's one. And two, I get
frustrated when we keep trying to worry about
what's happening with the banks and not the
people. And we take a lot of risks when it comes
to the banks, when it comes to the wealthy people,
but we don't take the risks when it comes to the
people who are living on the block.

So, I see one of the legal things is it's questionable whether a mortgagee can be held responsible for the property or civil penalties. I think we should push the envelope and see for this, because we need to take a risk on the people who are out here, because they're the ones that are going to be suffering.

So, I'm sorry I missed it, but why exactly would it deter lenders from foreclosing altogether?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: So, we're concerned that if lenders feel that they would be-have a significant responsibility during a foreclosure of process for maintenance, whether that be going into a building that they may or may not legally have the right to do, or financially be on the hook for civil penalties related to

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housing maintenance code, that that would then

sort of delay them from starting a foreclosure or  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right)$ 

prevent them from starting one at all. And

foreclosure, you know, for many of these

properties is actually a good thing to the extent

that it signals that something is wrong and forces

sort of a workout and also is often one of the

only ways to sort of unwind these deals that are

complicated and get rid of sort of an untenable

amount of debt. So, our concern is largely just

that, is making sure this something doesn't sort

of prevent them from starting a foreclosure.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Well one, I think that, you know, they've been foreclosing

too fast, and banks like Chase are not helping

people work things out and they'd rather go to

foreclosure. So I'm not worried about slowing it

down. But two, I feel if you go into foreclosure

that you have a lot of financial difficulty to

begin with; I'm not sure that the \$10,000 bond

would be the thing that stops, that gives you the

biggest headache if you have a 3, 4, 5, \$700,000

problem, another \$10,000 I don't think is going to

be what triggers you into oh, no, all of a sudden.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Right.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: And discouraging lenders from providing mortgages, why--well, one, they're not providing the mortgages now. Why would this further prevent

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: I think for the same reasons, just making sure that if they feel that the sort of responsibilities related to being a mortgagee have changed, then we wouldn't want them to sort of pull back on capital to the extent that they've pulled back already.

Obviously it's already an issue, but we don't want it to be further sort of exacerbated by this.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: So we think that a \$10,000 bond on a half a million or a million dollar or more mortgage would prevent them from wanting to provide a mortgage?

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: So we haven't looked at how much the compliance bond would cost. Council Member Lander had asked us also in terms of we haven't done that sort of work yet to figure out how you price the compliance bond and how big it would be relative to the value of the building,

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so I think we'd need to further understand that to know whether it's \$10,000 on a \$100,000 mortgage or is it, you know, is it going to be \$100,000 on a--you know, what sort of the ratio is from the bond to the mortgage. So, I think we have to

understand that a little better.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: So, and then I saw the legal part of it as well. that most mortgages, the mortgagee tells the property owner that they have to keep it up. need to have somebody responsible for keeping this property up. If we identify it as the mortgagee because they're the ones with the money should be it, I believe that we should push the envelope as hard as we can. And if that doesn't work, we'll try something else. But doing nothing I don't think is the answer, based on the experience that I had in my district and the experiences that are happening, I'm sure, all over. Foreclosure is a big issue in some census tracks in my district. But it was a blight for many years on a beautiful Victorian block. And I believe that these bills would have at least given us some more tools to work with. But thankfully BCU and Fern are

So if there's an abandonment basically before the completion of the foreclosure, what happens? RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: So, in the early moments a foreclosure is filed, right, then there will be a proceeding in the court to appoint a receiver, so during the term of the foreclosure, if there's no owner there would be a--well,

always, there would be--rather if there's an owner

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work. Thank you.

you do it.

asking if--

Τ	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 65
2	or not active there would be a receiver appointed
3	by the Court who would be responsible for taking
4	all the proceeds from the rental income of the
5	building and putting it toward the building, not
6	paying the mortgage.
7	[off mic]
8	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Council Member
9	Williams has the floor.
10	[off mic]
11	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Are you
12	calling me stupid in front of all these people?
13	[laughter]
14	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: All right. All
15	right, guys. Let's, let's bring this back to a
16	level ofCouncil Member Williams.
17	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Yes. Can
18	I yield the rest of my time to Council Member
19	James?
20	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: No. If Council
21	Member James wants to ask a question, she can get
22	the Chair's attention and we'll allow her to ask a
23	question. Council Member Lander is on the list
24	followed by Council Member Wills.
25	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: We've been

25 COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: All right.

the next one is coming out, but.

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2	So I guess I would ask, and I mean this is long
3	term, but when that starts to happen, to the
4	extent that you have the ability to figure out as
5	you sort of said you would do, you're going to go
6	back and look at ERP and how much of that is on
7	foreclosed properties. I think it would behoove
8	us to figure out, you know, as part of this
9	question of enforcement. Part of the goal is to
10	recover the money that the city is spending to
11	repair properties, and part of the goal is to in
12	appropriate places use that lien as leverage so
13	that the agency can play a role in getting a good
14	workout instead of a bad workout, so we use one of
15	our preservation purposes like you were able to do
16	at Ocelot rather than a bottom feeder
17	RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: [Interposing]
18	Right.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: --come along and, you know, not do right by the tenants and also not do right by the city. So, if you can, you know, it would be great as that process moves into place if we can capture the information in a way that helps us attend to--

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: [Interposing]

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2 Member James.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLS: I yield my time to Council Member James. Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Council Member Williams, I would never ever refer to you as someone--you are of the utmost intelligence and you can even read questions really well. Going back to your receiver issue, receivers are restricted. Their powers are limited by Supreme Court judges. And oftentimes Supreme Court judges want to yield some control over their cases. oftentimes, as you know, the caseloads of most Supreme Court judges and unfortunately in the judicial system are delayed and backlogged. Again, going back to the case that I was involved in and continue to be involved in, and based upon my knowledge of the system, receivers unfortunately cannot get bills pays. They have to run back to the judges. They have to get on their calendars and oftentimes it's delayed unless someone intervenes, it's a problem. So, saying that a receiver is somewhat responsible for the building is sort of disingenuous, because they're

really not. I mean, they are responsible to a certain point, but it's really subject to the approval of a judge.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: True, although we spend a lot of time on portfolios that we're working on that are in distress. We're working with receivers to make sure repairs are getting made, so certainly in lots of buildings they are doing meaningful work and making meaningful repairs.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: And Deputy
Commissioner, Council Member Comrie was absolutely
correct, I should refer to you as Deputy
Commissioner, and I apologize. We want to take
that responsibility away from you, because you
obviously have enough in your portfolio, and we
believe that banks should be given the
responsibility to make sure that there are no
violations in the buildings and that bills are
being paid and that tenants are living in
buildings that are habitable based upon the
warranty of habitability, which is obviously the
law in the state of New York. So, again, I just
think that we should move these bills and we

should require that Chase either modify these
loans, restructure these loans, forgive these
loans, and lend some money so that one, overall
our economy can get back on track, and two, people
can stay in their homes and they can live with
dignity. And I thank you for all of these
questions, Madam Deputy Commissioner.

RUTHANNE VISNAUSKAS: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Okay. Thank you, Council Member James and thank you, Deputy Commissioner Visnauskas.

Okay, so next we'll call up Mr.

Michael Smith and Mr. Bruce Bergman. And if you have copies of your testimony, please give it to the sergeant.

Okay, and we will begin with Mr.

Smith. And you can introduce yourself in your own voice, and then you can give us your testimony.

MICHAEL SMITH: Okay. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman and members of the Council and this
committee. I appreciate the opportunity today to
appear before you to testify on intro numbers 494,
500 and 501, all of which, as you have already
noted, seek to add new responsibilities to

financial institutions who are commencingforeclosure actions in the City of New York.

I am Mike Smith. I am the

President and CEO of the Association, which is comprised of commercial banks--state chartered and national--and thrift institutions, state and national, operating throughout the state of New York. I think it's important to make a distinction that banks is a generic term. We specifically represent banks that are chartered by the United States of America, or by the state of New York.

We understand that the goals of these proposals are to ensure that properties are maintained during the foreclosure process and to ensure that the HPD is aware of the property, that the property is in foreclosure. The duties and rights of borrowers, lenders, homeowners and tenants are clearly and appropriately addressed, we believe, an existing and potentially conflicting state and federal law. And I might add the state has enacted at least three, if not four, statutes since 2003 in the mortgage area. And we've worked with the state on all of this and

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2 in cooperative fashion with the state.

The additional actions contemplated today will place local rules and standards at odds with these state laws and beyond. This will confuse, we believe, consumers, make compliance unduly and unnecessarily burdensome for lenders and servicers and result in fewer mortgages being made by reputable financial institutions in New York City. I would just like to highlight, since we went through the subprime crisis, that most of the subprime loans made in the United States were not made by banks, and that also there is a mortgage brokerage industry and there's a mortgage banking industry. And at every hearing, I think, most of the hearings I've been through for seven years, there are some absentees testifying. we're here because our industry is directly affected by this.

Ultimately, we believe that the current legislation before you will aggravate the fragile housing market and the general economic recovery. Our member banks of the New York

Bankers Association--I'd like to highlight this--have a long history of supporting efforts to

encourage responsible home ownership and offering
assistance when borrowers get into trouble. We do
this daily through a variety of voluntary
programs, financial support for non-profits in the

6 community, and partnerships with concerned public

7 officials. For example, Senator Schumer worked

8 with us in 2003 and 4 going into various

9 neighborhoods to identify what were the problems

10 related to predatory lending.

My written testimony details many of these activities, but I would just like to highlight that the banks, our banks, our members, are the underwriters of the Community Preservation Corporation, which has made over \$7 billion in affordable housing over the last two or three decades. We're part of the mortgage coalition. We are a part, a leading sponsor of Operation Hope, Financial Literacy—an advisory group, and the NHS. Due in part to these initiatives and these works, New Yorkers—and I know and I can definitely identify with the comments that have been made by the panel today, we live it every day and I'm a representative of the banks—but quite frankly, New Yorkers have fared better than

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citizens of many other states. In fact, while New York is the fourth most populous state in the nation, we were ranked 43rd last quarter among all states in the rate of foreclosure filings and our statistics continue to improve against the rest of the nation. Indeed, New York's foreclosure filings last quarter were more than 21% lower than the year before. These statistics -- and the word foreclosure is a bit misleading as I'm sure that everyone is aware, because the foreclosure starts--there's a start and an endpoint, and we're going to get into that in a minute, where you get to final judgment. And it's quite frankly even longer and our witness, expert witness sitting next to me, can comment on this--Bruce Bergman, since it's his business -- on how long it does take.

But when we look at foreclosure statistics, we would like you to consider the following; one, almost all 82% of the foreclosure filings in New York State this past February were lis pendens. Lis pendens is only the first filing in the foreclosure process, which can last a minimum—as was said before—of two. But what we're hearing now is up to three years in New

York. Nationwide, only 1 out of 75 households
that receives a foreclosure filing actually
results in a completed foreclosure. All this is
meant to provide enough time for borrowers and
lenders to work out the loan with a mutual goal of
avoiding foreclosure. And on the current market,
it should be noted that over 40% of the mortgages,
subprime mortgages made in the United States, they
were made by a firm named Countrywide; another
firm that was from the west coast, Washington
Mutual. Some of our members, Bank of America in
the case of Countrywide, and Chase, acquired in
basically a very difficult situation with the FDIC
and acquired these institutions. They originated
and they were a source of some of the problems
we're talking about. But we, as institutions are
some 150 banks, our mutual goal iswith the
borroweris to avoid foreclosure.

In addition to the banking industry's voluntary efforts, we've long supported legislation to establish uniform national standards—and we've been frustrated in this—in the subprime market designed to eradicate predatory practice. We also have worked

tirelessly with the state to craft high cost home loan, subprime lending, and mortgage foreclosure laws. Because of these efforts, New York borrowers and tenants enjoy some of the strongest, if not the strongest consumer protection laws in the nation. For example, about half the states in the United States don't even have judicial foreclosure proceedings. Foreclosure takes place in about 90 days in a non-judicial foreclosure.

One of the chapter laws that was passed in 2009 that was alluded to earlier requires that all defaulting homeowners receive a 90-day pre-foreclosure notice--this is state law--and have the opportunity to participate in a mandatory settlement conference 60 days after proof of service has been filed with the county clerk. We've worked with the Office of Court Administration and the Chief Judge of the State of New York on this practice and support these conferences.

Borrows with owner-occupied one- to four-family dwellings already have the right to receive a notice regarding the availability of help for distressed borrowers. And that right has

also now been extended to any tenant in a dwelling unit. Lenders are subject to an array of new maintenance obligations once they have obtained a judgment of foreclosure and a sale on property which is vacant, becomes vacant after the issuance of the judgment, or is abandoned by the borrower but is occupied by a tenant. The key word that you'll hear in my commentary is after the judgment. Because our view is the owner should be responsible.

Introductory number 501 would require any lender commencing a foreclosure action on residential property to register with the Department within ten days of commencing the action. Because of existing reporting requirements, much of the information sought is already available today at county clerk's offices, or can be obtained from lis pendens filings, which I know Mr. Bergman can comment on.

Moreover, this filing requirement would be in addition to the filing which the new Superintendent of the Department of Financial Services—it used to be the Banking Department, now it's got a new name—currently requires of

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lenders statewide who are foreclosing on home loans. Existing law requires lenders to provide to the superintendent all relevant information about the borrower in order to determine whether the borrower, quote, might benefit from counseling or other services, end quote. Requiring that city lenders recreate, and I might say in our instance banks, recreate in yet a third format information already available will just impose another costly--in our view--and time-consuming burden on the banking institutions. The additional cost of compliance will inevitably lead to fewer mortgage loans, in our belief, being made in New York City, and greater borrowing costs for those consumers who do get mortgages, because the bottom line, is someone ultimately--and whether it be government or private institutions -- have to pay for these services.

We believe that a far more efficient—and would urge that you consider this—reasonable solution, would be for the Department to get the information directly from the court system. And we would support that. We work with the court system. Or the superintendent of what

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used to be the Banking Department and now the 2 Department of Financial Services, both of which 3 collect this data.

> We also strongly object to the provision in the introduction requiring the posting of lender-employee contact information on a public website. This could actually place employees at risk. In fact, the OCA, the Office of Court Administration, does not collect this information, as they deem it to be unnecessary to the process and a violation of individual privacy rights. We believe therefore that any possible benefit of collecting and posting such private information would be far outweighed by the potential damage to employees.

Introduction number 494 and 500 raise even more serious concerns, as they seek to reassign the obligations of property ownership from home and building owners to the lender. Even though the lenders neither own, nor have possession of the properties. Lenders are of course concerned about the neglect of properties in the foreclosure process and are troubled by the negative impact these properties have on

neighborhoods. However, we believe that the maintenance obligations set forth in the state law, which was passed in 2009, are not only comprehensive, but take to the outer limits the legal authority and obligation of lenders to maintain property which they do not own. burden should fall on the owners. We also note that many affordable housing units carry state or federal quarantees. It is not even clear how this 

provision would apply in such cases.

Current law already imposes substantial maintenance obligations on lenders who have obtained a judgment of foreclosure in a sale on property vacant or abandoned. In these circumstances, the lender has—this is current law—has the duty to maintain that property until ownership has been officially transferred and the deed has been duly recorded. The maintenance obligations quite appropriately do not apply when a receiver is serving, or during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding, which, as I said earlier, can exceed three years. That timeframe is the period in which I think is the focus of your attention today.

The burden being placed on the

lenders by Introduction 500 goes well beyond these legal parameters. Imposing maintenance burden on lenders from the moment the foreclosure proceeding is filed until the conclusion of this lengthy proceeding, despite the fact that the lender has no legal ownership to the property, and even where the property remains occupied by tenants. Even to say lenders who seek to enter occupied homes that they do not own, to make repairs that are not

authorized are not only trespassers under the law,

but also place themselves in potential danger if

confronted by a fearful occupant.

The cost of maintenance requirements and the extent of the obligation to maintain properties appear to be unlimited in this legislation. Essentially these proposals impose on the lender all the obligations of a full owner at a time when the lender at best has limited rights of access and is not recognized as the lawful owner.

Although we understand the desire to see properties maintained, this proposal does not achieve this goal without creating a conflict

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with the fundamental tenets of law. This
ordinance can only discourage regulated financial
institutions from extending mortgages in the city.
The maintenance expenses could be wildly
disproportionate to the mortgage investment. The
unpredictable, unquantifiable financial
obligations that this bill would create certainly
would send a chill through the mortgage market in
the city. And we have yet to understand how state
and federal regulatory authorities would treat
these loans under current supervisory guidelines.

Introduction 494 also seeks to impose maintenance obligations on foreclosing lenders by requiring them to obtain compliance bonds. The bonds, which would be used to reimburse the Department for repairs made as a result of violations issued during the pendency of the foreclosure. The minimum bond is \$10,000. The minimum is \$10,000. The bonds would be for amounts yet to be determined, but which will be assessed using a formula based on a percentage of the assessed valuation of the property. In other words, you have this variable. And pricing a product, even though we are not--we don't

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represent the insurance industry--it's very difficult. Once again, the financial burden of maintaining properties not owned by the lenders will therefore, without legal authority in our view, be shifted from the property owner to the lender, at an unknown cost and a burden to the lender. When you price -- as I understand and just, you know preliminarily--we'd be more than happy to work with you all. The pricing of this product, which would probably be provided by an insurance company or agent, typically you don't buy the product in a distress situation. You don't buy insurance. You might have to just buy insurance for all real estate in New York or New York City as a pricing matter, in order to build up a risk pool to take this into account. But these are only preliminary comments that we have in terms of the pricing.

We believe these measures will reduce the ability of New York City consumers to obtain mortgages from credible institutions, and will simply add to the borrower's costs, or to someone else's cost if the borrower, if the lender is prohibited from passing these fees along. That

2 means the price of product has to go up throughout 3 the entire marketplace.

Finally, a significant number of lenders in New York City are national banks or national federal thrift institutions, which may not be even covered by these mandates. Therefore, it is possible that different New York City properties would operate under different maintenance obligations, causing confusion and perhaps false expectations. These measures would place more stress on the state banking charters, an outcome which the state of New York most recently in Governor Cuomo's passage of this budget and the new Department of Financial Services wants to avoid.

In summary, the New York Bankers
Association appreciates this opportunity to
comment on these proposals, the foreclosure
situation. We pledge to work with you on
additional efforts. We should have a mutual goal
of encouraging reputable lenders to provide
mortgages to credit worthy New Yorkers and not to
discourage them if unnecessarily by obligations
that will affect the mortgage market.

2	Thank you for allowing me to appear
3	today. And with me is a practitioner, one of the
4	foremost mortgage lawyers in New York, and I might
5	say the nation, Bruce Bergman, who we have
6	consulted with over time but has many clients.
7	He's with the firm of Berkman, Henoch, Peterson,
8	Peddy and Fenchel. And I turn to Bruce just so
9	you have some introductory comments, and then
LO	we'll take whatever questions that you might have.
11	BRUCE BERGMAN: I want to add some
12	thoughts as to
13	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: [Interposing]
L4	Mr. Bergman?
15	BRUCE BERGMAN: Yes.
16	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: You just have
L7	to introduce yourself in your own voice, and then
18	you can continue.
L9	BRUCE BERGMAN: My name is Bruce J.
20	Bergman, and I have been invited as an expert
21	witness on behalf of the Bankers Association. I
22	wanted to add some technical comments which I
23	think are quite relevant to the statute.
24	I mean I can begin by noting that

while I find the statute to be unfortunate in many

respectsso if I comment on what the statute
might need to contain, it's not a suggestion that
I would otherwise approve of it. But, if it were
to pass, the definition of the property
encompassed by the statute is quite unclear.
There is a reference in the three separate
statutesthere is a reference in one to any real
property, in another it says residential real
property, which is not really a defined term
anywhere. And although there is a mention of one-
to four-family houses in its relationship to owner
occupied, when you mix all those together in the
three states of notice, bond, and maintenance, it
is truly unclear. So, if a statute like this were
to pass, you would create confusion and
litigation, which will help no one in the absence
of a clear definition of the precise property
being covered by the statute. I suggest that for
consideration.
In talking about who the lenders

In talking about who the lenders are--and obviously in listening we hear about the sentiment, and the sentiment towards lenders is generally, well, we could call it unkind or ungenerous--but without commenting on that one way

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or the other, I think the concept of who lenders are is to some significant extent misplaced. you think in terms of behemoth lenders--and while they have a significant number of loans--there are many other lenders. There are small mortgage companies, there are casual lenders, there are individuals. And to make the point most strongly, take an example of Mr. and Ms. Jones, who live in Brooklyn and own a home, maybe a two- or threefamily home. And they retire, and in order to sell the home, they have to take back a purchase money mortgage. Their buyer cannot get all the financing or doesn't have all the money or the value may not be there. So, they take back a mortgage and they retire to a rental apartment in If there is a default on their mortgage, they need to foreclose. Now they would be treated just as any other lender would, and they would need to give the notice--I assure you they won't know about it and unless they engage a mortgage expert they won't know it, and will be subject to a fine of \$1,000 per week. They will not have the ability to obtain a bond, and that leads me to a comment on bonding.

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There is a concept of bonding 2 capacity. While a very large institution will 3 4 have bonding capacity, which doesn't comment on 5 what the cost is, a relatively small or even 6 modestly sized mortgage lender or mortgage company or an individual will not have bonding capacity. The overwhelming likelihood is that the only way 9 such a person or company can get a bond is to post the full amount of the liability. So, if the bond 10 11 were \$50,000, and we don't know what the numbers 12 are--remember, 10 is the minimum--if that number 13 were \$50,000, Mr. and Ms. Jones, who sold their home in Brooklyn, would be required to come up 14 15 with \$50,000, which would make it impossible for 16 them. So, they are living in retirement on the 17 sum they get from their purchase money mortgage, 18 and are now unable to protect themselves. So, one 19 should bear in mind the nature of the lender who 20 is being affected by the statute. Not every 21 lender is the behemoth that some quarters find to 22 be distasteful.

There was a discussion earlier of delays in foreclosures, and I heard one comment that perhaps lenders delay them. I'm not sure

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whether that was viewed favorably or unfavorably. I suggest for your consideration that lenders have a very strong incentive to prosecute foreclosures as quickly as they can. Now, that happens to be exceptionally difficult not only in the state of New York but in New York City in particular. York City is the slowest venue to prosecute a foreclosure in the state, and I suspect the slowest venue in the nation. In Kings County for example, which is the slowest even of the five boroughs, I don't comment on Richmond, because I'm not sure of the statistics there, but in Kings County, I can tell you that today an order unopposed that was sent in in January of 2010 is only now in April of 2011 being looked at by the clerks of the court. When the clerks are done, it will go to the judge. When it goes to the judge and the judges are very busy, it is likely to take a month or two or three more for that order to be signed.

There are two stages of foreclosure, generally, not to bore you, where orders are obtained—the referee's appointment and the judgment. If each one of those is going to

2 consume 18 months, which is what it looks like now

in Brooklyn, that's three years in duration for

4 those two orders only, counting nothing else in

5 the case. So, foreclosures take a long time.

For every day consumed by a foreclosure, the interest accrues. Taxes have to be paid, the debt get greater. Every day portends a greater loss for the lender. The lender has an incentive to move as quickly as possible, virtually an impossibility in the City of New

12 York, but they are not looking to delay actions;

it can only hurt them. So, I wanted to make that

14 point.

On the level of the three proposals, there is notice and bond and maintenance, the notice being the least offensive—although unpalatable, I think, to any lender, bond in the middle and maintenance—exceptionally unfortunate. I want to comment very briefly on them. As to notice, and as Mr. Smith mentioned, when lis pendenses are filed with the court, that is information that is public record and could be obtainable from the court; you wouldn't need a separate list. If it were inconvenient to get

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that from the court, there are commercial listings. For a modest sum you get a subscription and it's a printed book and it's in front of you, and it tells you ever lis pendens filed and the type of property and the address and the section block and lot. And as Mr. Smith also mentioned, very detailed information is filed with the state of New York. So, the sources of this information are readily obtainable. To impose yet another layer on lenders, including Mr. and Ms. Smith, to provide information that can be obtained 13 otherwise, I think is worthy of reconsideration.

> As far as the bond is concerned, and I heard also a mention that perhaps the cost of the bond should not be compensable to a lender, if in addition to the cost that a lender incurs, it will have a bond premium of untold sums, and it could be very, very expensive. If this is not recoupable in a foreclosure, what a lender has to continue is, if we get a default upon a loan, we may incur tens of thousands of dollars of additional fees, which will guarantee that we can never get that back. How would anyone look at an investment knowing they will be guaranteed a loss

in every case where a bond has to be purchased?

It's a difficult situation to impose, and I think

it would certainly chill lending. Now, there was

a comment that in a particular district lenders

may not be making very many loans. I can't

comment as to that, but lenders want to loan, and

loans are being made. But if it gets so expensive

for them that they cannot loan, this is not a good

thing for the city of New York.

When you turn to the maintenance, and this is truly the most offensive, let me mention very briefly in lay terms what a mortgage is. A borrower borrows money and pledges, as security for the debt, the real estate they own. But what they say in a legal way is, Mr. Lender, I am giving to you the right—if I default—to begin a legal action and ask the Court to allow the sale of the property under its direction, and the sale will be through a court officer, a referee. That means that the lender has never been an owner, never. Only that the moment that a foreclosure auction is conducted. When a referee in the courthouse says sold, that is the moment the title is divested. So, the lender has a lien interest,

not an ownership interest, not a possessory interest. I understand very well your concerns--I happen to agree with them, although that's irrelevant--as to what happens in neighborhood when properties deteriorate, and what happens to tenants when they are abused by owners who do not supply services. By the way, I also defend foreclosure actions. So, I am fully aware, it is the owners who are the ones who are doing this.

Now, I don't know that there's a ready answer to making the owners do what they should do. But saying to a lender, whether it's Mr. and Ms. Jones or anyone else, that you who took a lien interest in property shall now be responsible to maintain that property for the duration of the foreclosure in an amount that's unstated so that you take a risk that can never be protected—how does someone make a loan of that nature?

And if, by the way, a foreclosure consumes a minimum of three years, and sometimes three and a half or four or more, and there is maintenance to be paid for over that period of time, what is that number? It can't be predicted.

It suggests that the accumulation of debt will definitely be greater than the loan that was made. So you tell a lender you will now lose money if you make a loan in the city of New York unless you can be so certain that these things can't be happening. If a private lender came to me and this bill had passed and said, I'm thinking of making this loan, what kind of risks am I taking on, and I told him and he said should I do that, I would say no. You cannot predict the costs to you. I suggest that this will chill lending. And again, while the purpose is a very good one, I suggest this is not the way to do it.

Turning again to the mechanical, less important but relevant. If you were to impose this maintenance, opposed though I may be to it, bear in mind that if a receiver is appointed in a case, which is something that can be sought, the moment a receiver is appointed by a court, a lender would have no authority whatsoever to have anything to do with the physical control of a property; they are barred. So, if you have a statute that says a lender has to maintain, it will clash immediately and create ambiguities if a

receiver has been appointed. Likewise, if a bankruptcy has been filed, which is common by the way in mortgage foreclosure actions, and depending upon the chapter it is; if it's a Chapter 7, then a trustee is appointed. The trustee is the one in control of the bankrupt estate. A lender has no authority by virtue of federal preemption to go anywhere near that property. They didn't have the authority anyway, but here you have a clear clash. If a Chapter 11 is filed, then the owner becomes a debtor in possession to the exclusion of the lender. The lender has no right whatsoever to go on the property. Again, it's a matter of federal preemption. So, if the statute does not take those into account, you create more litigation.

The final thought is that if the lender has only a lien interest, and they do as a matter of law, and it is not possessory, then you are telling a lender that the contract that they entered into, the mortgage document—and it is a contract—and all applicable law in history, with the sole exception of that state statute—which I can comment upon if asked—that we are now going to change that and reverse this and impose upon

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consideration.

you a burden that you never expected, that you

could not have bargained for, that you did not

agree to, and is against the history of law going

back to the Common Law in England. That's what

you would be doing. And I think that that is

rather unfortunate. It is worthy of

Last thought on the mechanics of If you impose that you will require a lender to go to the property, and if it is locked, break down the door or change the locks, go in, spend money that it would not otherwise have to spend as a matter of law. And just as an additional aside, to show you how unpalatable that would be, what happens when someone walking into the house trips and falls on the steps? They will sue, I assure you. They will sue everyone. Because the lender now has what's called care, custody and control of the property, they will be liable, when they never would have been, for this lawsuit. How will a lender obtain insurance and cost out the liability for every trip and fall in every building in the city of New York upon which it holds a mortgage? Need I tell you how many suits there are of that

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nature? And don't they sue everyone? Even people 2 not liable. But here a bank would be liable, or 3 any lender--again, Mr. and Ms. Jones.

So, I despair for what would happen to lenders if this goes into effect. And it's one thing--may I say that enough--to impose this in futuro. What do you do with a lender who made a loan previously, knowing what the law was and knowing they had no such responsibilities, and now the law says, but we will impose this upon you now? I suggest that that one's unconstitutional. I suggest your consideration that imposing maintenance even after you know about it is unconstitutional, I think clearly so for someone who previously made a loan. Those are my thoughts. And if there are questions as to mechanics, we're open to ...

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: There absolutely are questions. And I didn't mean that in a sarcastic way. I believe that there absolutely are questions. I'm going to give Council Member Fidler the prerogative of going first since he didn't ask questions in the opening round. And I'll defer until later. Council

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2 Member Fidler?

COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Thank you,
Chairman Dilan. And Mr. Bergman, I'm just a
humble country lawyer from Kings County, and it's
been some 30 some-odd years since I've been in law
school, so I'm going to ask you some questions and
maybe you can enlighten me. But I first want to
say a couple of things about your testimony.

I find the reference to Mr. and Ms. Jones to be offensive. I can tell you that Mr. and Ms. Jones, first of all, would not be charged with the knowledge of the provisions of this law, because if Mr. and Ms. Jones were foreclosing on their lifelong savings household residence that they had sold, if they hadn't gone to a competent foreclosure attorney to do that, they've got a problem to begin with, so that's number one. Number two, you know, I've been practicing for about 30 years, and the number of purchase money mortgages that are being held back because they can't sell their house when they need to, to someone other than a family member, are de minimis. All right? Usually under the table second mortgages that the bank didn't know about.

All right? So it would be a second mortgage that
would be under water, and it would be a first
mortgagee who would likely be more primarily
liable. And you know, quite frankly, to run past
this committee the notion that we're going to be
burdening Mr. and Ms. Jones or Smith or whatever,
in their foreclosure action in Brooklyn is a red
herring.

You know, I know that not every bank is Countrywide, but quite frankly, I'm willing to bet just by hazarding a guess that about 98% of the mortgages in the city of New York are given by a lending institution and not by Mr. and Ms. Joneses. Okay? And probably about 98% of the foreclosure actions in the city of New York are in that same category. So, let's not let the tail wag the dog. Okay? That would be my first comment to you. You can respond to that if you like.

BRUCE BERGMAN: I would like to respond. I'm sorry that you're offended. It was not made to be offensive. It was made to present a valid point, and that is that the statute assumes that all lenders are of a commercial and

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behemoth nature. That's false. There are	
purchase money mortgages. I'm out of law se	chool
ten years more than you. I'm involved with	real
estate, have been all those years. I can a	ssure
you there are purchase money mortgages. And	d if
there were only a handful, and if you are co	orrect-
-whatever the number iseven if there were	, this
statute does apply to those people. I poin	t out
that this statute would affect them. And is	f Mr.
and Ms. Jones came before you and said, wha	t has
this statute done to us, you might then be	
sympathetic. So I point out that you want	to be
careful in who you define as those who are	liable
This is not offensive; it's just its affect	

COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: I'll just merely repeat, tail, dog. Okay? I mean this is not--you know, I can't tell you that all the points you've made here are inapposite, many are. This is relevant. But to parade it before the Committee as if we are going to place this enormous burden on the little folks is really kind of ridiculous--

[Crosstalk]

COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Could we

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 105
2	interest in the property
3	BRUCE BERGMAN: [Interposing] Yes.
4	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Who had
5	nothing to do
6	BRUCE BERGMAN: [Interposing] Yes.
7	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER:
8	[Interposing] With creating the condition, will
9	benefit from the repair that was done because now
10	they're going to own the property, they're going
11	to wind up paying for it in the end, right?
12	BRUCE BERGMAN: For that kind of
13	lien they would, but they know that when they buy
14	the property.
15	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Yeah, okay.
16	I get that. I'm justI'm being enlightened. All
17	right?
18	BRUCE BERGMAN: Yes.
19	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: And if you
20	go to the sale and there is no purchaser and title
21	reverts to the bank, is the bank going to be
22	liable for it?
23	BRUCE BERGMAN: Yes.
24	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: And they
25	know that already when they give you the mortgage

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 106
2	too, am I correct?
3	BRUCE BERGMAN: Yes. There are
4	certain liens that can come on that they might
5	have to do, yes.
6	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: So, why is
7	it any more of a burden to have them file a bond
8	to secure that payment?
9	BRUCE BERGMAN: Because the bond
LO	premium would have to be paid even if no such
11	violation is ever attached to the property.
12	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Well, you
L3	know, now I understand that. But then, if the
L4	violation did attach to the property, the bank got
L5	the property back, they'd actually be saving money
16	now, wouldn't they, because they paid the premium
L7	instead of the cost.
L8	BRUCE BERGMAN: No, the premium
L9	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER:
20	[Interposing] But the premium is going to be less
21	than the cost, right?
22	BRUCE BERGMAN: Not at all. How
23	can you say that?
24	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: The bond,
25	the cost of the bond is going to exceed the payout

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 107
2	from the bond?
3	BRUCE BERGMAN: It depends on the
4	circumstances.
5	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: That would
6	be new.
7	BRUCE BERGMAN: It depends how big
8	the bond is and it depends what the emergency
9	repair lien was. An emergency repair lien could
10	be a minor item or it could be a large item. If
11	it's a very big bond premium and a small lien,
12	then the math is different.
13	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Oh, okay.
14	And if it's not a huge bond premium and it's a big
15	lien, would the bank save money?
16	BRUCE BERGMAN: In theory if it
17	came outwell no
18	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER:
19	[Interposing] Well not in theory, if in fact.
20	BRUCE BERGMAN: Yes. If that's the
21	circumstance, they would.
22	COUNCIL MEMBER FIDLER: Okay. And
23	so you don't, you couldn'tand I'm going to be
24	fair to you, you wouldn't be sitting here right
25	now knowing what the math of all that would be.

BRUCE BERGMAN: I disagree with all the first part, but I'll let Mr. Smith answer it.

cheaper to the taxpayers of the city of New York.

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MICHAEL SMITH: I just want to comment on a couple of things. Number one, obviously, our association represents the incorporated lending institutions state and federal, so leaving aside individual lending. And standing on our testimony as to our concerns about this legislation, as to insurance, I think it would be important and ask that the Council consider this, the Committee consider this, that

the pricingbecause I have not heard yet what the
right pricing is. We do have an insurance section
within our group, and we did do some inquiry. And
what I said in my statement was basically without
getting into exactly dollar amountsbecause I
think that would not be right because I don't
think anyone has had time to do thatthere are
such things as compliance bonds. And we're aware
of that. Number two is that this is typically an
insurance product and it would be regulated as
such, and that typically as I said, insurance
property and casualty insuranceyou would want to
price it in such a way if you were going to
provide this feature, it would probably be
applicable to all mortgages made in the city of
New York so that you would have what they call a
pool, a risk pool, an assignment pool. And that
means that every mortgage made, not knowing what
it was going to cost would be subject to this.
But number two is, if it were to apply as the bill
contemplates, at the time a notice is filed, a
foreclosure, that this bond is purchased from what
I understandand we want to get back to you on
thisbut from what I understand, we understand,

is that that is, when you have a distress
situation is when you least want to purchase
insurance, especially if you don't know what the
amount is. It's beenwe've talked about \$10,000,
but if it's a building, multi-familyI mean large
residential building, you know, it's not clear.
And it could be a residential home. It's not
clear how much that bond is going to cost, because
the costs are variable. And obviously there are
those who are in the risk business who probably
would look at this.

But the pricing mechanism which we've talked about is--in our view would create a major problem in terms of this legislation, and will affect the mortgage market because it's going to affect every lender.

it. Honestly I'm not so humble and I'm not such a country lawyer either. I understand the idea of the risk pool. I understand the notion that when you do that you are spreading out the risk over a much larger pool that the property that's being foreclosed upon. And as a result, even the innocent are going to pay a cost to that. All

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right? But theoretically the cost will be minimized because you are spreading it out over a large pool. All right? That would be a good thing.

I will say, Mr. Chairman, that we really, we probably need to hear from the insurance industry to see what their view of the pricing of a compliance bond here would be. they probably would have to analyze the number and the amounts of emergency repair liens that have gone to foreclosure in order to be able to do the math, to figure out what a bond would cost. But I don't think that we can dismiss the notion based upon an idea that it's going to be too costly without looking at it and analyzing it and having the people who do that for a living come in and tell us what the pricing would be. So, and quite frankly I think at the end of the game, I think perhaps the bankers might be pleasantly surprised to find out that when you collateralize it over an entire large risk pool the cost would not be that much and it would in fact protect you on the properties that you are increasingly seeing going back to the banks--all right--with emergency

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS:

Thank

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 113
2	you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for the testimony. Can
3	I just get the names again?
4	MICHAEL SMITH: It's Michael Smith.
5	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Mr.
6	Smith.
7	BRUCE BERGMAN: And Bruce Bergman.
8	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Bruce
9	Bergman?
10	BRUCE BERGMAN: Yes. Bergman.
11	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Mr.
12	Bergman, I was impressed that you had all that in
13	your head and not on a piece of paper; I do have
14	to say that. Although there was a lot of stuff
15	thatI was trying to cull out what I thought
16	actually made sense and stuff that didn't that
17	seemed to be disconnected from what's actually
18	happening on the ground.
19	My first question, I think it was
20	Mr. Smith actually that started off saying there's
21	different bankings.
22	MICHAEL SMITH: Yes.
23	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: So can
24	you just clarify that a little bit, really quick,
25	not to confuse all the banking?

MICHAEL SMITH: Absolutely. And it
can be confusing and is confusing certainly for
the public. There are about 7,000 banks in the
United States and some are fully chartered
depositories, the legal definition of a bank
takes deposits, makes loans. There is in the
United States either licensedprimarily licensed
at the state level in all 50 stateslicensed
lenders, mortgage brokers and other types of non-
bank entities. And what we have seen as a result
of what has happened in the marketplaceand I've
seen this and I've been doing this for 30 years
is total intertwining of what actually is a bank
into everyone who makes a loan is a bank or
everyone who is involved in the securities market
is a bank. And that is not true for the
institutions that I represent. I represent what
is considered to be the traditional banking
sector.
COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: So Chase.
You represent people like Chase.

MICHAEL SMITH: I represent Chase.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Okay. So

definitely disconnected what's going on the ground

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comment on a couple things. First of all I know-and we've testified on this in previous forms and committee hearings -- that the facts that we've presented, and I think have been verified most recently in congressional testimony by the regulatory agencies, that quite frankly the number one deterrent in this current situation has been there is a lack of demand, and the demand very often is a lack of credit worthiness, along with a tremendous amount of concern throughout the entire community--whether it be the lending institution or the consumer -- as to the economy and have we reached bottom. And we would argue, and we've worked by the way--I might mention in terms of credit, I mentioned at the outset, which I know doesn't receive a lot of attention, but we are-all of our members--I should say most of them--

## COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS:

[Interposing] So, just excuse me one second--one, I want to say I'm thankful that you guys came and gave testimony. Two, I'm not very sympathetic with the banks right now, whatever the definition is. And I also know that I don't have too much time, so I want to push the conversation a little

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bit. My question was specifically how does it make the foreclosure process quicker and how does it deter the banks from making loans?

MICHAEL SMITH: In terms of the foreclosure process, the point that we would make and have made in our written testimony is it's going to deter the extension of the credit at the front end. If you do not have -- one, rate is a reflection of risk. If you have variables that are not quantifiable you have a very serious situation in terms of how you can justify--I know the word bank, I know how it is viewed. But banks are either owned by shareholders or by depositors and their customers. And they have to have certainty, and they want to have certainty. what we've seen and we would have commented on throughout this hearing today is that because of the fact that it takes so long to foreclose, which is not in the interest of the lender or the neighborhood in the state of New York, which is a virtue of our law, that you have these situations where you could have this maintenance for example, or the cost of the bond for example -- and I think the notice piece is another one altogether -- would

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 119
2	detract at the front end from making the extension
3	of credit.
4	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: So, it's
5	more, you answered more of extending the mortgage,
6	not extending the foreclosure.
7	MICHAEL SMITH: That's correct.
8	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: Okay.
9	MICHAEL SMITH: That's correct.
10	Because banks really don'tyou know, foreclosure
11	is the point that you don't want to be at if
12	you're making a loan. So.
13	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: So, any
14	I know you didn't want to comment before, but the
15	banks aren't making loans now.
16	MICHAEL SMITH: The banks are
17	making loans.
18	COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS:
19	Particularly Chase is not remodifying loans now.
20	MICHAEL SMITH: Mywe have 150
21	member banks, and I believe certain institutions,
22	one in particular that has been referenced in this
23	hearing has commented on their lending at this
24	point. I do not represent any specific
25	institution. But I can say that banks are lending

and we're working cooperatively. The fact is,
we're working with the Speaker, and the Small
Business Committee in the small business area on a
great program here in New York, on a second look
program on small business loans. And we are
working with the organizations I mentioned. And
the issue is having a market. You know, there are
no subprime loans basically in the United States.
These are loans that basically came out about ten
years ago. And you could sell them into the
secondary market. And what we have now is
basically the traditional loan product.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: I don't think banks are making loans, particularly in-especially in certain neighborhoods. First of all, they weren't making enough before and now they're not making it with the expediency that they should be.

Now, with the bond issue, I was very confused. Because from what I understand any insurance and bond that you pay for, you don't get that money back if something--if nothing happens.

MICHAEL SMITH: That's right.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: The money

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under the normal.

on in the nature.

contemplated, it would be at the time of
foreclosure, which would be, whichand I'm not an
insurance person and we would be happy to provide
more information to the Committee on this, but
your risk is much greater, obviously, if you're in
a foreclosed property situation than it would be

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: All right. I'm going--the issue I guess that I 11 have, one, there was a lot of statistics about New 12 York and being where it's ranked. There are a few 13 zip codes in New York that do rival what's going

MICHAEL SMITH: That's right.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: So that was disingenuous because there are some very bad zip codes in Brooklyn, Queens, in New York in general.

MICHAEL SMITH: We are aware of that. In fact it's--the predatory lending issue was first raised in the state of New York in about 2002 and 3. And mentioned Senator Schumer. went into Queens and we went into--and we know that they are targeted areas. And it was our

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findings and they came out in 2004 or 5 that the
community predominantly was using mortgage
brokers, and they were using firms that were not
necessarily New York firms. And new laws were
passed in the state of New York, but there were no
new laws passed in the United States of America.
they were not applicable across the board in the
nation. Some of these lenders are no longer in
the market, by the way.

more things and two statements more. For the information piece, on the ground it's very difficult to find this information. You gave a slew of places where you could find it. We find it very hard to find owners, up to date owners, who owns it. The property I discussed, we thought it was Deutsche Bank. Bank of America has a piece of it. So there's a lot of confusing information out there. So how--

MICHAEL SMITH: [Interposing] In terms of the, as we stated, we would urge that the HPD talk and consult as governmental agencies where you can share certain information that a banking institution that's subject to privacy laws

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2	cannot, that the governmental, the role of
3	government here is you've got this information in
4	the County Clerk's office, the OCA or in the HPD,
5	and that information can be posted on a website,

and it's there today.

BRUCE BERGMAN: And so the information, by the way, is specifically available. I know what you're talking about with banks, because when I have to plead that in a case, we have to describe who the bank is and sometimes one bank succeeds another or is the SNE or there's a merger and so on and so forth. information is specifically given to the state in each case. It has to be.

COUNCIL MEMBER WILLIAMS: There's a--2013, I think, Glenwood Road in South Midwood. I've been dealing with that property since before I was a council member. For about ten years people were searching to try to find just who the owner of that property is -- so not just banks. It's difficult to find who owners are of property. But, I'm going to wrap up.

The last thing I want to say is, this whole thing is about money. Greed. That's

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time.

it, period. I think it is appropriate to have 2 banks take ownership of keeping the property up to 3 4 They can share that with the owner if the 5 owner is unavailable. We tend to pass the buck a б lot, and we have to stop doing that. So you're 7 going to pass it to people who don't exist, and 8 then the owner is going to pass it around and 9 around. We have decided that we are identifying 10 who we think the most responsible should be, and 11 that is the bank, the mortgagee at this current

> Where I get frustrated is the Mayor Bloomberg approach, everybody is going to run from the city. People want to make money. I do not think these laws are prohibitive to the fact that no one is going to lend. That doesn't make any sense. This is New York City; people want to make money. People will lend in New York City. will have to adapt to the new laws that are here, just like we adapt every time that new laws are passed. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Thank you, Council Member Williams. Just as a reminder, I want to ask everyone to have their cell phones

All that said, I have to say that

from both of you I really do find today's

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in any case, you know, your members were involved

whether slower or later thoroughly in the
origination and securitization of subprime and
non-prime mortgages that helped take us in this
direction, then they would up holding these pools,
you know, whether because the fed encouraged them
to buy them. So, we're in the situation today,
and what I guess I feel like is on the one hand,
you know, there's a requestwe've provided as
taxpayers a substantial bailout, you know, the
Neil Barofsky piece last week made clear that from
his point of view as the inspector overseeing
TARP, as tax payers we got a raw deal. We put
that money up and we didn't get the lending that
we were expected to get. And then on the other
side, and I think this is where you focused in
today's testimony, any effort to seek to hold the
banks accountable in any way is simply met with
the argument anything you do will freeze lending.
Right? We haven't really analyzed it. We can't
tell you what the price is. There's a reasonable
belief that it will be a de minimis cost. We
haven't figured out how it's spread around the
risk pool, but what we can tell you is banks will
stop lending, the credit markets will freeze and

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no lending will take place in the City of New York if you do this. So, I feel like we've heard this. We've heard it time and time again. We've heard it on Capitol Hill. There's a lot of it reflected in Senator Levin's report today. So, you know, that's where we start.

And I guess, to get to my first question, I think we actually agree on a big piece of the problem, right? It takes a long time to foreclose in New York, and so for this period, whether it's one, two, three, four years, when as a result of a loan being in default--whether because it was underwritten poorly or because someone took it when they shouldn't have, whether it's a single-family, whether it's a multi-family, it's going to take a long time to work its way through.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: I think we believe we don't have good incentives to get other I'll come back to that in a minute. workouts. But in any case, during that period of time there are some real risks, especially to tenants and neighbors. Right? If one of your members has brought the lis pendens action and the owner

believes they're less likely to be able to hold
that property, their incentive to keep that
property up, to maintain it for its tenants,
especially if it's a multi-family building, but
also if it's a one to four with tenants, and for
neighbors, they're much less likely to maintain
their buildings.

So, one of the questions we're asking here is, who should be on the hook to help guard against that problem?

BRUCE BERGMAN: Okay.

be responsible? There are couple of possibilities. The owner of course should be responsible. It's nice to say, but it's small comfort to tenants or neighbors if the owner is not present, has flown the coop, isn't there, isn't paying your members and isn't taking care of the building. So the tenants are without heat or hot water and the neighbors have a terrible eyesore. So, the owner doesn't seem to be a good answer.

The current answer seems to be the taxpayers. The taxpayers will take care of it.

One, we're not equipped to do a great job, and
two, I don't really think that that's the right
answer either, that the taxpayers essentially
should pay the ERP liens and take care of it. So,
it does seem to me actually that building that
into the pricing of the loanand I guess this
distinguishes the 500 from 494. I'm not asking
you guys to step in and do the repair work. I'm
asking you to provide a backstop that guarantees
that on a property where you've brought a
foreclosure judgment, where you know it's pretty
likely that some things are going to happen on
that property that have to be taken care of, and
that for the most part are likely to wind up as
liens against the property anywayso in fact it's
already going to be a responsibility to be
discharged at judgmentwhy it's not reasonable to
ask your members to participate in helping
safeguard tenants and neighbors against something
that you're participating in causing both with the
origination of the loan in the first place and
from the bringing of the lis pendens.

MICHAEL SMITH: Okay. Can I just make a comment on your earlier comment, which is,

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institutions is--

the TARP program, the banks paid--the government 2 received that and that is us, the taxpayer's 14% 3 4 interest and most of that money from the large

## COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER:

[Interposing] Maybe we should go into the businesses of making the direct loans.

MICHAEL SMITH: Well, and number two is, unfortunately because we were--I mean I was a witness to what was going on at the time. But the original purpose of that program was, as you say, to get into the lending side. And it was actually, as I believe Mr. Barofsky said in his report, at least the summaries that I read, was directed more at how it was changed by the treasury department during the phases of implementation. And also too, it's as to who our members are, I believe I said it, that most of our members, a vast majority, but most, and those that really--some of the most egregious are not in the business at all anymore, and in some cases have been bought. In terms of who is responsible which I know is--that's the purpose--I mean that's the sort of the theme of the hearing, if the bank is

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going to be--I mean our view as is in the testimony--the short answer is we believe firmly the owner should. And the owner--and if a responsibility now is going to be transferred either to the private sector firm or to the government, then obviously that affects how you evaluate that risk and what happens. If it's going to go to the private sector, to the bank, that means that everybody who goes to seek a loan, someone has to pay for it. I mean it's not some giant mystery as to these institutions who are accountable, and they're accountable to regulatory institutions, as to their risk. That's the number one supervisory thing going on in the regulatory agency. So, I think, one, you increase the price of the product throughout the marketplace if it's on the private sector. We all are familiar with the constraints on government today. And in our view, the responsibility going forward should be-and they should be made accountable -- is on the owner. And how you, how a private sector firm, or how government does that, that's where the focus in our view should be.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER:

So I think

on the books that say that that person is responsible --

[Interposing] Cold comfort--

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23 MICHAEL SMITH: And they signed a 24 piece of paper --

25 COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: --to

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tenants without heat or hot water, or neighbors where a building is being squatted next door.

MICHAEL SMITH: Okay. Okay. I know that's as to, you know, as was pointed out earlier. We're talking existing, and obviously there's a prospective nature to the law also, which is what's its effect on lending down the road.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: So, let's get to that. I mean, I guess I feel like the ways, and Council Member Fidler really talked about this well, I mean, I think the ways you talked about the uncertainty about price are in part disingenuous. The bill is written to ask HPD to set a clear amount. So, the bill says \$10,000 would be the minimum. But the amount that needs to be bonded--there's a different question about how the insurance industry will price the bond premium, but on what the amount will be, the law won't go into effect until the agencies set the amount. Our bill would designate HPD to come up with a framework, based on a percentage of assessed value. So, you would know of certain how much the bond was going to be. And in most of

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these cases, the likely ERP lien amounts are small relative to the value of the building. There's no doubt.

Now, there's some multi-family buildings where those ERP liens have been large, but they're still small relative to the value of the building. So, I think when we look together, and I hope after this bill passes and HPD has the responsibility to set the amount, that you'll work with us. I think we'll get a pricing structure, which at the very least is predictable. So first it will be predictable. So there will be no uncertainty about what it will be after HPD sets it in before it goes into effect. And second, I think we will work to make sure that it is--it doesn't start to come close to the value of the property that we're being protected against are those ERP liens and comparable issues, and not the value of the property. And then once you do those two things--and I'd even be willing to have some flexibility and think about what we could do, whether we could do it with something like a letter of credit, if your members are lending institutions and have cash and would rather not

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buy insurance but would rather put up a letter of credit against that amount, they would be in a great position -- this gets to some of what Mr. Bergman and Mr. Fidler were talking about--they could decide how to price the risk, and they could figure out is it worth it for them to put some reserves aside against what the likely ERP amounts would be, or buy a bond which might actually they would do better on because somebody else would backstop that risk, which again, as we said, they essentially have now anyway. I think that's what you said, that at the end of the day that value is going to come out of the property at judgment. And if they're the most likely purchaser of it at auction.

So, I just--I think you've overstated the--I think this idea that the relatively small amount here that we're talking about on foreclosure properties spread out against a broader risk pool is going to freeze lending is the Chicken Little thinking. And I hope when we get a chance after the bill passes to figure out how to set the amount, you'll join us in making sure it works.

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		A	nd I	see	the	Chair	man	is	eag	er	to
move on.	So,	I	just	want	t to	make	one	fir	nal	poi	lnt
on the											

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: [Interposing]

Please make it.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: -registration side. Well, all right. Let me make
two final points, but I'll only make one of them a
question.

One is, look, part of the goal here is to provide some incentives to get better workouts in that period of time. That two, three, four-year period, not going well for people. And some of that is because I believe not enough of the lending institutions are coming to those compliance conferences and doing modifications in good faith on the one to four side. And we're looking for some incentives to have the institutions work with us, whether with HPD on the multi-family side, or with borrowers and their counselors on the one to four family side, to make good things happen. It's not happening enough. We're looking for some ways to get incentives to do it, and I believe this is a good one.

2	Finally, on the registration bill,
3	I now from the Center for New York City
4	neighborhoods, who get the information from the
5	banking department and the court data, that it's
6	full of errors and omissions, it's difficult to
7	acquire and there's a whole bunch of important
8	information that is not going to be obtained
9	simply from HPD trying to get the information from
10	the court. The folks who have it are the
11	mortgagees who are filing the actions. And we
12	need it from them. And I guess I feel like your
13	testimony, which simultaneously says, well, it's
14	already available but also would put our employees
15	at risk if people had it, it's hard to see how
16	it's both ways. So, I do hope you'll take another
17	look at the registration bill, because again, it's
18	something that we need, and after we pass it we'd
19	love to work with your members to make sure that
20	it is implemented in a way that works for them.
21	So, I apologize for going on, Mr. Chairman.
22	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: I just wanted a
23	question. But we'll move on to Council Member
24	James.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: I'll be

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will not have a chilling effect and would not discourage regulated financial institutions from extending mortgages. In fact, this is really an incentive to keep families in their homes and to engage in more modifications and workouts with people on the ground. I do not believe that this is in violation of the preemption law. I believe it's certainly within our police powers to impose certain conditions on buildings within the city of New York. In 2009 there were over 23,000 foreclosures in the city of New York. Hardly any of them were filed by Mr. and Ms. Smith. As was indicated earlier, the amount was de minimis if any. And I think to argue that in fact most of your members were not involved in this practice belies the facts and does not speak to the truth and is not truthful.

That notwithstanding, I recognize that the definitions need to be clarified. We need to impose some exemptions. There is some question with respect to the cost involved. I think those are all valid concerns. I look forward to working with each and every one of you as we move forward. And I am confident that there

will be litigation, but I'm also very confident that we will win. Thank you.

one question, and it relates to the registration bill. You guys mentioned in your testimony and in your statements that, I guess sources for the information that we are looking to seek and have the city create some sort of database, are readily available in sources. You mentioned the county clerk's office and potentially the former--what was called the State Department of Banking, now it's titled the new agency. How do those sources receive that information? Are you required, are the banks required to provide this information as a requirement of some other statute?

matter of statute and it's required to be submitted to—I still call it the Banking Department—and they set up a website and it is done electronically. So it is—it has to be done, I forget whether it's three or five day, an initial filing after the action has begun. But it automatically goes to them and it's quite extensive. I think it's longer than you asked

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CHAIRPERSON DILAN: --since it's already there, it exists, you're required to file it, why not share it with another city agency so that we can stay on top of the housing maintenance.

MICHAEL SMITH: Our view would be that you have governmental agencies today, and of course we haven't gotten into the nature of the disclosure because you're talking about employees. You're talking about confidentiality and privacy.

> CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Sure.

MICHAEL SMITH: But it would be better in a private sector setting to have a governmental, have an intergovernmental agreement so that the affected agencies, the agencies who do have the information, decide what is going to be disclosed and to do it as a cooperative thing rather than having four different--because the Department of Financial Services is doing this today. I mean, in the initial stage that's our view, that rather than having the banks giving this to HPD that HPD can get it from those sources. It's, quite frankly just what we consider, as I said, a reasonable and efficient

1	COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND BUILDINGS 146
2	action
3	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: [Interposing]
4	Sure.
5	BRUCE BERGMAN: They have
6	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: [Interposing]
7	So just in that instance, would you agree that
8	when they have the ownership interest and they
9	have the title they should be responsible for the
10	maintenance.
11	BRUCE BERGMAN: It's not a matter
12	of debate or what I think; they are. They are the
13	owner, they bought it, that's their
14	responsibility.
15	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Okay.
16	BRUCE BERGMAN: They made a
17	business decision to be the bidder at the sale, if
18	they make that business decision.
19	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: So it goes back
20	to your point of then owner responsibility.
21	BRUCE BERGMAN: No question about
22	it. They're the owner, they're responsible.
23	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Great, thanks.
24	Thanks, gentlemen. Thanks for your time.
25	COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: End on a

2 point of consent.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: What? I didn't try to. It just happened that way. Okay, so, we're going to at this point move on and just take brief testimony from HPD and some brief questions about window guards. I don't have any testimony from the public on the window guard issue. If anybody is here to testify on the window guard issue, from the public, now is the time. If not, we'll hear from HPD and then move on, back with the public portion of the foreclosure hearings.

So, we have on Intro 531, which is the window guards, AnnMarie Santiago, Chief of Staff of Enforcement from HPD as well as Robert Edman, Assistant Commissioner from Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Come forward now. You can introduce yourself in your own voice, and then you can begin your testimony. And again, I want to ask that all cell phones be silenced or shut off. Okay, you can begin in the order that you'd like. Just introduce yourself in your own voice.

ANNMARIE SANTIAGO: My name is

AnnMarie Santiago. I am Chief of Staff to the

Deputy Commissioner for the Office of Enforcement

the number of window falls, almost a 94% decrease

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in gross reported falls since the law passed in 1973. Intro 531 enhances the City's ability respond to complaints about window guards by bringing the enforcement of what is really a housing maintenance condition into the same enforcement structure as other housing maintenance conditions. This legislation proposal does not change any of the requirements for window guard installation.

Currently enforcement regarding window guards is primarily the responsibility of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The New York City Health Code requires that a property owner seek to obtain information about the presence of a child ten years of age or younger annually. Based on this information, property owners are required to install an approved window guard if there is a child ten years of age or younger, or when requested by a tenant in all apartment windows, except fire escape windows and public area windows.

Complaints to 311 regarding a lack of or improperly installed window guards are routed to the Department of Health for inspection.

Failure to comply with the requirements of the code currently results in the issuance of a commissioner's order to abate. And if there is no compliance the issuance of a violation returnable to an administrative body for fines, and a referral to HPD's emergency repair program for the installation of the guards.

In September 2007, in recognition that HPD conducts inspections in thousands of apartments each year where window guards might be required, the Health Code was amended to authorize HPD to also issue Commissioner's Orders to abate for window guards on behalf of the Department of Health, providing notice to the owner of the condition and providing the same process as outlined above for compliance verification.

Since that time, HPD has issued over 36,500 Commissioner's Orders for window guard conditions based on observations during inspections in response to other conditions.

During 2010, all agencies were requested to review their operations to identify areas where greater efficiencies could be achieved, without losing effectiveness, by consolidating functions. Both

DOHMH and HPD identified window guard inspections as one such area. On April 1st, 2011, HPD began receiving all complaints for window guard conditions. Whereas DOHMH has seven inspectors assigned for this function, HPD can leverage its full resource of housing inspectors, which is over 300 field inspectors, to respond to these complaints.

The majority of HPD work currently occurs during the winter, as the Committee knows. HPD responds to hundreds of thousands of heat and hot water complaints each heat season. Utilizing HPD's inspection force to respond to window guard complaints, which are primarily received during the spring and summer months when people want to open their windows for relief from the heat, maximizes the use of the city's inspection resources without compromising response time or effectiveness.

Intro 531, introduced by Council
Member Dilan, enhances the City's response and
recognizes the efficiencies to be gained by this
change. Most significantly, the legislation
amends the Housing Maintenance Code to authorize

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HPD to issue HMC violations for missing or defective window guards when there is a child ten years of age or younger, or when requested by a tenant. This simplifies the process for both tenant and property owners by bringing an issue clearly related to housing maintenance into the existing enforcement process for other housing maintenance conditions. Tenants will be able to file a complaint with one agency and inspect only one inspection for all conditions in their apartment. Property owners will no longer have to follow a separate enforcement process for window quards, which can lead to confusion and duplicative effort.

Already familiar with HPD's process, since the vast majority of housingrelated violations are issued by HPD, property owners will be able to certify the condition as corrected using the existing process. Tenants, as they do now for all other housing maintenance conditions, will receive a notice once a violation is certified and have the opportunity to challenge that certification. HPD will audit certifications for window quards as it does now for other class C

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violations, and will follow through with emergency repairs if the owner fails to comply.

HPD's mission is to enforce the housing maintenance code to ensure that New Yorkers live in safe conditions. The enforcement of window guard regulations is certainly within that mission, and intro 531 brings the code in step with this reality. This legislation accomplishes several beneficial goals: simplifying the enforcement process for customers, both tenants and property owners; consolidating the provision of services among city agencies currently providing the same service; and maximizing existing resources by reallocating them when available to appropriate tasks.

HPD is fully in support of Intro 531. I thank you for your time and I'm happy to respond to any questions you might have.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Okay. And I'll just get right to the point on my questions. The first one is, why is it necessary to have it? I believe it should be in the housing maintenance code. Why is it necessary to have it both in the housing maintenance code as well as in the health

2 code?

ANNMARIE SANTIAGO: Responsibility for window falls will remain with the Department of Health, as are several other responsibilities that are currently in the code. And to that end, it's important that the Department of Health also be able to issue violations in those instances where there's a window fall.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Okay. And then so why would HPD also be happy to have this within the purview of the Housing Maintenance Code?

ANNMARIE SANTIAGO: Because in most instances—window falls there's only probably a handful, I think there were five to ten window falls in 2010, fiscal year 2010. In all of the other instances where they received complaints from the public or where another city agency, especially HPD observes the condition, we would like to be able to issue our own violation and follow the Housing Maintenance Code process.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: All right. So, will there be instances then when a building owner would be subject from inspections and fines from both the Department of Health and HPD as it's

Oda Friedheim. I'm appearing here on behalf of

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the Legal Aid Society. And we want to thank the

Committee on Housing and Buildings and the

Chairperson Dilan for giving the Legal Aid Society

the opportunity to testify today.

in favor of the intros 494, 500 and 501, and we want to thank the sponsors for introducing this much-needed legislation. Mortgage lenders have continually neglected their obligation as caretakers and owners of properties in foreclosure, leaving communities to suffer. Private equity lenders in particular have walked away from their investment properties when the return no longer met their expectation. It is the right time to put some reasonable safeguards on this conduct so lenders cannot operate unchecked while properties fall into disrepair.

Part of our civil practice is to represent homeowners in foreclosure proceedings, as well as tenants of larger multi-family buildings that are evicted as a result of foreclosures. And we realize that nothing destabilizes a neighborhood like block upon block for sale signs and obvious neglect. But even in

places where the foreclosure crisis is not as evident, tenants suffer from hazardous conditions and lack of everyday maintenance. When no one appears to be in control of the property, vandalism can also occur. That is why the requirement to register and provide contact information is so critical for tenant occupants. And we think Intro 501 would be an important step to ensure that lenders take responsibility for their real estate portfolios.

We also believe that a bond
requirement would allow the courts and the
Department of Housing Preservation and
Development, HPD, to enforce habitability
standards and reimburse HPD for any emergency
repairs or expenses advanced for these properties.

However, we suggest that the applicability of Intro 494, the bonding requirement, to five-unit buildings and up to that it be limited to avoid the imposition of the cost of the bond on struggling homeowners of one- to four-family homes. Our experience is that every fee and cost that the lender charges or expects to charge is passed on to the borrower in the

foreclosure litigation. That's even if the homeowner is maintaining the property. We fear that the bond costs will be built into the foreclosure, making it that more difficulty for homeowners to preserve their homes.

Intro 500 should likewise be limited to five-unit buildings and up, and to lessen the potential for the added cost and intrusion of the lender into homeowner's jurisdiction, unless the premises are abandoned.

The City Council can make a critical contribution toward curtailing lender neglect by enacting these bills as amended. We also urge the City Council to continue its long record of support for providing more resources for legal representation and advocacy, so we do not have to turn away so many clients—both homeowners and tenants—whose economic situation is threatened by a foreclosure. In addition, we urge that the city agencies, along with the city officials and the advocacy community, coordinate resources so that together we may better serve distressed neighborhoods.

I just want to add one quick thing

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2	in terms of we are very concerned with the passing
3	through of any fees and costs to homeowners. And
4	I know it has earlier been suggested that the bill
5	could exactly address that by carving it out. One
6	of the problems is that unless a foreclosure goes
7	to judgment of foreclosure, prior to that it's
8	pretty much, crassly said, a holdup operation.
9	You know, here, we modified your mortgage, be
10	grateful. And now we're going to tack on all the
11	fees without any kind of breakdown whatsoever. So
12	it is in fact not so easy to just say don't pass
13	it on. Because unfortunately the process of
14	passing through fees and costs, many, many of them
15	completely inflated, and not even based on
16	anything. There is no transparency in that. So I
17	just want to put that out as I hope we're going to
18	all collaborate further on how to make these
19	various bills actually into law and workable.
20	Thank you.
21	CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Thank you.

ELIZABETH LYNCH: Hi. My name is Elizabeth Lynch and I'm a staff attorney for MFY Legal Services in the Foreclosure Prevention Project. And thank you for inviting me to testify

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today about intro numbers 494, 500 and 501.

MFY Legal Services provides legal services to more than 7,500 low income clients in New York City. We are the largest legal services provider for mental health services consumers, many of whom come to us with housing problems.

In September 2008, as more of our clients began to face foreclosure issues, we launched the Foreclosure Prevention Project. date we have served nearly 200 homeowners in Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island and Manhattan. Most of the foreclosure defense work in New York City focuses on homeowners, attending court mandated settlement conferences, obtaining modifications, and defending homeowners from unjust foreclosures. But one frequently overlooked group in this foreclosure crisis has been tenants whose landlords are in foreclosure. Tenants have no defenses to the foreclosure action and have limited options to force an absentee landlord to maintain the safety of the building while the ban is trying to take it.

For this reason, MFY commends the Council for continuing to shine a spotlight on the

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issue and to provide better protection for tenants whose landlords are in foreclosure. While we have certain reservations about particular language in each of the foreclosure related bills presented today, we continue to support and very much appreciate the Council's concerted efforts to stop unjust foreclosures in New York City and to keep hardworking families, be them homeowners or tenants, in their homes.

It is a fact that some owners abandon their property once a foreclosure action is commenced. Without a landlord to maintain the building, the property falls into disrepair, depressing neighborhood property values, hurting local businesses and eroding the state and local tax base. More urgently in the case of foreclosed properties that are occupied by tenants, failure to maintain the property may create serious risks to public health and safety. Intro number 494 seeks to address the problem associated with the failure to maintain the property during foreclosure.

We agree that it is important that tenants are not left in dilapidated housing, but

2	we have several suggestions that we believe could
3	strengthen and clarify the bill. First, in order
4	to achieve the stated goal, we believe the
5	following issues should be addressed. Shouldn't
6	there be an obligation on the part of HPD to
7	maintain property that has been abandoned by an
8	owner and by the foreclosing entity? To that end
9	doesn't there need to be a mechanism by which
10	tenants in such abandoned property obtain HPD's
11	assistance. And three, doesn't the scope of the
12	term maintenance need to be defined in terms of

Second, as Legal Aid just pointed out, we believe language must be added that prevents the banks from passing the cost of the compliance bond on to homeowners. In our experience homeowners, again in one- to four-family houses, rarely abandon their homes. They usually maintain the property and try to work with the bank to get a modification. This modification process, unfortunately, drags out for more than a year, usually because of the banks' hoops that homeowners have to jump through. Lenders in inevitably add to the course of the loan fees in a

what HPD service tenants might expect to receive?

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foreclosure action by including attorney fees and 2 foreclosure fees to the price of a modification or 3 4 the price at foreclosure. We believe that a 5 provision prohibiting banks from doing this could

help stop that. 6

> Third, MFY is concerned that the proposed statute is limited to any mortgagee that commences an action. It is MFY's experience in defending such actions that often the person or entity that commences the action is not the mortgagee, but rather a mortgage loan servicer. Hence, MFY proposes that the statutory language be modified to apply to any entity or individual which initiates an action for foreclosure. change is language is also suggested for proposed intros number 500 and 501.

> Fourth, if the action is not dismissed or discontinued, the bond requirement only applies until there is an issuance of judgment. Again, there's a difference between judgment and the actual auction sale, where the time in between the two can last more than a year. And it's that time in which the bond's purpose would probably be best served. MFY thus suggests

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2 that issuance of a judgment be replaced with
3 foreclosure auction sale.

Finally, given the demonstrated propensity of the banks to flaunt many requirements relating to foreclosure actions, MFY suggests that some kind of compliance mechanism be added to the current bill. As it stands, there appears to be no penalty for failing to comply.

MFY also supports placing an affirmative duty on the foreclosing entity to maintain the property it has chosen to foreclose upon, as set forth in intro number 500. However, in order to avoid the imposition of unnecessary fees, again, MFY recommends that the language in the bill be amended to exempt one- to four-family homes. As stated above, homeowners in one- to four-family buildings most often remain in the property and will diligently with the bank to try to secure a modification. As the bill is currently written, foreclosing entities are required to make sure that the property is being properly maintained. Banks will use this requirement as an excuse for bank employees to make, and in the case of one- to four-family

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homes, unnecessary trips to the property to quote unquote inspect it. Unless there is an exception, these costs will ultimately be transferred to the homeowner.

Transparency and accountability have been largely lacking during this foreclosure crisis, and as a result, MFY supports intro number 501's efforts to require foreclosing entities to submit a registration statement. In addition to the reservations stated above regarding the narrow use and frequently inaccurate term, mortgagee, MFY has grave concerns about subsection ii, which makes the block and lot number of the properties in the foreclosure publicly available on the internet. Most homeowners in foreclosure are already the target of various foreclosure rescue scams by fly-by-night companies. Currently these companies must buy lists of the homes in foreclosure. By freely providing this information, there is a risk that the bill could lead to an increase in the number of foreclosure scams preying upon already vulnerable homeowners. Thus, MFY suggests that subsection ii be revised to require that access to the list of properties

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I'm Michael Hickey, Executive

foreclosures in New York City.

Director of the Center for New York City	
Neighborhoods. We are the primary non-profit	
responsible for coordinating foreclosure	
prevention services citywide. Very briefly, we	
fund 28 non-profits around the city who've alread	dy
conduced more than 12,000 interventions with	
homeowners who are at risk of foreclosure,	
providing free housing, counseling and legal	
services as well as strengthening those	
organizations through training and coordination	to
better perform their work.	

Many of the comments that are in my written testimony have already been covered by my peers, so I will not read my testimony. I just want to summarize a few points and make one or two comments. I think that Council Member Lander was very articulate earlier today in stating that obviously we have direct concerns with the way that properties are at risk and not properly protected from a blight and abandonment. The three pieces of proposed legislation working in tandem could strengthen those things. But, they're also, we hope, important incentives to bring servicers and lenders to the table to

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negotiate with advocates to actually avoid

foreclosure. We feel that that aspect of the

pieces of proposed legislation is just as powerful

as the direct result of the legislation itself.

And it may be just as powerful whether or not the

legislation is ultimately concluded.

You saw the reaction earlier today from representatives from New York's Bankers Association. I think they're taking this very seriously. You know, it does require negotiating with the banks, requires not just strong incentives but disincentives to foreclose. provided tremendous incentives. I think New York City can be extremely proud of the coalition of non-profit providers. It's really, I think, frankly the strongest network in the country. It's the best trained, the best coordinated. It's got tremendous capacity. And we provide that capacity to banking partners in the form of providing them with good applications for modifications and other loss mitigation strategies, but unfortunately that's not enough to get efficient and consistent responses from them when we're trying to negotiate. So, we need

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reasons why they would be compelled to come to the table and communicate with us and work with us.

And I think, again, these bills provide that.

I want to mention briefly, there's a number of folks who were commenting particularly on Intro 501, this idea that registration is overly cumbersome. It is true that a significant amount of data about people heading into mortgage distress is available. The Center for New York City Neighborhoods itself is the primary contractor for the New York State--well, formally the New York State Banking Department -- to receive data supplied to them from lenders and services. We use that information to reach out to homeowners who are in distress. Council Member Lander is correct that while it's very helpful to have that information, it is full of errors and omissions, frequently difficult to acquire. The courts themselves also do have information about, you know, when there are filings for foreclosures. They actually send to us copies of every request for judicial intervention, which is the initiation of the lis pendens process. So that, again, we can do outreach to those homeowners. It's a

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cumbersome, complicated process and it actually 2 doesn't disclose a lot of very important 3

4 information to help us identify the level of 5 distress of the homeowner. So we think that these additional disclosures are incredibly relevant and 6 very valuable to the City. HPD in its testimony provided a very exhaustive list of things that it 9 would like to know about when a foreclosure action 10 is preceded. We support that 100%. With that,

I'll conclude my comments. And we welcome any questions.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: I want to thank you all for your comments and suggestions to legislative changes. I want to say that they were very thoughtful and well put together, particularly regarding the protection of onethrough four-family home owners, which I certainly care about and have done a lot on this committee to provide protection for so that I'm very sensitive to that, I'll say at the outset. also the protection of the information that will be made public by this bill, I agree should be a little bit more secure. HPD certainly should have it, but I think we do have to safeguard who is

details.

asking for that information and not make it so readily available. So I agree with those in concept and look forward to working out the

So that was just a brief statement. I really have no questions. We've been joined, I see, by Council Member Jim Gennaro, who is here and that I've failed to acknowledge. And I see Brad Lander chomping at the bit. And I'm not sure if you noticed, but I think we just received via email about potential loss of state funding for foreclosure purposes that we are particularly saddened by, but certainly understand the reasons why it may have had to have been done in Albany in light of their fiscal crisis there. Council

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that we can join together to do everything we can at the City level to make sure that there continue to be resources for foreclosure counseling, which is dramatically necessary, but sadly not included in the administrations preliminary budget. So, I plan to keep fighting on that. Thank you for your

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2	testimony, which I think provides a lot of very
3	helpful ways to strengthen and improve all the
4	bills. But I really appreciate the feedback on
5	494. I guess, Ms. Lynch and Ms. Friedheim, you
6	have slightly differentso I agree. We
7	absolutely want to take action to make sure that
8	the costs can't get passed on to borrowers. I'm
9	reticent though to say just don't include one to

fours in the bill for two reasons.

First, I think this idea that Mr. Hickey talks about that we want this to actually function as an incentive to lenders to do workouts and modifications and to, you know, take maybe a little breath before foreclosing and have an opportunity. And second, in a lot of cases when an owner does walk away it is neighbors who are left holding the bag. So I guess I prefer the idea if we can work it out by simply prohibiting the passing on of the cost rather than not having this apply to one- to four-family homes. And, you know, I wonder what your thoughts are there.

ODA FRIEDHEIM: I mean, it would make sense to have that in the bill. The problem-

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CHAIRPERSON DILAN: [Interposing] If you could speak directly into the mic.

ODA FRIEDHEIM: I'm sorry. The problem is the implementation. And again, as I said before, the process of fee shifting, during the foreclosure, prior to judgment, is lacking completely transparency. And in fact as I said before, it's really a holdup operation. And it's only, and only when the foreclosure reaches the point of a judgment that the court in fact gets involved in even looking at the legal fees or any other fees. And then, yes, there are limits. fact they are statutorily defined. But, if you are trying now to negotiate for modification, the bank simply piles whatever fees they like without any kind of breakdown onto the end. And there is no way to detect what fees may have resulted from, you know, the bond or repairs or whatever. Or you know, what Ms. Lynch also pointed out, the frequent drive-bys. You know, we constantly get these monthly inspections, even when meanwhile the borrower is in court, is negotiating in good faith for modification, clearly lives there, clearly wants to save their home, and yet they have

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monthly drive-bys. And it piles up and it piles up, because you know what? Servicers actually profit from this process.

And maybe we don't have a readymade solution right this moment, but I think we would be very open to struggle with that because in principle we like the way, the thrust of the bill. There's no question about it. We just have particular concerns that come from our experience of representing struggling homeowners. And I think as Ms. Lynch had also said and it's our experience as well, that the vast majority of small homeowners, including those who have tenants and in fact take good care at times of their tenants. They want to save the home and they're struggling very hard. And to put any kind of impediments in their way it would be problematic. So, we are very open to figure out ways to address our concerns while keeping the balance you know, with the -- especially the multi-family buildings.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: That sounds very--I mean, the goal on my end as well is to help those exact same folks have a little more leverage. And I think maybe we can look--probably

ELIZABETH LYNCH: Just to follow

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it has to be done in state law, but if there's anything that we can do to address the broader concern of just all this fee applications, apropos of nothing, we should look at that as well.

I mean, we are also willing to work with it. up. I mean, the substance of the law is, I think, very necessary. And to use it as a tool to try to get the banks to the table--I mean, everything we do is just a tool to get the banks to modify a loan that they should be modifying. And we would be very eager to work. I think what's been pointed out is really a problem that it could be lumped into just general foreclosure fees. I don't know if the bill could be written in a way where it says where it's broken out, where it has to be by law broken out. But that's something that maybe we--instead of being lumped into foreclosure fees. But I don't know if state law then would preempt that.

COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Thank you. CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Okay. I'd like to thank you all for your time and your testimony. ELIZABETH LYNCH: Okay.

pipes are busting and people are just coming into

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the house. And if JP Morgan Chase or the other
banks would come around and would understand that
you're taking people out of homes that I knew were
there from my childhood. And they got into
difficult situations and had to leave. They left
the property. And as a result of that, you get
anything and everything moving into it, and it's
not fair. I grew up with their kids, you know?
And it's just not right.

The bank refuses to maintain the properties. Okay? But, they will send over these companies that are supposedly to keep the upkeep of the property, supposedly. But they'll break into the house. I've had them break into mine three times. Three times. I've called and I said what are you doing? Well, we own the property.

No, I'm going for modification, I'm trying—and the modifications, oh, how many times do they get you to go for modification? Send in the documents, you send in the documents and you send in the documents, and then they turn around and say, oh, we need more documents. Okay, what else do you need? Let me give you everything that you—I have made modification payments. They stopped

roof?

accepting my payments in May of last year. I'm still making the payments. I still—I put it in the bank. Okay? Now it came along—that tornado that came along in September, it took my roof.

Oh, I'm sorry. It took my roof. I called the bank. They sent me a check for \$8,000. I said \$8,000 isn't going to do me anything. But the trick with the \$8,000, you have to sign it and give it back to the bank. Then they take that check and they apply it to what you owe. What

about my roof? What am I supposed to do about my

Then, oh, the sweet part about it, they took your escrow. Well, how can you take my escrow? Well, you know you owe it. But how--one minute you tell me it's \$8,000, next minute you tell me \$18,000. And as recently as of Monday it's up to \$20,000. I said, can you send me this in writing? Can you give me something? I'm fighting. Like I said, 18 times I have been to court. And, yes, then you get the predators. Oh, my, Delta Funding was my favorite. I thought this was my sweetheart. I'm up against the wall.

Okay? I'm like I'm working--I was working then.

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Okay? I'm working seven days a week, three
different agencies. Okay. I'm a home healthcare
aide, healthcare worker. Don't you know this
where you got to pay Delta funding and they took
me to the bank for everything but the you're
not supposed to refinance more than once a year.
Did I know this? Nope. Was I tricked into
refinancing again? Yes, I was. Now where am I
stuck at now? Can I pay \$3,200 a month? No. I
can't. I can't.

Then we've got, oh, wonderful, I love this. The Advantage Program. I have a tenant, a beautiful tenant. I loved him.

Advantage Program came in and all of a sudden they're not paying. Section 8 isn't paying, but guess what? I'm still making my mortgage payment.

Now what does that mean now? Am I scraping together my pennies? Yes, I am. Why? Because I need to fix my roof. Okay?

So, does Chase care? No. They send me a letter. I never got the letter, but I got the phone call. Guess what the phone call was? Well, we're encouraging you \$25,000. We're going to give you \$25,000 if you agree to a short-

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sell. Why do I want to short-sell my house? Do
you realize whatthis is not an investment, this
is my home. This is my foundation. This is where
my children were born. This is where my
grandchildrenI had my grandbaby over there last
night. He's a sweet little thing. He drives me
crazy. He put three times. But this is where
they came from. Okay? My mother, never wentshe
went to school eight days in her life. Okay? She
cleaned bathrooms in people's houses. Okay? She
worked. Okay? My mom left this. On her deathbed
my mom asked me, Betty, get the property up and
running and this is what I did. This is what I'm
trying to do. Okay?

Citibank does not care. Chase does not care. JP Morgan does not care. The banks do not care if this is your life. They tell you, move on, it's just a house. It may be just a house to you, but to me this is my mother. This is my children. The good, the bad, this is what this is to me. Do not take this—if I'm working with you and I'm trying my best to give you what I have and I keep telling you, listen, I moved from the first floor to the second floor, from the

attempt to work with them to modify their

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mortgages. When my wife got sick almost three
years ago, we faced a choice every family dreads
and too many families makedo we pay for
healthcare and surgery or do we pay for the
mortgage. Well, we went for the healthcare.
Thank god my wife is fine now. But since then,
it's been downhill ever since.

Thinking that Chase, my servicer, would want to work with me when I was unable to make my monthly mortgage payment, I reached out to them to try to work something out. For years now I've been jumping through hoops, doing everything I can to stay in my home. Chase has not made this easy for me. Every month I am asked for the same documents over and over again, W2s, IT405s, reauthorizing tax returns, more W2s, 1099s, the DOD form that testifies that you haven't been prosecuted for a felony in the last ten years. That's right. All right. They've kept me in limbo for nearly three years now. It seems to be some kind of game to them, but it's no game to me, nor to my family, or to my neighborhood.

It took me years and countless interviews with the news media just to get them to

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offer me a temporary forbearance, that they just offered me. But it's just more limbo. I get to make three, small, temporary payments and then we're supposed to take another look at my situation and reapply for a modification. I've been in the system now for three years now.

What about--and I'm a best case scenario--so what about all the other New York homeowners who aren't on TV or in the newspapers, right? Explaining how they can't get attention from abusive banks like Chase. Where do they go? Who hears them?

The effects of the banks' reluctance to work with homeowners are very evident on my block alone. On my block there are two vacant homes that once had families in them. There's another home that's been turned over twice by foreclosure, auctioned, and then foreclosed on This brings down the value of my property again. and the properties around us. It brings crime into my neighborhood and it brings infestation or squatters. In short, it leads to even more foreclosures.

Councilman Lander's bill tackles

this problem. It ensures that property, once in
foreclosure, will be maintained. For the
homeowners of New York City, especially those of
us in hard hit neighborhoods like Southeast
Queens, this is vital. If banks are more willing
to foreclose on a property than they are willing
to work with a homeowner, it must be their
responsibility to the community that there is
propertythat it's proper to unkeep the property

We'd love for banks like Chase to actually work with homeowners in the first place rather than foreclose on them. Chase has a horrendous record at modifying loans. A recent study done by New York Communities for Change has detailed how only six percent of New York City homeowners with a Chase Mortgage, who sought help actually received any kind of help or permanent modification, six percent. That's 94% that didn't get anything. That is unacceptable. Anything we can do to keep the banks responsible is essential.

New York City homeowners fighting to keep their American dreams alive urge the City Council to pass these bills. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Thank you.

Skip ROSEBORO: Good afternoon. My
name is Elliott Skip Roseboro. And before I start
my testimony I just wanted to specifically thank
Councilman Fidler for taking the Banking
Association's CEO and his witness to task in
clarifying questionable statements in their
testimony. I was very impressed with that. And I
think we need to recognize that it's very easy to
make statements that sound good until someone
drills down and makes you realize that they're
really out of question. So, okay.

So, I'd like to extend my gratitude to the Committee for giving me a chance to speak on an issue that affects all New Yorkers, and I'd especially like to thank Chairman Dilan and Council Member Lander. The scourge of foreclosure can be seen in every borough and by every New York family, whether you're a homeowner or not. I reside in Bed Stuy Brooklyn, and vacant buildings are becoming more of a problem each day. Often because banks like JP Morgan Chase make it so difficult to work with them, homeowners feel there is no hope, and simply abandon their homes to the bank when they are in foreclosure.

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One would think that banks would want to protect what soon will become their assets. But these financial institutions don't take care of their new properties. They don't seem to care what conditions the buildings deteriorate into. Instead, they leave them to fester, to rot, and to become eyesores and black holes in the community.

We all know how vacant homes lead to crime and infestation. The problem, however, is multiplied when banks refuse to live up to its responsibility to care for those properties. it sure seems to me that many of those empty buildings in my community have become, have been foreclosed on by banks that simply do not care what happens to the buildings or subsequently how that affects my neighborhood and our quality of life. Excuse me.

I don't want to live in a community where I and my neighbors fear walking late at night or have to worry that drug dealers are taking over in a house that my neighbors used to live in. I love my neighborhood. I've been there most of my life. I want to make sure that our

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community stakeholders care about and respect it in the way that I do. That's why I applaud Brad Lander's effort to pass a bill that would hold banks accountable for how the properties they foreclose on are maintained. I thank the 30 other-co sponsors for taking a stand against these financial giants that care more about making record profits than about working with families to keep them in their homes. I know I'm sick and tired of abandoned buildings destroying my neighborhood. And we will continue to look to our elected officials to ensure that banks are responsible for their actions until they change these practices.

Finally, I feel that it's important to add the missing pieces as to how and why banks are able to sit on foreclosed properties for years, along with allowing them to deteriorate, yet still not lose money. The predatory and artificially inflated loan amounts are guaranteed in full by the federal government. So, along with speculative greed, there is no timely incentive to return to normal and fair business practices. Even worse, these federal guarantees and lax

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2	Ludsin			Okay,	last	panel.	Mr.	Steven	Α.
3	Ludsin	and	Mr.	Moses	Gate	s.			

MOSES GATES: I thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Moses Gates. I represent the Association for Neighborhood Housing Development, actually it's lobbying arm, ANHD, Inc. here. I'd also like to thank the previous folks who have testified here. And here at ANHD, we represent about 100 community development corporations that engage in a lot of foreclosure prevention. In addition, we're neighbors with the New York Mortgage Coalition. We hear a lot more of these stories. You know, these are not just three folks who came to testify; these are a bunch of people and I think it's really obvious to the Council and everyone in this room that the difference in perspective between the banks who have testified here and the homeowners who have testified here is just really glaring. And I think that's something that the Council can note.

In lieu of all of the lawyers and all of the technical expertise that has been demonstrated on this panel earlier, I do not have

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much to add in that regard. I will keep my
remarks short. I would like to say that all three
intros ANHD fully supports. We believe that they
work together in a very effective mechanism, that
all three are really necessary to effect a strong
and comprehensive new foreclosure process here in
New York City.

We do think that the bond mechanism for prevention of ERP liens is very good. It should not be a very large burden on the banks, as I think Councilman Lander pointed out, those ERP liens are now City superior liens to the first mortgage and would be recovered upon sale of the property anyway and should not be terribly onerous for the banks to post a bond in order for those ERP liens to not be effected in the first place.

So, in short, thank you for the opportunity to testify, and we do believe that all three of these bills are necessary in order to have the full imposition of a new foreclosure--

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: [Interposing] I have to say I did enjoy the exchange between Council Member Fidler and Mr. Bergman. It was quite entertaining. Mr. Ludsin?

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STEVEN	Α.	LUDSTN:	(+0.0d)	afternoon.

STEVEN A. LUDSIN: Gee, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Good afternoon.

This is one that's right up your alley.

Thank you. Let me identify myself. That's rule number one. I'm playing by the rules. I'm Steven Ludsin, and I'm the founder of Easy Escrow, and thanks to your patience, and becoming a more vociferous advocate. And frankly this hearing, as

you said, this is exactly what I'm talking about.

And what's really ironic is, as I told you before, I was talking more in terms of sound bites, but I just want to lay the foundation that, ironically, I bought a home out of foreclosure 26 years ago. And I had an article, which I'm happy to share and we can put it on the record about how I walked into this house that was, you know, a nice home—it was in the Hamptons, I'm not complaining—but the grass was about, I want to say hip high. There was no hot water. The whole place was literally shut down and I was just lucky enough to besiege a local handyman. He said, it's my day off, but I'll help you out. You know, and that was so, if you will,

a micro version of what happens in that world.
And if I may, I'll just talk about a macro
version. Because as I told some of you, and I
think this is the first time, Councilman Lander,
that we've had a chance to interact, I had a
federal contract aboutooh boy16 years ago, to
sell foreclosures in the Small Business
Administration by putting them on the Bloomberg,
of all things. And that contract did not turn out
to be as successful as I wanted it to be, but what
I did do is, as you all are learning, I believe
80% of life is showing up, and I saw these
properties. And I saw a property that literally
nobody watched. And there it wasit was called
Marvin Gardens because we all played Monopoly
Vero Beach, Florida. Not exactly a bad place. It
was burned down. Not a real enhancement to the
value of that collateral, okay? Similarly, there
was a place in Brooklyn. I took a train out. And
it was called Dreams Warehouse or something like
that. And in between Thanksgiving and Christmas
they had a barbeque inside the building. No one
bothered to lock the door.

So, I say this because I talk about

not leaning on a lien. And let me, if I could--so I don't get too far afield, and I thought the testimony this afternoon of Deputy Commissioner Visnauskas--I can pronounce it because my family was from Latvia, her family is from Lithuania--I guessed it. And I can only tell you that it is clear that when you have this twilight zone where no one in theory or in practice is legally obligated during this foreclosure period, it's really a recipe for disaster. That's obvious. That's why we're here.

Number two, you want to mitigate the distress. You don't want people living in the dark. You don't want unsafe living conditions.

It takes a long time to foreclose. So as you know, I believe that what you have to do is take proactive measures to set up the Easy Escrow fund.

Basically, if the tenants have to put up a security deposit, why shouldn't the landlords?

Why shouldn't the banks? And why shouldn't the owners? And if they're good actors, since they're moaning and groaning about the cost of a compliance fund--which I'll get to--then my answer is, this is refundable. And it's going to earn

interest. So if you haven't gone against, you
haven't violated your responsibility, I'll give
you your money back. And I say I, because I
envision a third-party escrow agent so that the
government isn't going to be able to always grab
all the money and there's going to be due process.
And this is a case of alternative dispute
resolution, which, you know, is becoming of age if
you will.

an area where you're talking about information.

And we have an information mayor, a high tech mayor, so that to me is—that's what it's all about. I like the idea of having all the information at our disposal, and the technology is there. So we can link up who owes money, how much they owe, and you're going to be able to sweep that account right away. Because if you don't have skin in the game, then you're just not going to respond. It's that. And I think the examples are just—you know many more than I do. You hear this every day.

To continue, the program of identifying responsible developers to in effect--

2	what's the wordeliminate blighted areas is in a
3	way a precedent. Because if you can make a

decision, if you call it objective or subjective,

as to who is responsible, I believe that the

6 responsibility fee fund fits with that, because

effectively we're identifying those responsible

8 owners and builders. And you already have

9 movements trying to do that.

Conversely, as we talked about the bad actor bill some time ago, it's the same thing what I said before. It's just identifying a bad actor, trying to ostracize him by publically embarrassing him with a worst landlords list is not enough. And I guess what I'm saying is I support your bills, all your ideas here. It just doesn't go far enough.

And if I may continue, again, we talk about—what I talk about is not trying to preempt the process. I got some feedback from some people saying to me, well, you're trying to preempt the way we do things. And the answer is, no, I'm not. I believe the compliance bond makes sense. And I see that Intro 494 incorporates that, but Intro 500 doesn't. And I guess I'll

leave that to you as to which one should. I think
they both should be there. But I like the idea
of, again, my recoupableif you willsecurity
deposit with interest to be administered
electronically, because it provides collateral
liquidity. And that's what you need, especially
in an environment like today, where you need
revenue. You have receivables, and I heard the
numbers todaythe previous testimony, 17,000
violations, 19,000 violations. The numbers are
pretty severe. And the idea that you are in an
area where in effect you could be deterring
lenders from foreclosing, which then means just
more abandonment, more delay, which again does not
enhance the value of the property. I mentioned
alternative dispute. I also want to mention, if
you will, this whole idea of a disincentive, that
you might even discourage bank foreclosure, which
we know means it's still in the hands of the
owner, which means you're going to have abuse.
The issue of the emergency repair program, where
the \$17 million was spent but only four and half
million was recoveredI like to think, again, the
responsibility fee fund will help increase that

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recoverability and the emergency repairs will be done and you'll have the money to pay for it near term, not down the road.

I just became aware at the last hearing where Commissioner Salkin talked about the fact they take these liens and put them into a trust and then they're sold to investors. Again, a two to four-year program. That's not liquid. I'm not saying that you shouldn't do that, but I suggest to you this might be another means to get that cash flow. Let's see here, I talked about skirting lenders.

The legal concerns as to whether somebody should enter the building, I guess that has to be sorted out. But this notion that the bank is saying, look, we don't have any interest until we actually foreclose and even then they're not the owner, and they're running the clock. It's just--it's absurd because they have a very vested interest in it, otherwise, why was the bank so concerned when I have my home to make sure that I have property insurance and that my tax payments are escrowed. They're concerned. They have a stake in this. And this idea that somehow they're

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just merely in effect distant lenders is foolish. 2 They're stakeholders. They need to have skin in 3

4 the game. You can enforce it, and they're not in

5 a weak position.

> Now, if I may, I guess I can wrap it up by simply saying that effectively what I'm really talking about is a private bailout. You mentioned TARP, and I don't think there's any shame in asking the private sector to take responsibility. And I can also say that I don't believe it's the tail wagging the dog here. And as I also mentioned finally, that if you look at the way the system works today, it is not allowing the society to be protected. And at the end of the day, that's what it's about. And I believe that my responsibility fee fund will achieve that. It's refundable and it earns interest, just like the tenant. And I want to make it electronic, because frankly, it's faster, cheaper, and we'll get some revenues for the city. Thank you. CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Okay. Thank

you, Mr. Ludsin. Council Member Lander? COUNCIL MEMBER LANDER: Thank you.

I like the idea of exploring whether allowing the

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16 17 foreclosing lender to do it through a letter of credit or a refundable deposit, and I look forward to learning more in addition to offering the bond option. So, thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing.

CHAIRPERSON DILAN: Thank you. And thank you all for your time and testimony. At this point we've received testimony for the record by Dan Margulies, who is the Executive Director for the Associated Builders and Owners of Greater New York. The testimony is in opposition to all three items on the agenda, as well as from Fern and Brooklyn Congregations United, which are in support of the items on today's agenda. At this point all four bills before the Committee will be laid aside, and that will conclude this hearing.

I, Erika Swyler, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. I further certify that I am not related to any of the parties to this action by blood or marriage, and that I am in no way interested in the outcome of this matter.

Signature \_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_April 29, 2011\_\_\_\_\_