CITY COUNCIL CITY OF NEW YORK

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES

Of the

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Jointly with

COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

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December 15, 2023 Start: 1:11 p.m. Recess: 4:39 p.m.

HELD AT: Council Chambers - City Hall

BEFORE: Kamillah Hanks

Chairperson

Jennifer Gutiérrez

Chairperson

COUNCIL MEMBERS: Joann Ariola

Erik D. Bottcher Justin L. Brannan Tiffany Cabán

Carmen N. De La Rosa

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A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)

Jeffrey Maddrey NYPD Chief

Michael Gerber NYPD Deputy Commissioner

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 5

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SERGEANT AT ARMS: Good afternoon and welcome to the Committees on Public Safety jointly with Technology. At this time, we ask that you please place phones on vibrate or silent mode. Thank you, Chairs. We are ready to begin.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Good afternoon and welcome to our hearing. I'm Council Member Jennifer Gutiérrez, and I'm the Chair for the Committee on Technology. I'm pleased to join Council Member Hanks for this hearing on the critically important POST Act. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss a matter of paramount importance, the New York Police Department's compliance with the public oversight of surveillance technology, also known as the POST Act. I come to this hearing with both gratitude and concern. Gratitude because the POST Act represents a pivotal step forward in our society's commitment to transparency and accountability, and the use of surveillance technologies by our law enforcement agencies. Concerns, because we haven't been able to meet the goals laid out in the legislation, and compliance has not been fully achieved. The POST Act was crafted with the intent of creating a balance between public

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 6 safety and the fundamental safeguarding of civil liberties. It requires the NYPD to provide clear and comprehensive guidelines regarding the deployment and implications of surveillance technology. technology's constant and rapid development, it's vital that our regulations keep pace through the good governance measures of transparency and accountability. However, NYPD's own office of the Inspector General, OIG, found that PD was not in full compliance with the POST Act. Instead, OIG determined that NYPD had taken advantage of loopholes and ambiguities to evade essential transparency measures. As the City Council we are responsible for ensuring that the NYPD fully adheres to the principles and requirements of the POST Act. Instead, OIG determined that NYPD-- oh, wait. We are responsible -- sorry, the POST Act. To this end, we are convening to also discuss several bills that will fortify the law and ensure its robust enforcement. In addition to understanding what technologies the PD is using, we also need transparency into how the PD uses data sharing agreements, how long it retains data, and whether information is shared with other agencies or entities including federal law

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 7 Transparency in these matters is not enforcement. merely a technical matter of compliance, but a hallmark of responsible governance. It is imperative that we examine the use of certain technologies such as aerial drones and the subway Robocop, and understand why the NYPD has not issued impact and use policies for these clearly novel technologies. merits further scrutiny and may warrant future amendments to existing legislation. We must also consider the role of the Office of Technology and Innovation in oversight and risk management. OTI has testified that they are responsible for agency's technology procurement and management, a critical issue that we are exploring here today. How does OTI inform the NYPD solicitation for new technology? does OTI ensure that surveillance technology are audited and scrutinized effectively, and what mechanisms are in place to quarantee that these tools are used responsibly and within the boundaries of the law? We hold these hearing not as adversaries, but as stewards for the public trust. The concerns about the lack of transparency come both from multiple branches of city government and outside of it. Our objective is clear, to ensure that the POST Act

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 8 fulfills its intended purpose of providing transparency and accountability in the use of surveillance technology by the NYPD. It is our collective duty to protect the rights and privacy of our citizens while also upholding the principles of public safety. Given the accommodations these committees provided to the NYPD in the rescheduling of this hearing, we're looking forward to NYPD's full engagement with questions from Council Members, as well as listening to testimony from the public. I hope you will stay as long as you can, and I look forward to the insights that will emerge from this hearing as we work together to achieve these crucial objectives, and I like to recognize Technology Committee Members who are present, Council Member Abreu-- and that's it. I'll pass it over to Chair Hanks.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much,
Chair Gutiérrez. Good afternoon. Happy Friday and
happy holidays. I am Council Member Kamillah Hanks.

I'm the Chair on the Committee of Public Safety, and
again, I am joined by Chair Gutiérrez of the

Technology Committee and Public Safety Members and
Council Members Abreu, Cabán, Bottcher, and we are

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 9 also joined by our Public Advocate. Welcome to today's joint hearing of the Public Safety and Technology Committee where we'll be examining the NYPD's use of surveillance and implementation of the Public Oversight Surveillance Technology Act, the POST Act. We will also be hearing related legislative proposals aimed at enhancing transparency and the NYPD's use of surveillance and improving privacy safeguards and oversight in the Department's use of surveillance. The New York City Police Department relies on a wide array of surveillance technologies to fulfill its mission in maintaining public safety. These technologies have the potential to gather vast amounts of personal data and their-and they raise valid concerns about potential impacts on privacy and civil liberties of civilians. address some of those concerns, this council enacted the POST Act in 2020 which designed -- which was designed to provide oversight regarding NYPD's acquisition of use of surveillance technologies. Specifically, the POST Act mandates that NYPD publish impact and use policies, IUPs, for all surveillance technologies used by the Department and continually produce IUPs upon the acquisition of new

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 10 technologies. As required by the POST Act, the IUPs must provide detailed information about the technology's capacities, capabilities, Department quidelines on access and such use of technologies, data sharing and retention policies and more. POST Act also requires the opportunity for the public to have input on all draft IUPs to provide a one-excuse me-- a 45-day period for public comment on draft policies in order to have public concerns taken into account when NYPD creates its final policy. NYPD has made great strides in publishing the IUPs for various surveillance technologies covering a wide range of capabilities. However, the recent evaluations by the Office of Inspector General for NYPD raised shortcomings in published policies. Notably, the OIG/NYPD described generic boiler plate language used in the majority of the IUPs and the grouping of related technologies under the single IUPs which impeded the inspector General's ability to conduct meaningful oversight and audits of the Department's use of surveillance as required by the POST Act. Our goal for this hearing is to assess the NYPD's progress in implementing the POST Act, consider legislative enhancements to the Act, to hear

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 11 public -- to hear concerns of the public and examine how NYPD seeks to maintain a delicate balance between using surveillance to secure public safety while ensuring civil liberties. Additionally, at this hearing we will be hearing -- we will -- considering and hearing four pieces of legislation in the Public Safety Committee, Intro 1193 sponsored by Council Member Farías, legislation to strengthen the OIG/NYPD's capacity to conduct meaningful audits of eh NYPD published IUPs. Intro 1195, sponsored by Council Member Hudson, legislation to require NYPD to publish a written policy that establishes procedures and regulations for its use of facial recognition technologies and conduct biannual public audits of the Department's use of facial recognition technology. And Intro 1207 sponsored by Council Member Won, legislation to amend the existing POST Act to ensure IUPs contain sufficient detail and specificity needed to enable meaningful oversight and regular audits. Finally, we will hear Intro Number 1047, sponsored by Council Member Vernikov, in relation to requiring -- okay, we will not be doing that. I was just patted. So, to that end, I would like to again thank Council Member Gutiérrez, Chair

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committee on Public Safety with committee on Technology 12 of the Committee on Technology, our staff for all the hard work for putting this hearing together, and I look forward to an engaging and constructive dialogue with all stakeholders including representatives from the Administration, advocates and members of the public to chart a pathway forward that best serves all of New Yorkers. Thank you for your participation in this critical discussion. And now I'll turn it over to our public advocate for his opening statement. Thank you so much.

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PUBLIC ADVOCATE WILLIAMS: thank you,

Madam Chair. As mentioned, my name is Jumaane

Williams. I'm the Public Advocate for the City of

New York. I want to thank Chair Gutiérrez and Chair

Hanks and the Committee members for holding this

hearing. Fundamentally, everyone is protected by the

14th amendment's right to privacy in the United

States Constitution. While New York Police

Department has the responsibility to secure the

safety of New Yorkers, we also must be extremely

cautious in adapting technology that violates civil

rights. We all know that technology is coming. It

is not something that we could prevent. We have to

make sure that it is instituted while honoring civil

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 13 Individuals should have reasonable expectations that they can move around freely without overuse of surveillance by law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies that recently adopted facial recognition technology are also being sued for racial and gender discrimination. Detroit has seen three lawsuits for wrongful arrest stemming from facial recognition technology. Researchers at MIT reported in January 2019 that facial recognition software marketed by Amazon, mis-identified darker-skinned women 31 percent of the time. While other studies have shown, "shown that algorithms used in facial recognition return false at a higher rate for African-Americans and white Americans unless explicitly recalibrated for a black population." Specifically the Amazon technology mis-identifies people with dark complexion 15 percent of the time, as compared to only three percent for people with light complexions. These findings prompted experts at Google, Facebook, and Microsoft to sign a letter calling on Amazon to stop selling its facial recognition technology to law enforcement. With mass surveillance, personal information is more likely to be at risk. It is no exaggeration to say that leaks

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 14 of personal data can put people's lives at risk, commuting patterns, frequent locations or other identifying information threatens survivors of domestic violence as well as anyone in a marginalized group who may be targeted. For example, an Anchorage police officer used an internal database to find and sexually assault a woman. How the NYPD uses technology must be closely monitored and abusers held accountable. Additionally, hacking may not even be necessary for those looking to cause harm. Surveillance contractors often sell their data to third parties which leads to poorly monitored databases being created. I want to thank my colleagues for introducing legislation that will create more accountability and transparency around the police's use of technology. Strict monitoring is necessary to oversee the NYPD's vast tool kit of surveillance technologies. There's reason to be concerned when NYPD utilizes many technologies such as robot police officers in Times Square, drones at crime scenes, x-ray vans, and GPS tracking allowing officer [sic] to tag and track vehicles without oversight of how these technologies are stored and tracking data on New Yorkers. The NYPD opting into

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 15 the Amazon Ring program itself is cause for concern. Ultimately, the council must take concrete steps to limit the use of facial recognition technology in the future when it comes to better policing, just like better education, better medication, better medicine. This is a conversation that always has to continue. I don't think it would ever stop, nor should it, and I hope these conversations could happen with that spirit in mind. Lastly, we mentioned the tragic event that happened yesterday where technology was Unfortunately, we still saw a fatality, and a police officer shot. Thankfully, that officer was wearing his bullet-proof vest and will go home to his family. [inaudible] was barricaded and was killed. But technology was used there. Unfortunately, we still had a familiar outcome. Thank you. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you so much. Okay, you can swear in folks.

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COMMITTEE COUNSEL: Welcome everyone.

From the Administration we'll be hearing testimony

from the NYPD and the Office of Technology and

Innovation to begin with. From NYPD we have Chief

Jeffrey Maddrey and Deputy Commissioner Michael

Gerber, and for Office of Technology and Innovation

we have Michael Fitzpatrick. There's a bunch of other folks who are going to be available for question and answer for NYPD, which is Assistant Deputy Commissioner Seth Severino, Chief Privacy Officer Emily Gold, Managing Attorney Melanie Braverman, and Chief Contracting Officer Nicholas Mendoza. So, can you all just raise your right hand and affirm the following? Do you affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth and to answer honestly to Council Member questions? Acknowledge that you all have said yes. So, you may begin.

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afternoon chair Hanks, Chair Gutiérrez and members of the Council. My name is Michael Gerber, and I'm the Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters for the NYPD.

Since the POST Act was passed in 2020, the NYPD has worked to meet its obligations under the law. Within 180 days after the passage of the Act, the Department published 36 draft impact and use policies, or IUPs, containing more than 300 pages of information regarding the Department's surveillance technologies. Following a comment period, the IUPs were finalized in April 2021. The IUPs are publicly available on our

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 17 website and provide a wide range of information concerning capabilities of our surveillance technologies, as well as policies and procedures relating to those surveillance technologies. release of our IUPs and subsequent amendments have dramatically increased the Department's public disclosures regarding its surveillance technologies. The POST Act strikes a balance between a number of critical interests, transparency, public safety, innovation, and administrability [sic]. We disclose a wide range of information without compromising our ability to solve crimes and keep people safe. It has been suggested that we are grouping multiple surveillance technologies within a single IUP in a manner that undermines transparency. That is not the case. Within a given surveillance technology there will be different types of equipment and models, various forms in which the surveillance technology may be deployed, and a range of uses for that surveillance technology. We have not done a separate IUP and comment period for each type of hardware that deploys a given surveillance technology. approach is not required by the POST Act. Having a separate IUP for each brand of camera that we use or

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 18 each variation on a given type of surveillance technology would result in repetition and confusion. In fact, it would decrease transparency. The nature of a particular surveillance technology used by the Department would be scattered across multiple IUPs. It would also be administratively unworkable. Itemizing surveillance technology using covert operations would endanger public safety, provide a detailed road map to those who wish to do harm, and put our undercovers at risk. The POST Act accounts for all this. It makes clear that each surveillance technology must be covered within an IUP, but that enhancements to a surveillance technology, or the deployment of a surveillance technology for a new purpose, or in a new manner do not result in a new IUP and comment period. Rather, the Department is to write an addendum to a pre-existing IUP. I want to emphasize that in these circumstances, proceeding by addendum rather than doing a new IUP is not contrary to the POST Act. It is what the POST Act mandates, and it gives the Department the flexibility to use pre-existing surveillance technology in new ways, while maintaining transparency with the public. I

would now like to take a moment to comment on the

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 19 bills being heard today. Intro 1193 would require the Department to provide to DOI upon a request a list of surveillance technologies, information on data access and retention policies, and quarterly updates on new and discontinued technologies. Department takes DOI's oversight mission very seriously and works with DOI to ensure that they can fulfill that mission. We are committed to continuing to do so. The Department looks forward to working with the Council to craft this legislation, and to ensure that DOI has the information it needs to fulfill its audit function. Intro 1195 would require the Department to establish and publish procedures and regulations for the use of facial recognition technology. The bill would also require the Department to conduct biannual audits of our use of facial recognition, and to provide the results to DOI, as well as publish them on our website. I would note that the section of the patrol guide addressing facial recognition is posted on the Department's website, together with answers to frequently asked questions regarding our use of facial recognition is posted on the Department's website together with answers to frequently asked questions regarding our

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 20 use of facial recognition. We have no issue with continuing to publicize this information and we are open to providing more data regarding our use of the surveillance technology. We would, however, like to have a dialogue with the Council regarding the contours and scope of the audit. The bill as presently drafted requires granular detail regarding each itemized use of facial recognition technology, and that at least at present, is administratively unfeasible and could interfere with our ability to use this important law enforcement tool. We believe that we can work with the Council to craft an audit that will further increase transparency without impeding critical law enforcement efforts. 1207 would require a separate IUP for each surveillance technology used by the NYPD regardless of whether such technology overlaps in functionality or capability with any other technology for which an IUP already exists. We aren't sure what is intended by this language. Does this mean that every time the Department intends to purchase a different make or model of camera with even slightly altered functionality, a new IUP would have to be issued? We replace officer's smartphones, would a new IUP be

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 21 required? Does this man that the Department would be required to do an IUP for a new covert undercover recording device? These are not rhetorical questions. The language of the bill as presently drafted is unclear. If the answer to these questions is yes, the bill would be extremely harmful to the functioning of the Department and could serve to compromise public safety. The Department opposes this legislation as drafted, because it would upset the careful balance that lies at the heart of the POST Act. We look forward to a continuing dialogue with the Council regarding the proposed bills, and more generally, regarding the POST Act. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this matter, and we look forward to answering any questions you may have.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much, and thank you all for all the hard work that you do for this city. We just want to recognize that publicly. Before I get into questions, I would love to recognize Council Member Joseph, Ariola, Paladino, Holden, and Mealy have joined us. So can you provide an overview of the surveillance technologies currently used by the NYPD?

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CHIEF MADDREY: [inaudible] Good

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afternoon. I think when you look at our surveillance

technology, some of our more widespread technology that we use is of course our license plate readers, our Argus [sic] cameras, our body-worn cameras assigned to our officers, I think those are our most widespread used technology that we have in the Department that's used on a daily basis. And then when you drill down, we have been implementing drones. Of course, we use cameras fixed and mobile. And you know, you touched on facial identification, but I think that's pretty much the big picture. mean, we could drill down more, but that's the big

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you.

picture of what we use on a daily basis.

Commissioner, you testified that if we would have a report for each IUP, that it would decrease transparency as the nature of the particular surveillance that is used by the Department would be scattered across multiple. And you know, for administratively, itemizing surveillance technologies used in covert operations would endanger public safety. Talk a little bit about this specifically for the public to understand what that actually mean.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 23

It's in the second paragraph of your testimony. I

think we should just like kind of unpack that a

little bit.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Sure, absolutely.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thanks.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, for each surveillance technology we have an IUP. Now, for any-- for a given surveillance technology, that could be deployed in different ways. So for example, situational awareness cameras, we can deploy these cameras in a variety of context. You could have different platforms, different purposes for which we use those cameras. If we were to have a separate IUP for each type of camera that we use, or each different place where we could put a camera, or each different way we could deploy a camera, that's not what the POST Act requires, but it also would be incredibly difficult for the public to understand what's being done. Other words, as it stands now, if a member of the public wants to understand how we're using situational awareness cameras, they can go look at the situational awareness camera IUP and that will lay that out. If we had numerous IUPs for each

different type of camera— again, putting aside the administrability [sic] issue— you'd have tremendous repetition, obviously across the IUP. You'd have tremendous overlap, but also I don't think a member of the public would know where to look. Is it this type of camera? Is it that type of camera? They're actually now— you're a member of the public and you want to understand a variety of matters regarding a given surveillance technology. You go to the IUP for that surveillance technology, and then you can learn more about it in a variety of ways.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you. So, also to a little dig deeper into that, you also testified that the Department is now required to write an addendum to a pre-existing IUP. What is the timeframe for submitting such addendums, and how many addendums if any have been done thus far? Would you happen to have that information?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Yes. So, the statute actually does not give a timeframe for the addendum. The statute is silent on that. And you know, we have undertaken to do that, frankly and we try to do it in a reasonable timeframe, in a fair timeframe, but the statute actually is silent on that

matter. With regard to which IUPs we've done addendums to, I can tell you, it's body-worn cameras, cell side [sic] simulators, CCTV systems, Calia [sp?] Collection system, the criminal group database, digital fingerprint scanning devices, facial recognition, portable electronic devices, situational awareness cameras, thermographic cameras, and unmanned aircraft systems. So we have done addendums, additional information has been provided with regard to each of those IUPs over time.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much.

Does the NYPD track to the extent of which the data
is gathered by surveillance technologies and they're
shared with external entities?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'm not sure I understand the question exactly.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: So, does the NYPD have specific data sharing and retention policies? I apologize, I kind of jumped the question before really kind of unpacking it for you. I apologize.

So, you know, do we have specific data sharing and retention policies for the use of data gathered through surveillance technologies? Are there uniformed policies and protections in the terms and

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 26 agreements with external entities? And then I moved into saying do we have a policy on how we share.

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Right, so there are a number of different pieces to that. So, first of all, we obviously do have a set of rules, whether by statute or by, you know, a policy regarding data retention, personal identifying information. There's a whole set of rules about that. And I should say, by the way, that those sets of rules are going to be at least as a baseline matter consistent across multiple IUPs. Which is one of the issues with regard to, you know, boiler plate, I think it's important to emphasize -- this was mentioned earlier -- it's not boiler plate. It's our policies. And it is a great example. We're going to have a baseline set of rules and regulations about data privacy, data security that are going to be consistent across our IUPs and across the Departments. That's a good thing. So, I do want to say that -- we can come back to this maybe, but on the boiler plate pieces, it's not boiler plate, it's the consistency that I think one would want across an organizations to have baselined rules and regulations that apply, and then for particular IUPs, maybe

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 27 additional -- but for particular surveillance technologies, there might be additional rules, restrictions on top of that. But coming back to your question-- so there are rules about our ability to share information, obviously. We do share information with law enforcement partners in the course of criminal investigations. That does happen, of course. I should emphasize that we think of that in terms of investigations. We organize that by investigations, not by surveillance technology. If we are partnering with a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency on a particular investigation, obviously they're sharing between the law enforcement partners as one would expect. With regard to, you know, vendors or third parties where we have, you know, contracts, that is a standard, I think it's exhibit A that is appended to these contracts that has our standard rules regarding data privacy and data sharing. I think that's actually available online. And that's like a standard form that we use in a wide variety of agreements with third parties.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much. So, when you're gathering this data, does NYPD ever use this for commercial purposes?

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 28

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: the NYPD?

No, absolutely not.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Okay, great thanks.

So how does NYPD seek to balance the demands for public transparency regarding its use of surveillance technologies where the Department needs to protect sensitive information regarding operational protocols?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Right, we're very sensitive to that. Obviously, transparency is crucial. There are, of course, obviously, public safety issues and there's a balance there. And you know with regard to our POST Act IUPs, we do try to provide a lot of information about our technologies. Obviously, always can provide more detail and if there's a question of line drawing that always exists when you're doing this, and we do try to strike that balance. We want to provide the information called for. We need to provide the information called for by the POST Act, and we do that, but when we-- we drafted the IUPs, and when we do the addendums to the RFPs, we are sensitive not to compromise on public safety when we're doing that.

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 29

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you. The NYPD, you also previously expressed concerns about the extent to which disclosure of these surveillance technologies can impede the ability to conduct investigations. Can you provide specific examples of how disclosing information requires by the POST Act could reveal vulnerabilities and compromise intelligence operations?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I want to be very clear, I think that the way the POST Act is written now, I don't think it calls for that. concerns that the POST Act could be amended in a way that would raise those issues. So, just to take an example, we have an IUP for covert recording devices and exchange information about rules, policies, how we might use covert recording devices. We do not list out in the IUP or otherwise publicly the different types of locations or places where an undercover might have a covert recording device for obviously reasons. Now, that is consistent with the POST Act as written, and I-- we're very comfortable with that. I do have concerns that Intro 1207, again, I think the language it's not clear what's intended, and I-- we're genuinely unsure about that.

But when you start talking about doing a new IUP for anything, any surveillance technology utilized by the Department, even if there's an overlap in functionality or capability, I think it raise a question at least. Is that demanding that each time we find a new place to put a covert recording device, on an undercover, we have to do an IUP for that? I find it difficult to imagine that that's what's intended. I think the language could be read that way, though.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Yeah, I could read it that way. I'm going to ask a few other questions, and then we're going to take a two-minute break to kind of switch gears. And this is really surrounding around public notice, you know, and comments. What are the protocols in place to provide the public with notice about newly acquired and deployed surveillance technologies?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, if you renew surveillance technology, the POST Act essentially requires 90-day-- you do a draft IUP, and then there's a 45-day comment period. The draft IUP is published, available to the public, and then individuals can comment on it, and then it's at least

another 45 days until the IUP becomes final. So when you have a new surveillance technology, there's this sort of comment period the POST Act provides for.

When you have not a new surveillance technology, but a pre-existing surveillance technology that's being deployed in a new manner or for a new purpose, or even when there's an enhancement to that surveillance technology, what the POST Act says is you don't have to do a new IUP, you don't have to have a comment period. You do an addendum to the publicly available IUP, and that way the public is told, hey, we are taking this pre-existing surveillance technology, and we are deploying it in a new manner or for a new purpose, or with some enhancement.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much.

I'm going to conclude my first round and I'm going to pass it along to Chair Gutiérrez next.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you so much, Chair. And I know we have limited time and I know members have questions, so I will do a couple of questions and then pass it on to members so they can get their questions in. So, I wanted to ask if you could expand a little bit on the data sharing question that Chair Hanks asked. Would you be able

to tell me with more details kind of how the-whatever data is collected from any and all of the
surveillance devices, how you all determine, you
know, which agencies or external or third party
agencies get which data?

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Sure. So there is a whole set of rules about that. We have our agency Privacy Officer here, and—Emily Gold, and if it's okay, she can come to the microphone and answer your question.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Yeah, I would love that. And I'd also like to recognize Council Member De La Rosa, Althea Stevens, and Council Member Darlene Mealy, and Council Member Erik Bottcher, and Bob Holden [inaudible].

afternoon. So, in terms of how we determine whether data is shared, that's really a request that comes from an operational standpoint, and then its assessed by relevant operational commands and for legal concerns which is where I come in to determine whether or not we're allowed to share the information under— as the agency Privacy Officer and looking at the identifying information law and whether or not

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 33 1 identifying information is being asked for, and 2 3 whether we can be giving it under the citywide 4 quidance. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: So, have there been instances where you have been sharing where--6 7 the agency has been sharing data? 8 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: Yeah, we 9 share data. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay, and what 10 11 are-- can you share what-- which agencies? 12 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: Well, we--13 across the board we share data broadly. If you're looking-- if we're focusing down on POST Act 14 15 technologies and kind of surveillance technologies, I 16 think the most relevant data shares would be with our 17 case management systems, because that's how-- sorry? CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Still internally 18 19 with PD? 20 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: Well, you're 21 asking for sharing outside of the agency? CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Yes. Well, I'm 2.2 23 asking-- yes, exactly.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: Right.

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 34

2 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: All other

3 agencies.

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CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER: Right, so we share information on our case management systems with like the prosecutor's offices, because that's how they get the information they're— that we have to give them for discovery demands. Similarly, that's how— that is how and why we share like body—worn camera footage as well.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: all of that is governed by—— and every day the share is governed by an agreement that outlines how the data is transferred, like technologically, and how it is meant to be utilized, stored, and limits its use by the other entity and what they're allowed to do with it.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Are there instances where data is shared with-- outside of city agencies, federal agencies or third parties?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: Federal agencies, most of our sharing is actually for ongoing investigations. It's a lot of-- with our taskforces.

So, like our federal taskforces like FBI. That is

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 35 1 also done by MOU, but most of that information is 2 3 being shared during an ongoing and open 4 investigation. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. And what 5 about ICE? 6 7 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Absolutely 8 not. 9 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER: No, right? Yeah, we don't share. 10 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We do not 11 12 share any of the surveillance technology data with ICE. 13 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: What about with 14 15 any third parties? CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: Surveillance 16 17 technology to third parties, not that I can think of. 18 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: There may be 19 situations, just to be clear, depending on the 20 surveillance technology, there may be a vendor who 21 has access to information, right? And then that's 22 going to be governed by contract. Again, with 23 exhibit A which restricts their ability to use that

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data.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: so, that comes during while we're negotiating the terms of the agreement to utilize the technology.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: so, that's

25 assessed.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: But while they're accessing that information or during that duration is there any additional— is there any additional checks after once the vendor has everything that they ask for?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: I think that would depend on the system and what audit processes are in place for that specific technology.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Oh, I see. So there's no like uniform kind of check on that once they have the data that they are asking for.

there's a cloud-- when there's-- so for example, specifically when the cloud is being used, before we can even give any data to a vendor with-- using their cloud space as opposed to our cloud space, there's a security check run on that. We have a Chief Information Security Officer within ITB, Information Technology Bureau, in NYPD and they check all of that before we even are giving them anything.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. I'm going to -- I'll come back, but I'm going to switch gears to OTI now. And can you just confirm if all-- does NYPD handle all of its technology procurement in-house, or

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 38 does OTI ever have any input in the technology procurements of NYPD?

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CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Thank you for the question, Chair, and the opportunity to participate in this important conversation today. Again, I'm Mike Fitzpatrick, New York City's Chief Privacy Officer. My office, the Office of Information Privacy, became part of the Office of Technology and Innovation when it was created by Mayoral Executive Order Three of 2022. Intentionally, bringing together the City's technology and technology-related entities under one common ecosystem and allowing for common touch-points across subject matter expertise such as privacy, information security, infrastructure management, etcetera. From a procurement perspective, those are responsibilities that are managed by others at the Office of Technology and Innovation. However, my understanding is that our procurement folks negotiate citywide contracts that individuals' agencies are capable of leveraging for their needs, most notably to drive cost-efficiency, but my understanding as well is that our agency does not -- is not involved in any direct procurements for the Police Department.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 39

But of course, I'll turn it over to my colleagues to clarify if I've gotten that wrong.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Any response from the agency?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Chair, I just wanted to clarify one point from before which I think-- maybe just-- [inaudible] this, maybe not I'm not sure. When we're talking about vendors having access to data, we're not -- there's a not situation where someone's coming to us and saying, "Hey, can you give us this data." Right? We're talking about in order to operationalize a particular surveillance technology, it involves some third party vendor, and necessarily in the nature of using that surveillance technology, the vendor will by definition have access to the data, and therefore we have to make sure it's secure and not be used improperly. I just wanted to be clear. This is not -- we're not talking about a situation where-- you know, where we're just choosing to give data to a third party. This is all within the context of, alright, we have a surveillance technology, we're operationalizing it. That involves a vendor, and that can come up in various contexts,

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committee on Public Safety With committee on Technology 40 and then how do we make sure the data is secure. I just wanted that to be clear. That's all.

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I still have some follow-up questions, but thank you for that clarity. I'm going to go back to OTI. So, I guess the sense that I'm getting is that there is a level of procurement involvement that OTI has, but it sounds like PD for the most part has free reign to kind of manage that system independently, regardless if it's technology or surveillance specifically.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: So,

I'm not sure that I would characterize it as free
reign.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: That's the way I understood it. So, clarify, please.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: So, again, as I understand it, and again, I'm happy to bring questions back to the procurement folks who specialize in this. The agency negotiates citywide contracts for services. Again, notably to get the most effective cost for the delivery of those services, that individuals agencies are capable of leveraging. So, I think for example, something as basic as a cellphone plan. Rather than having each

committee on Public Safety With Committee on Technology 41 individual agency contract for those services and achieve different rates, the Office of Technology and Innovation procurement will negotiate a common rate to get the most effective price for the Administration and the City.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. So I guess to that end, in procuring technology contracts, PD, are there specific OTI stipulations that you are all subject to around things like cyber security and data management practices? How does that look like?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I'm happy to take this first. So again, as I mentioned, with the consolidation of the City's technology-related entities into the Office of Technology and Innovation, we've brought together the City's subject matter expertise and policy offices as it relates to a number of different articles of which mine is information privacy. For me, as Chief Privacy Officer in the role of my office, we have the responsibility of setting citywide privacy policies that all agencies follow pursuant to the identifying information law.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: PD included?

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 42

2 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: PD

3 included.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. And is there any-- and this also includes cyber security and data management services?

Security is the responsibility of our Office of Cyber Command which provides that particular expertise. But through that consolidation, for example, we've actually been very well positioned to harmonize those policy requirements across the City. So, for example, the most recent revisions to our citywide privacy policies that occurred earlier this year, included such a harmonization by necessarily integrating the City's cyber security policies with direct links to them, recognizing the different practice areas often overlap, but allowing for that information to be available to agency employees in one place.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Can you explain how agencies follow this, these policies? Like what is the checks? How are you all checking in with them to ensure that these agencies— the agencies are following these policies?

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 43

2 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:

Absolutely. So thank you for that question, Chair.

The identifying information which identifying information law, rather, which is my area of concern, naturally integrates a very strong governance regime on a citywide level from agency operations as it relates to identifying information. That law requires every city agency to have a privacy officer designated, and that privacy officer is intentionally so empowered by the law to evaluate collections or disclosures of identifying information by their agency through the lens of legal requirement, as well as the agency's overall mission or purpose.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And--

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER: [interposing]

Those-- oh, sorry.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: No, no, I just--does that happen on a-- like a consistent, like once a year, once a quarter? How often does that need to happen?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER: So, those evaluations on the agency level are occurring as necessary by their privacy officer if, for example, a new initiative is contemplated by an agency. That

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 44 would be something that should be-- that would involve their privacy officer for consideration. additional element of the identifying information law is the biannual requirement. Every two years, every city agency does a review of its policies and practices as it relates to identifying information. Those reports -- we're actually approaching another compliance cycle which will be due July of next year. Those reports are submitted to the council, and kick off another critically important element of the identifying information law which is the review of the City's Citywide Privacy Protection Committee of those reports. That committee is defined with particular agencies having a statutory seat at that table, as well as the flexibility of the Mayor to add additional agencies as they see fit. That committee in reviewing those reports on a citywide level drives toward the development of recommendations to the Chief Privacy Officer on how citywide privacy policy can be revised based upon the observations contained within those reports. Those recommendations are provided to the council as well as to me on October of compliance years, and then formally transferring the responsibility to me and my office in terms of

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 45 1 auctioning those recommendations. So, it's a very 2 3 important, and I think practice that the identifying information law codified as it relates to that 4 biannual review recognizing privacy practices must 5 necessarily be considered periodically and evolve 6 7 over time. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. I'm 8 9 going to ask just two more questions and I have some follow-up, but I definitely want to let my colleagues 10 11 ask a couple -- ask their questions. So I just have 12 two more before I pass it off. Can you share what 13 information was provided to OTI from PD related to 14 the POST Act in this past year? 15 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: 16 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing] Or 17 detail which projects. 18 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: So, 19 the POST Act does not include the Office of 20 Technology and Innovation, I would say. However --CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing] But 21 2.2 even in new procurement? 2.3 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: Well-

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 46

2 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing]

3 So, -- okay, sorry, I'll let you finish. I apologize.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: So, however, critically important, the identifying information law to the extent that such technologies involve the collection or disclosure of identifying information, the identifying information law still provides a governance regime.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. I guess I'm just trying to grapple. I know that—— I know that

Commissioner Fraser on a couple of instances has said where funding requests go through OTI, but you're saying not the case with PD and the POST Act in purchasing of new surveillance equipment or technology equipment?

OHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: I can only speak to that from a privacy perspective.

Again, there are others within the Office of Technology and Innovation that have varying responsibilities, again, through procurement. My understanding is that the Office of Technology and Innovation has not done individual procurements for the Police Department as it relates to surveillance

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 47 1 technology, but if there are follow-up questions, I'm 2 3 happy to bring them back. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And can PD-- can 4 PD speak to that? 5 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'm sorry to 6 7 which question? CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: With relation to 8 9 the POST Act and the integration of new technologies and new equipment, is that something that you all for 10 11 the purpose of procurement, for example, work with 12 OTI on or no? 13 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Yeah, our 14 Chief Contracting Officer is here. I think he can 15 answer that question. 16 CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: you ask the question again? 17 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Sure. So I quess-18 - I've asked OTI, have the response, they're going to 19 20 get back to me, but I'm curious with relation to the 21 POST Act and any surveillance or technology projects that PD is pursuing for the purpose of procurement, 2.2 2.3 for example, is there any communication that they made to OTI, for example? Because the way I have 24

understood and the way that Commissioner Fraser has

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 48 1 testified in the past is obviously related -- anything 2 3 related -- under OTI, everything related to technology 4 from any agency sees OTI at some point. And so I'm just trying to understand for the purpose of the POST Act when that happens. 6 7 CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: it would depend on the specific procurement. Again, 8 OTI is not overseeing our procurement process. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Totally. 10 CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: 11 if 12 we're purchasing a type of technology, surveillance 13 technology, that may include like a cloud component, there are certain standard writers that should be 14 15 included in the contract. If any changes are made to those writers, sometimes we'll be asked to confirm 16 17 with OTI if they generally agree with--18 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing] So, 19 it has happened? 20 CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: it's not a formal approval process, and it's really 21 2.2 related to specific elements of the procurement, not 2.3 like the scope of what we're procuring. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. Okay, well 24

thank you. I'm going to pass it over to my

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 49 1 colleagues. I believe Council Member Cabán is first 2 3 up. Thank you. COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: thank you. So, I 4 just want to ask some follow-up question on various 5 parts of your testimony throughout the afternoon. I 6 7 want to start by going back to the IUPs for a moment. How does -- how different does a technology have to be 8 to receive its own IUP, and I want to give an example here to hone in on, right? Like, you have a 10 different IUP for CCTV cameras and situational 11 12 cameras, right? They're both cameras, but why does 13 the autonomous robot or the Times Square robot, like why does that not have its own camera? 14 15 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Its own IUP 16 you mean. 17 COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: Its own IUP, yeah. 18 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, and I 19 appreciate the question. There is by definition, 20 [inaudible] there is line drawing that has to be done. There's-- that--21 COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: [interposing] How 2.2 2.3 are you drawing them? I want to know what's--DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing] 24 Council Member, I'm answering your question.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 50

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: I only have limited time, though, so I just want you go get straight to the point.

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Alright,

I'll get right to it. To the extent, the nature of
the surveillance is fundamentally different, we're
going to do a separate IUP. So, for example, drones,
a great example. Drones, obviously, yes those have
cameras, but the nature of, you know, surveillance
that's done by drones is fundamentally different than
the nature of surveillance that's going to be done by
a situational awareness camera.

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: so why doesn't the autonomous robot have its own?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Right, so the autonomous robot is—— there's a camera on that robot, and the nature of that surveillance is not different than the nature of the surveillance that is done by any other type of situational awareness camera. The robot is different, but the nature of that recording is not.

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: But if-- I mean, if the nature of the type of surveillance and recording were not different, then why does-- why do

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 51 we have it? Why does it exist? Why is it like-- if it wasn't substantially different, if it wasn't expanding the capacity or filling a gap in the area, then I would presume it would be superfluous. It wouldn't be needed.

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: No, there are two different things going on. One is the nature of a camera. The other is how a camera's being deployed. So if we have a the night scope [sic] K5 in the Times Square subway station, having that camera there and the robot sort of moving about, providing sort of a 360 view, you know, that may have efficiency and value, but the nature of the camera itself, the nature of the surveillance that is happening is not different.

that the added value that it has in comparison to other "situational cameras" to-- you're making the determination is does not-- it does not rise to the level of needing a separate IUP. That I don't agree with and I'd be curious to know whether DOI agrees with that. I'm going to move on. So you had mentioned that you do share surveillance technology with other federal agencies, correct?

1	COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 52
2	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: In the
3	course of criminal investigations
4	COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: [interposing] Just
5	yes or no. Like
6	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]
7	I'm answering your question. In the course of
8	criminal investigations, we share evidence with our
9	law enforcement partners, and that includes evidence
10	gained through the deployment of surveillance
11	technology, yes.
12	COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: But my specific
13	question was like, do you share with agencies like
14	the FBI?
15	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: In the
16	course of investigations, yes.
17	COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: Okay, thank you.
18	And do you share with the Joint Terrorism Taskforce,
19	the Homeland Security Investigations Taskforce, high
20	intensity drug trafficking areas? Are those some of
21	the Departments that you share information with?
22	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: In the course
23	of investigations, we definitely share with our law

enforcement partners, yes.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 53

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: And then you testified that you don't share information with ICE, correct?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We do not provide information to ICE, correct.

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: So, but do you share any surveillance technology data with other agencies or third parties that then can-- may share that data with ICE? So, for example, when you share information with the FBI, do you prevent the FBI from sharing that information from ICE-- sharing that information with ICE?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: There is absolutely no reason to think that in the course of a criminal investigation into a particular criminal organization or individuals, that the FBI would be giving that information to ICE.

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: That wasn't my question. My question was, when you share information with the FBI, do you prevent them from sharing that information with ICE?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: That information is to be used for the investigation at

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1 COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 54

2 issue. It is not-- as with any investigation,

3 they're investigation-specific. It would be-
4 COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: [interposing]

5 You're not-
6 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]

I am answering your question which is that we provide

it for that investigation.

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COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: Yes, and when you provide it to the FBI, yes or no, do you do anything, are there any mechanisms in place to prevent them from sharing that information with ICE?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: To the extent there's a taskforce and there's an MOU for the taskforce, that MOU may or may not govern how information is being used in the course of taskforce investigations. That is going to depend on the particular taskforce and the nature of the MOU that exists for that taskforce.

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: So, if there's information that you give to that—— may I have a few more minutes please? If there's information that you give to a taskforce or an agency in the MOU, is it your standard practice to set an agreement that that information will not then be passed off to ICE?

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 55

2 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: The
3 information that we share through the course-- for
4 the taskforce is only to be used for taskforce
5 investigations only.

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COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: And so do you enforce that?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER GOLD: That's an operational enforcement, because the members of the taskforce, whether federal or NYPD are still required to follow their own confidentiality rules within their agencies.

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: Okay, but the rules within that agency might be different than the rules within this agency that is— that exists in a sanctuary city, correct?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER: But to the extent that they sign onto the MOU that requires them to only use it-- use the information that they gain for taskforce investigations. That's the security measure.

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: Okay. I'm going to move on. I have two more questions. I want to be respectful of my colleague's time, and thank you for indulging me, Chairs. But the first is about

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 56

Clearview AI facial recognition. When you were using that, who controlled the data? why were officers using Clearview AI without any policy in place about how that data was maintained, and who had access to it? And then I just have one final question after that.

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: The Department's policy is very clear. When using facial recognition, the photo repository that is used is arrest photos and parole photos. Absent authorization from either the Chief of Detectives or the Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism, officers aren't-- detectives are not permitted to conduct facial recognition outside of the universe I just described. So whether it's Clearview or anything else, you cannot go outside that photo repository of arrests and parole photos absent authorization from one of the individuals I just mentioned. To the extent you don't have that authorization, you absolutely cannot conduct facial recognition using Clearview or any other facial recognition system.

COUNCIL MEMBER CABÁN: Thank you. Hopefully one of my colleagues follow up on that. My

1	COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 57
2	final question is just you were part of, along with
3	other agencies, in agreement. So, the NYPD and the
4	DOI, the Comptroller, the Mayor's Office of Contract
5	Services, the Mayor's Office of Management and
6	Budget, the Law Department, you all had an agreement
7	to hide special expenses of budget contracts which
8	includes a lot of your surveillance contracts, and
9	then Comptroller Stringer withdrew from agreement
10	after the POST Act passed. Are the agencies still
11	abiding by that agreement to keep this info from the
12	public? Like, is everybody still a part of that
13	agreement? Is there a new agreement? That's my last
14	question.
15	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Council
16	Member, I do not accept the premise of your question,
17	and we are
18	CHAIRPERSON HANKS: [interposing] Thank
19	you so much. We have to move onto
20	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]
21	abiding
22	CHAIRPERSON HANKS: the next Council
23	Member to ask a question I want to recognize Council
24	Member Brewer, and we're going to move on to Council

Member Joseph.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 58 1 2 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Thank you, good 3 afternoon. I wanted to talk about Digidogs. So, I 4 wanted to find out how many Digidogs did the NYPD purchase. 5 UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah. 6 7 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Does the NYPD 8 plan to purchase more Digidogs. 9 CHIEF MADDREY: Thank you for your question, Council Member. How are you? 10 11 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: I'm good. 12 CHIEF MADDREY: Good. We've purchased 13 two Digidogs. At this time, we don't have any plans 14 to purchase any more. 15 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: According to 16 Politico, two Digidogs cost about \$750,000. Does 17 this contract include maintenance, annual software 18 update, patching mechanism, or other upkeep 19 procedures? Maintenance, are you going to maintain 20 it? 21 CHIEF MADDREY: The price that you quoted is accurate. The full details of the contract I do 2.2 2.3 not have, but I can get. 24 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: You're going to

get that information for me.

COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Because for

CHIEF MADDREY: I can get that for you.

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\$750,000 I hope somebody is taking care of that,

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updating, the software, making sure it lasts. How

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often have the Digidogs have been used since their

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purchase?

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CHIEF MADDREY: We deployed them five

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times since we purchased them.

COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: And what was the

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reason for the deploy?

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CHIEF MADDREY: They were deployed for

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situation where people were armed with firearms,

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barricaded in homes.

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COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Was it helpful?

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CHIEF MADDREY: Yes, it is helpful. It

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is helpful. As the Chief of Department, my main

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concern is making sure that not only do I keep my

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officers safe, that I keep the public safe. Digidog

is a tool that helps us to go into a situation where

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1 a person may be armed, and hopefully we have the

opportunity to see what the person has-- if they do

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possess a weapon, alright? Instead of sending my

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officers in there first, I can send the robot in

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there, and I $\operatorname{don'} t$ want anything to happen to the

robot, but if it does, you know, it is what it is. We have to make sure our officers are safe, and we also have to make sure the people we're trying to help are safe. Earlier this year when we had the parking garage that collapsed over here, it was through the use of Digidog we were able to find unfortunately someone who was in there buried. But Digidog was able to go in there when police officers or firefighters could not go in there.

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COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Okay, thank you. After introducing the Digidog and a K5, the Mayor stated this is the beginning of a series of rollouts. Are we going—we're going to do? So the public safety—in the statement it said, the public safety has transformed itself. What other technologies are in the pipeline for NYPD?

we're looking at different technologies. The biggest thing that we've been using with a lot of success are the drones, the unmanned aerial systems. That's what we're really using. We're really trying to learn that technology better and expand that technology. I have many, many events that I can discuss with using the drones were extremely helpful. It helped public

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 61 1 It helped police officer safety. So our 2 safetv. 3 done technology is one the -- probably the biggest 4 thing that we're looking to expand on right now. There's other things that are-- were being looked at. We're always looking at new technology when it's 6 7 delivered to us, but nothing that we're really ready 8 to move on just yet. COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Are you looking into AI as part of your technology, and--10 CHIEF MADDREY: AI is already out there. 11 It exists. 12 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: It's out there. 13 Are you training your officers to use AI for weapon 14 15 detection? 16 CHIEF MADDREY: We don't use AI in the 17 Department. 18 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: And just to 19 be clear about that, you know, it really depends what 20 your question is. In terms of like some free-21 standing AI training. We don't do that. There are 2.2 certain technologies we have where the sort of the 2.3 background to the technology is--COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: [interposing] Is 24

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AI.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 62 1 2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: AI, machine 3 learning based. 4 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Correct. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We have a few 5 things like that, but we don't have sort of a--6 7 there's no-- I'm not aware of some like free-standing 8 AI initiative if that makes sense. But to your point, there are a few surveillance technologies we have where the-- there's sort of machine learning 10 11 that allows the technology to function, and that does 12 fall within the scope of AI. COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: And some of it 13 14 also AI where you can detect the weapon if somebody 15 pulls out a weapon in the surveillance part. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We do not do 16 17 that. We don't have that. COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: You don't have 18 19 that. 20 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We certainly don't use it. We certainly don't have the-- that is 21 2.2 not a technology that we have deployed. 2.3 COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: And how often are your officers trained on this new technology once it 24

comes into use?

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 63

2 CHIEF MADDREY: It's a rigorous process.

When we have-- when we obtain new technology, it doesn't go to the masses within the Department. It's usually within our Technical Assistance or Response Unit, commonly known as TARU. We usually-- our TARU officers who are trained in technology, in various forms of technology. We usually allow them to use it first through a pilot phase, a test phase. Then if

COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: And there's been training -- and it's been helpful the way you're training your small units.

it's something that works, then we'll expand it.

CHIEF MADDREY: Yes.

COUNCIL MEMBER JOSEPH: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Council Member

17 Holden?

talk to that?

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COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Thank you,

Chairs. A question on-- I guess for Deputy

Commissioner Gerber regarding the facial recognition software, the improvements we've seen over the past few years, because I hear a lot of, you know, comments that it's not accurate, but it has improved immensely from my research over the years. Can you

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Yeah, no, I think that's exactly right. I think what you've seen over the past few years, and there's been, you know, academic work on this, scholarly work on this, that really over the past few years, the accuracy of the facial recognition software, you know, has improved significantly. And you know, so we use a software that has algorithms that have been reviewed by NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology. And to your point, the technology, its accuracy has improved very significantly I'd say over the past, you know, half decade.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Were the-- could you speak to the accuracy, though? Like what percentage is, like, that comes up as an error in certain software? Do you have those figures?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: That I do not have here.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Okay, because there's a lot of even businesses that have invested in that to protect their property and to protect their businesses. And it seems, you know, when I was speaking to some of the business groups they were saying that would actually disable many of the stores

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 65 from even-- or at least prevent them from operating normally.

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: One thing I do want to emphasize is that when we talk about using facial recognition technology, we are talking about having multiple individuals reviewing that output and reviewing the possibility of a potential match before anything is provided to a detective.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: So there's quite a debate on that. They talk amongst themselves. Is this the same guy? Is that— that kind of thing, or?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Right, so you'll have an initial—if a case detective requests that facial, you know,—a case detective submits an image for facial recognition use. That image may or may not be useable for facial recognition. It's really going to depend. So sometimes, you know, a photo is provided and it's rejected, because we can't use it. If it is usable, you'll have an initial detective who does this work who reviewed the output. If that detective identifies a potential match, if that happens, a second detective will also review to see if he or she agrees on the potential match, and then a supervisor will also review. And only if

there is complete agreement between the first detective, the second detective and a supervisor, will that be flagged for the case detective as a potential match. So we have a lot of-- I think it's very important that yes, there is of course, this important technology that we're using, but there also is-- there are substantial human checks in this process, multiple human checks, and just to emphasize, even when it's a potential match, it's just a lead. That's all it is. It is not basis for a probable cause.

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COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: It's a tool.

It's a tool, and-- but it does catch a lot of the bad guys, I would say.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Exactly. It is--

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: [interposing] You look at once we have a photo of the individual who attacked a woman, let's say on the subway, once we get that, many times that person is arrested. So, it is working, and to eliminate that tool would be a problem, especially with a smaller police force and less detect— I have half the amount of detectives in my precinct that I use to have just a few years ago.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 67

And so I can see it-- if we're not using technology
in the right way, obviously-- if we're not-- if we're
prohibited from using it, period, certain technology,
that's going to hurt us with public safety. I guess
the Chief can speak to that.

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CHIEF MADDREY: You're absolutely right,

Council Member. We don't want to lose this

technology, and as the Commissioner said, the facial
identification just provides a lead. It-- from there
our detectives have to go out and do some good old
fashion detective work, knock on doors, use other

technology to verify that match, if the person they
believe it is, is that person, and if that person was
even in the position to do that crime. So it's just
a lead. It's a very helpful lead, something that
this department relies on, and it helps to solve
crime.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: and that's why
the police force exist first of all, and public
safety. Let me just ask one other question. Deputy
Commissioner Gerber, you said you don't share
information with ICE at all.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We are not permitted to do anything basically in the world of

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 68 civil immigration enforcement. We're not allowed to do that.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: No, but well,
let's say there are two million people now on the
terror watch list, you know that? There's two
million people. It's the latest news that we have,
two million. So let's say your facial recognition
comes up with somebody and it pings on the fact that
this guy is on the terror watch list. Do you just go
to the FBI, or you won't--

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]
So, obviously, if--

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: [interposing] Do you go to ICE?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: As a matter of a criminal investigation we go to-- we have various law partners, law enforcement partners, but whatever else we're doing in the criminal realm, we are not permitted to use Department resources, Department information in connection with civil immigration enforcement.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: No, but I'm talking about criminal. If--

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 69

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]

Right.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: If somebody comes

in and he appears on the terror watch list and you

have a match. You notify ICE, then?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We're going to notify law enforcement partners in connection—

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: [interposing]

Right.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: with potentially a criminal investigation, obviously.

and most of us have lived through 9/11. We know why customs enforcement was created, so that we could communicate with agencies. So, not to communicate with somebody who matches the terror watch list would be ridiculous.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Just to be clear, the terror watch list is not part of our facial recognition repository. I think it's important just so the record is crystal clear, right? Our facial recognition system, again, is off of arrest photos and parole photos. It does not include

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 70 photos off of the terror watch list. That's totally separate. And again--

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: [interposing] I would say why not, but I just-- you know, that's me.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you, Council

Member. Council Member Stevens?

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COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: Hi, good afternoon. I just wanted to just make sure and have a couple of points, because when we talk about terror watch lists and things like that, we have to be careful about that because Nelson Mandela was on a terrorist watch list for a number of years, and he was a great man, and so obviously those things come with biases, and because humans are always in charge they also come with biases. So, it should be a tool, but we also need to recognize the racial implications that those come with, and so I think we need to be-make sure that that needs to also be said. And also just talking about technology, and I think that we should be moving in a direction of technology and the Police Department should be using those things, but again, because of the relationship that they have

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 71 with certain communities, especially the black, brown, Latino, and Muslims, this is why it is becoming an issue because the mistrust is there, and it hasn't been built, and so when we have these things coming up, these issues, we're going to be suspicious of it because we are not doing the work of actually building these relationship and trust in all communities. So I do think it's a lot easier for other folks to lean into some of these things in an easier way, because they're not discriminated against continuously. But my question is, the Office of Inspector General released a report on criminal group database that stated that 99 percent of the individuals found on the database were black or Latino. How do you explain the huge racial disparities found in these surveillance databases? DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'll start and then turn it over to the Chief. I do think it's important in responding to your question, part of the response, I think it is important to emphasize that that report which was, you know, exhaustive found no evidence that inclusion in the criminal group database caused harm to an individual or group of

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individuals.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 72 1 COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: 2 That's you 3 making that assumption. The people that's on the 4 list might speak otherwise, but continue. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'm just quoting form the report. 6 7 COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: I know, but I'm 8 just saying. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: It's DOI's 10 report. And they did not find any evidence of a 11 relationship between inclusion in the database and 12 any individual adverse outcomes. Again, that's the 13 DOI report speaking, not me. I think that's 14 important to say on the record. 15 COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: And even quoting 16 that means if it doesn't do anything, then why do we 17 have it. 18 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: No, no, so--19 COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: [interposing] 20 Because you quoted the report, right? 21 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: 2.2 COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: So, we going to 2.3 quote the report and from the report that you just quoted to try to say that it's not being used, then 24

why do we have it, then?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: No, no, it is used as an investigative tool. I just think it's important to emphasize that that information is not being provided, for example, to-- it's not part of one's criminal history. It's not provided to potential employers. It's not provided in connection with housing. I just--

COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: [interposing]
Then why is 99 percent of it black and Latino.

CHIEF MADDREY: Council Member, I think when we just look at what's going on in our communities, when you look at a lot of the gang and the crew activities, a lot of--

COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: [interposing]
They're not just black and brown.

CHIEF MADDREY: A lot of it is based in a lot of our communities in Brownsville, in--

COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: [interposing] I'm disappointed that you as a black man would even say that.

CHIEF MADDREY: But you're taking it-COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: [interposing]
Every racial group has gangs.

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Wrong way. We're talking about just the sheer numbers. I'm not saying it doesn't exist in other neighborhoods, but I'm just saying in our particular neighborhood, we do see a number of gangs and crews. This is an internal intelligence piece. As the Commissioner said, we don't share with people, it's all internal information. There's a series of steps that we go through before we put anybody on there, and there's a series of steps that we go through before the taking it the sheer would be the saying it the sheer would be saying it doesn't exist in other and there's a series of steps that we go through before we put anybody on there,

then what are the tools that you're using to surveillance people who are not black and brown?

Because if you're going to say that in these communities, there are high numbers of gangs. That means that okay, great, and we know that there other communities that have gangs and do criminal activities. Where's their database? Where's their use for investigations? Where is that information being kept? Because if it's one specific group, it seems like they're being targeted.

CHIEF MADDREY: Well, we have an intelligence division that keeps different

1 COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 75
2 information on different groups. I mean, there's
3 information all kinds of criminal groups.
4 COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: Could you give
5 us information about where those other databases is
6 on the other groups? Because maybe that would

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us information about where those other databases is on the other groups? Because maybe that would probably help with some of it, but when we have a database that is 99 percent black and Latino, that's a concern and red flag for me. And if it's not for everyone sitting up here, that's a problem for me, because that means that you're watching a certain group of people while others aren't getting the same level of scrutiny. And even when we talk about the [inaudible] to get on there, it's very subjective.

CHIEF MADDREY: The way you get on there is not subjective. A lot of it has to do with self-admission. A lot of it has to do with self-admission, and a lot of young people that we bring and they do self-admit yes, I'm a part of this. They don't hide it.

COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: So, alright-CHIEF MADDREY: [interposing] But just to
go back--

COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: [interposing]
You know I know those criteria.

CHIEF MADDREY: No, just to go back to your point. We have organized crimes groups, we have database and information on organized crime, people who in there and they don't look like people from our communities. Some do, some don't. We have different databases. I understand that the crew, gang crew database has been a very-- a subject that's, you know, resonated poorly throughout our communities, because yes, there have been young people who have been put on there and we've gone through steps to remove them and as well as [inaudible]--

COUNCIL MEMBER STEVENS: [interposing] And part of the problem is some young people don't even know that they're on the database. So, listen, you know this is one of the areas I actually know a lot about. So like, let's not pretend like you don't know that you're on there. It's a secret. You don't know how to get off of there. The steps to FOIL to do it is very difficult and arduous, but what I'm saying is that I'm going to wrap up because I know there's other people in regards on the time limit. It is a problem that 99-- I'm going to say this again, 99 percent of those folks on there are black and brown which is why-- every reason why they're

pushing back on any new technology, surveillance, because this is another reason why people don't trust the work that is being done. This is a reason, I'm telling you. Like, we don't feel safe, because why would you have a database that literally racially profiling? But this is—I'm telling you, we got to get to a place where everyone feels safe and everyone feels like they're being included, and that's just not the case and this is an example of that. So thank you.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Council Member Stevens-- Council Member Paladino?

COUNCIL MEMBER PALADINO: Good afternoon.

I have a couple of simple questions. given the

NYPD's opposition to the POST Act, can the Department
elaborate on the challenges it faces in balancing
transparency with the need to protect sensitive
operational details from potential criminal
exploitation?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'll take that. This is—relates to question that Chair Hanks asked earlier. When we are do— when we did the IUPs initially, and then we do the addendums to the IUP, yeah, we have to follow the law. We have to make

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 78 1 sure we're making the requisite disclosures 2 3 consistent with the Act. We do have to be careful 4 not to compromise public safety, and we would not 5 want to, for example, put our undercover's at risk. We would not want to take steps that would hurt 6 7 public safety efforts. I think, you know, the way 8 we've-- the way the POST Act is working, I think-we, consistent with the law, have been able to strike that balance. Again, I do have real concerns that 10 11 Intro 1207 shifts that balance or at least risks 12 shifting that balance in a way that will compromise 13 public safety efforts. 14 COUNCIL MEMBER PALADINO: Because the 15 NYPD was against the POST Act back in 2020. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: 16 We were. 17 COUNCIL MEMBER PALADINO: Right, okay. 18 One of the other questions I had was can you 19 elaborate on how disclosure of surveillance 20 capabilities as required by the POST Act could 21 specifically endanger your undercover officers and 2.2 compromise their safety?

goes to the hardware point. So we have an IUP for each type of surveillance technology. We don't break

Yeah, this

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER:

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 79 it down by each type of hardware, and that plays out in a lot of different ways, and if we had to do it, you know, hardware by hardware, there'll be a lot of problems with that. Some of them administerability [sic], some of them I think actually confusion of the public, but it actually goes to this point about undercovers. It is one thing to say publicly we, you know, have under -- we have covert recording devices, covert video recording devices, covert audio recording devices. It's one thing to explain that at a certain level of generality, to explain the rules, laws, procedures that govern those investigative It would be something else entirely if we had tools. to do a new IUP for each type of hardware in which a surveillance technology is deployed. That would be for our undercovers very dangerous.

COUNCIL MEMBER PALADINO: [inaudible] I got it. I'm on. Okay. How does the NYPD assess the impact of POST Act— of the POST Act on its counterterrorism efforts? Are the concerns of that Act, and could they inadvertently aid terrorist organizations by revealing these surveillance tactics?

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 80 1 2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: so, I think 3 in terms of where we are now, you know, I think-- I 4 do not think that the POST Act has compromised those efforts. I would be concerned about changes to the language of the POST Act that would require, again, 6 7 IUPs on a hardware by hardware basis or in a more 8 granular way, I think raises the types of concerns. COUNCIL MEMBER PALADINO: Thank you very 10 much. 11 CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much, Council Member Paladino. Abreu, Council Member 12 13 Abreu? 14 COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: Thank you, Chairs. 15 I have a question on Digidogs. Where do they live? 16 CHIEF MADDREY: Where do they live? 17 COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: Yeah, where do the 18 Digidogs live? 19 CHIEF MADDREY: They're at our TARU base. 20 COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: Okay, where's 21 that? 2.2 CHIEF MADDREY: in Queens. 2.3 COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: In Queens. CHIEF MADDREY: By the Whitestone Bridge. 24

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COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: I have a question in regards to the police-involved shooting earlier this week. Were Digidogs deployed there?

CHIEF MADDREY: We had Digidog at the scene. Digidog was--

COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: [interposing]

Sorry, one question-- one second. I want to be able to see you. Go ahead.

CHIEF MADDREY: Digidog was there.

Digidog was actually in the process of being deployed, but we used the avatar first, and then that's when things, you know, it got-- became chaotic, and that's when the gunfire started.

COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: Got it. So Digidog was not used at that?

CHIEF MADDREY: Yeah, we didn't-- we deployed some other forms of technology first. We had Digidog there. We were ready to deploy it, but that's-- the gunfire started before we had a chance to use Digidog.

COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: And is it because

Digidog was maybe too far away, or just the timing of

it didn't work out? Because I do know-- you

mentioned in your testimony earlier that Digidogs

committee on Public Safety with committee on Technology 82 would be deployed in situations where people are armed. I want to make sure that we're, of course, maximizing the use of Digidog.

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CHIEF MADDREY: Absolutely, but we do have other forms of technology that can also do the same thing that Digidog can do. We sent a scout in first. A scout is like a small ball that goes in there. It has a camera. The person in there was able to immobilize the scout by throwing something on it. We actually used a drone first, a small drone. The person took a broom and swatted the drone down.

COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: That's right. I read that.

Then we sent the avatar in, which is basically a camera that's on wheels. It's like a camera—a set of wheels. The camera is a pole camera. We sent that in, and emergency service kind of walking behind it because they were trying to close the distance between themselves and the suspect. That's when the suspect emerged from the bathroom door and started firing.

COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: Thanks for that,

Chief. You also mentioned earlier in your testimony

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 83 that there were five situations where Digidog has been deployed. One of them was the garage collapse.

Can you-- to the extent you have those, can you speak to the other four situations that they were used for?

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CHIEF MADDREY: I can't speak to all of them. I can speak to two that are— that I was a little bit more— you know, I was at the scene of.

One was— about a month ago we had a situation over in Astoria where a resident of building shot his super, and then he ran inside and barricaded himself inside. We were able to use Digidog, and the reason we were able to use— Digidog has the ability to walk upstairs. So we used Digidog at that location. And then we had another situation where there was a person— there was an emotionally disturbed person who was— we couldn't locate him in a building. So we used Digidog to walk up and down the building and we found him on the roof.

COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: And so it seems it was helpful for--

CHIEF MADDREY: [interposing] Absolutely. We were able to use Digidog. We found him on the roof. We were able to bring him-- you know, put him in custody with no problem. So definitely helpful.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 84

The other situation where we had Digidog and Digidog went up there. Digidog was able to go up there, do some surveillance for us, but eventually emergency service had to move in a little closer. When we moved in a little closer, the suspect shot himself.

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COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: Thank you. And since I have one minute I just want to quickly pivot to drones. Hopefully my colleagues can ask further questions on drones. Who makes the decision about how drones can be deployed, and where is drone-recorded data stored?

me, one of my designees. It's usually the Chief of Patrol, my Chief of Staff, or Chief of Special Operations. What we do with the drone, we just—basically right now we're still developing the whole process, but we just take some notes of when we deploy the drones if they was useful for what we needed it for, and that's what we're doing right now. Of course, we're going to improve that.

COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: And what's the done-- what are drones primarily used for?

CHIEF MADDREY: It's used really for large scale events. We've used them with success at

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 85 large scale events. Electric Zoo that happened late in the summer where about a thousand people crashed the gates because there was a discrepancy with the We were making the decision to close the tickets. place down because we thought it was over-crowded. We were able to put the drone up. We were able to get an aerial view of the park, and we realized that the place wasn't overcrowded, so we didn't have to create a situation now where we're telling thousands of people the event's over. We knew it was safe in there, and we allowed the event to continue. Union Square over the summer a bunch of young people converged down there, you know, believing that they were going to receive some gifts. I was there personally on the scene and I couldn't gauge how many kids were out there. Once we put the drone up there, we realized we had up to 5-6,000 young people out there, where from my vantage point it maybe looked like a 1,000 or 1,500. So, again, very helpful. realized we had more young people out there than, you know, we could handle at that moment. We had to bring additional resources there, and we had to figure out how to get them out which we were able to

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 86 1 2 COUNCIL MEMBER ABREU: Thank you so much. 3 Appreciate it. 4 CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you. Council 5 Member Brewer? COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you. 6 7 of my questions, because I was late, I had another event. Might be for the next session. But I'm 8 always interested in the contracts, and obviously for those drones, it's cyber security. I just want to 10 11 know, do you handle this in-house? Do you have-- how many contracts do you have? How do you work with 12 13 Commissioner Fraser, etcetera? How do you put 14 together this procurement for technology? 15 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: 16 you for the question, Council Member. I'm Mike 17 Fitzpatrick, New York City's Chief Privacy Officer. 18 My office, the Office of Information Privacy is part 19 of OTI. I know you came in late, I just wanted you 20 know--21 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: [interposing] 2.2 Well, I appreciate that. Thank you. 2.3 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: from a contracting perspective, in my role as the 24

Chief Privacy Officer, I have the responsibility of

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 87 providing agencies with standardized terms to support data protection pursuant to our local identifying information law. Those terms are part of citywide privacy policy, and our agency privacy officers look to those terms to support their agency negotiation of contracts. Our policies provide that most notably, I think, that when sensitive identifying information is at issue, that is information that carries an increased risk of harm to a particular individual, that is a must-attach situation for a very specific set of terms. And again, notably earlier this year, pursuant to our latest revision to citywide privacy policy we included an additional requirement that those -- that contracting language cannot be changed, without the express authorization of the Chief privacy officer to add an additional control and support for other data protection and privacy protection at the agency level. So I'll answer that from the policy perspective, and I'll turn it over to my colleagues to speak to the Department's practices. COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: That's helpful.

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, yeah, I can speak to that. So, we obviously have internal

process review for any type of contracts that we

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 88 purchase. Obviously, the value of the contract, the type of procurement that we're doing, the type of surveillance technology we might be procuring will have different types of steps of review to make sure that the appropriate clauses and terms are included in the agreement. In addition to that there's obviously multiple levels of oversight review. we put together our contract after internal review by our legal teams, which also goes to the New York City Law Department who also does an additional layer of I mentioned before that, you know, occasionally we're asked if, you know, if we've made changes to some of the agreements that are provided by OTI, if OTI has concurred with any changes that we've made, that usually happens through the Law Department review process. So, again, multiple layers internally as well as oversight review so that all appropriate parties are informed of whatever type of contract, and if there's any privacy concerns, that they're addressed.

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COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: And it sounds like it hasn't breached at all, in the sense that you keep the information and that this contracting process is working in terms of information not

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 89 1 getting to the private hands where it should not be. 2 3 Sounds right? 4 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: 5 knowledge, yes. COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Okay, do we have 6 7 some sense, because a lot of this has to be contracted out, obviously-- do we have some sense 8 generally for NYPD how many contracts are let for technology surveillance, etcetera? I mean, I know 10 11 it's a very broad question, I know that. But do you have some sense on what the dollar figure is? 12 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I think we 13 14 do have some dollar figures that we can provide, and 15 I'll double-check to make sure we have them. We do 16 about anywhere from 2,500 to 3,000 individual 17 purchases, right? Those can be small contracts. 18 Those can be large contracts. 19 COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Per year is what 20 you're saying. 21 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Correct. again, you know, I don't have an exact figure for you 2.2 2.3 and how many of those things relate to surveillance technology. I think we have some rough numbers of 24

spending regarding surveillance technology. I think

committee on Public Safety With Committee on Technology 90 it's in the realm of 120 million dollars per year for surveillance technology that's covered under the POST Act.

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I also ask is I know a bit about technology in my past. It's always concerning to me that when you contract out, which has to happen, then you don't have the intellectual property internally, and when that company contract end, sometimes so does the information. Is that something that you're aware of and deal with, or that's not an issue?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I don't think so. I mean, I believe our agreements contain very specific language that any IUP created through those contracts is retained by the City of New York. So, I believe they would be in breach of contract if they took any information from that engagement and then used it elsewhere.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much. I just have a few questions, and I thank all my colleagues for those great questions, and kind of expanding on the questions from Council Member

Stevens. When it comes to the technology— and there are a lot of things that have been written about coded bias. Is there any potential— we know this, but for racial biases and the underlying technologies of certain surveillance utilized by NYPD, and if so, does the Department mitigate that bias when using the technology?

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, I'll start with that. I think one concern, for example, that's been raised over the years is that sort of bias in the facial recognition space. I do think-- I do think that those concerns are much less now than they were say five or ten years ago. I do think the technology has gotten better, and that risk of bias inherent in the technology has diminished. think that the crucial point, again, is that we're not just blindly, you know, following some output from some facial recognition algorithm. That is the starting point of a process that then goes to multiple points of human review. A first detective, a second detective, and a supervisor, and only if all those three are in concurrence, only then does it get passed along as a lead to the case detective. So I do think that that's an example of a situation of

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 92 which the human element on top of the technology, you know, should have a mitigating effect in terms of the issue that you're raising.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much.

So, do you have any internal audits on this use of technology when it comes to the surveillance audits? I think you started by saying you have, you know, a detective, a process, but then you know, things are changing rapidly. Is there a space where there's an audit process where it's quarterly, yearly—you know, there is a human component to this. what I think the question is surrounding on is there a compliance, an audit as time goes on to make sure—recalibrate, I guess the word is, to make sure that the technology that even the officers who are looking at this are in the right and correct head space.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, with regard to any surveillance technology there's always—you know sometimes audits can be ordered in a variety of contexts for a variety of reasons. I think the question that you're asking is about is there some regular audit that is done in terms of the facial recognition procedures, I'm actually not sure about that. I'm not aware of that, but it's possible

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 93 that I just don't know about it, but I'm not aware of that.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: And finally, before I pass it along to my Chair, and I also just want to thank you all for your testimony and answering our questions to the best of your ability. We had a -- in Staten Island Northshore, we had a summer stage concert, and I noticed that there were drones being used. It was probably one of the first events in my district where it was 5,000+. It was-- we considered it an incredible event. Is there a mechanism in which we're told that if we have an event, especially as a Council Member, people who are-- you know, we're funding these events. It's our names on the flyers and the outreach. Is there any way or is there any mechanism in which you are letting us know as Council Members or as event organizers, because to your point they were very helpful to you. I just wish you took better pictures. But, you know, we just wanted to kind of get an idea that -- I didn't know that it was being used, and I thought it was media. I thought it was, you know, a newspaper. How do we know which drone is being used for what purpose and what agency?

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CHIEF MADDREY: We can definitely build that mechanism in. I don't believe we have one right now, but that's something that's a very easy fix. do want you to have that clarity where you know if it's us, the NYPD, using the done versus a media company using the drone. So that's something that we could definitely build a mechanism for to make sure, you know, the members of the council are aware if we're going to use drone technology in the district.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much. did want to have -- I had some questions on like social media analysis tools and like Shot Spotter. According to the NYPD's report, the Shot Spotter system records one second before and one second after a gun shot. However, there are several reports from advocates that demonstrate that the system's recordings often beyond this second -- this one-second window. Can you confirm that the audio recording received by NYPD is only limited to one second before or after a gunshot, and can you determine the difference between that and Fourth of July fireworks? [inaudible] my neighborhood.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, to answer your question, when there's a Shot Spotter hit, so to speak, a Shot Spotter is triggered, the audio clip that the NYPD gets has one second before one second after. We're not given some larger audio universe, period. The Shot Spotter system, there is recording that the Shot Spotter System has that goes on for some number of hours, but we don't have access to that. We don't have access to it in real time.

We don't have access to it historically.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Who does have access to it?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Shot Spotter has it. I also do want to just emphasize when I say, you know, there's-- the microphones are on, but they're 30 feet above ground. They're not designed to pick up human conversation and all that, but to the extent there's any confusion about this, I think the confusion about this, I think the confusion is between what is being recorded by Shot Spotter and what the NYPD ever has access to. And what we're talking about is gun shot, one second before, one second after.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much.

That concludes my questioning for NYPD. My Chair
Gutiérrez?

2 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thanks, Chair.

Can I-- I just want to finish up the conversation around Digidog. I know that the Mayor has stated multiple times that the roll-out of this device is kind of the beginning, right? There's more. Can you all share if there are any other technologies similar or with the ability to kind of operate in the same way as Digidog? Anything that PD has in the pipeline?

CHIEF MADDREY: Not that I'm aware of. I mean, we have an IT Department. They have numerous people that work there that are looking at different technology, but nothing that's been introduced to me yet for a potential roll-out.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: and I know-Chief, thank you. I know you mentioned that you
could speak to a handful of incidences where Digidog
rolled out. I'm sure you know in the previous
Administration when something similar was rolled out,
there was a lot of opposition, particularly in
communities in central Brooklyn, East New York, that
really felt like they would be targeted? How do you
feel that you are rolling this device out

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 97 differently, and how have you integrated that feedback into your decision-making?

CHIEF MADDREY: believe it or not, I have requests from community groups, young people. I have actually one sitting on my desk right now in the Bronx. They have a robotics program. They asked if we could bring the Digidog up there. We're going to bring it up there to show it to a group of kids in the Bronx at the Renaissance. Yeah, well--

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: She's going to take that up with you.

She's there. But again, you know, I have an ask, and we're going to bring it up there. This is what we need to do. we need to bring Digidog out, and we do bring Digidog out and we let people see exactly how it operates, and I think once people see it, it kind of— you know, it kind of brings them down and they understand exactly what it is. There's no weapons attached to it. It's— you know, a robotic way. It can move and operate like a dog. It can do certain things that other robotics we have can't do.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Yeah.

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CHIEF MADDREY: and again, it's a tool to save lives. It's a tool to save people more than anything else.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Understood. And that example of the school is more like a show and tell and kind of like exposure, correct?

CHIEF MADDREY: Yes.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: But in instances where communities, for example, like in East New York I remember they were in opposition to the previous Administration's roll-out. What can you say about how you all-- how you will prioritize or the decision-making process behind like where Digidog goes? Is there anything that you can share specifically for advocates that are concerned about like racial profiling?

CHIEF MADDREY: Digidog-- again when
Digidog is deployed it's usually, you know, under my
orders, one of our designees. We're using Digidog
for very volatile situations, situations where people
are armed, situations where people may need to be
rescued. It's not just being used randomly in
neighborhoods to walk around. You will not see
Digidog doing that. Or if you see it walking around

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 99 1 the neighborhood, it's going to be for demonstrate--2 3 you know, a demonstrative purpose. I'll probably be 4 there talking to people in the community, let everyone know this is what it's about, but you won't 5 see that. It's used for purposes where there's 6 7 danger. If someone's safety is in jeopardy, that's 8 what we using Digidog for. Thank you. 9 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: That'll wrap up my Digidog questions. Let me move on 10 11 to--CHIEF MADDREY: [interposing] I should 12 13 have brought him here. 14 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: I want to say no, 15 but I'm tempted to be like yes, you should have. 16 What is -- so I want to just switch gears outside of 17 the Post Act? Really curious about policing software 18 and predictive policing software. Do you know, does 19 NYPD use any predictive policing software? 20 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: No. The PD 21 does not have a mechanism for predicating future crime. 2.2 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: 2.3 So no databases? DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We certainly 24

analyze historical data. Humans analyze data.

committee on Public Safety with committee on Technology 100 sometimes use technology to analyze historical data, but in terms of like predicting the future, predicting future crime, we don't have that capability, no.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Well, some would argue that a database in many ways provides-- does do that.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Well, no, just for example, fi we have a crime that's been committed and we're trying to figure out if that links up with some other past crimes -- so a crime has been committed in the past. Is that part of some pattern? Where of course, of course we're going to look at historical data to see if it's a pattern. would be irresponsible not to. We're going to look--[inaudible] database, we're talking about historical, you know, crime reports, for example. You know, historical data regarding locations of crime or the ammo that was used in a particular crime, in those situations we're going to look at that historical data to try to solve crimes that have been committed, but that is very different, categorically different than some sort of predictive policing.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. I know that the members had asked about facial recognition. Is there anything that you can speak to regarding voice recognition? I read a number of examples where potentially of like cellphone equipment can be utilized to capture information from folks. I think it might even be on one of the devices that you're utilizing, but is voice recognition a feature of any of the surveillance tools that you use?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'm not sure exactly what you're referring to, but I believe the answer is no. We don't-- I'm not 100 percent sure I know what you're referring to, but again, if I understand you correctly, the answer is no.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: But, so I think plainly, are there any devices or surveillance tools that the PD has that are for like the intent of capturing voices or conversations--

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]
Oh, well, sure. I mean, we-- sorry. We, of course,
in undercover operations we'll sometimes record
conversations, right? So undercover recording
devices which have come up a number of time. We
also, as you know, we have court-authorized wire

taps, for example, and there's a rigorous legal process for that. It requires a court authorization, frankly authorization and a showing that goes beyond probable cause for court-authorized wire taps. So there are scenarios where we are recording what people say consistent with the law. I mean, obviously, there are very strict rules about when we're allowed to do that and how we can do that, and the necessary court authorizations for doing that. But I thought you were asking about sort of voice recognition. I think that's a little different, and that's what I was a little confused about.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: But I think you answered it. I think it sounds like no. I want to just kind of jump back-- jump a little bit related to--

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]

Actually, Chair, if I may just for one moment, just I want to clarify one thing. There is—because the voice recognition issue where it does come up, we are not using yet. There have been public reports about Truelio [sic], and that—so there's been public reporting about this. We're considering what if anything to do with Truelio. There is a contract.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 103 If we decide to go ahead with a Truelio pilot and using Truelio, that is a-- it easily uses AI. It's vice analytics. It's voice analytics. Part of voice analytics-- I'm not an expert on this, but as we're talking about -- voice analytics is going to include obviously the ability to recognize and distinguish between voices. But I just want to be very, very clear. We are not doing that now. And if we were to start using voice analytics, which maybe is what you're questions is getting at, we would have to do a new IUP. That would be a new surveillance technology for us, voice analytics, and we would have to do a whole new IUP which would describe what we're planning to do, and there would be a comment period for that.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. Go ahead.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much,

Chair Gutiérrez. I have one question just off of

that. Is NYPD currently using any AI to review

footage received from surveillance technology, body

cams, drones?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: No, no.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you, Chair.

My next question is related to the OIG report,

specifically this might be also for OTI, related to

social media. According to the report, PD creates

fake social media accounts to obtain information

during investigations. What are the guidelines on

how these accounts are used, and how are they

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, there are guidelines. We have—there's certainly internal policies about undercover accounts. I don't have that at the ready here. What I will say and I think it's important to emphasize, is that in the same way that we do undercover operation's traditionally, you know, out in the field so-to-speak, which involves officers in an undercover capacity, we also will have officers in an undercover capacity at times on social media out in the virtual world, so to speak.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: But those guidelines are not made public, or they're not accessible?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: No, I-- my understanding is those guidelines are not public.

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enforced?

2 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Can they be made 3 public?

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'm certainly not going to commit to that sitting here right now, and I have to emphasize, you know, you can imagine why there would be operational concerns, very significant operational concerns about providing public information about under-- how we use undercover accounts. So, I, sitting here today cannot commit to that, absolutely not.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. in the same-- in a similar OIG report, social network analysis tools use AI to search and monitor social media, and pursuant to Local Law 35, the OTI shall publish all automated decision-making systems used by agencies including artificial intelligence systems. However, social network analysis tools were not listed in OTI's report. What is the reason?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'll take that. Our social media analysis tools do not use AI. We're not using AI on social media. We do searches and we look at relationships between individuals as part of investigations, but to the extent the question is are we applying AI at our sort of social

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 106 1 media searches, my understanding is that the answer 2 3 to that is no. 4 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. Okay. We're doing so good on time, y'all. I want to just 5 ask about some more contract questions. Is every 6 7 contract with PD related to surveillance technology a 8 part of city records? 9 CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: you say a part of city records, like you mean that 10 11 it--CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing] Is 12 13 it public? CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: 14 15 any new contract that we procure is going to have to go into City Administrative Systems. Procurements 16 17 generally require public notice. Anything over 100K 18 is going to have to have a public notice both for 19 solicitation and for award, so those things would be 20 publicly available. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And is every 21 2.2 such -- can every such contract be found on Checkbook? 2.3 CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: They should, yeah. Every procurement we do when it's 24

registered will show up in Checkbook.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Are there any agreements between NYPD and other agencies to keep the existence of contracts confidential?

CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: Not to my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Do you know if you have any existing FOIL requests related to contracts or?

CHIEF CONTRACTING OFFICER MENDOZA: We certainly get a number of FOIL requests. I don't have any information about anything active.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: I'm well aware you get a lot of FOIL requests. What is the-- and I know there are plenty of advocates who will testify on this today, but what is the process for getting a response for said FOIL request? How many people in the agency are working on FOIL requests?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I'll take that. We have a whole FOIL team. I don't have the exact numbers here in front of me in terms of how large the team. We certainly can get that. We certainly can get you that information.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: But you don't know? You don't know how long it takes for a response to a FOIL requests?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Oh, sorry, it thought you meant the number of people involved. The time it can take can vary tremendously depending on the nature of the request. There are FOIL requests that are very straightforward. There are FOIL requests that are incredibly complex. Some that can be done in a short period of time, some that require frankly a very significant undertaking in terms of time and resources. It's going to vary tremendously depending on the nature of the request.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Do you know if you have outstanding FOIL requests older than a year old?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, we certainly have a backlog. We have undertaken actually recently to try to really work through that backlog, put additional resources into FOIL, getting additional individuals to work on that backlog. I don't have the data here with me, but we are working to cut into that backlog.

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2	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: But do you
3	believe that there are probably requests older than a
4	year old?
5	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: It certainly
6	is possible, yes.
7	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Older than two?
8	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I don't
9	know.
10	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Do you see where
11	I'm going with this?
12	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: There is a
13	backlog and we are working on it.
14	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Yeah.
15	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: And to your
16	point, we need to cut into that backlog. There is a
17	resource issue here in terms of
18	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing]
19	Sure.
20	DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: We have
21	gotten additional individuals assigned to work just
22	on working on this backlog. That's a project that
23	we've undertaken, and it is ongoing.
24	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And you don't

have a sense of if that means hiring more people?

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 110

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we've gotten some officers temporarily assigned to us. They're not permanently part of the legal bureau, but they've come to us for some period of time just to work on this backlog. That was we cited personal. We have problem here. We have this backlog. We need to really cut into it, reduce that back log, and the way to do that is by getting additional personnel to work on that, at least on a temporary basis, and that's what we've done.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Do you have a sense if these are existing personnel members that'll be switching gears to this project or are brand new hires?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: No, no, they're not new hires. These are restricted personnel. These are officers who for one reason or another can't right now be out in the field, and a very good way to deploy their abilities if they can't be out in the field is to have them working to get through this FOIL backlog.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. My next question is related to-- in the instance where PD is deploying new surveillance technology, is there

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 111 communication with OTI at some point during that process?

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CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: So, my conversations, again, when we look to the Office of Technology and Innovation very intentionally so, we've got subject— the citywide subject matter expertise across various verticals. So for example, my area is information privacy. My common touch—point at the agency level is the Agency Privacy Officer, and with NYPD during my tenure I had had conversations about surveillance technology periodically.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Sure, and is OTI in those scenarios giving an approval or consulting? Kind of-- what is that? What are those conversations?

mentioned earlier, Chair, the agency at large generally does not handle procurements for individual agencies. We negotiate—the agency negotiates citywide contracts. Agency—from my area of responsibility, agencies are very intentionally empowered to utilize technology, and in the context of information privacy through the lens of the

identifying information law with the individual analysis through their particular mission or purpose, recognizing each agency is the expert of its own field, my office is available to provide feedback, guidance, perspective as necessary to any agency privacy officer.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: and in those scenarios where you are providing feedback, if PD is requesting funding for said technology, does that go to OTI for some level of approval?

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: For funding my understanding is no, but again, that's not my area.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Funding the specific technology, equipment or program.

CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK:

Correct. So my understanding of that is no. Again,
the agency generally does not handle individual
procurement for agencies, and I'm unaware of any
procurements for the Police Department as it relates
to surveillance technology.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: That sounds right to you all? That checks out as well?

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 113

2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Yes

3 absolutely.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay, thank you.

And-- okay, well then that changes my next few
questions. Okay, I guess my last question is related
to social media monitoring. What tools does the PD
use for social media monitoring? How much can you
share?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, we certainly in the course of criminal investigations will run searches across publicly-available social media. It's very important to emphasize, publicly available. And in the course of a criminal investigation, in the same way that we try to get information, you know, out on the street, so to speak, we can all try to do that on social media by running searches across publicly available information. And then in particular, in the same way you would in a sort of traditional investigation, identifying connection between people that are publicly available. So we certainly do that in the course of criminal investigations.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And does OTI provide any guidance for utilizing these websites,

committee on public safety with committee on technology 114
these publicly available platforms, or you can-you're utilizing these tools independently, not-- you
don't-- you're not checking in with OTI?

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thank you for that clarifying question, Chair, and I think it's a really important one. As I mentioned, when we look at that individual analysis on the agency level about evaluating collections or disclosures of identifying information, empowering the role of the agency privacy officer. We also as a matter of citywide privacy policy enumerate a number of privacy principles to help support agency decision-making as it relates to identifying information citywide with the guidance that agencies consider them in all decision-making as it relates to identifying, but recognizing that each individual agency is going to have a unique analysis as it relates to own mission and purpose.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And that's a good-- that's great. That's a sufficient answer. Is there-- just separate from this conversation with PD, does OTI provide guidance on this kind of technology, particularly with accounting for bias, like for example.

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CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: thank you for that question as well, Chair. I think it highlights an important point. Certainly, when you're discussing bias you're likely going to encounter that decision in the world of leveraging artificial intelligence, for example. And as I think the Council is aware, OTI and the City announced its artificial intelligence action plan just about a couple months ago now I think, which I think is quite a robust undertaking in terms of very specific action items to develop a governance structure on a citywide level as it relates to the utilization of this new technology. that work-- and I think also quite boldy calls for the majority of the called upon action items to either be completed or initiated within one year form publication, including multiple touchpoints with stakeholders throughout that process, by virtue of setting up advisory committee's public engagement, and inclusive consideration of the very important issue of bias.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. What mechanisms are in place to protect the privacy of individuals who may be inadvertently captured by NYPD surveillance technologies?

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 116

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DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I think it's going to depend on the nature of the surveillance technology. I think it's something we are very sensitive to, of course, but it's hard to answer that at a global way.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Yeah.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Really, obviously that tissue comes up in various surveillance technologies. You know, in some context when you're getting a warrant for something, for example, they're going to-- the warrant itself and the court order may put in place a variety of restrictions of limitation on what we even can do because of those concerns. In the court-authorized wire-tapping context, for example, there are very strict rules about minimization on court-authorized wire taps because of the issues that you're identifying in terms of, you know, innocent third parties. But the answer to that really does depend on the nature of the particular surveillance technology, and the, you know, particular issues that might arise.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Is there a process for retaining or deleting any of that data

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 117
that— for those innocent individuals that's
collected through surveillance technology?

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it's going to just depend on the particular surveillance technology. to go back to the courtauthorized wire taps, just as an example, in the nature of a court-authorized wiretap, you're almost certainly going to end up sometimes with interceptions of individuals who are, you know, innocent civilians and there are very strict rules imposed by statute as to minimization, to make sure that you're not listening to more of those conversations. You know, to the extend you're intercepting those conversations, they're walled off. So, you know, there are going to be rules and procedures in place, but it will vary by the nature of the surveillance technology.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: In those instances are people made aware that they're being-that their like face or voice are being captured in surveillance technology?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: so, again, as using the court-authorized wiretap example, the statute actually provides the basically-- at the

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 118 1 conclusion of a court-authorized wiretap, individuals 2 3 who are intercepted on the wiretap need to be notified. 4 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: So, that's 6 7 an example where, you know, exactly, those individuals are told there's a whole sort of 8 9 statutory regime for that. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: and does OTI play 10 11 a role in overseeing that, that they have to be told or any of that? Or what-- does OTI play any kind of 12 role in that? 13 CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: 14 15 advising in the context of criminal investigations, 16 no. 17 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: For-- no, no. Ιn 18 the example of having to notify people, innocent 19 folks, that they're being captured to some capacity 20 in surveillance equipment or technology? CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER FITZPATRICK: 21 my understanding is no. The circumstances in which 2.2 2.3 individual notification manifests in the context of

my area of responsibility is when there has been an

unauthorized disclosure of identifying information by

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committee on Public safety with committee on technology 119 a city agency. We provide guidance to agency privacy officers when and under which circumstances ought to be and should be notified of those occurrences depending on the data elements at issue.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. I
think-- are we waiting for [inaudible]? OH, she's
coming back. Okay, sorry. I'm trying to just milk
every minute that you guys are here. Can I just jump
to the DAS system, the Domain Awareness System, just
a couple question? Yeah? How do NYPD personnel
receive authorization to access that system, and do
they receive training on the use of it?

CHIEF MADDREY: All of our members have access to the DAS--

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing] Is your mic on? I'm sorry.

CHIEF MADDREY: I did turn it off, I'm sorry, forgive me. All of our members have access to the DAS, Awareness System. They may not know how to work every individual search engine, but a lot of the basic work are complaint reports or accident reports, [inaudible] reports all link to the DAS system. All our officer have access to the DAS.

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 120

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And do they receive training on it?

CHIEF MADDREY: They receive training on how to do complaint reports, how to do accident reports, and then when we develop new search engines or new protocols, depending on what it is, officers will get trained on it.

emphasize that the Domain Awareness System, DAS, it's bringing together information from other sources, right? Just so there's no confusion. It's not like DAS itself, the Domain Awareness System, is somehow conducting surveillance. It's other surveillance technologies feed into the DAS system—to DAS so that a police officer who's trying to investigate something, it's oen place they can go to and bring together multiple sources of information.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And do you-- is there a way that the agency audits personnel use of this system? Is there any-- are there scenarios where members are using DAS for personal purposes?

I'm trying to get to the issue of misuse of the system.

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 121

2 CHIEF MADDREY: There's a footprint.

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When you use DAS, you leave a footprint. So if I sign into something right now it says, Jeff Maddrey--

5 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing] It 6 logs in.

CHIEF MADDREY: signed in, right. So, if we become aware of some misuse or some misconduct, an internal investigation-- our Internal Affairs do have the ability to go back and see who looked at what or who used what.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: and how does the PD address that? How do you address that?

CHIEF MADDREY: We have strict policies about computer misuse, using computers for personal or business. We have strict policies for that.

Officers who are found to violate that policy, it's strict punishment.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. And while the 2021 Impact and Use Policy states that the DAS itself does not use video analytics, biometric measurements technologies, or facial recognition technologies, can data produced by the DAS be utilized by other tools that do use those technologies? Are there screen grabs? Are there

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 122 still images? Are there any way that information on the DAs can be used for any of those technologies?

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I totally understand the question. I think it's almost the other way around. In other words, we have information we gain from other surveillance technologies that feeds into DAS, and DAS is sort of a repository and a means of bringing together those different sources of information. I'm not sure that answers your question.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: I guess I was asking if the reverse is possible?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Right, but DAS itself is not a mechanism for surveilling anybody. It's taking it from other sources and bringing it together.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And so DAS does not have any capability to share video images?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: Well, no,
just to be clear, if you're watching a video or you
see a photo whether it's on DAS or otherwise, someone
capable of, you know, screen grab or capturing that
in some way, yes, and if that's being done, you know,
in an inappropriate way, it being misused in some

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 123 way, as the Chief said, that person is subject to disciplinary action.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And do you-similarly, Chief, to how you're able to see who
logged in and how they're accessing it, are you able
to tell when information on the system is being
screen grabbed?

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: The technology exists. I just want to let you know, Snapchat figured that out a long time ago.

and I don't know if I can answer that for certain.

We may not be aware if they grab just the image, but we will be aware that they pulled the image up. So we'll know that hey, if there's an image that's compromised, we will know who pulled that image up.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. Thank you.

I have a-- I'm just going to ask [inaudible]

question, and then I'm done. So I just want to-- I

know that Council Member Cabán asked the question.

We didn't get to hear the answer. So I'll just--

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 124
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                DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: [interposing]
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     Yeah.
                CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Do you remember
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     the question?
                DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER: I do. I do.
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                CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay, okay.
     [inaudible] have that on the record.
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                DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GERBER:
     absolutely. I said that I did not accept the premise
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     of her question, but I also wanted to add that we
     follow the law, we follow state law, city law. To
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    the extent she was suggesting that are we taking
     steps to evade requirements under the law, the answer
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     is no.
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                CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ:
                                         Thank you.
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     Chair?
                CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much.
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    My questions -- do I have any other Council Members
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    who have questions before the release the NYPD at
     3:30 on the dot? Good stuff. Thank you so much for
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    your testimony and your answering the questions, and
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    now we will have DOI coming up.
                CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you.
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Looking forward to the follow-up.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 125

2 CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you.

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Would you like me to start? Okay. You have not sworn me in. I'm just letting you know that--

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: [interposing] I told them you were honest.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: In case you would Thank you, Chair Brewer. I appreciate the confidence. Good afternoon. My name is Jocelyn Strauber. I'm the Commissioner of the Department of Investigation. Thank you, Chair Gutiérrez, members of the Committee on Technology and Chair Hanks, members of the Committee on Public Safety for the opportunity to speak about DOI's oversight role with respect to the NYPD's use of surveillance technology as set out in the public oversight of surveillance technology legislation which I'll refer to as the POST Act. As you know, DOI oversees the operations, policies, programs and practices of the New York City Police Department through our Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD. The POST Act requires NYPD to produce and publish Impact and Use Policies, IUPs for short, for each surveillance technology used by the NYPD and directs OIG-NYPD to prepare an annual audit

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 126 of the Department's compliance with these IUPs. Today, I will give you a summary of DOI's findings from our first annual report pertaining to the POST Act, speak briefly about the focus of our second report which is currently in draft, and also share our view of the three proposed bills under consideration today with respect to the NYPD's use of surveillance technology. Before I begin, I want to recognize Inspector General Jeanene Barrett, who I appointed to that permanent position in August. She unfortunately could not be here today as planned, but I am very proud to be working with her. She has led the OIG-NYPD since January 2022, initially as the Acting Inspector General and brings critical experience to this role in relevant areas including police oversight and accountability, community engagement, and supporting underserved communities. Now, let me turn to our November 2022 report, our assessment of the NYPD's response to the POST Act. In November 2022, we issued our first report pursuant to the POST Act. The report was the result of an indepth examination in which OIG-NYPD interviewed a range of individuals including NYPD officials, members of the advocacy community who called for the

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 127 legislation that ultimately became the POST Act, and experts on various surveillance technologies. this first report, the OIG-NYPD reviewed all published IUPs and performed a section-by-section assessment of one IUP, and an in-depth assessment of two selected surveillance technologies, and compared the POST Act to similar statutes in other jurisdictions to better understand other models for achieving transparency and public engagement in this area. While the OIG-NYPD investigative team found that NYPD largely complied with the technical POST ACT requirements, it also found that the IUPs did not contain sufficient detail to allow for a full assessment of NYPD's compliance with those IUPs, as the statute requires. OIG-NYPD concluded that improvements to the IUPs would enable more robust oversight, as well as more transparency with respect to the nature and use of these technologies. Specifically, the IUPs contained certain overly general language that failed to provide sufficiently specific information about the nature of the technologies, the retention period for data obtained via use of the technologies, and the entities with which the data can be shared. Per our assessment,

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 128 the broad and non-specific language within the IUPs failed to provide clear direction to NYPD and sufficiently concrete information to the public in these and other areas. Additionally, OIG-NYPD interprets the POST Act to require an IUP for each unique surveillance technology and disagrees with NYPD's view that grouping of technologies is permitted as a general matter. While grouping may be appropriate for devices that use identical or very similar technologies, OIG-NYPD is concerned that grouping of related surveillance technologies into single IUPs is inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter of the POST Act. Grouping may mask certain unique technological capabilities because they may not be publicly disclosed at all, as they will be deemed "covered" by an existing IUP. Furthermore, because there will be no new IUP applicable to those new technological capabilities, there will be no opportunity for public comment on those policies. It is also difficult for OIG-NYPD to meaningfully assess NYPD's compliance with the IUP when the IUP applies to various technologies that could have different functions or capabilities. Based on its review, OIG-NYPD issued 15 policy and

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 129 procedure recommendations to NYPD in November of I want to be clear that many of these recommendations went beyond the requirements that the POST Act imposes, and that we made these recommendations to enhance public transparency with respect to NYPD's use of surveillance technology. Equally important, the recommendations are intended to be sensitive to the need to protect confidential law enforcement information. For the most part, as the report made clear, and with the exception of NYPD's practice with respect to grouping, we did not find that NYPD had violated the POST Act. recommendations advised the NYPD to issue an IUP for each individual surveillance technology, to ensure that each IUP contains specific information such as the names of the entities with which the NYPD can share surveillance data as well as specific safeguards or restrictions on the use or dissemination of the surveillance data, and to describe the potential disparate impacts on protected groups of the use and deployment of the surveillance technology. OIG-NYPD also requested an itemized list of all surveillance technologies used by NYPD, in order to determine whether grouping of multiple

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 130 devices or technologies under a single IUP was appropriate. NYPD previously rejected OIG-NYPD's recommendation to provide an itemized list of the surveillance technologies that it uses, but the NYPD has since agreed to provide this itemized list. look forward to receiving that list so that we can further consider the question whether any technologies currently grouped within a single IUP in fact require distinct IUPs. The OIG-NYPD recommended that NYPD convene a working group that included NYPD personnel, relevant City Council members, and representatives from select advocacy groups with expertise in surveillance technologies to make recommendations to NYPD on any necessary updates to existing IUPs, for example recommending updates to IUPs to reflect disparate impact of technologies. Other recommendations included strengthening internal tracking of each instance when NYPD provides an external agency with data collected via its surveillance technologies and other transparency measures. With the exception of our recommendation that DOI receive an itemized list of technologies, NYPD has rejected all of our POST Act report recommendations. Let me just speak for a moment to

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 131 our ongoing roles in the auditing process. understand the relevant and important concerns about the use of surveillance technology in New York City and we are committed to providing oversight in this important area. I want to be clear that an annual comprehensive inquiry into the NYPD's compliance with each of its three dozen IUPs, for more than 80 surveillance technologies, is not a feasible undertaking for DOI. For that reason, both in last year's annual report and in the one we plan to issue in the first quarter of 2024, which will cover this calendar year, we are focused on particular surveillance technologies of public interest and concern, as well as broader issues with respect to the POST Act's requirements and NYPD's compliance more generally. In our upcoming report to be issued in the first quarter of next year, we will discuss NYPD's compliance with the POST Act with respect to a group of technologies of particular public interest, including Digidog and the Autonomous Robot, which I believe is referred to as K5. We have reviewed Introductions 1193, 1195, and 1207, which are being considered at today's hearing, and we are broadly supportive of the three bills as they generally track

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committee on public safety with committee on technology 132 several of our recommendations from the 2022 report. We look forward to working with the Council on these bills if they move forward to a vote. Thank you for your time, and I'm happy to take any questions that you have.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you so much.

That was great. I appreciate that. We talk about your testimony in particular, you said that for that reason, both in last year's annual report and we plan to issue the first report of the first quarter of 2024. You're focused on particular surveillance technologies of public interest and concerns as well as broader issues with respect to the POST Act requirements of NYPD's compliance more generally.

And then you went on to say those particular public interests are Digidog and the autonomous robot. Am I correct in saying that those are the two that you're going to focus on in particular?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: We are going to focus on those. There are several others that we will be considering as well.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: And why-- out of all of them, why is it a particular interest to look at Digidog and the autonomous robot?

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Well, I think as today's hearing and your questions show, there is some public concern about how these technologies are going to be used and deployed. There has been an announcement, you know, that referenced here today, but this is sort of the beginning of a wave of more technology of this nature. And while fully recognizing the importance of the use of these technologies for public safety, I think there's a public interest and better understanding how they work and the rules and regulations that apply to them through the Police Department's implementation, and that's why we've chosen to focus on those.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Thank you. Do you believe that NYPD's grouping of the related technologies into a single IUP can be used to obscure the Department's specific use of technology, and what applicable policies apply to what technology?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: So, I think it can be. Grouping, I think, can obscure not only the particular— it can obscure first of all what are the technologies being used, right? Because if there is no impact and use policy which also describes the general purpose of the technology and how it's used,

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 134 if there are technologies that are grouped and therefore not specifically referred to in the policy applicable to a particular area, let's say, then I think it can obscure the types of technologies that are using-- that are being used by the P-D. I think this is a fact-specific inquiry, however. There may well be types of technologies that are sufficiently similar such that the kind of detail that an IUP calls for is not required for each individual device, for example, as which was the language that was used in the Police Department's testimony. It's entirely possible that describing general types of technology works much of the time. What we want to do and what our recommendation and specifically our request for that itemized list is designed to affect, we would like to know what all of the technologies are, that in theory fall within let's say one or two IUPs, if there are multiple technologies. And we want to be able to then consider ourselves how are these used, and does the IUP fully describe and encompass the capabilities and functionalities, the rules that apply to these technologies.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: I appreciate that.

And I'm following you, and so do you think that

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committee on Public Safety with committee on Technology 135 there's a space in which they don't think that the grouping needs to be done, or the grouping that they're doing is sufficient because they're not looking for what we would be looking for or the public would be looking for?

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might be. I think the inquiry that we're doing in the upcoming report will touch on this issue, because we heard today and my understanding is that Digidog, for example, is included in the IUP for situational awareness cameras. And so we will undertake as we look at this issue an inquiry as to whether that is sufficient to describe to the public the capabilities of that technology, and I don't want to get ahead of myself because we don't have a final report yet, but I expect those are the type of questions that we will consider in the report that will come out next year.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Is there ever a time which NYPD would say, you know, we don't want to do this because of sensitive information and a space where DOI would want that information for a different reason? Does that make sense?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Well, I think in terms of the information we receive, we've developed

a very productive relationship with the Police

Department and I expect we will get all of the information that we're asking for to prepare this report. I could envision situations where there's concern about certain types of disclosure of information or where the Police Department— and we heard some of this today, doesn't want to go into detail about certain devices, because there might be a risk that that compromises a law enforcement operation or interest. I could see that, and if that comes up we would have a conversation about that.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: And as you said in your testimony, that the bills that have been proposed today would speak to that or would at least give us as legislators and governmental people who have the ability for oversight, you think that those bills would give us what we needed to kind of find that middle ground?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Well, I think the bill's track certain of our recommendations with regard to providing more information to the public, and with regard to how the IUPs are designed. I think at another time we could get into more of a discussion about sort of the nitty gritty of the

committee on Public Safety with committee on Technology 137 language of the proposed legislation, because we might have some proposals there, but generally I think they track our recommendations and they accomplish some of the things that we sought to accomplish in our report.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: And they meaning the-my colleague--

 $\label{thm:commissioner} \mbox{COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: [interposing] the legislation.}$

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: My colleague's, okay, that's great.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: that's great news. Is there a place in which with the regards to the bills that were heard today or that were mentioned today, do you think that there's something that needs to be added to what we could be doing to help in that transparency and that accountability? And we can talk about that offline. It could be a yes or no. I don't want to--

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: [interposing] No, I mean, at the moment, I don't think so. I mean, I think the legislation has captured some of what I

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 138 think are the most important suggestions and recommendations that we made.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: What actions can the NYPD make to enhance the public awareness and transparency regarding the deployment of new surveillance technologies and associated public comment periods?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Well, certainly I think to the extent that they are deploying a new, a distinct surveillance technology, issuing an IUP for that technology provides the maximum sort of public-the opportunity for public input because there is a draft policy issued. As we heard today there's a notice and comment period. The Department then considers that comment and then issues the final I think for circumstances where there's an report. upgrade, it's important that there be an addendum, and I think we've heard about, you know, the Department's view on that, and that they would provide that in a situation where the technology is upgraded. I think these are the best ways under the current framework for the public to understand the technology, and I think the more information that is provided publicly within the limits of protecting

committee on Public Safety with committee on Technology 139 what might otherwise-- areas where disclosure might compromise law enforcement is the best way for the public to get some comfort about the nature of the technologies and how they're being used.

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CHAIRPERSON HANKS: I very much appreciate your testimony, and you know, the briefing on your-- on the report, and so thank you so much.

And I'll pass it along to my colleague Chair Gutiérrez.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Commissioner, so much for staying this entire time and for your thoughtfulness in your testimony and certainly in your agency's reporting. I also hope that you take back before the release of your report and certainly all the ones thereafter. I think it is, yes, about the use of devices such as Digidog and K5, but I think for advocates and for New Yorkers and definitely for folks in my community, it's when we're seeing the rollout of these technologies at the cost of making what seems like is proportionate cuts to other social services, agencies, and so yes, I think there is mixed reviews on like the purpose of Digidog, and honestly what the Chief said here today, to me it sounded like fine, it

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 140 could go upstairs and there were examples where it works, but I think where you hear a lot of the contention is around where releasing all of this equipment and we're saying it's to keep New Yorkers safe, but we're also making cuts to after school programs and to housing programs. So I know that your acute focus as he Commissioner for DOI is -- if this is like of ours specific to the POST Act, but there's a lot more context here, it's still why you hear opposition from advocates. It is about surveillance and it's about transparency, but it's also the agency's ability to kind of roll out what they deem are priories with very little checks and balances, with very little consultation you heard here with OTI that ty need to do it and they're not going to do And what I appreciated from your testimony and from the report is they didn't-- but outside of its one piece they did not violate the POST Act, but as the City's' premier safety agency, they should be doing a lot more for the purpose of transparency. They should be doing a lot more for the purpose of invoking trust with New Yorkers. So, if any of that is also considered, we would love that. In your testimony, Commissioner, you mentioned that PD has

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 141 1 finally agreed to provide an itemized list of 2 3 surveillance technologies. They have not. What has the wait time been like since? 4 COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Well, we did make this recommendation in our original report. 6 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: 7 In 22. 8 COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Which was issued 9 in November of 2022. We have not yet received the list, but I understand that we will receive it. I 10 11 don't have a specific time frame. 12 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Gotcha [sic], 13 gotcha, okay. Are there any other key findings from 14 that report which NYPD in your opinion did not, you 15 know, meet the standards of the POST Act, the spirit? 16 I think you said this in your testimony, you 17 appreciated is you know, the POST Act is a very 18 explicit piece of language, but there is a lot more 19 behind that spirit. Are there any other things that 20 you would like to highlight form that report that 21 they didn't do out of the how many recommendations that you made that--2.2 2.3 COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: [interposing] We

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Gotcha.

had 25 recommendations, so.

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 142

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: You know,

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actually, there isn't' anything that goes beyond sort

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of what I already said in my testimony. I mean, I

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think the focus here and the value, one of the key

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values that our reports serve is to bring some of

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this information to the public and make clear where $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right)$

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there is more information, more transparency that the

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Police Department can provide.

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O CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. And have

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there been any -- have there been any identified

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changes in how the PD is publishing or updating their

the extent that with respect to the IUPs that we're

changes of that nature, we will note those. There's

nothing I can point to right now that I can identify

as a change in practices, but we will be thinking

about that, you know, as we prepare the upcoming

examining for the upcoming report, if there are

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: So, I think to

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And does OIG-NYPD have access to all contract agreements and terms or conditions with vendors of surveillance technologies?

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: so, one of the things that we requested in our report was that we have those terms and conditions. I do not think we have those at the moment. Now, that doesn't mean that if we make a specific request for those things, in the context of, for example, the upcoming inquiry. I'm not saying we've asked for it and we're not getting it, but as a general matter our proposal was that we receive all of those contracts so that we can review them and see what sort of retention, requirements, and protections those vendors build into their systems, and we do not have those yet.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Nor have they agreed to provide them.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: I don't think
they've agreed to provide those. But we are-- we do
remain as part of our process with the Police

Department, we are in a very consistent regular
dialogue with them about all of our outstanding
recommendations, and I'm optimistic now that we're
getting the itemized list that perhaps there'll be an
opportunity to get some more of this information.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Great. My last couple questions, Commissioner, are related to the

committee on Public Safety with committee on Technology 144 public process of amendments to IUPs. I know you said, I know the Chief said, like these public— this public engagement process or public comment process exists and considerations are made. Is DOI present for these, like, public engage—

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 $\label{thm:commissioner} \mbox{COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: [interposing] We} \\ \mbox{are not part of that process.}$

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay.

commissioner strauber: My understanding is there's public comment, public-- to the extent the public has input. There are members, I believe, of the legal department at the NYPD to consider that input and then work on the policies accordingly, but we have not been part of that process.

interested in the realities of how like how much of the public comment they're integrating into their IUPs. I believe that— the advocates that are— that have been in support of the POST Act since it was first introduced years ago, obviously I think their—this is on their google alerts. They're following this. They're showing up. But you know, the sake of having, you know, saying that there's a public comment period for the sake of it and having none of

it be realized in the IUP, for example, and I'm not saying that that's happening. I'm just curios if you have an understanding of how much of that comment—of the public's comment is integrated into their amendments of IUPs.

Some reference of this in our 2022 report because we looked at the volume of comments, and there were actually a couple of changes that were made that relate— that it did relate to the comments that came in, but I'm not in the position to sort of give you real sense of, you know, that the extent of the changes that are made based on the public comments sitting here today. I just don't know.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. Thank you,

Commissioner. Do we have any questions from members?

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Yes, we do. Council

Member Holden?

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Thank you,

Chairs. Thank you, Commissioner, again for staying.

And just a couple of questions on-- well, NYPD was

really against Intro 1207. They said it was vague.

Do you consider-- did you find anything vague in

1207?

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Well, I think perhaps the language -- if we were working with you on the language, there's a reference to the fact that even if there's overlap with capabilities and functionalities of other technologies, there still needs to be a distinct IUP. And I think we could in future discussion maybe have some ideas about that language so that it's clear -- if this is the Council's view I think this is our view, that if there are substantial overlap with the functionality of another technology, then it's not our position that there needs to be a separate IUP. It's where you're really talking about something distinct, and I think this is a line drawing exercise, but working on language that sort of captures that perhaps a little bit better is something that we'd be happy to

talking about the Digidog, let's say that your concerns would be if they added something else to it, some other-- that they don't have now. I don't know what exactly they have on the dog. You know, for instance, tear gas, if they added that, if they added something else, that would be a concern, or would it?

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 147

Because I did buy the idea that because the dog can

climb up the stairs— you know, R2D2 couldn't, right?

I mean, there's technology that we need sometimes

because there are obviously stairs to climb, and

that's a valuable robot actually to do that. So what

else would be concerning to the dog, really? It has

no weapons on it. It maybe has cameras, obviously,

but what else would be—— like, let's say for

instance, in your studies?

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Right, so I can't get too far ahead of myself here, because we're literally in the process of working on a report on this, but I just want to be clear that I don't think the-- I think I share your view that to the extent technology serves a valuable law enforcement purpose, it's a good thing, and I'm not concerned about the technology itself. I think what we're saying is, if the Digidog is captured and described in the situational awareness camera IUP, does that document really tell the public enough about Digidog, or are there features of Digidog that are kind of not made clear to the public because Digidog is included in an IUP that's really focused on situational awareness cameras. And Digidog might be a camera, but it might

committee on public safety with committee on technology 148

be more than that. And what we'd be looking to say

is, if there's more than that, is that sufficiently

disclosed.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Right, but again,

it's what you just mentioned, is that if we give too

much information on the dog, then the bad guys would

it's what you just mentioned, is that if we give too much information on the dog, then the bad guys would know how to maybe defeat it, or what it could do, or throw a blanket over it. You know, there's a number of things that I think we don't want to give away.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: I think there's a balance there, absolutely.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Yeah, and that's the key here, because— and that's why you're important and drafting new— you know, obviously, the POST Act, they actually— you said yourself they were within the POST Act, right?

 $\label{eq:commissioner} \mbox{COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: That's what we} \\ \mbox{found for the most part.}$

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: for the-- okay, for the most part. But your recommendations where they weren't, they rejected that?

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: They did, yes.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Okay.

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 149

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Although we've had some progress now on receiving this list of technologies which was one of our recommendations, and we're going to continue to have a dialogue with them and hope that we can make some more progress.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLDEN: Great. Thank you, Commissioner. Thanks so much.

CHAIRPERSON HANKS: Council Member Brewer?

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Thank you very much. I am-- I know you mentioned this dog and the robots, but are you not also looking-- because I have to say I'm more interested in the facial recognition, drones, and other kinds of surveillance. Are they also part of your discussion?

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: And you got answers on that? I mean your recommendations.

actually, I was just looking back at the report. We don't-- our recommendations are not specific to facial recognition, but we did-- but actually, that's not correct. We did make recommendations as to facial recognition, and some of those have been taken

up in the proposed legislation here, and we're appreciative of that. So, we recommended that there be an auditing process and that there be a published policy and procedure relating to how the conduct of facial recognition work is done. So we did address that in 2022. That's not something we're currently planning to address in the upcoming report. In some future report, of course, we could take a look at it. We're also, as far as I know, not specifically focused on drones. Again, that is something that we could look at in the future.

what you're saying on the facial recognition is that the recommendations were not necessarily abided by, but the legislation that's proposed-- but the Police Department should have done it, not the City Council. That's why I'm confused.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Well, we made recommendations to the Police Department. It was certainly within their power to do those things even if they--

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: [interposing] Yeah, that's what I'm saying.

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 151

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: were not required by the POST Act. For the recommendations, obviously, we're always grateful when the City Council agrees with some of the recommendations we've made and considers, you know, making those part of legislation. That's what's happened here with the facial recognition recommendations.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: Okay. And are there other technologies popping up that you're aware of-- obviously, we didn't know about the dogs until recently-- that should be considered in the future?

Do you have any suggestions about that, or?

certainly say, although I don't have the complete list of them here right now, that in addition to the robot and the dog, we are looking at a couple others at the moment, and those will either be in a report in the first quarter or a subsequent report. So we are certainly alert and watching for these things as they're announced.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: [inaudible] even things like cameras, because one could track from somebody from New York to Florida with cameras easily, according to NYPD. Is that something that

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 152 comes up under POST Act, or that's not covered because it's not--

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: [interposing]
Well, if you're referring— there's a technology
called License Plate Readers or LPRS, and I think
that's probably what you're referring to when you say
like to the extent that numerous states have that
kind of technology—

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: [interposing] Yes.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: you can track someone who's driving from point A to point B. We did look at LPRs in connection with our initial report, and we had some recommendations relating to being more specific about how long that data is retained and that kind of thing. So we have looked at those.

access to all contract agreements and terms with vendors or surveillance technology? Is that something that is both part of your request and answered? A big focus on contracts.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: We have not received all of the contracts for all the technologies. That was one of our recommendations,

and we have not received those. We're going to sort of restart that dialogue now that we're getting the itemized list of technologies. I think it would make sense for us to have the vendor contracts that go along with them, to the extent that they are sourced from the outside, which many of these technologies are, to the point that you were making earlier.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: So, in your first report, and I should know this, did you ask for that or only now are you asking for these contracts?

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: No, we asked for that. That was one of the recommendations in our first report.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: And you did not get it.

COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: WE did not get it.

COUNCIL MEMBER BREWER: That's a problem.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay, and with that, thank you so much, Commissioner. We are excited for the release of the next report. We'll do this all over again next year, hopefully. And I also just want to thank OTI. Stacey [sp?] thank you so much for staying. And this concludes, right, the

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 154 agency portion and I think we can go straight ahead to the public testimony. No breaks. Power through everyone.

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COMMISSIONER STRAUBER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you,

Commissioner.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL: Public testimony
we're going to start with Michael Sisitzky from New
York Civil Liberties Union, Jerome Greco from Legal
Aid Society, and Nina Loshkajian from STOP. We're
going to make three minutes available for individuals
to testify, and you're free to submit written
testimony as well. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: You can begin when you're ready.

MICHAEL SISITZKY: Good afternoon. Thank you, Chair. My name is Michael Sisitzky, Assistant Policy Director with the New York Civil Liberties Union. So we'll be submitting full written comments for the record. I'll focus my comments today on a few things that we observed with the overall compliance or lack thereof with the POST Act and the NYPD's policies, and also address some points that come up from the discussion earlier and hopefully

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 155 clarify some issues for the Council. So I just wanted to start with the big picture. the POST Act was a first step towards getting a better understanding of the NYPD's approach to surveilling New Yorkers, and it was really not that much of an This was basic transparency. This was a really ask. clear and simple assignment. And it's an assignment the NYPD failed. When we reviewed the NYPD's POST Act policies when they were first published, the drafts, in 2021, you know, we observed so many issues in terms of the Department's attempt to evade those minimal transparency mandates in the Act. included inaccuracies and misleading statements, omissions that occurred throughout these policies. So I want to touch on a few things. Yeah, there were some conversation earlier around whether the Department using artificial intelligence or machine In the first draft of the NYPD's policies learning. pretty much across the board, there was a statement that the department does not use artificial intelligence or machine learning in those policies. When it was pointed out to the NYPD in our comments and comments from many of our partners that in fact facial recognition is reliant on those very

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 156 processes, that shot spotter which the NYPD operates has an entire section devoted to the technology's artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities on their website, the NYPD simply just removed any references to artificial intelligence and machine learning from their policies going forward, basically saying, well, there's not an accepted industry-wide definition, so we're just not going to even acknowledge these capabilities at all. were major issues in terms of the Department's approach to considering the potential disparate impact from these policies which was the crucial reason that communities were pushing for the POST Act in the first place, to understand how these polices were actually impacting communities. the Department basically used the same boiler plate, copy and paste language, saying that there were no disparities in any of their uses of the technologies, and claimed that in their interpretation they were only required to consider whether the policies themselves and not the underlying technology was actually capable of producing disparities. But to the extent that these policies were supposed to contain the rules and procedures for how these technologies are used in

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 157 practice, it's very clear that the council's intent all along was to consider the ways these technologies could be weaponized against communities of color. And you know, the copy and paste language that went into this, there was talk earlier about how it could be confusing if the Department were to do a less boiler plate approach and not repeat the same kind of clauses over and over again. it's really the case that, you know, the -- it's actually more confusing for the public to understand what these technologies are and how they operate and what their impact is, and to the extent that the Department was claiming that this is providing more clarity and more information for the public in their initial draft which, you know, they corrected. Their disparate impact policies on unmanned aerial systems actually included a reference to a different technology, because they had been simply copying and pasting. So this is a law-- I know my time's expired, so I'll wrap up. This is a law that the NYPD has never had any real intention of implementing and complying with, which is why it's really incumbent on the council to take further action. We support the recommendations from the Office of the Inspector

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 158 General and that are contained within the bills before the Council and it's really critical that the Council actually legislate on this. We know the NYPD has a long track record of rejecting OIG recommendations. We don't anticipate that without Council action they will improve their practices, and I want to just emphasize that his is also a point where-- you know, again, the POST Act was the first step towards transparency, but it was also a first step towards further regulations and restrictions on NYPD activities. The transparency is an important goal but it is not the goal in and of itself. need to be using these reports, this information to better regulate and restrict and ban certain practices by the NYPD, including imposing bans on things like facial recognition and getting a better handle on exactly how New Yorkers are policed and surveilled. Thank you.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: thank you.

NINA LOSHKAJIAN: Thank you. Good afternoon Chair Gutiérrez, and thank you for organizing this important hearing. I'm a staff attorney at the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, and we are here to support Intros 1207 and

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 159 1193 and to continue to work with your office hopefully to amend them into the strongest versions possible. The POST Act was an essential first step, as Michael noted, in gaining greater transparency over NYPD's use of repressive surveillance against black and brown New Yorkers. While it was just a first step, it was still a landmark bill, because it re-asserted the Council's indispensable role in overseeing NYPD operations. The Council must now again reassert its authority to ensure that the bill it fought so long to implement is not totally ignored. Three years since its passage, it is clear the Department has blatantly disregarded the law's requirements. Its IUPs consist largely of boiler plate language not specific to each individual technology. And I just want to pick up on something that Michael noted, the Department today described having to do additional IUPs as something that would be-- or cause repetition and confusion. What is repetitive and confusing is their current approach to IUPs. That's not the reality of what would change by requiring additional IUPs. And this failure to comply has detrimental consequences. Because of NYPD's secrecy, we don't know what private contractors get

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 160 access to our info. We don't know how much disparate harm to vulnerable communities the NYPD is acceptable in its surveillance tools, and that's incredibly disturbing especially given the example Council Member Stevens cited today of the gang database being 99 percent black and Latinx. We support the language that was taken directly from the OIG's straightforward recommendations in their Department-in their report, sorry. These recommendations reflected clearly how the Department can and should change its practice to adhere to the law. NYPD's surveillance arsenal is expanding rapidly in violation of the POST Act. Mayor Adams is constantly rolling out new spyware that costs the City millions of dollars, and as you highlighted, at the same time cutting back funding from crucial services. To truly protect New Yorkers, the City Council must fully outlaw discriminatory surveillance technologies, including facial recognition, fake police social media profiles, drones, and other spyware, but while we wait for such bans, the very least New Yorkers deserve is transparency. We urge the council to listen to advocates and the OIG in taking urgent steps to ensure the NYPD follows the rule of law.

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And just one final note, is that when the original POST Act was being considered, the NYPD was so adamant that this would— the sky would fall. It would be a road map to terrorists, and in their testimony today very interestingly they said that the POST Act has not impeded its counterterrorism efforts. So it's just proof that the NYPD will continue to say the sky is falling whenever it is held to the lowest standard of accountability and that can't be reason to not hold their feet to the fire.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. That was great, yeah, absolutely.

JEROME GRECO: Thank you for having me here today. I'm Jerome Greco. I'm the Digital Forensic Supervising Attorney at the Legal Aid Society. I'm going to address two things that I think the Legal Aid Society particularly well-quipped to address. The first is related to the contracts that the NYPD has kept secret. There was a lot of testimony here today that is inconsistent with what I know for a fact to be true based on hearings and lawsuits that are still ongoing. So, the NYPD along with the DOI, the Comptroller's Office, the Mayor's

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 162 Office of Contract Services, Office of Management and Budget, and the Law Department had an agreement for 13 years that allowed them to keep secret a lot of these contracts. I'm talking about thousands of pages of contract. After the Post Act passed, the Comptroller's Office at the time withdrew from that agreement, but it is my understanding that the other agencies are still part of it in order to keep secret these-- all these different surveillance contracts. We're able to obtain many pages, again, thousands of pages, form the Comptroller's Office of these contracts, but as part of that agreement, the Comptroller was only allowed to hold onto copies that the NYPD had redacted. And so some of these, we don't even know the names of the companies and how much money the NYPD was giving to them from tax payer money. We subsequently sued the NYPD [inaudible] Article 78 which we recently court ordered -- ruled in our favor, and now the NYPD is appealing it. so when they sit here saying we don't know what you're talking about about secret contracts, they're literally in active litigation with us to prevent us from accessing copies of those contracts to even find out the names of the vendors. So it's baffling for

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 163 them to say that, and frankly have the gall to say that. related to the facial recognition technology, they keep referring it to this NIS [sic] study, which by the way they never actually cite anywhere, but they allegedly gave the OIG-NYPD and they used this to say that this human process that they have proven that this facial recognition is okay, that it's not the problem we think it is. however, the OIG-NYPD report said, OIG-NYPD reviewed that study and concluded that it does not support NYPD's claim that human observation can remedy erroneous software In fact, to the contrary. The study does matches. not address human observation except to say that the interaction with machine and humans beyond the scope of this study, as is human efficacy. So they're citing to a study that literally does not say what they say it says in order to justify what they're And then the reality of it is that they are just compounding bad identification procedures on top of bad identification procedures, ones which would never be admissible in court, in order to justify an investigation in which then there is zero procedure for what happens after that. It's not, can you stop someone's car based on a facial recognition match?

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 164 Can you stop them on the street? What [inaudible] level does that get? What level of interaction can you have with somebody? Can you go to their job and interrogate them? There's zero procedure, zero rules from the NYPD about that. Not to mention, that this investigative lead that they keep referring to. they actually do is they look at that person's history and they send it to-- they send a photo to an officer who's previously arrested him and says, hey, do you recognize this guy? Why do you think that officer thinks he's getting that picture? Because he must know who that person is. He has no connection to the investigation otherwise. He says, yeah, I know that person. I previously arrested him. That's what then they're going to make an arrest. not a legitimate investigation, and for them to say it's only an investigative lead as if it doesn't direct their investigation and that they don't essentially launder it through this fake identification procedure is ridiculous. So, Legal Aid Society supports strengthening the bills that have been presented, particularly 1193 and 1207, and we hope the Council will take it up and [inaudible].

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 165

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: 2 Thank you. 3 you for your testimonies. I have it here. Can I 4 just ask one question related to the IUP process? Because I think, obviously some of the bills are trying to strengthen kind of how they amend these 6 IUPs, what they're including, and to specify what 7 8 they're used for, these specific technologies. What is this like-- what is the public testimony process like, because I'm very curious if, obviously, they're 10 11 just taking public record of it, and like, I would 12 love to see where public testimony is integrated into 13 some of these amendments. I'm not sure if they're happening. What can you say in your experience of 14 15 these-- of this like, public portion? 16 JEROME GRECO: So, I could say that it's 17 only happened once so far, and that when they--18 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: [interposing] 19 There's only been one public portion, but they said 20 today they've made various amendments? 21 JEROME GRECO: Right, but those 2.2 amendments have not been subject to public 2.3 commentary--

25 That's right. That's right, only the new ones.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ:

[interposing]

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 166

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JAMES GRECO: Right, and so only when they initially released the 36 was there any public commentary period.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: The one time.

JAMES GRECO: And for-- I know for us, we submitted close to 50 pages of comments which seemed mostly to have been ignored. I think other people felt similarly. I do know for example, when certain issues were pointed out, I think Michael was talking earlier about their saying artificial intelligence and machine learning weren't being used, and they were called out on that. Instead of defining that or fixing it, they just removed that statement, which seems to be their-- the path of least resistance.

CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL: Thank you for your testimony. Next, we'll hear from Jonathan Lamb with Amnesty International, Ivey Dyson with the Brennan Center of Justice, and Elizabeth Vasquez from Brooklyn Defender Services.

ELIZABETH VASQUEZ: Good afternoon. My name is Elizabeth Daniel Vasquez, and I direct something called the Science and Surveillance Project at Brooklyn Defender Services. My job every day is

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 167 to work with criminal defense attorneys, family defense attorneys, immigration attorneys, housing attorneys to understand the ways in which the NYPD is using technology, the ways in which they are surveilling our clients, and the information that they are collecting. When the POST Act passed, we felt like this was going to be an incredibly positive step towards getting some more transparency around what has always been an incredibly opaque system of buying, procuring, implementing, and rolling out technology that we had no notion of until it would show up as potentially a set of letters in discovery, and then we would be left to be like, what is that, and try to figure out what's going on. When the POST Act Impact and Use Policies came out, what we were left with was 36 repetitive statements that didn't give us much insight, but there were a couple of things that I think are worth flagging here. I agree with everything that folks talked about in the last panel, but what I want to focus on is what we did actually learn from what they said. So the first thing is, today they chose to focus on the wiretap act and to talk to the Council about the requirements for minimization that were in that particular

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 168 provision. When you look at their IUPs, 36 of them, only four do they say that they require court oversight in order to use those technologies. where, we're talking about aggregate technologies, so many more than just the 36, and what we're getting is four that would have required court oversight. should cause us pause. It should also make us think about the incredibly important role of the Council in reigning them in. because if they are saying to you we do not have to go to the criminal court to ask for permission to do these things, then you are the only ones that stand in the way of them and the information collection that they are engaged in. second thing that we learned from these Impact and Use Policies, what they actually did perhaps accidentally, track the way that they were sharing information across systems within those policies. And so to your question, Council Member Gutiérrez, when you were asking about the Domain Awareness System and they kept saying, no, no, the Domain Awareness System is not a surveillance tool, it's just ingesting everything. That was revealing because it's not just the Domain Awareness System that is doing that, and when you look at all 36 policies,

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 169 what you start to see is that the technologies are in important in the sense that they are grabbing data streams, but where are those data streams going needs to be the next set of questions that we ask. And they have done everything they can to not come to accountability on the answer to that particular part of this question. Because when they say we're not using machine learning, or we're not using artificial intelligence, what they're really trying to obscure is that they have collected all of the data in order to act upon it. They act upon it using machine learning products. They act upon it using their own search capabilities within the Domain Awareness System, but they are not just collecting this data for no purpose. And so it is critically important that the Council start to think not just about banning individual technologies, but about fully reckoning with the way that the NYPD obtains the data, how long they are allowed to keep it, and what purposes they are entitled to put it to. I'll stop there.

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23 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you.

24 IVEY DYSON: Good afternoon Chair

Gutiérrez. My name's Ivey Dyson. I serve as Counsel

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 170 at the Brennan Center for Justice in our Liberty and National Security Program. As part of our focus on government oversight and accountability, we advocated for the passage of the POST Act, but unfortunately, the NYPD, as you know, has consistently evaded the Act's disclosure requirements while continuing to expand its arsenal of surveillance technology. Members of City Council have introduced two bills aimed to strengthen the POST Act and which we support, but we believe there are additional common sense changes that the Council should make to ensure that the NYPD surveillance does not go unchecked. So, to date, the NYPD has used generic language in its POST Act disclosures to explain how it shares surveillance data with outside actors, such as federal immigration agencies and city housing authorities. City Council must require the NYPD to share more information on how external agencies access its surveillance data and whether there are restrictions on how that data is used, such as how long it can be kept, whether it can be copied, and if any other entities can access surveillance data that NYPD has transferred to external agencies. As put forth by the NYPD Inspector General, the police

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 171 should also maintain an internal tracking system recording every instance in which the Department provides an external agency with surveillance data, and the NYPD must publish any known safety hazards for each surveillance technology it uses. finally, the City Council must address the NYPD's failure to provide meaningful information on the potential disparate impacts of its surveillance technologies. The NYPD has a history of discriminatory surveillance, and the Department continues to use facial recognition technology that has led to wrongful arrests of black Americans across the country based on racialized errors. The NYPD must provide more information on the disparate impacts of the surveillance technology it uses, specifically any variations in accuracy of the technology based on a characteristic protected by New York City Human Rights Laws such as race or religion. I also want to highlight something that you brought up earlier, Chair Gutiérrez, about the NYPD's open FOIL request related to surveillance and activities and, you know, social media monitoring activities. The Brennan Center filed FOIL requests in 2020 related to the NYPD's use of social media monitoring

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 172 and social media monitoring tools, and I know there are other advocates who are here in the room who have filed many FOIL requests related to surveillance policing and have open request that have still been unanswered or have had to file an Article 78 petition for every single question because they've not received adequate information. And so this is another reason why POST Act compliance is so important so that we have an actual mechanism where the NYPD has to be held accountable for the surveillance technology it uses. And the City Council passed the POST Act in response to public demand for greater police accountability, and it must now strengthen the law to ensure the police can no longer evade the transparency that New Yorkers deserve. Thank you.

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JOHNATHAN LAMB: Good evening Council.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify on the use of facial recognition technology in New York City. My name is Johnathan Lamb. I'm a freshman at Cornell University. I was born and raised in Jackson Heights, Queens, and I'm here today as a student activist leader, a part of Amnesty International Ban the Scan Taskforce in New York. Our taskforce work

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 173 has focused on the use of NYPD's use of face recognition technology, its abuse against marginalized communities, and its attack against our common privacy rights. Amnesty International launched an ambitious effort called Decode Surveillance NYC. This effort mobilized thousands of digital volunteers to find and categorize CCTV cameras throughout this city. In addition they worked and investigated these findings with data scientists, geo-photographers [sic], 3D modifiers to analyze this data, and as a result, the results were very shocking. The taskforce found that the NYPD has been using face recognition technology in over 2,022 cases from 2016 to 2019, half of which came from 2019 alone, and this issue has affected marginalized communities in New York City the most. Through analysis and research we also found that areas in communities of color that have seen brutal policing tactics are likely to be more exposed to invasion facial recognition technology. When looking at the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens, the most diverse boroughs in the city, our data shows that communities of color have the highest concentration of facial recognition CCTV cameras, even when Black Lives Matter protests

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 174 were occurring during the pandemic, protesters risked high levels of exposure to face recognition technology. Only two months ago we saw that face recognition technology were finally banned in New York State School statewide. As someone who went to the New York City K-12 public school education system and who went to a school that was over-policed, it's time that we look into facial recognition technologies as a broader community so our community members, especially BIPOC youth feel safe and protected. With the rise in protests and public demonstrations due to current political conflicts, it is so important that we're protecting youth activists who are participating in these actions and basic first amendment rights. According to the New York Civil Liberties Union, there are plenty of research that demonstrated how inaccurate facial recognition are, and there's a risk of cooperation between ICE and the NYPD. as the son of Vietnamese refugees and coming from Jackson Heights, a predominant immigrant community with a high immigrant population, it so vital that we are re-envisioning public safety that does not foster xenophobia and discriminatory practices towards community members. We need to

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committee on public safety with committee on technology 175 enact 1207 and 1193 in order to hold the NYPD accountable for their usage of facial recognition and transparency. There is much-needed urgency-- reforms are needed for the POST Act. The usage of facial recognition technology is not a political issue, but it's a human rights and public safety issue. Thank you.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you all so much for sticking around and testifying. Appreciate you all. Thank you.

your testimony. We're going to do a combination panel for folks on Zoom as well. We'll hear from Towaki Komatsu, Raul Rivera, and Andrew. We also have online-- read out your names so you're ready, Christopher Leon Johnson. Whoever wants to go first may go ahead. Christopher Leon Johnson, are you available? Oh, there you are. Christopher?

RAUL RIVERA: Good afternoon, my name is
Raul Rivera. I'm a New York native, TLC driver
advocate, and I just want to get a quote out of the
way before I forget it, because I kind of forget a
lot. Humans first, technology second, today,
tomorrow, forever. I repeat, humans first,

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 176 technology second, today, tomorrow, forever. we're concerned about the NYPD, and so am I. don't fully trust them, but we have to say that we need cops in this city. New Yorkers need cops in the city, and when we have elected officials who are voted in, and just because you're voted in, that doesn't automatically make you a leader, because I don't see all you Council Members as leaders. have some that are, and we have others that are not. When we have our -- and that's not to say that New Yorkers agree with me, but there's a lot of people that do see each and every one of you as leaders, and if you going to say defund the cops, that hurts New Yorkers. That hurts a lot of people. That hurts the NYPD. And when we have a Public Advocate who can't stand the police, that's a big problem. When we have Council Members that call for the abolishment of cops, that's a big problem. Maybe reform, but not abolishment. We need cops in this city. I don't know if you guys know, but Jumaane Williams lives in an Army base. Jumaane Williams, the Public Advocate, he lives in an Army base. He's well-protected. New Yorkers are not. And when you say defund the cops, you are hurting New Yorkers. So we say, that

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if you want to be a true leader, you do not do that. That's what we ask. We start with common sense stuff. Me, I'm a lover of technology, but we put humans first, technology second, today, tomorrow, forever. We ask our Council Members to stop saying defund the cops, because when you do that you're telling people they can go in the stores and take whatever they want, to disobey the law, to ignore the cops, to disrespect the cops. I'll leave it there. Thank you.

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CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL: Thank you for your testimony. Looks like we got the gentleman online, so we're going to turn to him before passing it off back to here, okay? So, Christopher Leon Johnson, you may begin.

CHRISTOPHER LEON JOHNSON: Alright,
what's up everybody? My name is Christopher Leon
Johnson on the record. Thank you, Chair Gutiérrez,
be on the-- for sticking with us for all this time.
Hope you have a happy holiday through the end of the
year. I'm here to make this clear, personally, you
know? I appreciate the committee. I understand how
the NYPD they was dodging, ditching and dodging us

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 178 the voters, the constituents, because they don't want to really answer why they're spying on New Yorkers. It's just not just the stuff that they're doing with the fake social media accounts, and the over-the-top cameras and body cameras and all the type of-- to surveil us. Not only hurts minorities, it hurt everybody. It hurts every race, every creed, every culture. We just can't make it just about black and Latino and gay people and Asian people. Got to be about all people, including white people. everybody get affected by the body cameras and all the cameras. What I believe that should happen, that should start happening more is that there should be more real transparency of how these-- about how obtaining the footage of interactions with police. know that there's a lot of instances of that got a FOIL request, and the NYPD actually rejects the FOIL request, and we need to really need to start making it more hard for the NYPD to-- and help with the-and the NYPD Law Department to rig the cameras and destroy footage and edit footage. If they-- the footage be transparent for all of us to see, if it gets out there like that, you know, that's what should be happening a little more, with the spying--

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 179 with the cameras and with the footage. Yeah, we need to stop this surveillance on people. I think it's stupid, and it's not transparent at all. The City--I know the problem is that, you know, like I said we have the City Council, you know, they have their hearts and their intentions in the right place of trying to stop this stuff with spying on New Yorkers, but the real political support is not there, because a number of these Council Members, and we all know who they are, they're scared of the police union. All they care about is pandering to the police unions and try to keep their endorsements, which I think is kind of stupid, because the endorsements of the PBA are not even that effective in New York City, you I don't-- it's like-- the rate of success with a PBA endorsement is like abysmal. Even Marjorie Velazquez who had that endorsement, she lost to Chrissy Martimoro [sp?] in the general election even with the PBA endorsement. So I don't get why that, you know, this stuff-- you know, we need more transparency with the NYPD and, you know, bills like this, stuff like this need to be heard a little more often. I wish there was more people that was courageous enough to be here on here and speak

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 180 1 2 against this spying, but I understand that people 3 scared of being doxed by the NYPD, and help of their little snitches all over social media and on the 4 5 streets. But I appreciate you, Jennifer Gutiérrez, for being real cautious with the panels today with 6 7 the online zoom, that you privatized everything, you 8 didn't put any names out there in the panels. I appreciate it. I understand. But going forward, like I said, we need like more support with this 10 11 stuff. People need to come out more and testify 12 other than just us three and the legal people. Shout 13 out to all the non-profits [inaudible] Legal Aid, 14 STOP spying, all these other nonprofits that are 15 trying to fight this situation. We need more people 16 to come out there and testify this stuff. 17 SERGEANT AT ARMS: Time has expired. 18 CHRISTOPHER LEON JOHNSON: [inaudible] 19 I'm sorry. A few more seconds. Stop being scared 20 and come out and testify, and we need to stop spying 21 on New York City, and stop these rats [sic] in NYC. 2.2 So, thank you, Chair Gutiérrez. 2.3 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. CHRISTOPHER LEON JOHNSON: 24

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Holidays.

Thank you.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 181 1 CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: 2 Thank you, same 3 to you. 4 COMMITTEE COUNSEL: Either one of you 5 can--TOWAKI KOMATSU: Hi, I'm Towaki Komatsu. 6 7 I'm a Navy veteran. To lead off my testimony, 8 there's a mural on top of the ceiling in the chamber, and I'm going to change the words a bit. A government of the empty seats, by the empty seats, 10 11 for the people. At the start of this public hearing there were a bunch of City Council members in the 12 13 How many are here now? Mr. Holden, you're room. good. Ms. Gutiérrez, I just took a note that you 14 15 were using your cellphone in violation of City 16 Council's rules at 4:32 p.m. while somebody was

Council's rules at 4:32 p.m. while somebody was testifying. So, Mr. Holden used to be a teacher.

During tests, they tell students put away your phones and things like that, that can be used for cheating.

So with regards to first amendment rights, due process rights, if this is a public hearing, where are the City Council Members to actually hear from the public? Also, DOI Commissioner Strauber was here. I've been DOI repeatedly to make valid

complaints against the NYPD. DOI is totally useless.

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 182 This hearing is also about contracts, NYPD contracts. There was a public hearing yesterday about contracts between HRA and various vendors. The public notice says that you can go to HRA headquarters at 150 Greenwich on the 37th floor to see those contracts. Problem is, I've got litigation against HRA. They're still retaliating against me by not letting me in their doors. So, even though it's not relevant to todays public hearing per say, you're the City Council. You have the ability to craft legislation. You have the ability to issue subpoenas. have the ability, I guess, to override proposed contracts especially when they're pretty crappy. Sorry for the language. But let me move on. I submitted an exhibit in conjunction with today's testimony. I don't know if maybe Mr. Holden has seen This is what I submitted. Basically, I've got ongoing litigation, like I said, against the City. Let me read from some emails in that exhibit. For starters, you currently have Shekar Krishnan, he's a City Council Member. He lives in Jackson Heights. moved into his former apartment. The NYPD when conducting an illegal surveillance against me also pulled up his name as a former occupant of that same

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 183 apartment. I previously informed Mr. Krishnan of that. So the point is, if I have no ties with Mr. Krishnan, why in the heck is the NYPD spying on Mr. Krishnan after he used to be a clerk for a federal judge in Brooklyn. So, bottom line is here's an email that was sent by Jacqueline Rothenberg [sp?] on June 28th, 2017 to Howard Redman [sp?] who pled quilty to a felony earlier this year, for obstructing DOI's investigation. Confirmed that he appeared at 4WTC on June 6th and served an order to show cause. That OSC and another pending matter where submitted ot the court for a decision on June 7th. HRA is still waiting for the written decision. Problem is, I had sealed litigation then. Jessica Ramos illegally had access to that sealed litigation. You're the Committee counsel who I'm looking at right now. So why in the heck are personnel of the City of New York illegally violating New York Supreme Court Judge Barry Ostrager's January 17th, 2017 sealing order, and what is the recourse of when personnel of the NYPD come to your hearings and commit perjury under oath while they're sworn. Thank you. COMMITTEE COUNSEL: Thank you for your

testimony. Andrew, you may go ahead.

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1 2 ANDREW: Hello there. My name is Andrew, 3 and I would like to point out that I have nothing 4 against law enforcement. I appreciate the hard work 5 that they do have. Law enforcement has a habit of terrorizing people throughout America. 6 There's a 7 court case that I gave you called Socialist Workers 8 Party versus the Attorney General where law enforcement went around the City making people homeless and getting people fired from their jobs. 10 11 This is a court case in New York City, and there's an 12 additional flyer that I gave you all that law 13 enforcement -- after people have encounter with law 14 enforcement throughout different states become 15 homeless or fired from their job or can't find a job. 16 So law enforcement is not only terrorizing me-- they 17 go time fired-- but they terrorizing American as 18 well. So that's why I'm here today to ask for an 19 investigation of law enforcement why they keep 20 attacking me. Several times I asked for body cam. 21 They refused to give me body cam. Why is that? 2.2 they trying to hide something? Several times I have 2.3 encounters with them, and one time where they had brutally assaulted me on 61st Street and Northern 24

Boulevard in Queens. The cameras just magically

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 185 Incredible. Just like disappeared off the building. Lequan McDonald [sp?] in Chicago when the police had murdered him. They went to Burger King and they had erased the video. It's amazing how law enforcement keep doing the same thing state after state after state. So, I'm asking for an investigation. I'm asking for body came from different incidents that law enforcement had brutally attacked me, not only in New York but Chicago as well. They keep putting me in hospital for some strange reason, and also it's strange how law enforcement when they want to hide evidence, they like to commit people to the psych Two people from NYPD, Nella Gomez [sp?], a Police Detective, had evidence against corruption in law enforcement. What happened? Oh, let's commit her to the psych ward. New York City Police Department, right? Again, this another person who has nothing to do with Nella Gomez, his name is Agent [inaudible], again had corruption, evidence of corruption, of law enforcement, and what happened? They tried to commit him to the psych ward. Oh, this person is crazy. Again, when people have evidence like me, they try to commit me to the psych ward saying that I'm crazy. You can say anything that you

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COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 186 want to say, but just take a look at my evidence. The court case is right here in New York City. The court case says law enforcement make people homeless. They get people fired. I have news clips from different states showing that law enforcement make people homeless when they have encounters with them. And Colin Kaepernick is a football-- because I'm pretty sure not everybody watches sports. football player protesting police brutality. happened? Can't find a job. But he's not [inaudible], but other people are on this list who are not well known as Colin Kaepernick that lost their jobs. Even a veteran came across law enforcement. He too had lost his job. So I'm asking for an investigation and body cam for assistance. CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Thank you. Can I just ask, have you been connected to legal services yet pertaining to that request? I tried several times. ANDREW: Nobody

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ANDREW: I tried several times. Nobody has helped me. They would say that they would help me, and so far, nobody has helped me do anything. I'm still being attacked by law enforcement, and I still have no body cam from New York or Chicago because they want to cover this up.

1	COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 187
2	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: And what borough
3	do you live in?
4	ANDREW: I live in Queens.
5	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Okay. Let me
6	make note of that.
7	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: You guys have the
8	QR codes?
9	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: I have it, yes.
10	Thank you. Yeah, thank you so much.
11	ANDREW: And what's your name?
12	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Jennifer
13	Gutiérrez.
14	ANDREW: Okay, like Jennifer Lopez.
15	Okay, thank you.
16	COMMITTEE COUNSEL: If anyone else in the
17	room would like to testify, please come up to the
18	front. Seeing no one else, I'll turn it back to
19	Chair Gutiérrez to close out the hearing.
20	CHAIRPERSON GUTIÉRREZ: Alright, thank
21	you so much to both committee staff and thank you so
22	much to the advocates and everyone who signed up to
23	testify online and here in person, and that adjourns
24	today's hearing.

[gavel]

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 188

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY WITH COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY 189

World Wide Dictation certifies that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. We further certify that there is no relation to any of the parties to this action by blood or marriage, and that there is interest in the outcome of this matter.



Date January 12, 2024