

**Testimony of Caswell F. Holloway  
Deputy Mayor for Operations, City of New York**

**Before the New York City Council  
Committees on Public Safety, Fire and Criminal Justice Services, Health, Aging, Mental Health and  
Disabilities and General Welfare**

**January 16, 2013**

Good morning Chairpersons Vallone, Crowley, Del Carmen Arroyo, Lappin, Koppell, Palma and members of the City Council Committees on Public Safety, Fire and Criminal Justice Services, Health, Aging, Mental Health and Disabilities and General Welfare. I am Cas Holloway, Deputy Mayor for Operations; here with me today is Joe Bruno, Commissioner of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM). Thank you for the opportunity to testify on New York City's response to Hurricane Sandy, a deadly and devastating storm, from which the City—and thousands of New Yorkers—are still recovering.

Hurricane Sandy hit New York City on October 29, 2012. Sandy was unlike any storm in the City's long recorded history, and everyone on the dais is well-aware of the power and strength with which it hit, and the destruction Sandy left in its wake. This storm was the product of a number of unique weather elements that resulted in a worst-case scenario for the City. Sandy's arrival coincided with a full moon that gave rise to astronomical high tides, and its path was altered when it collided with a second weather front that caused it to turn towards New Jersey, putting the City on the northeastern side of its winds. These factors led to the massive surge that hit many waterfront neighborhoods—from the Rockaways, to Midland Beach and other communities on Staten Island's South shore, to Coney Island, Howard Beach and Gerritsen Beach. Water levels at the Battery reached an unprecedented 14 feet – a scenario that FEMA estimated had a less-than-1-percent chance of happening. Tragically, 43 New Yorkers lost their lives to the storm.

Sandy is also shaping up to be the second most expensive storm in United States history. Damages are still being tallied, but some estimates have been as high as \$70 billion. Sandy destroyed more than 270 houses in New York City, nearly 200 by storm-related fires. Due to an unprecedented storm surge that took out Con Edison's power and steam plants at 13<sup>th</sup> Street on the East Side of Manhattan, more than 800,000 customers lost power. To this day, approximately 8,400 households still do not have electricity restored. Sandy shut down fuel infrastructure, creating a severe gas shortage, which remained a problem for weeks. And more than 151,000 businesses that employ a total of 1.1 million people were closed because of the storm—either because of direct damage or loss of power.

Hurricane Sandy hit New York nearly 14 months to the day after Hurricane Irene. In many ways, we were lucky to have experienced Hurricane Irene, as it was the first time that the City's Coastal Storm Plan (CSP) was activated since it was developed by the Office of Emergency Management in 2007. Sandy and Irene were very different storms, and the damage Irene caused was far less severe due to the course that storm took when it hit the coast. But in addition to protecting thousands of New Yorkers, we learned a lot from the activation of the Coastal Storm Plan in August 2011, and that perspective improved our decision-making during Sandy, and in many ways, enabled us to respond more effectively this time around.

Our preparations for this storm did not start the week before Sandy arrived, nor with Hurricane Irene, but with the development of the Coastal Storm Plan (CSP). I will now turn it over to Commissioner Bruno to describe in a bit more detail OEM's role as the lead coordinating agency for a natural disaster event – including coastal storms/hurricanes. He will provide an overview of the City's Coastal Storm Plan (CSP),

(NWS) showed landfall occurring near southern New Jersey by 2AM Tuesday. Preparations for Sandy were in full force as various elements of the CSP began to be unpacked and operations were stood up. At this time, the Logistics Center (LC) opened – preparing for any and all requests that could come in for various supplies and equipment; the Healthcare Evacuation Center (HEC) opened to prepare for the potential evacuation of healthcare facilities; and the Emergency Supply Stockpile was deployed to the City’s shelter system. That afternoon, the Mayor held his first press conference to update New Yorkers on the City’s preparations for Hurricane Sandy. Later that evening, the first shift of shelter staff was notified that they were to report for shelter duty at 8AM on Saturday morning.

These decisions – including when to activate the Coastal Storm Plan, to notify shelter staff and to deploy the Emergency Supply Stockpile – were all being made by the Mayor at executive-level briefings first at City Hall and then at OEM Headquarters in Brooklyn. During these briefings, the Mayor would receive detailed information about the storm directly from the National Weather Service; as well as storm preparations by City agencies (Police, Fire, Health and Mental Hygiene, Transportation, NYCHA, Homeless Services—which is responsible for the shelter system—Education, and others), the MTA, and other entities (for example, the State Department of Health). The MTA is particularly important in the execution of the CSP, because public transportation is needed to assist people in the event of an evacuation. At the same time, the MTA must protect its equipment, which could necessitate shutting down the subway and bus networks well in advance of a storm. All of these scenarios were reviewed on Friday, and the City and the MTA coordinated closely before, during and after the storm. While information can never be perfect in these circumstances, the information provided enabled the Mayor to make decisions about how to ensure that the City and its residents were prepared for the storm.

Two decisions are obviously critical in these circumstances—whether to order evacuations of healthcare facilities and/or the general population in part of the City. The decision to evacuate (or not) is not taken lightly, as the public safety risk of sheltering-in-place must be balanced against the potential adverse consequences of moving individuals to a shelter facility. This is particularly true of hospital and other acute-care populations, for whom the very act of moving creates risk. Based on the latest storm data at the time, we did not order any evacuations as of the Friday before the storm, though the Mayor did order hospitals and chronic care facilities to cancel all elective admissions and discharge patients that could be safely discharged. And as I noted a moment ago, the Mayor activated the CSP shelter system so that we would be prepared to shelter residents in the event that an evacuation was deemed necessary. I should note that the City received forecast data directly from NWS throughout the storm; in fact, we had NWS staff embedded at OEM on a 24/7 basis as of Saturday, October 27, which continued through Tuesday, October 30.

On Saturday morning, staff began to arrive at shelters and the shelter management center—identified in the CSP as the Unified Operations Resource Center (UORC)—was activated. Also on Saturday, the City began to prepare for a Homebound Evacuation Operation, in the event that any were ordered. Both of these operations take time to carry out, and their successful execution is measured against what the CSP calls Zero Hour. Zero Hour is the projected time when the City expects to experience sustained tropical force winds (39 MPH) and the time when it is unsafe for first responders to continue pre-storm life-safety operations. The decision-making process for all Coastal Storm Plan operations is measured against Zero Hour—which, as of Saturday, October 27, was projected to be 7AM Monday morning.

On Saturday evening, the Mayor again updated New Yorkers on Hurricane Sandy, providing the latest information on the storm’s path and urging residents to be prepared. Although the forecast still had the worst of the storm hitting the mid-Atlantic and southern New England, he told City residents, “If you live in a low-lying area and have particular concerns about severe flooding or prolonged power loss, you should consider staying with friends or family members who live somewhere less vulnerable to those problems.” The Mayor also announced that 65 shelters would be open on Sunday morning for anyone

a lot from Hurricane Irene, which enabled us to have better coordination with NYPD. We were able to keep the vehicles at the developments longer and ensure that anyone who wanted to evacuate had the means to do so. You will hear more details about NYCHA Emergency Planning and Response from General Manager Cecil House at a future hearing. To ensure that residents had every opportunity to evacuate, NYPD officers canvassed Zone A areas with bullhorns from marked NYPD vehicles flashing their lights and alerting residents about the mandatory order to evacuate. NYPD officers drove MTA buses and provided transport to anyone who still had not evacuated. These operations continued until it was no longer safe for first responders (or anyone) to be on the roads.

By this point, the NYPD had switched its tours to 12-hour shifts and had pre-positioned 60 flat-bottom boats to the most vulnerable neighborhoods. The Department also secured its equipment, moving it to higher ground so it could be easily deployed in the immediate aftermath of the storm.

Pre-storm, the FDNY also ramped up operations in Zone A, adding a fifth Firefighter to 40 Engine Companies and placing five additional Chiefs in service. The FDNY activated their Incident Management Team (IMT) and pre-positioned marine skiffs, also known as "hurricane boats," in the Rockaways, Bronx and Staten Island. The Department further deployed eight inflatable swift-water rescue boats with teams throughout the City. Following the storm, firefighters used these swift-water boats to rescue more than 500 individuals trapped by rising waters across Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island. FDNY Operations set up Command Posts in each of the hardest hit areas of Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island as bases from which to coordinate with other agencies and muster additional resources. For example, at the height of the storm, FDNY worked with OEM and the State to secure 50 high-axle Humvee vehicles. EMS operations had 100 percent staffing in all five Divisions, including more than 100 additional ambulances. In total, the FDNY had more than 600 additional personnel (both firefighters and EMS) working during the height of the storm.

Zero Hour arrived in New York City at 7AM on Monday, October 29. By that time, water levels were already beginning to rise and the weather was getting progressively worse. The Mayor, Agency Commissioners, and Executive Mayoral Staff were all working out of the Situation Room at OEM Headquarters, adjacent to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The Mayor was in communication with President Obama, Governor Cuomo, FEMA Director Craig Fugate and other officials. At 11:30AM, the Mayor updated New Yorkers on the storm, and announced that schools would remain closed the following day, Tuesday, October 30. By 2PM, the Holland and Battery tunnels closed. Following Hurricane Irene, DOT and the NYPD formalized a coordinated Bridge and Tunnel Shutdown Protocol, which helped to ensure shutdowns were implemented smoothly. By 5PM, Con Edison was already reporting that 46,900 customers were without power and two hours later, it began to pre-emptively power-down electrical service to portions of lower Manhattan.

Just after 2:30PM on Monday afternoon, a tower crane working 75 stories above West 57<sup>th</sup> Street in Manhattan, whose operations had been shut down per DOB's guidelines prior to the arrival of the storm, partially collapsed due to extremely high winds. Luckily, the collapsed section of the crane remained attached and did not fall to the street – no one was injured. FDNY, NYPD, OEM, and DOB responded immediately, and within the hour were followed by DOT, DSNY, DEP, and Con Edison who worked to shut down local gas and steam lines to prevent any further collapse from rupturing active sub-street pipes. FDNY evacuated all adjacent buildings, and emergency personnel shut down all vehicular and pedestrian access to the street. FDNY also worked with the MTA to bring buses to the area to provide shelter for evacuees. In total, about 300 residents were evacuated to shelters, while additional residents self-relocated.

Because sustained high winds made accessing the collapsed crane impossible over the course of the storm, emergency personnel established a Collapse Zone in the surrounding blocks – West 57<sup>th</sup> Street

service access to critical citywide information, services and assistance. 311 personnel staffed the call center continuously, overcoming the MTA transit shutdown, power outages and for a time, a lack of heat and water. Many worked multiple shifts, staying at the call center when they were displaced from their own homes due to Sandy's impact.

We faced a number of challenges on the overnight into Tuesday morning. The threat of the loss of emergency power forced evacuations at two hospitals Tuesday night: NYU Langone and Manhattan Veterans Affairs hospitals, and later Bellevue and Coney Island hospitals, which you will learn more about at subsequent hearings. I will note, however, that the evacuations of these facilities went almost without incident thanks to the heroic efforts of hospital staff and the National Guard. At approximately 3:30AM, a six-alarm fire was transmitted for an enormous fire in Breezy Point which began when rising sea water came in contact with an electrical system in a home. Hurricane-force winds caused the fire to spread quickly to other nearby homes. The fire ultimately destroyed 126 homes, a devastating toll in one of the City's most iconic neighborhoods.

By Tuesday morning—24 hour hours after Zero Hour—it was clear that Sandy left tremendous damage and destruction in its wake. City agencies began to survey damage as soon as it was safe to do so, and it became clear that we had to contend with a number of very complex problems, some which continue to affect our residents today. Commissioner Bruno's team and my staff worked to identify and address immediate critical needs—in addition to the search and rescue operations being conducted by NYPD and FDNY. We assigned a lead person to each stream and created a management and reporting structure to the Mayor, which provided a current snapshot of each work stream along with challenges, next steps, and issues to be resolved. I will briefly describe each of these areas.

#### Power

The unprecedented storm surge and high winds led to an enormous loss of power across the five boroughs. In Manhattan alone, the inundation of critical infrastructure, including the 13<sup>th</sup> Street Con Ed substation, led to a far more widespread outage than we initially predicted based on the National Weather Service's surge modeling. Once the power was out, we responded immediately to keep communities safe and protect vulnerable populations. Ultimately, NYPD was able to deploy more than 500 light towers to assist first responders and help residents.

We also closely monitored power restoration and used this intelligence to guide our response and recovery efforts to have the maximum impact. For example, after the storm we dispatched teams of electricians to help homeowners certify for utility restoration with the Department of Buildings (DOB) at no cost, a process that the City requires to make sure that all electrical work is safe. We worked with landlords in multi-family residential buildings to fix any building damage that would prevent power restoration in areas in which the electrical grid was up and running. Power is perhaps the single most important pre-requisite to maintaining personal health, safety, and quality of life in the home, and we continue to monitor power restoration on a daily basis in close coordination with the utility companies—Con Edison and the Long Island Power Authority, LIPA.

Thanks to hard work by Con Edison, power was largely restored to Manhattan south of 39<sup>th</sup> Street by November 3, approximately five days after the storm. But that still left many thousands of residents in the hardest hit areas—the Rockaways, Coney Island, Brighton Beach, Sheepshead Bay, Gerritsen Beach, Midland Beach, the South Shore of Staten Island, and the South Street Seaport, just to name a few—without electricity, heat or hot water. A particular challenge was public housing, where 400 buildings were initially impacted, and by November 7 (one week after the storm), 86 buildings in 12 developments had no power, 44 elevator pits remained flooded, and 38 boiler rooms that serve 81 buildings in 29 developments were out of service. To restore critical utilities to these buildings we immediately began to

damaged by the storm. Since the first repair was made on November 21, Rapid Repairs has completed over 4,800 homes containing over 8,200 residential units. While it took some time to get the program up and running, we have completed more than 200 homes on each of the last 4 days; repairs are under way at 2,114 homes as we speak, and we are on pace to repair the remaining 5,200 homes within the next 40 days.

I would like to thank FEMA, and particularly FEMA director Craig Fugate and Federal Coordinating Officer Mike Byrne and his team for working with us to develop a program that serves New York City's unique needs, and will accelerate real recovery—because it is enabling thousands of families to remain in or return to their homes. A guiding principle of our recovery efforts is that the best temporary shelter is permanent shelter. Rapid Repairs is making this principle a reality.

### Dewatering

Another result of the record-setting storm surge was that private facilities and public infrastructure were inundated with salt water, requiring extensive dewatering and repairs. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) pumped out many of their own facilities, including wastewater treatment plants, and worked closely with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy to pump out the Battery Park Underpass and the West Street Underpass. The Army Corps also assisted in major tunnel and subway pumping operations for the MTA and Port Authority, and many of the critical parts of the City's transportation network came back online in record time.

On the residential side, the Army Corps and Navy also provided equipment and personnel to pump out NYCHA buildings along with private contractors hired by the City. And the FDNY assisted hundreds of individual homeowners—and continues to provide assistance as needed.

### Fuel

As the Council is well aware, Sandy damaged critical energy infrastructure that resulted in a fuel shortage in New York City and throughout the region. City agencies had prepared for this possibility by fueling vehicles and generators before the storm, but the enormous scale of the cleanup and recovery operation required more sustained action to secure the fuel supplies necessary to run emergency equipment and get the recovery going. Beginning Sunday November 4, the City worked with the National Guard to set up a fueling operation at Floyd Bennett Field for city vehicles and other first responders and other critical recovery-related personnel. Along with two satellite locations at Fort Wadsworth in Staten Island and Orchard Beach in the Bronx, we estimate that more than 22,000 emergency and essential vehicles filled up through this partnership with the National Guard. First responders, including private ambulances, also had the option to fuel at 10 Hess locations throughout the City, thanks to a partnership the City brokered with Hess.

For the general public, we worked with the White House to suspend the Jones Act to allow tankers to supply fuel from refineries along the Gulf of Mexico, and the National Guard distributed free fuel in affected areas to refill personal generators. Intelligence from the NYPD positioned at gas stations and from the crowd sourcing application Gas Buddy made clear that the shortage would last longer than originally anticipated, and on November 9, led the Mayor to institute an odd/even license-plate fuel rationing system that immediately alleviated fuel lines and was in place until November 24, when the City's fuel supply infrastructure had been largely restored.

MTA, the NYC Department of Environmental Conservation, the National Parks Service (NPS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), FEMA, the Department of Defense, and the National Guard. Leading the charge on the ground were the Department of Sanitation (DSNY), the Army Corps of Engineers and nearly 35 private contractors brought in to supplement the City's resources. In addition to the men and women of the Department of Sanitation and the Army Corps, I want to extend a special thanks to those contractors, who responded so quickly to help clear our streets to allow the recovery and rebuilding efforts to commence.

It is estimated that Sandy generated 1.33 million tons of debris. Since debris collection began on Thursday, November 1, the Debris Removal Task Force has collected over 540,000 tons of material from city streets, which has been stored at sites on Father Capodanno Boulevard, Jacob Riis Park, and Floyd Bennett Field. This includes construction and demolition debris, sand, vegetative debris, and concrete. To put this in perspective, DSNY normally collects just over 3 million tons per year. Today, the collection efforts continue. Just on Tuesday, DSNY and Army Corps contractors collected 1,200 tons of materials. As homeowners and businesses begin to receive insurance settlements and federal aid, and Rapid Repairs and demolition efforts increase, we expect to collect significantly more debris over the next month.

In addition to debris from damaged buildings and other installations, downed trees created significant post-storm hazards. Sandy downed and damaged nearly 20,000 trees and limbs. On Saturday, October 27, the Downed Tree Task Force, consisting of representatives from DSNY, Parks, DOT, OEM, SCOUT, NYPD, FDNY, Con Ed, Verizon, Cablevision, and Time Warner, began preliminary preparations for the removal and disposal of trees damaged by the storm. Over the course of the storm, emergency personnel responded to downed trees that posed immediate threats to life safety. Once the storm abated, the taskforce operated in full, removing all downed trees reported to 311, 911 and other outlets by December 16. Augmenting the primary operation at Floyd Bennett Field, small quantities of wood debris have been stored at Cunningham Park, Central Park, and Randall's Island.

### Recovery Efforts

The City has been working non-stop to provide assistance to those affected by Hurricane Sandy and the Council is aware of the numerous recovery efforts and programs that are currently underway across the City. We have been partnering with FEMA, the State, local non-profits and the private sector to ensure that New Yorkers are able to recover from this storm and continue to rebuild their lives. From assisting with the immediate clean-up of debris and downed trees to providing short- and long-term housing options in hotels and apartments across the City, we are working to mitigate the challenges that residents are currently facing. To help small businesses affected by Sandy, the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) and the Department of Small Business Services (SBS) have coordinated a set of services to streamline the path to recovery. The Mayor has set up five Business Recovery Zones to provide targeted assistance to those areas that were the hardest-hit. And one of the newest initiatives to be announced – the Hurricane Sandy Emergency Loan Program – will provide \$15 million in emergency loans to help New York City businesses damaged by Hurricane Sandy. This program has already approved 285 loans valued at \$6.6 million.

On Friday, November 2, we opened the first Disaster Assistance Service Centers – or DASCs – in the hardest hit areas of the City – Coney Island, the Rockaways, Staten Island, and Breezy Point. On November 13, Mayor Bloomberg opened the first of a total of seven Restoration Centers, which were designed to be one-stop-shops for City, State, and Federal resources for those most impacted by the storm. Locations for the Restoration Centers were determined based on input from City's Community Recover Directors, who were appointed by Mayor Bloomberg to help identify urgent needs, stay in close

focus on what we did well and what could be improved the next time a Coastal Storm comes our way. At the same time, the Mayor also tasked Seth Pinsky, the President of the Economic Development Corporation to lead a special initiative that will develop long-term recommendations on climate resiliency. This report will be released in the spring and will present a number of comprehensive Community Recovery and Rebuilding plans.

I understand there will be a number of additional hearings that will focus more in depth on various aspects of our response and recovery. I hope this broad overview is helpful in that effort, and I am happy to answer any questions you may have today.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.



**TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH F. BRUNO  
COMMISSIONER  
NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

**Before the New York City Council  
January 16, 2013**

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Good morning. I am Joseph F. Bruno, Commissioner of the New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). First let me say thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to speak about the City's Coastal Storm Plan and disaster management related to Hurricane Sandy.

**Overview**

The plan that guides the City's response is the New York City Coastal Storm Plan. This detailed plan is really a series of plans that guide the City's detection of, response to and recovery from, the hazards that hurricanes bring. These plans - including storm-tracking and decision making, evacuation, sheltering, logistics, public information, and recovery - list agency responsibilities for a coordinated citywide response to any coastal storm event, from a Nor'easter to a Category 4 hurricane. In the worst case planning scenario, 2.3 million New Yorkers who are at risk from storm surge could be ordered to evacuate of which more than 600,000 could seek public shelter.

Like all of our plans the Coastal Storm Plan is based on the Citywide Incident Management System, or CIMS. The playbook for every City response, CIMS is in effect before, during and after a coastal storm, as it is every day and during all types of emergencies. For a coastal storm, CIMS mandates a unified command with FDNY, NYPD, DSNY, DOT & OEM in the command element. This was implemented during the City's response to Sandy and it worked very well.

**Storm Tracking**

OEM's first responsibility is to monitor weather conditions and to identify these storms as they form. Our Watch Command maintains an awareness of predicted storms 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days a year and we provide that awareness to agency partners via email, fax and radio and to the general public via NotifyNYC and social media .

We maintain continuous contact with the National Weather Service via phone and email and, when the situation warrants as was the case with Irene and Sandy, the NWS assigned a *Decision Support Meteorologist* to work directly with OEM in the Emergency Operations Center.

## Situational Awareness

OEM maintains regional situational awareness about potential storms through the Coastal Storm Steering Committee or CSSC - an interagency task force consisting of over 50 City, state and federal agencies and non-profit partners. The CSSC includes key partners who provide services to the special needs population, such as Department for the Aging, Human Resources Administration, American Red Cross, and MTA Para-transit Operations. With the CSSC we review roles and responsibilities to ensure that all preparations have been made and all assets are in place.

## Activation

When the NWS forecast meets a plan threshold OEM recommends activation of the major Coastal Storm Plan pre-landfall operations. These major operations include Evacuation, Sheltering and Logistics and require massive commitments of agency personnel and assets. These personnel and assets, often working outside their normal agency structures, require intricate coordination which can only be provided through the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

The EOC is the primary communication and coordination point for major emergencies in New York City. Over the weeks more than 200 senior officials from city, state, and federal agencies worked around the clock in the EOC to activate and sustain all of the major operations described by Deputy Mayor Holloway. *These agencies included FDNY and NYPD, NYC Department of Health and NYS Department of Health, State Office of Emergency Management and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Human Resources Administration, Department of Homeless Services, Department for the Aging (DFTA), Health & Hospitals Corporation, NYC Housing Authority, Department of Sanitation, Department of Transportation, Greater New York Hospital Association, American Red Cross and many others.*

The EOC remains activated today at reduced staffing and continues to coordinate and support recovery operations.

The Coastal Storm Plan is the most comprehensive and actionable plan of its kind in the country. It was extensively revised using the lessons we learned from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Additionally, a near-miss from Hurricane Earl in 2010 and a direct hit from Hurricane Irene in 2011 provided real world tests that led to further review and revision. This included a coordinated Bridge and Tunnel Shutdown Protocol, a Social Media Emergency Protocol, improvements to our emergency logistics and procurement procedures, and extensive enhancements to emergency sheltering, particularly involving additional training and support for shelter staff. The Irene After-Action Report also led to an overhaul of the *Healthcare Facility Evacuation Center (HEC) Manual* and the *Coastal Storm Activation Playbook* which focus on the critical pre-landfall operations. The end result is what I believe to be the most operational plan possible. By operational, I mean we ensure that the plan contains the capability, the personnel and the assets, needed to execute these critical operations on behalf of the residents of New York City and in cooperation with our local, state and federal, private sector and not for profit partners.

## Training/Exercises

OEM has developed a robust training and exercise program to maintain the City's capacity to implement the plan. This includes both online and classroom training in areas such as logistics, EOC operations and storm tracking. More than 34,000 people have taken our Hurricane Shelter Training including City employees, private sector and non-profit partners, to our Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) volunteers.

Finally, OEM also hosts regular exercises with all agencies focused on specific areas of the plan including evacuation, sheltering, and school closure. The workshop held in 2012, called Eyeing the Storm included a review of lessons learned from Hurricane Irene.

We believe that these efforts, combined with a continual emphasis on public and private sector preparedness, are the keys to success in responding to the hazards that coastal storms bring. Through innovative partnerships with the city's public, private, and non-profit sectors, successful programs like CERT and NYC Citizen Corps, direct community engagement, and extensive use of new media, OEM's outreach efforts have reached millions of people since 2003 and included specific outreach to hurricane prone areas.

Thank you.



**Testimony of Helena Wong, Executive Director  
Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence (a/k/a CAAAV Organizing Asian Communities)  
January 16, 2013**

**Submitted to New York City Council Committee on General Welfare Hearing on Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm: Disaster Management (Jointly with the Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services, the Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services, the Committee on Public Safety, the Committee on Aging and the Committee on Health)**

My name is Helena Wong and I am the Executive Director of CAAAV Organizing Asian Communities. We are a city-wide organization that works with Asian immigrant and refugee communities around issues of affordable housing, community development/land use, accountable policing, and immigrant rights.

On October 29<sup>th</sup> the electricity went out for over half a million in New York City as Hurricane Sandy descended as one of the strongest storms the City had ever seen. The next afternoon, I went to Chinatown to check in on our members. The streets were eerily empty. There were no police officers, no elected officials, no signs of any emergency personnel. People were in their homes with no internet, no TV, and no way to call their families and loved ones.

For those of us who experienced how Chinatown was left to fend for itself after 9/11 and saw how people's lives were affected from Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, we knew that we had to do something. We started relief efforts the next morning.

We were able to secure a generator to charge people's cellphones and we were able to buy and get some supplies donated. We also set up a system where our friends who had access to the news would text us relevant information as it was coming through so we could disseminate it. On the first day, NYPD officers from the 7<sup>th</sup> Precinct came by and told us what we were doing was going to incite a riot and tried to shut down our relief efforts. When I went to the precinct to address the issue, I saw our signs taped up to the precinct door and the front desk officers referring people to us!

A block away from our office was an evacuation center housed at Seward Park High School. People who went there came to us because they said the workers there told them they were not there to provide information for people. The workers also made comments that were

disrespectful, blaming people for not leaving before the storm hit. Language access was another barrier to why people refused to go to the evacuation centers set up by the City. One worker came by continuously to get information and supplies, saying he had no idea what was going on.

We sent people into buildings every day to hand out information (In English, Chinese, and Spanish) and to talk to people. It was the most important thing we could have done. We were able to see who was stuck in their homes and allowed people a sense of safety and a feeling of connection even if we were total strangers.

When FEMA came three days after the storm, people were already out of food, batteries, and water. FEMA passed out MRE (Meals, Ready to Eat) food packs that were not translated and people in our community did not know why their food was smoking up. Because FEMA personnel did not go into buildings where elderly, disabled, and families with children were located, many people were not able to access what they provided. In the aftermath of the storm we have been working to provide information to people around FEMA relief because very little was translated and there has been a lot of confusion and misinformation.

The Red Cross came by our office on the seventh day asking us what we were doing. They said their job was to coordinate efforts. It was clear they did not know what their job was.

For us, we have learned a lot coming out of this experience and we think we have a lot to share with our leaders on the City, State, and Federal levels.

Thank you for creating the space for me to share our experiences with this committee. This testimony was not meant to be a list of what went wrong. As we continue to feel the impacts of climate change for the foreseeable future, I am hopeful that lessons shared today will get addressed and we will be more and more equipped to deal with challenges that immigrant communities face and what ALL New Yorkers need from our elected officials and City agencies during times of crises. I am happy to have more conversation with you all moving forward.

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Testimony at the City Council Hearing on Disaster Management

Committees on Public Safety, Fire, Health, Aging, Mental Health/Disabilities, General Welfare

Wednesday, January 16, 2013

The experience of the New York State Nurses Association, as a representative of Registered Nurses and advocate for patients throughout the areas affected by Superstorm Sandy and beyond, is that despite all emergency planning and procedures put in place by New York City, the City's response to the health care crises caused by the hurricane were - and still are - woefully inadequate.

Sandy laid bare a monumental lack of management and coordination of the crisis response of New York City health care systems in general. There was no NYC direction in the evacuation and medical identification of evacuees; in protecting people from additional damage by cold weather, mold in flooded buildings, and the flu season, nor in the canvassing of the affected areas for elderly and disabled New Yorkers who were stranded in their apartments and thus could not get food, medical attention and medications.

In addition to staffing up and making available extra equipment and resources for police and fire, there must also be a health-care component overseen by the New York City government. For example, there must be gasoline available to health care providers so they can get to work and back. NYSNA had to make a special appeal to the Governor to get several truckloads of fuel to health-care facilities so that nurses and other providers could tank up during the fuel crisis.

The City must address and solve the problem of how to sustain the health-care network as a whole – public, non-profit and private – when large components like Bellevue, Coney Island and NYU are put out of commission, as was the case with Sandy. The hospital closures of the last decades have left the City without the surge capacity necessary to adequately and safely deliver care to the thousands whose lives and health were upended by Sandy.

Emergency health care in the affected communities was left up to volunteer medical personnel, non-profit disaster relief organizations like the Red Cross and individual health care facilities. Hospitals, providers and patients were left to their own devices, and so people fell through the cracks. The city needs to put into place a coordinated, nimble quick-response emergency system that will provide the resources needed on-site and ensure coordination of resources and personnel, including evacuations, redeployments and volunteers and canvassing operations.

At HHC facilities, evacuation of the inpatient population proceeded in a timely and orderly fashion, thanks to the prior experience and the work of HHC employees, but what happened to clinic patients who visit health care facilities regularly for dialysis and chemotherapy, for example: How were they redirected to other facilities, and how did they get to alternative facilities far from their communities?

The City must direct the flow of patients and respond to the disruption in services in a coordinated fashion, and must be able to sustain the coordination for as long as needed to rebuild.

Front-line medical personnel need to be included in the planning and execution of the plan. Ultimately, it was the employees of Bellevue and Coney Island who implemented the evacuation plans and thus guaranteed the safety of their patients.

As always, NYSNA is ready to help with planning to ensure the safety of our members, our patients and the people of New York City.

Thank you.

City Council Oversight Hearing on the City's Response to Hurricane Sandy  
January 16, 2013

Testimony

My name is Caron Atlas and I live in Park Slope, Brooklyn. I organized the cultural and wellness programs at the Park Slope Armory special needs evacuation shelter. Artists from across the city stepped up to perform and give workshops at the Armory and we also organized religious services, therapy dogs, a Veterans Day commemoration, knitting circles and much more.

The cultural and wellness programs played an important role at the armory, to give people something to do, and even more important to restore people's dignity and respect under very trying circumstances. Wellness centers, like the one we created, should be included in shelter designs; artists and wellness providers should be part of ongoing emergency teams; and culture and wellness should be built into recovery, rebuilding, and community resilience efforts.

Because the wellness center functioned as the living room of the shelter we got to know the evacuees very well. And when the shelter closed and a group from the Belle Harbor Manor adult home in the Rockaways could not return home, a small group of our volunteers followed them when they were moved to the Kings Hotel in East NY and, when that was deemed unsafe, were put in the Milestone Residence psychiatric institution on the Creedmor campus. Having spoken with the residents several times about their experiences I want to share some of the questions they are asking:

Why were they not evacuated until after the storm?

Why were they moved three times to increasingly worse situations and why are they now in a psychiatric institution with psychiatric patients?

Why have they been continually lied to? When will they be told the truth about when they can go home?

And a question from me:

Where has the city been as this is going on? What is the city doing now to help the evacuees that haven't been able to go home?

Thank you.



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## Jewish Association Serving for the Aging Response to Hurricane Sandy

My name is Leah Ferster. I am the Chief Services Officer at JASA. On behalf of the Board of Trustees, staff, and the 53,000 older adults we help each year JASA appreciates this opportunity to provide testimony to the NYC Council on the impact of Hurricane Sandy. While in some respects we are still recovering, we welcome this opportunity to share thoughts about what we have learned and what issues we will need to tackle together in order to be better prepared for future crises. We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony to the NYC Council.

JASA, established 44 years ago, offers a broad continuum of services to help and support elders as they age in their homes and communities. The agency's mission, 'to sustain and enrich the lives of the aging in the New York metropolitan area so that they can remain in the community with dignity and autonomy,' promotes independence, safety, wellness, community participation, and an enhanced quality of life for NY City's older adults.

### Storm Preparations

JASA staff was on alert days before Hurricane Sandy hit. With six of JASA's eight housing sites situated in "Zone A" areas, JASA began its preparations to secure these 1900 units several days prior to the Hurricane. Staff at each location brought in key supplies (batteries, water, blankets, flashlights, non-perishable food, medicine, etc.), posted pre-evacuation notices, braced windows, stored movable equipment and prepared to power down elevators at the second floor and above. All houses were in "ready mode."

The week before the storm JASA sent additional shelf stable meals to all home-delivered meals clients. Adult Protective Services, Community Guardian and case management staff reviewed their list of at-risk clients. All JASA staff took home their emergency telephone trees.

During the weekend before the storm, staff knocked on doors of both clients and tenants, to confirm that they had enough food and medication to last 3-4 days. JASA Senior Center staff helped their members prepare as well, ensuring they had shelf stable meals to serve.

Once the call came for a mandatory evacuation, staff was sent out once again, encouraging people to leave the community. For many reasons, most chose to stay. While many of our tenants went to stay with families only 23 out of 1200 people left Far Rockaway for shelters prior to the storm.

Home Care contacted each client and ensured that all homebound clients would have home attendant coverage throughout the storm.

### The Storm

During the storm, JASA's Director of Housing kept in constant touch with his building managers, who remained on site for the duration of the storm. Although phone service was sporadic, he received periodic reports from his managers indicating significant problems. Power was down in all eight housing sites and several – particularly Coney Island, Brighton Beach and Manhattan Beach – suffered significant damage. Once the storm ended, he visited each location to assess the damage with the managers and to identify immediate next steps.

### Storm Aftermath

As all JASA housing sites initially were without power and some were severely damaged, all JASA tenants now became JASA clients as well. In the days following the storm, JASA's Housing and Services divisions worked tirelessly together to intervene. Staff knocked on all tenant doors daily, bringing up water, food and blankets and arranging for medications, when necessary. With no power, staff – and soon countless volunteers – walked as many as 22 flights of stairs to bring food and other necessities to tenants. Of all the JASA housing sites, Scheuer House of Manhattan Beach (Brooklyn) suffered the greatest damage. The site, which initially had only a 10% evacuation rate, operated with only partial heat and power for 33 days.

Much of our focus was on housing which is based on our obligation to our tenants and property. However JASA's housing was not alone in its need to begin the recovery process - JASA's clients needed assistance and support to recover as well. The commitment of JASA's staff was extraordinary. Many people worked seven days a week, 16 hours a day. Virtually every staff member was deployed, in many cases to responsibilities not ordinarily theirs. Many staff, including porters and housing staff, continued to work to assist tenants and clients, even though they themselves lost everything in the storm. Working with our HDML caterers we were able when necessary to deliver food to seniors in our Brooklyn NORC's. And when DFTA called and asked us to assess individuals who were in need, JASA's case managers did so

and HDML meals followed. Staff contacted every client to ensure they were safe and had the basics: food, water, blankets and medications.

In our home care program, 642 clients received service on the day following the storm. Most aides remained in place with their clients, and some accompanied clients to the shelters. Home delivered meals were back on Wednesday in Brooklyn and Thursday in Far Rockaway and continued through the week.

Although JASA was well prepared for a 3-4 day event, the extended length of the emergency taxed JASA's service structure. (Far Rockaway had no electricity for one week and a number of our buildings were on generators. It was a full two weeks before being re-connected to the electrical grid. Manhattan Beach in Brooklyn was without electricity for a full month.) Throughout the duration, JASA made every effort to ensure its residents were never at risk.

For example, after 15 days without heat JASA worked with VNS staff who assessed all tenants in one of our Brooklyn buildings to ensure they were not at medical risk.

In addition to the efforts of JASA staff, other organizations and more than 700 volunteers assisted in the efforts. Throughout the following weeks, JASA staff had to manage and coordinate hundreds of volunteers, both through organizations like UJA and its member agencies who recruited and helped to organize volunteers, New York Cares who brought volunteers to our sites, Doctors Without Borders, and people who volunteered on their own.

JASA could not have responded and recovered without the extraordinary advocacy and assistance of our partners in government. The Office of Emergency Management provided generators for every building and served as facilitators with government agencies and utilities. Commissioner Lilliam Barrios Paoli and Linda Whitaker, DFTA's liaison to the Office of Emergency Management, are particular heroes to us as well as the State Office for the Aging. They made sure that our needs for assistance and support were heard and acted upon. They were available to us day and night, weekdays and weekends, until all of our buildings and services were up and running again. We are also grateful for the support we received from Speaker Quinn's office in securing leased vehicles to replace those we had lost. We are also grateful to our UJA-Federation sister agencies for making their housing and nursing home resources available to our tenants.

JASA is still in the process of assessing the storm's financial impact; it will surely exceed \$3 million. Separate accounts and tracking systems have been set up to ensure that JASA can effectively track and submit for all storm-related costs.

In addition to the damage to JASA sites, more than 50 members of JASA's staff had suffered significant damage to their homes, with six completely lost. To assist with staff losses, JASA has set up a staff relief fund, a loan program, and a time bank for

employees to donate vacation time. We are grateful to our Trustees and other generous donors for make these efforts possible.

Despite all preventative efforts, JASA, like the rest of the New York area, was hit hard by Sandy. In the face of unprecedented obstacles, JASA came through. Yes, there was and remains a significant amount of physical damage and emotional pain, but we are on the road to healing and rebuilding. As life returns to 'normal,' JASA's clients in Zone A have continued to need ongoing support to recover.

For example, many seniors at the Rockaway Park Senior Center had difficulty returning to their usual activities. A professional from the Addabbo Health Center taught them stress-relief exercises and helped them talk freely. This provided a great sense of comfort and relief to the seniors, who have requested that these visits continue.

As an organization, JASA comes away from this experience with admiration for our government and volunteer partners and deep appreciation for the creativity and commitment of our staff. We look forward to working together to learn the lessons from Sandy that will strengthen us for the future.

Issues going forward:

1. What does "mandatory evacuation" mean? And what would an effective evacuation plan for frail seniors entail?

We would welcome participation in a broad public discussion about the difficult question of what it means for the City to issue a mandatory evacuation order. In practical terms it would be helpful if OEM had all senior housing and NORC's throughout the 5 boroughs on their radar when planning for interventions in an emergency. We fully support the ability of our tenants to make informed decisions, weighing their own unique personal circumstances and values against the information about threats to their health and safety. At the same time, we must also consider the health and safety of our staff, who in many respects became "first responders," particularly to the tenants residing in housing that JASA manages.

The reluctance of frail tenants to evacuate in part reflects their concerns about whether the available evacuation options were adequate to meet their needs. The ability to identify assisted living or other supported environments, and to have appropriate transportation for those with limited mobility could ease the burden on first responders by increasing voluntary participation in evacuation zones. City agencies could play an invaluable role in planning and arranging for specialized transportations.

2. What are the responsibilities of those who receive government funds to manage senior housing?

JASA's actions in preparing for and responding to the storm went far beyond the typical

response of a landlord, as might well be expected from a large and mission-driven social services organization. During this period, those who had been our tenants became our clients as we endeavored to meet their basic needs, offer them safe and appropriate alternatives when their housing was compromised, and communicate with their worried family members when phone service was sporadic or unavailable. While we are very proud of these actions, they extend beyond what we are staffed and resourced to manage, and requires public policy support if we are to maintain these standards.

3. How can city agencies and volunteers better coordinate efforts to maximize impact and minimize confusion?

New Yorkers have big hearts and they respond in mighty numbers when the call for help goes out. Relief centers sprang up in many locations, and volunteers brought resources to buildings where food and services were already being made available because there was no clearinghouse or method for sharing information and directing efforts. Perhaps the city's community-based offices – whether police precincts or HRA job centers – could be designated as relief centers as part of a larger disaster preparedness effort. That way, volunteers would know where to report for services and those in need would know where to come for help.

4. How can we prepare the full range of first responders?

When first responders receive their much-deserved praise, speakers usually mention public safety officials, the Red Cross, and the National Guard. In JASA housing, superintendents, porters, service coordinators and social workers acted as first responders as well, along with corps of volunteers. How can we better train and prepare so that all of those with a role to play have the skills they will need to draw on?

On behalf of JASA I thank you for giving us the opportunity to share our thoughts and ideas and ask the necessary questions we feel need to be answered in order to create an emergency plan that will make all of us better prepared to intervene in the next emergency.

Claudette Duff, LCSW

Founder of Integrity Senior Services

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## CITY COUNCIL

OVERSIGHT: Hurricane Sandy disaster Plan

01/16/13

I would like to first thank the City Council and all of the committees represented for inviting me here today.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you.

### **THE CITY'S STORM PLAN**

What is the City's storm plan?

In preparing for this hearing, I spent many many hours searching the internet trying to find the City's storm plan that addressed my experience volunteering in the shelter on Staten Island for twelve consecutive days, starting Oct 28<sup>th</sup>.

I downloaded and read the city's emergency plan READY NEW YORK for seniors and people with disabilities. I also read READY NEW YORK preparing for emergencies in New York City.

Now, I could be wrong but my understanding of the City's storm plan is basically,

## **PLAN IT YOURSELF.**

I know that this is a short description but this is my understanding of the two documents.

Think about your own needs

Develop your own Disaster Plan

You may have to evacuate

This is what happens when you evacuate

You may have to go to a shelter

You may have to shelter in place

Put together a "go bag"

Put together an emergency supply kit with at least 100 items that are too heavy for you to carry if you're a senior

And finally,

If you need additional help during a disaster

**CALL THIS LIST OF AGENCIES OR PROGRAMS**

**LOOK THEM UP ON THE INTERNET ?**

**AND IF YOU STILL NEED HELP**

**Call 311**

While reading these documents on storm related instructions on the internet, a strange feeling came over me, that of a "disconnect" of what I was reading and what I had experienced. (There was a mismatch). I kept thinking hard and harder, trying to identify one senior that I encountered who was capable of putting together and executing their own disaster plan as recommended.

In addition this could not be further from the reality I experienced during my twelve consecutive days volunteering in the shelters.

Seniors and people with disabilities were by far the most vulnerable.

They needed direction, help and guidance.

The job of the Government should be to care for and protect our residents who cannot care for or protect themselves.

### **WAS THE CITY'S STORM PLAN ADEQUATE FOR SENIORS ON STATEN ISLAND?**

The answer is NO!

On October 28<sup>th</sup> I was informed that older adults from a local senior residence were evacuated to the Petrides School (shelter). I became concerned got in my car and rushed to the shelter only to discover my greatest fear, they were among strangers in a strange place, accompanied by no one who knew them or who was familiar to them and had no necessary documents or paperwork. They had no one to watch over them or advocate for their needs. They were placed in empty class rooms and were given cots with no mattresses. These were seniors in their 70s, 80s and 90s, some with various stages and types of dementia and multiple medical and medication needs.

### **WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT SENIORS?**

The fastest growing segment of the older population is the oldest old - that is, those ages 85 and older. They are expected to grow from 5.5 million in 2010 to 19 million by 2050.

About 50% of this population will develop some type of dementia.

By 2030 the census projects that 1 in 5 or 20% of the U.S. population will be 65 or older.

This should be of concern to policy makers because they are most likely to be disabled.

Only 5 to 6 % of seniors live in Nursing Homes which suggests that most seniors are living in private homes.

#### WERE NEEDED SUPPLIES IN PLACE BEFORE AND AFTER THE STORM?

The Seniors staying in Petrides school had to sleep on cots with no mattress for four days, they were transferred to Susan Wagner HS where they were supplied with mattresses. The following morning after spending the first night at the Susan Wagner shelter, one man expressed "That was the first good night sleep in four days".

#### GOING FORWARD

We need to identify who and where vulnerable seniors live, possibly using the Census or a registry to do so, and we need to find a way to monitor and oversee a proper and effective implementation of a plan to ensure their care and safety during a disaster or emergencies.

#### **(See Attached): Fatalities caused by Hurricane Sandy on Staten Island**

Strict oversight of ALL facilities housing seniors which include:

1. Nursing Homes
2. Assisted Living Facilities
3. Adult Home
4. Independent Living Facilities
5. Retirement Communities

The City needs to implement a disaster plan that is mandated and monitored by a Government Agency similar to what has been done with the New York City Fire Code.

### **Fatalities Caused by Hurricane Sandy on Staten Island**

24 people perished on Staten Island as a result of Hurricane Sandy. 14 (58.3%) of the fatalities were over the age of 60.

And of those, 57.1% lived in the Midland Beach area. Only 5 people, 20.8% were under the age of 50.

#### **People Over 60 by Area**

Midland Beach: 8, 57.1%

South Beach: 1, 7.1%

Great Kills: 2, 14.3%

Rosebank: 1, 7.1%

Ocean Breeze: 2, 14.3%

Under 50: 20.8%

- 1) Angela Dresch: 13, Tottenville
- 2) John C. Filipowicz: 20, Oakwood Beach
- 3) Brendan Moore: 2, Midland Beach
- 4) Connor Moore: 4, Midland Beach
- 5) Artur Kasprzak: 28, South Beach

50's: 20.8%

- 6) Lenny Montalto: 53, Oakwood Beach
- 7) John Filipowicz: 51, Oakwood Beach
- 8) Frank Suber: 55, St. George
- 9) Patricia Bevan: 59, Midland Beach
- 10) Geroge Dresch: 55, Tottenville

60's: 29.2%

- 11) Marie Colborne: 66, Great Kills
- 12) David Maxwell: 66, Midland Beach
- 13) Andrew Sammarco: 61, South Beach
- 14) Anna Gesso: 62, Midland Beach
- 15) David Haggerty: 65, Midland Beach
- 16) Jack Paterno: 65, Midland Beach
- 17) Eugene Contrubis: 62, Midland Beach

70's: 12.5%

- 18) Anastasia Rispoli: 73, Midland Beach
- 19) Charlotte Brewster: 77, Midland Beach
- 20) George O'Regan: 79, Rosebank

80's: 16.7%

- 21) Walter Colborne: 89, Great Kills
- 22) James Rossi: 85, Ocean Breeze
- 23) Beatrice Spagnuolo: 80, Midland Beach
- 24) Ella Norris: 89, Ocean Breeze



Good afternoon and thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today.

My name is Catherine Abate and I am the president and CEO of Community Healthcare Network. We run 13 Federally Qualified Health Centers in some of the most low-income, underserved communities in New York City.

CHN provides access to quality, culturally competent, community-based primary medical care, mental health care and social services to underserved populations throughout New York City. We take care of individuals and families who might otherwise have little or no access to basic health care.

CHN provides nearly 200,000 patient visits each year. Fifty-two percent of our patients are on Medicaid and 36 percent are uninsured. We serve young and old, well patients who come in for annual check-ups, and some of the most chronically ill people in the city, and we never turn anyone away.

With this spirit of service in mind, we were quick to react to communities' health care needs following Hurricane Sandy. In the days after the storm, while the lights were still out downtown, we dispatched our mobile clinic on November 2nd and 3rd to provide walk-in primary care service to Lower East Side residents. In addition to medical services, we served as a resource to the community to charge phones which allowed residents to communicate with family members who they had lost contact with for nearly a week.

On November 5th, 6 days after the storm, the New York State Department of Health asked us to deploy our mobile clinic to the Rockaways. We were asked to help and we immediately responded to this great need.

The State asked us to park our mobile clinic at Hammal Houses Playground. The Hammel Houses are a public housing complex of 14 building which are home to nearly 2,000 residents. We were stationed there for two days alongside of Jamaica Hospital's medical mobile unit. We next moved approx. ½ mile away to the parking lot at Key Food Supermarket returning the following week to this central location in the Rockaways.

As you have heard today over and over, Sandy devastated the Rockaways, flooding buildings, cutting off the power supply, and disabling transportation. The storm also wiped out the health care infrastructure on the peninsula: doctors' offices were shut, pharmacies were closed, and residents had no way to get the medical care or products they needed, save for the mobile clinics. The primary health care facility that serves this community, Joseph P. Addabbo Family Health Center, was severely flooded and closed for several weeks.

Having absolutely no access to health services and medications is very scary. It's even worse when you're dealing with an unhealthy population that's concerned about leaving their homes for long – lets not forget what a huge problem looting was.

Let me give you a specific example. Here is one patient's story.

A fifty-five-year-old African American woman living in Hammal Houses in Far Rockaway was one of the first patients to visit our mobile clinic.

She is a diabetic whose blood sugar levels were under control before the storm. By the time she saw our medical providers, not only was her blood sugar dangerously high - perhaps due to the stress following the storm - but she was also about to run out of insulin.

She had nowhere to go. Her doctor's office was closed. The pharmacy was leveled by the storm. Buses were barely running. She lives on a fixed income – so cabbing it to the nearest clinic was pretty much out of the question.

We titrated her insulin and then went to work figuring out how we were going to get her – and dozens more patients just like her that we saw during our days there – the meds they needed to live.

But, by far the most terrifying thing about our experience is seeing all those patients with just a few days supply of life saving drugs left and nowhere to get refill. To assist in filling these prescriptions, we quickly realized the need to improvise. We saw patients and family members presenting with empty medicine bottles who were desperate for refills. We called in the prescriptions to the closest pharmacies. In some instances the pharmacy was able to deliver to the mobile, in other cases our provider drove to the pharmacy during her break to pick up the medications. On another day, a group of New York City volunteers who had made their rounds through the high-rise properties came with a long list of medications. CHN's team worked quickly and nimbly to fill these necessary medications.

We were able to help Anna and dozens of others patients with chronic illness. We treated patients with respiratory infections, allergic reactions to cleaning products, and other aches and pains. We visited patients stuck in their homes and provided them with medical care. And, we not only provided medical care: we also provided mental health counseling, helping individuals to deal with the stress brought on in the aftermath of the hurricane. Every person who was seen on the mobile came with a story; many shed tears and felt tremendous relief to have a professional to talk to.

As we have learned in the weeks after the storm, the Rockaway's is an isolated community, which was cut-off from the city both in terms of utilities as well as transportation. I would like to make the following recommendations for future emergency planning should a similar disaster occur:

1. There needs to be improved communications so residents have up-to-date information. Residents were anxious to know when stores, pharmacies and health clinics would re-open.
2. A mobile emergency pharmacy with basic medications and medical supplies needs to be available 24/7.
3. Mental health counseling needs to be available to address post-storm stress.
4. Temporary charging stations for cell phones and tablets should be established to enhance communications with family and friends.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the generous donations we received that supported our efforts. Our sincere gratitude to Robert Hayes at Universal American for his financial donation of \$5,000 which supported personnel and vehicles expenses as well as to Direct Relief who donated medications, medical supplies and nutritional supplements valued at \$106,878.

The  
City  
of  
New York



BOROUGH OF STATEN ISLAND  
**COMMUNITY BOARD 3**

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January 14, 2013

Mr. Robert Calandra  
Legislative Council for NYC Council  
City of New York  
250 Broadway, 14<sup>th</sup> Floor  
New York, New York 10007

Dear Mr. Calandra:

The city's immediate response in the aftermath Hurricane Sandy was quite poor. NYC Officials could have done a better job of encouraging people to evacuate their homes. In stressing the importance of an evacuation, it is my belief that New Jersey Governor Christie's performance was superior to both Governor Cuomo and Mayor Bloomberg. City officials add to the public's hesitation to evacuate by their constant dramatization of storm warnings. Every storm is labeled as "the worst storm of the century." Regularly crying wolf only makes the public indifferent, and less responsive to warnings.

The first few days following the storm there was a general lack of city services and fragmented leadership, people were left to devise their own survival skills. I reside in Zone A, and fortunately was unscathed by the storm. Subsequent days following the storm I became aware of the lack of police presence, and like many others, were left to watch over our property to safeguard from looters and robberies.

The Mayor's initial persistence not to cancel the marathon exposes the total disconnect that he, and his administration, have with all the inhabitants of our great city. Notwithstanding the death and destruction that occurred in Staten Island, Brooklyn, and Queens, the Mayor tried his best to force his will on the people who were suffering in the aftermath of the storm. Only immense public pressure forced him to cancel the race.

If it were not for the immediate actions taken by our Staten Island elected officials, the Borough President, our NYC Council delegation, our state Senators and Assembly Members, the perplexing task of implementing immediate aid to flood victims would have been regrettably delayed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Frank Morano".

Frank Morano  
Chairman of the Board



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[www.CIDNY.org](http://www.CIDNY.org)

**Center for Independence of the Disabled, NY**

January 15, 2013

New York City Council Committees on General Welfare, Fire & Criminal Justice Services; Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services; Public Safety; Aging; and Health

Hearing on

Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm

Susan M. Dooha, J.D.  
Executive Director

Re:

The Center for Independence of the Disabled, New York ("CIDNY") is an independent living center serving people with disabilities throughout New York City. CIDNY's mission is to ensure full integration, independence and equal opportunity for all people with disabilities by removing barriers to the social, economic, cultural, and civic life of the community. Currently CIDNY serves about 14,000 persons in New York City.

We have more than 10 years of experience in preparing for and responding to disasters. On and after September 11<sup>th</sup><sup>1</sup> and during Hurricane Irene, CIDNY responded to the needs of people with disabilities. As part of this effort, we helped individuals apply for federal assistance to restore their homes, replace wheelchairs and other equipment, search for transitional and permanent housing, secure health coverage and obtain services, replace food, and more. We delivered training and technical assistance to relief providing agencies. We encouraged people with disabilities to increase their preparedness. We worked with the New York City's Office of Emergency Management and the New York City VOAD. We conducted outreach and provided case management services to people with disabilities through our disaster relief program.

Unfortunately, not much has changed. More than 10 years ago, we documented the same gaps we found during Hurricane Sandy: shelter inaccessibility; gaps in accessible transportation for evacuation and in the aftermath of the disaster; inaccessible disaster-related communications efforts; lack of reasonable accommodations by relief organizations and City agencies.

Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. We hope that we are at a tipping point and that our testimony will contribute to a plan of remediation that finally includes people with disabilities appropriately in emergency preparedness and disaster response and recovery.

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<sup>1</sup> After September 11<sup>th</sup>, CIDNY issued a report lack of inclusion of people with disabilities by emergency planners and responders entitled "*Lessons Learned from the World Trade Center: Emergency Preparedness for People with Disabilities in New York.*"

***Demographics: High Prevalence of People with Disabilities in Zone A***

Disability mattered in Hurricane Sandy—planners should have been far more attentive to the demographics of the Zone A population in planning, response and recovery.

Planning should have reflected the higher prevalence of people with disabilities in Zone A areas who were living independently in the community. While there is a 10.89 percent prevalence rate for people with disabilities Citywide, the prevalence of people with disabilities living in Zone A areas is much higher—in some cases it is two times higher. Overall, at least 118,000 people with disabilities live in the community in Zone A.

**Brooklyn: Zone A Disability Prevalence**

	Total Population	People with Disabilities	Prevalence Rate
CD 13	103,000	20,000	19.4
CD 15	137,000	18,000	13.1

**Queens: Zone A Disability Prevalence**

	Total Population	People with Disabilities	Prevalence Rate
CD 14	115,000	15,000	13.0

**Staten Island: Zone A Disability Prevalence**

	Total Population	People with Disabilities	Prevalence Rate
CD 2	136,000	18,000	13.2

**Lower East Side Manhattan: Zone A Disability Prevalence**

	Total Population	People with Disabilities	Prevalence Rate
CD 3	163,000	20,000	12.3

In addition, there is a high concentration of nursing facilities and adult facilities serving people with disabilities in Zone A areas. Although mandatory evacuation was ordered, nursing facilities and adult homes, such as Horizon Care Center and Belle Harbor, were told not to evacuate although they were not prepared to safely shelter in place.

### ***Communications***

When warnings, shelter guidance and recovery related messages are issued they must be properly communicated to reach the public. In the case of people with disabilities, this means they must be made available in multiple ways: printed material in alternate formats, internet instructions that can be accessed using screen reader technology, captioning, email, text messaging, ASL interpretation.

In the case of Hurricanes Irene and Sandy, New York City relied on maps for evacuation that could not be read with screen reader assistive technology. The City used shelter rules and instructions that were written in small print that would be difficult for individuals with limited sight to use and they had no Braille or audio versions. It does not appear that the materials were tested for reading level either—which would have limited their value for low-literacy disability groups. The City relied on 311 for those who couldn't use the internet instructions or print materials—however individuals reported to us that they had 20 minutes to an hour and a half of waiting time to get through to an operator. The City relied on community-based agencies with limited resources to push messages out—without appearing to have a clear understanding of their capacity to do this or their reach. Restoration centers do not have ASL interpreters available or large print materials.

Unless communications are appropriately issued they will be impossible to follow.

### ***Transportation***

When an order of mandatory evacuation was issued for people living in the community—it was already too late for many people with disabilities to evacuate. Within a narrow window of the announcement, Access-a-Ride was shut down—before inaccessible transportation was shut down. Taxis and subways are not generally accessible. The New York City Housing Authority told residents to evacuate—but residents told us that the buses intended for their evacuation weren't accessible.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, people who sheltered in place and those wishing to return to their homes were stymied by the lack of paratransit and bus services in Zone A. This gap also made it more difficult to get to recovery centers, doctors appointments, food stores and to evacuate after the Hurricane when it became clear that housing was uninhabitable.

Many people with disabilities require more time to prepare for evacuation than people without disabilities. It is not helpful to tell people to evacuate when their means of doing so are limited. Either an evacuation order must be issued earlier for people with disabilities or accessible transportation must be available longer for this population. After an event, quick restoration of accessible transportation should be a priority.

### ***Shelter***

Many people with disabilities have limited networks of family and friends. Those with family and friends often must meet in public places because frequently the housing used by their family and friends is inaccessible. This means that shelters are more important for people with disabilities than for people without disabilities. It may be the only option for housing in an evacuation.

We surveyed shelters on the eve of Hurricane Sandy. We found entrances up flights of steps or with dangerous ramps that led to locked doors with no way to signal someone to open the doors. Signage to "accessible" entrances was lacking. Once inside, we found that restrooms were not accessible for individuals with wheelchairs—and no accessible port-a-potties had been provided. There were no accessible cots. It would be impossible for many people with disabilities to transfer in and out of a standard cot which meant that an individual would have to remain in their chair for the entire duration—risking pressure sores. Access to food or sleeping areas were sometimes on higher or lower floors—meaning that people with disabilities would have to climb stairs or use elevators that would be out of service in the case of a blackout—trapping them.

Shelters did not have ASL interpreters. They had shelter rules in small print with no alternate formats. We spoke with staff who frankly admitted that their shelters were

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not accessible and that they had received no training on disability and reasonable accommodation issues. In one instance, staff at an inaccessible shelter told us that they were referring people with disabilities to another shelter, when we checked the second shelter staff told us that they were not accessible for people with disabilities and that they referred people with disabilities back to the first shelter.

Unless shelters are fully accessible—why should people with disabilities evacuate?

### ***Health Care***

Many people with disabilities rely on assistive technology, mediation and aides on a daily basis. During and after Hurricane Sandy—we heard from people who: ran out of medication and couldn't leave their homes to get to a pharmacy and many pharmacies were closed; dialysis centers were closed, breathing machines ceased working and people ended up in the hospital as a consequence. In some cases, people told us, their aides did not arrive. When electricity failed, people who needed electricity to power their refrigerators to keep medicine cool, power video phones, wheelchairs, breathing machines and other equipment could no longer use their equipment or had to resort in some cases to heroic volunteer efforts. Elevators became inoperative—preventing evacuation and hindering response to those who lacked food, water and medicine. Some people with disabilities still lack elevators two and a half months later. There were no provisions to get emergency generators operating in buildings without power.

People were left in congregate facilities with inadequate resources to shelter in place—lacking staff, food, water and generators that would work if flooding occurred. Then, people were evacuated from congregate facilities without medical records, medication or medical directives or staff. Family members didn't know where their relatives had been taken. This presented a potentially life-threatening situation and we are told that at least one death occurred. In shelters the evacuees from congregate facilities were placed under unwarranted restrictions—not permitted to leave, to have visitors, not given their allowances. Some people were evacuated to facilities that were overcrowded—presenting a hazardous situation. Some of these individuals have not

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been restored to their homes and still have not been able to see what remains of their belongings.

Ensuring that generators can withstand an emergency—for example by placing them on a higher floor, provision for backup generators and priority restoration for buildings that house people who rely on electricity due to their disabilities should part of any plan.

### ***Housing***

We do not know how many of the people with disabilities lost their housing as a result of Hurricane Sandy. However, we know that the loss of housing is catastrophic for people with disabilities who may end up in nursing facilities if they cannot locate affordable and accessible housing. Our chart shows that 91 out of 100 apartments available would be unusable by someone requiring accessibility. It is also worth noting that the New York Affordable Housing Registry does not list a single apartment that is accessible and affordable to low-income people with disabilities.

### ***Affordable and Accessible Permanent Housing is in Short Supply<sup>2</sup>***

<b>Location</b>	<b>All vacant rentals</b>	<b>Median monthly rent</b>	<b>Median monthly household income for disabled</b>	<b>Number vacant accessible, &amp; below median rent</b>	<b>Percentage vacant accessible &amp; below median rent</b>
New York City	67,993	----	----	5,927	8.7
Bronx	12,693	\$950	\$758	1,253	9.9
Brooklyn	18,011	\$1,030	\$853	994	5.5
Manhattan	16,473	\$1,500	\$873	1,577	9.6
Queens	17,023	\$1,200	\$1,444	1,520	8.9
Staten Island	3,792	\$1,000	\$1,712	583	15.4

<sup>2</sup> Professor Andrew Houtenville at the University of New Hampshire provided this data using public-use microdata files of the 2011 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) and the 2008-2010 American Community Survey.

It is imperative that there be a plan to transition people with disabilities from temporary housing to permanent housing in the community as part of recovery.

### ***Registries***

We understand that policymakers are recommending a voluntary registry for people with disabilities. Based on our experiences for people with disabilities living independently in New York City, we have real concerns about whether registries would help or hinder progress, and should not be considered *in lieu of or in isolation of* actual advance planning to meet the needs of people with disabilities

Our experience with registering in advance of the 2003 blackout in New York City was poor. Disability organizations were advised to register employees who needed help with evacuation at the local Fire House. When an emergency occurred, we waited for this help to arrive. When it did not arrive, we sent an employee to the Fire House in the neighborhood to get the promised help. We were told that no one was coming and that we were on our own.

There is no empirical evidence that registries work.<sup>3</sup> In general, registries are:

- Under-inclusive—people may be reluctant to register due to privacy and safety concerns;
- Difficult and expensive to keep updated;
- Based on a false premise—even people with disabilities who are labeled homebound leave their homes for appointments, to worship, etc. (if rescuers seek them at home they will waste scarce resources);
- Likely to give people a false sense of security and discourage getting other help.

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<sup>3</sup> Effective Emergency Management: Making Improvements for Communities and People with Disabilities, National Council on Disabilities, 2009.

Most importantly, registries do not to ensure an inclusive planning process that leads to full inclusion of people with disabilities in emergency preparedness and disaster response. A registry will not produce an ASL interpreter, accessible cot, accessible port-a-potty, ensure safe evacuation and preparation for sheltering in place, electricity for ventilators, accessible recovery centers, etc. They could be an expensive distraction from this important planning process. Rather the City should focus on what it needs to do with its planning with respect to people with disabilities. The conversation about (1) what steps the City can take to systematically provide for the needs of people with disabilities (and thus lessen the need for individual accommodations), and (2) how and when to identify people with disabilities in need of assistance, should be part of that conversation.

***Conclusion***

We thank the Council for holding these hearings and for inviting our testimony. We hope that the Council can encourage the development of a plan for preparing for emergencies, responding to them and helping people recover. That plan should include: communication; transportation; shelter; health care; and housing. We believe that an effective plan can only be developed with the full participation of the disability community.



Testimony of Kate MacKenzie, MS, RD, Director of Policy and Government Relations

City Harvest

New York City Council, Joint Hearing of the following Committees:

Public Safety, Fire and Criminal Justice Services, Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services, the Committee on Aging, the Committee on Health and the Committee on General Welfare

**Oversight: Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm: Disaster Management.**

January 16, 2013

Good morning Chairwoman Palma, and members of the committees. My name is Kate MacKenzie, and I am the Director of Policy and Government Relations at City Harvest. City Harvest is the world's first and New York City's only food rescue organization, dedicated to feeding the city's hungry men, women, and children by collecting excess food that would otherwise go to waste. Each week, our deliveries help feed more than 300,000 New Yorkers in need. This year we will rescue more than 42 million pounds of food.

Thank you for holding this first hearing to discuss and learn from the City's response to Hurricane Sandy. Not only did the City respond well and in a timely way overall, but there are numerous opportunities to improve and prepare for responses to future disasters. My remarks will briefly outline how City Harvest responded, and then will outline a number of recommendations that we hope will be considered.

Since the storm made landfall, City Harvest has delivered 2.7 million pounds of food in direct response to the hurricane, with targeted deliveries to communities that were hardest hit, including Red Hook, Coney Island, and Canarsie in Brooklyn, the Lower East Side of Manhattan, Breezy Point and the Rockaways in Queens, and Midland Beach, Cedar Grove, and South Beach in Staten Island. These deliveries were not just to soup kitchens and food pantries in the impacted areas, but also to pop-up relief sites and housing units, both NYCHA and others. We redirected the efforts of several staff members to the hardest hit areas to get an "on the ground" sense of needs and to identify locations where our food was needed most. More than 1,000 of City Harvest's individual and corporate volunteers played a big part in this response, preparing tens of thousands of pantry bags from bulk food donations at our Food Rescue Facility. City Harvest also helped provide prepared meals through our relationships with the restaurant community. Our partners in the food industry were asked to prepare meals that

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could be distributed to those impacted and they responded enthusiastically, helping us deliver some 30,000 meals. All of this occurred while maintaining our regular food distributions to all areas of NYC, during the busiest time of the year.

On October 31, City Harvest reached out to our city government partners in the Mayor's office, the Council, and HRA with two very simple questions: What does the City need (in terms of food), and how can City Harvest help? The responses were anything but simple.

Initially, it appeared that the shelters that were established for evacuees were key points of focus. The office of the Food Policy coordinator noted that she was focused on the shelters and was really trying to make sure that culturally appropriate (particularly Kosher) foods were available to those that needed it. While this was critical, we felt that there must be a more coordinated plan that addressed both shelters as well as impacted geographies. Our colleagues at the Council helped plug us into specific NYCHA units that were in need, as well as key contacts in Red Hook. Based on this, we reached out to the offices of all council members to hear about key needs within their district. While this approach was working, it did not seem to be the one that would elicit the best response. Where was the central plan?

Internally, City Harvest remembered the role VOAD played during September 11. I phoned into a call on November 1, in which I was the only NYC person on the call. That clearly couldn't be the right place. Later in the day, I learned of the person who was in charge of NYC VOAD. Upon connecting with him a few days later, it became clear that VOAD was really functioning to sort out in kind donations, and to serve as a match-maker of needs and supplies. This role was important, but still did not seem to be "the plan." Finally, on November 12, our Executive Director received an email invitation to participate in a call, with 2 hours and 45 minutes of notice. This "1600 hours call" was intended for the Interagency Task Force on Food and Water. It included a range of organizations that seemingly would be involved in "the plan," yet it was outdated, with old addresses. In spite of that, it was in fact this task force that appeared to be asking the questions about need and concerned about meeting those needs. I will not go into the content of those meetings because my understanding of this hearing is that it is addressing the immediate response to the storm. However, I do want to call out that it took nearly two weeks to have a coordination call to address food needs of those impacted by Hurricane Sandy.

I would very much recommend that this Task Force be functional and in communication before, during, and after disasters such as this. We should use this current disaster to identify a clear plan that will be employed during disasters, that identifies who has what responsibility and function. It seemed that the roles of VOAD, OEM, HRA, and others was not particularly understood. More so, much like the Mayor appropriately cleared mass transit trains, and established evacuation centers in advance of the storm, this interagency food task force ideally would check in in advance of a disaster, if possible.

Further, a disaster preparedness plan should be created that clearly identifies the functions of each city agency, and the expected role of non-government partners. By mid-November, our

partners in city government made it quite clear that their efforts and desires were to see businesses come back, and the non-governmental partners should ensure that resident's needs were attended to. Being aware of and part of the creation of these plans can ensure that we work together in support of full recovery.

I very much hope that subsequent hearings are convened to learn from other phases of the relief and recovery work, particularly regarding Disaster SNAP and the experiences of those living in NYCHA housing units.

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Oversight – Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm:  
Disaster Management

January 16, 2013

Good afternoon, members of the City Council. My name is James Slevin, and I am the Vice President of the Uniformed Firefighters Association. The UFA represents 20,000 active and retired Firefighters, Fire Marshals, Marine Engineers, Pilots and Wipers. During Hurricane Sandy our members performed heroically and went above and beyond for the people of New York City. Firefighters were not complaining about not being able to get to work or going out in this storm. In fact anyone that knows a NYC Firefighter, knows that they all wanted to be working during a storm of this magnitude. It takes a special person to be a NYC Firefighter and their heroic acts during the storm proved it. While tragically far too many people were killed in the storm, the number would have been in the hundreds if not for the actions of our members. Even while our members were risking their lives, hundreds of them were being personally affected by the storm. A very large percentage of our members live in some of the areas that were the hardest hit. Their homes were flooded, burned to the ground or simply washed away. Most of them are not back in their houses yet or simply do not have a house to go back to. They were forced to take what they could salvage and move their families to different locations.

The overall pre-storm response plan by the New York City Fire Department was pretty thorough but as in all disasters you learn as you go and find ways to improve. One area that was glaringly deficient was the failure to staff all companies with an adequate number of Firefighters. Knowing that this was going to be a "monster" storm, the department should have staffed every engine company with a 5<sup>th</sup> Firefighter. During the storm every single FDNY unit was heavily engaged in storm response. The availability of units dropped below 10%. Things were so desperate that the first engine company responding to the Breezy Pointe fire was Engine 10 in lower Manhattan. The second was Engine 14 in Chelsea. There is no doubt that a 5<sup>th</sup> Firefighter would have been helpful. Numerous units operated by themselves and there was no second engine to team up with. There was not one area of the City that wasn't affected by Sandy. From City Island to Tottenville, fires raged, homes flooded and cranes collapsed. Rather than just providing adequate staffing on 60 companies, every engine company should have been fully staffed. The Incident Management Team (IMT) had no lack of personal assigned to it and the

same should have happened in the field units. The additional staffing costs are likely going to be reimbursed by FEMA. For the safety of the Firefighters and citizens of NYC future storm planning should include adequate staffing.

There was also a lack of manpower within the Fire Marshals. OEM requested 80 teams of marshals to assist them. FEMA requested ten teams of marshals to assist them, too. The Chief Fire Marshal could not provide the requested marshals due to lack of staffing. We currently have approximately 95 marshals. Actual operational marshals in the field are significantly lower. Furthermore, and most important, we could not adequately provide security for the firehouses affected by the hurricane. The Bureau only had the manpower to establish three teams to do a roving patrol, instead of securing each firehouse affected, as conditions warranted. More Marshals could have secured firehouses, escorted rigs on certain boxes, and worked in concert with FEMA, OEM and the IMT units to better assist during the hurricane.

As you are aware, over two dozen Firehouses were completely flooded out. Companies were forced to relocate and respond from houses out of their districts. This in itself was a major problem but there are things that can be put in place to get them back in their quarters quicker. The first is proper disaster planning in designing future firehouses and future firehouse renovations. Any firehouses in flood zones should not have any critical equipment or infrastructure installed or stored below the flood level. A brand new firehouse in the Rockaway's had a backup electrical generator installed on the first floor. It was flooded in the storm surge and rendered useless. This generator should have been located on the roof out of the floodwaters. This firehouse was in a known flood area and a generator should have never been placed there. This was the case in many of the other firehouses as well. All firehouses should undergo a survey to see if there is a way to move critical equipment and infrastructure above a potential storm surge.

Firefighting gear was also soaked and contaminated during the storm. Firefighters operated in conditions that were outright dangerous and hazardous. Often they were in water that was chest deep or sometimes even over their heads. One firefighter in Breezy point had to go "snorkeling" to find a working fire hydrant. Others in Staten Island were in boats that couldn't even over power the storm surge. The boats were not powerful enough and were pushed backwards. Those not in boats were in water up to their heads rescuing people off of roofs and upper floor windows. As a result their bunker gear was soaked and contaminated with raw sewage, petroleum and other contaminants. Many of these members had backup gear back in the firehouses that was also soaked due to the storm surge. The department was able to provide some loaner gear in a short amount of time but it wasn't enough. Unfortunately the vendor that cleans all the gear was also knocked out in the storm. Firefighters are only assigned one set of boots to wear with their bunker gear and the department was not able to quickly provide an adequate number of back up boots. For the future all firefighters should have a second pair of boots and firehouses should have boot dryers installed.

was under-prepared for a storm of this magnitude and we cannot allow it to happen again.

In closing I would like to say thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. Overall the planning and response of the FDNY was good, but there are always areas for improvement. I hope we can get these recommendations in place before the next disaster strikes.



# The Uniformed EMT's, Paramedics and Inspectors – F.D.N.Y.

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# Testimony of Israel Miranda President of Local 2507

## January 16th 2013

## Testimony of Israel Miranda Local 2507 President

Good afternoon distinguished committee chairs and members of the City Council My name is Israel Miranda. I am the President of Local 2507 representing the 3500 Emergency Medical Service EMT's & Paramedics of The FDNY Emergency Medical Service Command.

I come here today to provide testimony regarding the FDNY EMS Command response to Super-Storm Sandy. I present this narrative to you, not in the form of a complaint, but rather as a plea for your intervention in this matter of extreme importance. The command decisions enforced by EMSC Chief Nahmod resulted in a clear, present and serious threat to safety and well being of the health care professionals who so bravely serve the citizens of our great city. I am pleading that this legislative body use all and any means necessary to protect and defend the safety and well being of The EMT's & Paramedics of the FDNY. Disaster preparedness consists of 2 keystone tenets: probability and predictability. Sandy has been touted as "the storm of the century", a moniker that has been bestowed on 3 events in the last 5 years, and yet here we are once again judging the inadequate response of FDNY EMS to a metrological disaster. Sandy was predicted 7 days before landfall, yet the storm plan was released only 24 hours preceding the event.

The plan, although released, was never implemented. Chief Nahmod by not adequately preparing for evacuation of personnel and equipment caused the department to incur losses that exceed 2.5 million dollars.

Chief Nahmod has jeopardized the safety of the public and his front line EMT's, Paramedics, Lieutenants and Captains by not ordering evacuation of personnel and equipment from flooded facilities. As an

example Station 4 is located on a South Street pier. The firehouse located across the street was evacuated in the early hours of the storm day. However, the members of EMSC were ordered to “shelter in place” by Chief Nahmod. Even as the 13 foot debris laden tidal surge swept through the facility and despite pleas from rescuers whose boots on the ground Chief Nahmod instructed them to “shelter in place” but retreat to the 2<sup>nd</sup> floor.

Even when a fire broke out in the facility, the facility Chief, as directed by Nahmod, refused to abandon the station. When the fire was extinguished by the rising tidal surge the line officers disobeyed command and evacuated the station, but not before the diminutive facility chief had to be carried in a wheel chair thru the rushing flood waters for her own safety thus forever enshrining her as the Cleopatra of EMS (exhibit 1-2-3)

As you know EMS crews respond to assignment not from facilities but from unsheltered cross street locations. On that day as wind speeds approached 85 mph, Chief Nahmod via radio ordered all units to remain at those unsheltered cross street locations despite knowing that some of those intersections were located in mandatory evacuation zones. The safety of the workers was never considered resulting in the near drowning of three members whose only means of salvation was to invoke the intervention of a higher power and stand on the roof of their ambulance as it floated down Rockaway Beach Blvd. (exhibit 4)

Chief Nahmod's impractical solution to maintain operations was to have members change shifts in the wind swept, blacked out, flood ravaged street

leaving off going EMT's and paramedics stranded with no means of protection or access to transportation. (Exhibit 5-6)

In the preceding testimony we were revealed with stories concerning the magnificent, efficient directed response of The EMSC command. Chief Nahmod may be entitled to his own opinions, but he certainly not entitled to his own facts. The failure to issue a re-call to off duty personnel and the denial of requests from off duty members to aid the response were made in the name of budgetary consideration and despite the contention that staffing levels were adequate an mutual aid assistance call was issued. The call for ambulances from surrounding counties, staffed with geographically ignorant crews, and no radio inter operability constituted the proverbial lip-stick on a pig. Those mutual aid units did not respond to single 911 incident. They instead languished at Floyd Bennett Field un-utilized and idle. The assertion that mutual aid and staffing enhancement with marginally trained academy cadets was sufficient to insure adequate response should be considered be-bunked myths. The course of action implemented by Chief Nahmod was at best feeble and in reality grossly negligent. The response by the Fire Department, at least in the EMS arena ignored multiple Homeland Security Directives as well as an arbitration decision regarding span of control that resulted in the Chief of EMS command enacting policies that prohibited a well-coordinated, efficient response. In fact after the 2010 blizzard investigation that resulted in the demotion of Chief Perruigga, when Chief Nahmod was Commander of the Communications Division, his response to the events surrounding of that incident was to initiate a program called call cueing. Chief Nahmod maintains the service received 5700 calls on that day, yet units responded to only 3200. That system of call cueing instituted by Chief Nahmod systematically denied service to distressed New Yorkers

whose calls were held more than 6 minutes and thus would have adversely affected their advertised and touted 6-minute response time. The most serious call types were routinely downgraded to lower priorities where they were held for 1 hour and then disappeared into cyber space. In fact records provided show that no fewer than 300 calls were cued & eventually dropped in the first 15 minutes during the onset of the storm. (Exhibit 7)

One call, received from an elderly couple in Far Rockaway, was held, cued and eventually dropped. The husband again called 911 when no responders came to their aid. The second call was held, cued and again dropped. Some 2 days later a National Guard unit flagged down a passing EMS ambulance. The crew upon entering the residence found the elderly couple to be deceased apparently drowned. Had those calls been answered or those calls re-sent to another agency the outcome would surely been different. (Exhibit 8)

Since hurricane Sandy a new protocol of call classification, coupled with call cueing, is seeing the most serious callers being instantly down graded based on patient pedigree and thus not being counted in response times. (Exhibit 9 & 10) The FDNY EMS is no longer a nationally recognized advocate for patient care, but instead is morphing into a platform for the self aggrandizing of its Chief with an eye toward post retirement employment.

In closing I again beseech this council to seize the opportunity to abrogate the danger Chief Nahmod has created via his inability to consider any factors apart from budgetary items and jerry rigged response times which are maintained at artificially low levels via the slight of hand method of call cueing. You are being presented with the unique opportunity to potentially save the lives of unsuspecting New Yorkers whose call for help are being

dismissed. You can in effect become the angle guardians to the EMT's & paramedics who are the angles of this city.

FTR



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*250 Broadway, 16<sup>th</sup> Floor*  
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*January 16, 2013*

*Urban Justice Center - Community Development Project*

***Testimony before the Committees on General Welfare, Fire & Criminal Justice Services;  
Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services; Public  
Safety; Aging; and Health***

Good morning. My name is Harvey Epstein; I am the Project Director of the Community Development Project at the Urban Justice Center. The Urban Justice Center is a project-based umbrella legal services and advocacy organization serving New York City residents. In the past 28 years, the Urban Justice Center has provided direct legal assistance, systemic advocacy and community education to low and moderate income rent regulated tenants in New York City. The Community Development Project (CDP) of the Urban Justice Center formed in September 2001 to provide legal, technical, research and policy assistance to grassroots community groups engaged in a wide range of community development efforts throughout New York City. Our work is informed by the belief that real and lasting change in low-income, urban neighborhoods is often rooted in the empowerment of grassroots, community institutions.

I am here to discuss the City's evacuation and decision-making plans as they relate to Superstorm Sandy. In addition, I plan on commenting on the City's public communications efforts and other aspects of emergency response. I want to thank the City Council for taking the time to allow the public to testify about their experiences before, during, and after the storm. I live in lower Manhattan, and while I do not live in an area that was designated as an evacuation zone, I did lose power with the rest of lower Manhattan. My battery operated radio was extremely helpful to me to get updated information about what was going on around the city and the country. Unfortunately, many of my friends and neighbors did not have access to any reliable sources of information. For most of the week without power, we saw almost no governmental presence in our buildings or on our streets. No one from FEMA, NYCHA, or any other governmental agency was coming around to check in on elderly residents who were stuck in their apartments without electricity, heat, or water. During that critical first week after the storm, there appeared to be no coordinated governmental effort to assist the most vulnerable populations who needed basic necessities such as food and medicine.

There were many things that could have been done differently and that the City should now consider doing differently in the future. For example, the City could have provided informational flyers to all tenants and property owners before Sandy that would have provided information about what to do to prepare for and to survive the storm, such as the location of shelters and who to contact for assistance before during and after the emergency. The City also should have arranged for the transportation and temporary relocation of the most vulnerable residents who lived in the mandatory evacuation zones, including low-income residents, senior citizens, and persons with disabilities. Mandatory evacuation orders are meaningless when poverty, age, and/or disability can prevent thousands of people from being able to relocate in the absence of governmental assistance. Finally, of the very little information that was available, almost none of that information was translated into the major languages necessary for our multi-lingual city.

Another area that the City must address in its future disaster response plans is its relationship to community-based organizations. As the City Council knows, New York is a great city with amazing community-based organizations. Immediately after the storm hit the city, organizations like CAAAV: Organizing Asian Communities and Good Old Lower East Side (GOLES) went to work to provide emergency disaster relief. They organized volunteers to go door-to-door in hundreds of buildings in order to distribute the batteries, food, and supplies that were so badly needed throughout the Lower East Side, East Village, and Chinatown. While GOLES did receive substantial support from Councilmember Mendez's office, both GOLES and CAAAV were operating without any support from governmental or private disaster relief agencies. In fact, it seemed like while many governmental agencies did not have a structured and coordinated response to the disaster, they wanted to hamper the efforts of community-based organizations. As an example, when NYPD officers first noticed CAAAV's disaster relief center that was being run out of their office on Hester Street, the officers initial response was to try to shut down the center and send dozens of residents away from the only source of donated supplies that had been set up in the area. When one of Urban Justice Center's staff attorneys went with CAAAV's Executive Director to speak with someone at the 7<sup>th</sup> Precinct about the officers' conduct, they were astounded to discover that precinct had put up CAAAV's flyers on their doors, directing area residents to the same CAAAV relief center. While eventually a higher ranking officer in the Community Affairs division intervened and directed the patrol officers to allow the center to continue its operations, it is very troubling that the patrol officers' first reaction to community-led disaster relief efforts was an attempt to stop their operations and limit the assistance they were providing to vulnerable residents. The City should have applauded the efforts of CAAAV and GOLES and provided more support for their efforts.

After the storm, New Yorkers from every corner of the city came out to volunteer. Thousands of people, whose only thoughts were to help other New Yorkers, donated and transported food, batteries, flashlights, and other necessary items. People walked through buildings knocking on doors and checking on tenants. These were New Yorkers at their best. However, the community-based organizations coordinating these volunteer efforts needed more assistance (including funding and supplies) from government agencies. With sufficient support these CBO's could have reached more tenants, provided more help, and reduced the suffering of New York's most vulnerable residents. I would ask the City to compile a list of those organizations and that when another natural disaster occurs, that City agencies would be required

to coordinate relief efforts with the staff at these CBO's who have the best knowledge of their own neighborhoods so that we can efficiently and effectively respond to all of the many consequences of major storms and other disasters.

In conclusion, we support the City's efforts to critically analyze and improve its response to future natural and man-made disasters. While insufficient planning and staffing resulted in unnecessary hardships for many low income and elderly residents in the aftermath of Sandy, we hope the feedback provided today will help the City to correct these problems and to become more effective, equitable, and accountable in its response to future disasters. Thank you giving me the opportunity to testify on these important issues.

FTR

**Testimony to the Committee on Public Safety with the  
Committee on General Welfare**

**January 16, 2013**

**Statement Regarding Center-Based Day Care and Head Start Centers  
Closed From Damage after Hurricane Sandy**

**G.L. Tyler  
Political Action Director  
District Council 1707 AFSCME**

On behalf of Executive Director Raglan George, Jr. and the Executive Board of District Council 1707, AFSCME, I want to thank the Committee for allowing me to present this testimony regarding City-funded center-based day care and Head Start Centers closed by Hurricane Sandy.

The number of centers closed by Hurricane Sandy was greater than the centers listed today but some centers have opened to smaller capacities and others have merged temporarily with other centers in the same neighborhoods.

At issue for the Union, acting as an advocate for children, more than 800 children and their families had their childcare displaced. The eight centers which remain shuttered may not open in the near future or maybe not at all due to structural damage to the centers, basic equipment replacement (refrigerators, desks, tables, etc.), electrical, heat and plumbing repairs. While some of these centers are located in public housing, it should be incumbent on the City to provide the necessary funding to make these centers viable again.

District Council 1707 would like to work with ACS on contingency plans for the future to assist parents to find other sites for care and to insure that workers receive temporary support obtaining employment and/or other assistance until their workplaces are repaired. Parents have complained to our members their difficulties finding appropriate care for their children since the hurricane.

It is hoped that the City of New York and the City Council can further assist the damaged centers; particularly the ones in public housing, receive the necessary assistance to reopen.

It is important that the City take a comprehensive approach to providing the necessary services to insure that the parents and their children have safe, quality and affordable child care because child care remains a vital component to the city's economy. Child care workers who have been affected by Hurricane Sandy and by Early Learn have had difficulties obtaining assistance other than unemployment insurance. Some members have told the union they are not eligible for Medicaid and other health services for themselves or their loved ones because they earn more than the programs allowed.

**Center-Based Day Care and Head Start Centers still closed on  
January 16, 2013 Due to Hurricane Sandy**

<b>Madeline Jones Head Start</b>	<b>3415 Neptune Avenue Brooklyn NY 11224</b>
<b>Coney Island Community DCC</b>	<b>3001 West 37<sup>th</sup> Street Brooklyn NY 11224</b>
<b>Roberta Bright DCC</b>	<b>3001 West 37<sup>th</sup> Street Brooklyn NY 11224</b>
<b>Family Head Start</b>	<b>2960 West 27<sup>th</sup> Street Brooklyn NY 11224</b>
<b>P.A.L La Puerta 2 DCC</b>	<b>868 West 21st Street Brooklyn NY 11224</b>
<b>P.A.L Carey Gardens DCC</b>	<b>2964 West 23<sup>rd</sup> Street Brooklyn NY, 11224</b>
<b>Virginia Day Nursery DCC</b>	<b>464 East 10<sup>th</sup> Street New York, N.Y 10010</b>
<b>Rockaway Child Care Center</b>	<b>14-66 Beach Channel Drive Far Rockaway 11691</b>
<b>Sheldon R. Weaver DCC</b>	<b>1279 Redfern Avenue Far Rockaway 11691</b>

**Testimony by Leticia Remauro, Chair of Community Board 1 Staten Island, before the joint Committees on Public Safety, Fire and Criminal Justice Services, Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services, Aging, Health and General Welfare – January 16, 2013, regarding Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm: Disaster Management.**

Good morning, Chairpersons Vallone, Crowley, Lappin, Palma, Arroyo & Koppell. My name is Leticia Remauro and I am the Chair of Community Board 1 in Staten Island. I want to thank you for inviting me here today to testify before you with respect to Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm.

As you know, the shores of Staten Island were hard hit by Sandy. From Port Richmond, to Ft. Wadsworth and around the bend from South Beach to the Southern tip of Tottenville, lives were lost, homes and businesses were washed from their foundations and possessions were swept away in what was one of the most destructive storms our island has seen in our lifetime.

Those of us who could, were out there immediately following the storm, organizing volunteers and trying to open up the lines of communication anyway possible. Contact was made through text messages to and from phones that were charged by car batteries. Facebook pages were started to match people in need with people who were willing to donate. Twitter was used to relay information about those who needed to be rescued, and when all else failed, first responders (whether official or deputized by human nature) sloshed out into the sodden streets fighting through debris to help those who had not been heard from.

Staten Islanders are often referred to in less than complimentary terms. But following Sandy words such as resourceful, resilient, unstoppable and heroic replaced some of the snarky words people have used to describe our populous.

Unfortunately, while we proved that we could rely upon ourselves, City Hall demonstrated that for all the love it professes to have for us, we are still the forgotten borough.

All of the dead were not yet uncovered when our Mayor insisted that we should go on with the New York City Marathon. Some were appalled by the Mayor's indifference to our plight, but others understood that it was simply a case of City Hall acting before they truly understood the extent of the damage. Since most of the damage was done far away from the inner metropolis, many didn't know Sandy's true impact on our city. They acted too soon and without all the information – a mistake that would be repeated time and again throughout the weeks following the storm and indeed up until this day.

It is my opinion that the Office of Emergency Management should take the lead in an emergency, however, to those of us on the ground closest to the activity, it seemed that the Department of Homeless Services and the Law Department were steering the ship.

While I applaud the good work of Commissioner Diamond and Counselor Cardoza who have managed to keep us from unraveling fully, I believe that we may have all been better off if we had followed the accepted practices in an emergency.

If you read any emergency preparedness manual it tells you that the most important thing you can do in an emergency is to remain calm. Do not rush in until you assess the situation.

If we had followed that rule perhaps we would have cancelled the marathon and had enough hotel rooms to house those who were displaced by the storm.

The next ten things our manual tells us to be ready with is 1) food 2) water 3) first aid 4) communication 5) lighting 6) sleeping supplies 7) cash 8) personal hygiene 9) clothing 10) tools.

Having been on the ground running volunteers out of six different locations from October 31 – December 25, 2012, I can personally attest to the fact that there was food, water and clothing being deposited by the tractor trailer loads. Unfortunately, it was being deposited in areas where people could not get to it. Miller Field was an excellent location for a base camp, but it was not the only place supplies were needed. Thank goodness for the neighborhood hubs that sprang up in South Beach, Midland Beach, New Dorp Beach, Cedar Grove, Great Kills, Eltingville, Prince's Bay, Tottenville, Port Richmond and Bay Street.

While most of the damage was concentrated in the South, New Dorp and Midland Beach area, those were not the only areas impacted by Sandy. People all along the coast – north, south, east and west, were without electricity, vehicles, water and food for many weeks.

I also wonder, now that we have had time to reflect on it, four months after Sandy and still without much needed federal aid – if we still think it was a good idea to turn away a visit from the President of the United States in the days immediately following Sandy. We knew we would be looking to the President to provide us with numbers 3) first aid, 6) sleeping supplies 7) cash, yet we decided to skip over 4) communication and decided against showing him the true extent of the damage Sandy wreaked upon us.

Some say a Presidential visit would have cost too much money. Others say that we wanted to wait to have the damage cleaned up a bit before we accepted a visit from the President. I say, if either of those explanations are true we may be suffering a bit of post traumatic stress.

We were in crisis----we are still in crisis. We have a long way to go before we are repaired and little that city government has done to date has expedited our recovery. In fact, I believe that we made many hasty moves that have had to be undone and therefore cost us time, money and possibly lives.

The Rapid Repair Program is anything but rapid and by many accounts it is not working. \$500 million dollars has been allotted for a program that was supposed to have cleaned, dried and electrified 800 houses a day so that homeowners could be back in their homes before winter fully set in. What we got instead was layers of bureaucracy in both government contracting

agencies and union leadership that resulted in money being paid to out of state laborers and business owners while the small mom and pop home improvement businesses watched from the sidelines as jobs were botched and had to be redone because NYC code was not followed because big companies who received the emergency contracts from DEP were incapable of oversight because they are not familiar with the nature of home improvement jobs.

And while we are on the subject of small businesses, that may be the single largest government failure in the wake of this emergency.

Does anyone else besides me find it ironic that every elected official rushed to extend unemployment for those who lost their job due to Sandy but not one thought to offer no cost grants to businesses to get their shops up and running so that they can keep paying their employees who in turn pay their taxes which in turn gives government the money to offer these grants?

I have been to countless seminars informing small businesses about the help the government is offering by way of a low interest loan. I wonder though, why is the government charging interest on money that they get for free? I also wonder why government doesn't see the importance of insuring that it has a cash flow by investing in the established small businesses in NYC. (That is number 7 on our emergency preparedness list for those of you who are interested in following along)

Let me put this in perspective for you....on the north and west shore of Staten Island, 51 small businesses employing 1000 employees suffered loses that averaged between \$500,000 and a million dollars. When an insurance company comes out and takes a look at a claim in an amount that large – especially when it was part of a greater event, do you think they are just going to say “okay, here is your million bucks. Nice doing business with you. Have a nice day.” Or do you think they are going to haggle. Of course they are going to haggle. It doesn't matter what the governor says or how much red tape the president cut....the insurance company is in control and they will haggle until the business owner is exhausted to save money on the pay out of the claim.

So what is government's responsibility in this? Well, I'm no professor of economics but I think even an average Jane like me can tell you that you should always take steps to preserve the entity that sustains you before taking care of the ancillary details.

It's simple common sense – when you are on a plane and the oxygen masks drop, the one who will care for others should put the mask on first. If business pays taxes and employs others who pay taxes and if government exists because of the taxes it collects then someone ought to be looking out for the people who are causing the taxes to be paid.

In future, might I suggest the government offer established small business owners who demonstrate that they are keeping people employed no interest bridge loans so that they stay open while they battle the insurance companies? It may sound like simple common sense, but I hope you will think about it nonetheless.

If I had more time I would carry on about the people who had savings accounts being forced to spend every dollar they had before receiving government assistance in the way of food stamps but I will spare you because we already covered # 1 on our emergency preparedness list.

Now let's get to #10 on our list, shall we – tools. If instead of Rapid Repair the City had chosen to give homeowners the tools they needed to get back into their home – we would likely have seen greater success at a reduced cost. If we gave each homeowner with a sticker on his/her house \$20,000 to replace the boiler and electric it would have cost the City \$240 million – empowered the homeowner to make good decisions and kept every mom and pop home improvement company working thereby putting the money back into our local economy and keeping New York City businesses paying taxes and New York City residents employed (not to mention that it would have saved us \$260 million dollars.)

Lastly I want to turn your focus to #6 sleeping supplies. We already spoke about the lack of hotel rooms so I won't go back there. Let's instead discuss trailers. While everyone was saying that they didn't want to create a refugee camp by placing trailers in a field, why wasn't anyone discussing placing trailers on the pads of demolished homes as a temporary residence until the city and the resident could decide what to do next? The sewer, water, gas and electric hook up is already there. In the event of another storm, the trailer could be moved to a safe location. It may not be the best solution, but it is no worse than having people stay in a shelter or a hotel, eating through their life savings while paying mortgages on a home they may never be able to occupy again while we try to figure out flood plains, zoning and building codes so that they can be protected in the future.

Again, I do not profess to be the brightest bulb that burned, but I think this is an idea worth looking into.

At the risk of repeating myself, emergency preparedness comes down to these simple steps: Stay calm and don't rush in. Take the time to assess the situation. Be prepared by having 1) food 2) water 3) first aid 4) communication 5) lighting 6) sleeping supplies 7) cash 8) personal hygiene 9) clothing 10) tools.

If we do these things going forward, perhaps we will be better prepared to handle our next emergency.

Respectfully submitted by:

Leticia Remauro, Chair

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New York City Council Committee on Public Safety, jointly with Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services, The Committee on Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services, The Committee on Aging and Committee on Health, and the Committee on General Welfare

Hearing on Oversight: Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm: Disaster Management

January 16, 2013

Testimony presented by

Jed A. Levine

Executive Vice President

Director of Programs and Services

Alzheimer's Association, New York City Chapter

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today to discuss the importance of disaster planning for persons with Alzheimer's, other dementias, their family and paid caregivers and related dementias. I am Jed Levine, Executive Vice President of the Alzheimer's Association, New York City Chapter. Founded in 1978, the Chapter is one of seven statewide and 78 nationally that deliver services and provide care and support, free of charge, and support research into the cause and hopefully, one day a cure for this devastating disease. The New York City Chapter serves an estimated 500,000 New Yorkers, those with Alzheimer's and related disorders and their family members and paid caregivers who care for them.

Alzheimer's is a progressive and fatal brain disease, mostly affecting the elderly, which threatens to overwhelm the health care system, if we don't find a way of preventing, or hopefully curing it one day. Approximately 5 million people in the United States are living with Alzheimer's disease – 5% reside in New York City. That number is expected to grow to as many as 16 million by mid-century. Every 68 seconds someone is diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease and we expect by 2030 there will be 7.7 million people age 65 and older living with Alzheimer's. The financial ramifications of the disease are daunting and currently cost America over \$200 billion annually.

Today, an estimated 250,000 people in the New York City area, diagnosed with dementia or Alzheimer's disease, are living with losses that are unimaginable to those of us who do not suffer from this illness. This debilitating disease not only robs persons with dementia (PWD) of their memory but also causes problems with thinking and behavior severe enough to adversely impact nearly every aspect of their daily lives. The PWD is no longer able to work, enjoy lifelong hobbies or social life. The lives of their family members are profoundly affected as well. They become increasingly isolated as their caregiving responsibilities escalate. Alzheimer's and other dementias are one of the leading causes of dependency and disability in older adults.

The Alzheimer's Association, NYC Chapter is on the front lines every day providing a wide variety of educational and support programs including over 120 support groups, the MedicAlert + Safe Return Program, a 24 hour helpline and care consultations with professional counselors all designed to assist caregivers, family members and persons with dementia develop methods for successfully coping with this progressive and terminal illness. We also train home care workers and others to better care for a person with dementia. A major focus for the Chapter is outreach to the Latino, Chinese, African-American and Russian communities and other underserved populations.

Even though our offices were closed for three days during Hurricane Sandy, and didn't open to the public until the following Monday, we were able to provide support to families because our 24 hour Helpline is answered by our National office in Chicago when we are not available, and our MedicAlert + Safe Return Program also provides off hour coverage 24 hours a day from California.

People with dementia, including residents of long term care facilities are at increased risk for wandering during a disaster. Our local MedicAlert + Safe Return Manager and team work closely with several city agencies whenever there is a missing person, whether or not a Silver Alert has been posted. We notify OEM or are notified by OEM, and coordinate our response with NYPD and with DFTA. We have a long history of working with NYPD, doing role call trainings on MedicAlert + Safe Return (MASR) , and working with the detective who is assigned to MASR when there is a missing person. We work with the Missing Persons unit to get more detailed information about the incident.

Having worked at the Chapter during 9/11 and a member of an advisory group to the National Association and the Louisiana chapter after Katrina, and co-author of a chapter on Disaster Preparedness for Persons with Dementia I am in a unique position to make some observations and recommendations about

the special needs of cognitively impaired people during the evacuation, displacement and post-disaster period.

In disaster situations we require all of our physical, emotional and cognitive resources to weather the storm. Those with dementia, by the very nature of the disease are made that much more vulnerable. Their diminishing ability to think abstractly, change plans and create new strategies puts them at higher risk, whether they are living at home alone, with home care, or in a residential care setting. We also must consider the stage of illness. Those in the early stage might have more resources available to them, but a sudden change in routine might prove overwhelming, even if they have been doing well on their own prior to the situation. Those in later stages obviously need more support. The response to a disaster is unpredictable, but be prepared for a person with dementia to hide, fight back, pace or refuse to leave the premises. The added stress of the disaster makes it even more difficult for a person with dementia to handle frustration. They most likely will forget what they have been told about the disaster; react with a catastrophic reaction, i.e. becoming more confused, yelling, hitting out, or becoming more agitated.

During Hurricane Sandy and immediately afterward, two elderly women, one in Brooklyn and one in the Bronx were found wandering, confused and disoriented. They were identified and returned to a safe and secure environment because they were registered in our MedicAlert + Safe Return Program. One woman living alone, was found outside her home in Brooklyn, naked, cold and scared. Apparently when the lights went off she panicked and ran outside into the night. The police were called and they took her to the ER where the doctor saw her Safe Return bracelet. She was reunited with her family. Both families received counseling and guidance from our Care Consultants and helped to make a safer long term plan.

Understanding this helps caregivers and emergency responders respond in a way that minimizes these reactions, or at least does not exacerbate them.

### **Recommendations:**

1. Have an emergency Go-Bag for the person with dementia, and their caregiver. In addition to the usual recommended items, (see attached sheet), this should include extra medications, list of medications and dosages, change of clothing, incontinence supplies if needed, favorite snacks,

and small items that might be comforting to the affected person.

2. Be on the look-out for pre-wandering signals – pacing, asking to go home, and agitation.
3. Do not leave the person alone, and inform others, in the shelter, in the hospital or emergency responders that your relative has dementia and may not understand what is happening.
4. Continue to reassure the person with dementia. Do your best to stay calm. If possible, get them to a quiet, safe, less stimulating environment.
5. Before the disaster all persons with dementia should be registered in the MedicAlert + Alzheimer's Association's Safe Return Program. You have heard how it helped several people during the disaster. One other advantage is that it can be used as a de-facto electronic medical record. If everyone with dementia from the nursing homes that were evacuated had been registered, the receiving hospitals and homes would at least have had the names of next of kin, the patient's diagnoses, current meds and lists of allergies. And it would be a way for families to track where their family members were.

6. Training for Emergency Responders on the needs of persons with dementia. The Association is available to provide training to Emergency Responders, the Red Cross and City Agencies, including HHC, about managing persons with dementia in an emergency.
7. Specialized shelters for those with special needs, including those with cognitive impairment. If possible, having specialized shelters would greatly improve the outcome for persons with dementia and their families.

AFTER THE DISASTER - One special consideration for persons who are cognitively impaired is that, like the rest of us, the trauma of the disaster continues to linger and affect the emotional wellbeing of those who have experienced it long after the immediate danger is passed. Unfortunately those with cognitive impairment are less able to process and resolve the feelings of unease, anxiety, and irritability. We strongly recommend that exposure to the pervasive 24 hour coverage on TV and radio be limited or eliminated altogether for those with cognitive impairments.

Families that were displaced and caring for a relative with dementia need special assistance finding appropriate resources and programs. One family, forced to leave their apartment in Coney Island were temporarily housed in a hotel in Times Square.

This elderly man caring for his 82 year old wife with Alzheimer's needed counseling and support to deal with FEMA and how to manage his wife's increased agitation and confusion. She wandered away several times, but was found, as she is registered in our MedicAlert + Safe Return. We were able to help him with getting the hotel to add a more secure lock to the door. We were also help him organize the cleaning up of his their apartment which was flooded by water from the apartments above him, as taps were left on when the water was cut off, and then flooded when it was restored. They are now safely home, and she is back at the Social Adult Day Program that she attended prior to the storm.

Before I end I want to recognize the work of home care workers, many of whom heroically stayed with their patient, in dark, cold apartments, without adequate food or water. Many of them did this while neglecting their own families and risking their own well-being. They are truly the unsung heroes of the disaster.

A word about family caregivers. Unless you've lived the life of a caregiver for a person with dementia, you cannot understand how demanding, how challenging, and how exhausting it can be. Most caregivers find it hard to plan for the next day...let alone for an emergency. We know that there are increased rates of depression, stress and more doctors' visits. Given the ongoing

demands, caregivers are at greater risk for not being as resilient when facing a disaster. Although it is challenging, we encourage caregivers, especially those who live in disaster prone areas to make the effort to put together a go-bag, have their relative's important information on a secure website or sent to an out of town relative via email, and have a plan for evacuation, know where they will stay, and with whom, etc. We also know that access to guidance and support, such as those that the Association offers such as our 24 hour helpline, support groups and care consultation help foster resiliency in caregivers.

Due to the limited time, I have focused primarily on the needs of community dwelling persons. There are special protocols that we can share for those living in nursing homes, adult homes and assisted living programs. I am aware there will be another hearing in two weeks that addresses this issue.

The Alzheimer's Association, NYC Chapter stands ready to provide expert guidance and assistance to the Council in considering these matters, and how we can coordinate and cooperate with the multiple city agencies involved when a disaster strikes New York City.

Thank you.

Reference: Levine, Jed A., and Beth A. Kallmyer, "Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders." Geriatric Mental Health Disaster and Emergency Preparedness. New York; Springer, 2010.

Disaster Preparedness. Updated Nov. 2007. Copyright © Alzheimer's Association. All rights reserved.

## Disaster Preparedness

### Advance preparations

- If your loved one lives in a residential facility, find out about its disaster and evacuation plans. Ask if you will be responsible for evacuating your loved one.
- Whether your loved one lives with you, or you are a long-distance caregiver, make sure evacuation plans include his or her specific needs. Check your local Alzheimer's Association and other organizations that provide services for the elderly to see if help is available.
- Prepare an emergency kit (see below for suggestions).
- Enroll in MedicAlert® + Alzheimer's Association Safe Return®, a 24-hour nationwide emergency response service for individuals with Alzheimer's or related dementia that wander or who have a medical emergency. Call toll-free at 1.888.572.8566 or visit [www.alz.org](http://www.alz.org).
- If you are already enrolled in MedicAlert + Safe Return, make sure your information is up to date.

### If you know a pending disaster is about to occur:

- Get yourself and the person with Alzheimer's to a safe place.
- If the need to evacuate is likely, do not delay. Try to leave as early as possible to minimize long delays in heavy traffic.
- Alert others (family, friends, medical personnel) that you are changing locations, and give them your contact information. Contact them regularly as you move.
- Be sure there are people other than the primary caregiver who have copies of the person with dementia's medical history, medications, physician information and family contacts.
- Purchase extra medications.
- If your loved one uses oxygen, be sure to obtain portable tanks.

### Emergency kit

Consider preparing an emergency kit in advance. Keep it in a watertight container and store it in an easily accessible location. Your emergency kit might include:

- Easy on/off clothes (a couple of sets).
- Supplies of medication (or minimally, a list of medications with dosages).
- Velcro shoes/sneakers.
- A spare pair of eyeglasses.
- Incontinence products.
- Extra identification items for the person, such as an ID bracelet and clothing tags.
- Copies of legal documents, such as a power of attorney.
- Copies of medical documents that indicate the individual's condition and current medications.
- Copies of insurance and Social Security cards.
- Use waterproof bags to hold medications and documents.
- Physician's name, address and phone numbers (including cell phone).

- Recent picture of the person with dementia.
- Hand lotion or other items to promote comfort.
- Bottled water.
- Favorite items or foods. Liquid meals.
- Pillow, toy or something else to hug.
- Alzheimer's Association and MedicAlert + Safe Return phone numbers.

Get more information on disaster preparedness from the [National Hurricane Center](#).

### **During an evacuation**

People with dementia are especially vulnerable to chaos and emotional trauma. They have a limited ability to understand what is happening, and they may forget what they have been told about the disaster. Be alert to potential reactions that may result from changes in routine, traveling or new environments.

- When appropriate, inform others (hotel or shelter staff, family members, airline attendants) that your loved one has dementia and may not understand what is happening.
- Do not leave the person alone. It only takes a few minutes to wander away and get lost.
- Changes in routine, traveling and new environments can cause:
  - Agitation
  - Wandering
  - Increase in behavioral symptoms, including hallucinations, delusions and sleep disturbance.
- Do your best to remain calm. The person with dementia will respond to the emotional tone you set.

### **Tips for preventing agitation**

Reassure the person. Hold hands or put your arm on his or her shoulder. Say things are going to be fine.

- Find outlets for anxious energy. Take a walk together or engage the person in simple tasks.
- Redirect the person's attention if he or she becomes upset.
- Move the person to a safer or quieter place, if possible. Limit stimulation.
- Make sure the person takes medications as scheduled.
- Try to schedule regular meals and maintain a regular sleep schedule.
- Avoid elaborate or detailed explanations. Provide information using concrete terms. Follow brief explanations with reassurance.
- Be prepared to provide additional assistance with all activities of daily living.
- Pay attention to cues that the person may be overwhelmed (fidgeting, pacing).
- Remind the person that he or she is in the right place.

### **Helpful hints during an episode of agitation**

- Approach the person from the front and use his or her name.
- Use calm, positive statements and a patient, low-pitched voice. Reassure.

- Respond to the emotions being expressed rather than the content of the words. For example, say, “You’re frightened and want to go home. It’s ok. I’m right here with you.”
- Don’t argue with the person or try to correct. Instead, affirm his or her experience, reassure and try to divert attention. For example, “The noise in this shelter is frightening. Let’s see if we can find a quieter spot. Let’s look at your photo book together.”

**Take care of yourself**

- Take care of yourself by finding a good listener to hear your thoughts and feelings about the event.
- Find moments to breathe, meditate and reflect.

The Alzheimer’s Association is the world’s leading voluntary health organization in Alzheimer care, support and research.

**Updated November 2007**



January 16, 2013

Contact: Jeremy Saunders, 917.676.8041, [jeremy@vocal-ny.org](mailto:jeremy@vocal-ny.org)

### **Testimony for City Council Oversight Hearing Emergency Planning During Superstorm Sandy**

Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the New York City HIV/AIDS Services Administration's (HASA) response to superstorm Sandy. We are also submitting recommendations for principles to guide a transparent, equitable and just rebuilding process that will make New York more resilient in the face of future storms, not just in terms of our physical infrastructure but also our social services and healthcare infrastructure.

VOCAL is a grassroots membership organization building power among low-income people affected by HIV/AIDS, mass incarceration and the drug war working to create healthy and just communities. In addition, we coordinate the New York AIDS Housing Network, a coalition of agencies that provide housing assistance to people living with HIV/AIDS. In addition to creating new emergency, Sandy also exacerbated existing crises our individual and organizational were facing.

#### **HIV/AIDS Services Administration (HASA) Emergency Response After Sandy**

HASA, a division of the Human Resources Administration, provides access to housing, healthcare, nutrition and other services for over 32,000 low-income people living with HIV/AIDS and nearly 14,000 of their children or other dependents. Approximately 5% of HASA clients are homeless in emergency housing programs, 2% have Section 8 or in public housing, 14% are in permanent supportive housing and 78% reside in private market apartments with rental assistance.

HASA was woefully unprepared for an emergency like Sandy and was largely missing in action after the storm hit. The agency failed some of the most vulnerable people in this City and did not communicate effectively with clients, programs or advocates.

Note that HASA has not released information about service utilization since November 2012 that would enable us to better assess the impact Sandy had on homelessness, increased demand for services or case closures among clients. The following testimony is based on information we have gathered from HASA clients and programs directly. In the initial week after the storm, VOCAL worked with the Coalition for the Homeless to deliver blankets, water and, in some cases, food to HASA clients in supportive housing and emergency housing programs in affected areas.

I want to touch on three areas of HASA's response in particular: permanent supportive housing, emergency housing and HASA Centers.

### **Permanent Supportive Housing**

By our count, there were over 150 supportive housing units for formerly homeless people living with HIV/AIDS located below midtown that lost power, heat and/or running water after Sandy. There was little-to-no communication from HASA during the critical first week after the storm. The silver lining is that non-profit supportive housing programs had staff that quickly responded to meet the immediate needs of their clients. Notably, these are the same programs that Mayor Bloomberg has sought to enact deep cuts to since 2009, which City Council has thankfully restored every year since then.

At least three HIV/AIDS supportive housing programs had to evacuate HASA clients after the storm, often to shelters where they would be worse off and less likely to remain connected to care. Let me stress that programs did everything they could to avoid relocating clients. However, case managers in programs that did evacuate continue to work with clients to stay connected to healthcare, including mental health and substance use services.

In the case of Bailey-Holt House, the nation's first supportive housing program for people living with HIV/AIDS, the City's outdated flood zone map failed them as well. Although the building is just outside Zone A, their building was flooded and need to be evacuated.

Notably, HASA has rejected Bailey House's pleas for assistance after the storm as the agency has gone hundreds of thousands of dollars into the red due to building damage and lost revenue once clients were relocated to shelters, which does not even count the rebuilding costs. The cost of the storm continues to grow by the day. Bailey-Holt House has always represented the best of New York City's response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic – it is a shame it now serves a symbol of the Bloomberg administration's callousness towards low-income people living with HIV/AIDS.

With the exception of Bailey House, whose situation has already been publicized, we are not citing specific program names or situations due to fear of retaliation by HASA.

### **Emergency Housing**

What's even more troubling is HASA's lack of communication with homeless people living with HIV/AIDS being warehoused in for-profit shelters. Because HASA is highly secretive about the locations of these facilities, we were only able to locate one serving approximately 25 clients that was directly affected by the storm.

In this particular shelter, people with AIDS live in shoebox rooms with little space for more than a bed and small refrigerator for medication, but no cooking facilities or real storage. There's a shared bathroom and shower on each floor. People who cannot afford to live on

their own or who have severe mental health and substance use issues are typically warehoused in these programs.

No one in the shelter we visited regularly for two weeks after the storm had heard from HASA even though they had lost power, heat and, at one point, running water. Although the bottom two floors of the building had been converted into a tourist hostel, the conditions changed when you ascended into the section for HASA clients. The SRO operator did not even provide flashlights, food or extra blankets after the storm.

### **HASA Centers**

Three HASA Centers – the central office in Union Square along with the centers on Staten Island and Coney Island – were closed down after the storm with no communication to clients or their case managers. These Centers are crucial conduits for HASA clients to access emergency and permanent housing, Medicaid, nutrition support and other vital services.

There was also no communication from HASA staff with the legally-mandated HASA Advisory Board, which VOCAL-NY's Board Chair Wanda Hernandez, a HASA client in the Bronx, is a member of.

The only advice HASA provided after we reached out to the agency was for clients to call HASA's automated Serviceline (which can be difficult for clients to navigate to a live person to speak with) if they needed assistance, and for clients enrolled in a Center closed due to the storm to travel to the nearest one to them.

Were we surprised by HASA's poor response after the storm? No. But just because we've become accustomed to poor performance from the agency does not make it more acceptable.

### **Recommendations for HASA**

The storm highlighted several longstanding problems with HASA. The following recommendations represent some first steps HASA should take to become more resilient in the face of future emergencies:

- **Supportive Housing:** HASA should commit to making whole all supportive housing programs who were affected by the storm, including both physical building damage and lost revenue due to client evacuations. City Council should also restore the \$5.1 million for HASA supportive housing contracts again in the FY13 budget. The benefit of onsite case management in supportive housing programs was again made abundantly clear after the storm when they ensured stability for their clients.
- **Emergency Housing:** HASA should transition to relying primarily on contract-based transitional housing run by non-profit organizations for homeless clients. The use

of MOU-based commercial Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotels for emergency housing has long been criticized due to comparably poorer conditions due to the lack of onsite support staff, adequate oversight and enforceable standards. An emergency like Sandy further exposed the problems with this housing as there were no onsite staff, and no communication with HASA, to ensure vulnerable clients weren't abandoned after the storm.

- **Affordable Housing:** The biggest step the administration could take to reduce homelessness among HASA clients, and therefore their overreliance on the emergency housing system, would be to support the 30 percent rent cap affordable housing bill in Albany, which City Council has repeatedly endorsed through resolutions and which retains bi-partisan support in the legislature. Mayor Bloomberg has been the single biggest obstacle to the bill's passage, which would enable homeless people living with HIV/AIDS to move out of the costly and unhealthy emergency housing system and into permanent housing.
- **Communication:** HASA's Serviceline is an improved tool for communication and the agency should more widely publicize it among clients and service providers *and* increase staff dedicated to the line during emergencies. However, HASA must improve communication with clients and community-based partners, which should include working with partners like VOCAL-NY's AIDS Housing Network to disseminate information after emergencies like Sandy (we posted information on our website and circulated it over listservs with little input from HASA), but also increase their openness on an ongoing basis. The agency has a growing HASA should have a plan for how caseworkers can communicate with and track clients who may be displaced by an emergency like Sandy, at least ensuring that public benefits like Medicaid or SNAP nutritional assistance are not accidentally cut off.

### **Principles for Sandy Rebuilding**

The second set of issues we wanted to address what the City should do in rebuilding process going forward. The following recommendations are adapted from a consensus statement ***Alliance for a Just Rebuilding***, a coalition of labor unions, community groups and New Yorkers affected by Sandy that VOCAL-NY helped form to address the immediate crisis and long-term rebuilding.

**We call for an ongoing response from New York State, New York City and the federal government that builds climate, economic, housing and infrastructure sustainability together, so that our capacity to weather the coming storms is not dictated by race, class or power.**

#### **(1) Our Communities Need Immediate Relief**

The city, state and federal governments must work quickly and efficiently to address the needs of people in impacted communities and must work in concert with the community-led relief efforts that were first on the ground and have remained the core of relief work.

Relief must include: food and clean water, repairing utilities immediately, access to public transport, housing for the homeless, mold remediation, short-and long-term health care for storm-related illness, repairs and improvements to the public and affordable housing stock, and relief to those who have been left behind because they are excluded from disaster assistance under state and federal law or face insurmountable institutional barriers to assistance.

## **(2) Equitable Investment**

As public funds begin to move into rebuilding, money must be allocated first to rebuild communities that are hardest hit, including public housing and low-income housing whose residents cannot meaningfully replace their housing in the open market. Publicly-regulated funding that is not specifically disaster-related, including carbon cap-and-trade (RGGI) and utility surcharges (SBC), must also be directed to communities who face the greatest risk in the new climate, to support community-driven sustainability innovation and break the pattern of market-driven programs that fail to serve lower-income populations. Subsidies, land-use policies and new building codes shouldn't displace existing or future generations from working and living in healthy, affordable neighborhoods. All such funding must be used to create economy-building jobs that maintain critical high road job quality and safety standards that employ union labor, pay family sustaining wages, provide opportunities for training and include meaningful benefits.

## **(3) Transparency and Accountability in the Reconstruction Process**

As government agencies begin reconstruction work directly and through contracts, transparency is essential to ensure the following: money is used effectively, communities are included in the rebuilding process, communities benefit from housing or land development and job and training opportunities. Transparency must be meaningful, and accountable. Communities must have sufficient notice of decision-making processes; details of proposals and public hearings must be made widely available on the web; and community members must have opportunities to make use of this information.

## **(4) Participation, Inclusion and Decision-Making for our Communities**

Beyond transparency, communities (particularly those affected and at risk) must have a permanent place in planning and budgeting of all such funds and projects, including climate response planning. Currently, labor only has one seat on the commissions created to direct relief and rebuilding funds, and there are no seats for community organizations or leaders from communities directly affected by Sandy. A genuinely democratic and transparent recovery process empowers regular citizens – especially those in hard-hit communities – so that rebuilding creates vibrant neighborhoods. We should strengthen the role of community organizations that were first on the ground in superstorm Sandy's hardest-hit neighborhoods, give them a central role in deciding how funds for rebuilding their neighborhoods should be spent and how to prepare for future crises. Best practices of participatory planning and participatory budgeting, in which community members determine priorities and make real decisions are needed rather than traditional hearings that provide only consultative opportunities without decision-making power.

## **(5) Sustainability in a New Climate**

New York can create itself as a global model of sustainability and equity – meaning sustainability for *all* New Yorkers – in the face of the new climate. We urge city, state and federal leaders to take the threat of climate change seriously, and create a bold Climate Response Plan that ensures just, safe and resilient communities. Taxpayers expect officials to secure funds that promote development projects that benefit the environment and create good jobs, including green jobs. Rebuilding of housing and other infrastructure must be framed around sustainability and equity; and publicly regulated investments in climate change must be directed toward rebuilding of sustainable communities, not markets. Work must move beyond post-storm rebuilding to making the rest of New York City and New York State sustainable. New York must meaningfully build a green workforce that addresses income inequality and unemployment, engaging communities and contractors as equal partners at the policy table.

### **The First Call**

It is imperative to move quickly after the storm to put relief funding in place, and generate plans and solutions to the emergent changes in climate. But it is also imperative to engage communities in that movement and address long-standing equity issues in the process. The quick convening of the Moreland Commission on utilities, and the other commissions on disaster and rebuilding planning, is laudable. However, the intention of those commissions to release recommendations in January, while basic cleanup is still underway and some communities don't even have power back, reflects willingness to steam ahead without meaningful participation from impacted communities. Furthermore, the commissions fail to include significant representation from labor, community, and faith based organizations that have been at the frontlines of relief efforts. City and state agencies may have been duly consulted, and developers may have submitted plans. Communities have not been supported to move as quickly. Public and private development must be planned in an inclusive process.

**We call on Governor Cuomo, Mayor Bloomberg and President Obama to release basic repair funds quickly so that homeowners and tenants can regain their footing – and slow down the machinery of other recovery planning until that has happened. Rebuilding and prevention of future disasters cannot be done in the absence of those most impacted by such disasters. We call on the commissions, planners and developers to locate their hearings and planning sessions in affected communities, and give communities a central role in deciding how funds for rebuilding their neighborhoods should be spent and how to prepare for future crises.**

These are basic building blocks for equitable recovery, and we pledge to uphold them, and will work together in the coming months to insist that our public officials do the same.

Thank you.

## TESTIMONY

Jonathan Gaska, District Manager  
Community Board #14

January 16, 2013

### Oversight –Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm

1. The Mayor made the call for mandatory evacuation on Sunday October 28<sup>th</sup> which did not give residents or business much time to make plans to leave or protect their property since the storm and flooding occurred that night through Monday the 29<sup>th</sup>.
2. OEM is not an agency that has been willing to work with our community nor is it interested in community input. We did not have any contact with OEM during hurricane Irene or after Irene. We had no contact with OEM until 5 weeks after Sandy when they needed our help to get phone numbers of homeowners whose homes needed to be demolished. Clearly community outreach or input is not a strong point for OEM.
3. For the first 2-3 weeks after Sandy communications were difficult, phone lines were down; the internet was down and almost 90% of our district was also without power. The only way to communicate was by cell phone and that was difficult as well. Cell signals were unreliable and you had to find a generator to charge your cell phone.
4. Other than the Fire Department and the Police Department, it was the overall sense that government was absent from our community until 3 or 4 days after the storm.
5. The 911 and 311 systems were of no use to our community due to power outages and downed phone lines.

6. City and State entities need to do a much better job organizing and facilitating the evacuation of our high rise buildings and our nursing and adult homes. Hundreds of people were trapped for days and weeks in their apartments.
7. The Police Department and the Fire Department did an amazing job considering the overwhelming circumstances.
8. While it took more than a week to organize a response for the cleanup. Most of our City agencies should be commended for a job well done and Community Board #14 would like to give special recognition to the Men and Women of the Sanitation Department who worked tirelessly to clean our streets from sand and debris.

## **Testimony of The Legal Aid Society, Civil Practice**

Before the Committee on Public Safety jointly with the Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services, the Committee on Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services, the Committee on Aging, the Committee on Health and the Committee on General Welfare

### **Oversight: Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm: Disaster Management.**

**January 16, 2013**

#### **Introduction**

The Legal Aid Society is pleased to have the opportunity to address concerns raised about emergency planning. We thank Speaker Quinn and the Chairs of the Committees for convening this important hearing. The issues being discussed today are of vital concern to low income New Yorkers.

The Legal Aid Society, the nation's oldest and largest not-for-profit legal services organization, is an integral part of our City's emergency response efforts. It is more than a law firm for clients who cannot afford to pay for counsel. The Legal Aid Society is an indispensable component of the legal, social and economic fabric of New York City – passionately advocating for low-income individuals and families across a variety of civil, criminal and juvenile rights matters, while also fighting for legal reform. The Legal Aid Society has performed this role in City, State and federal courts since 1876. It does so by capitalizing on the diverse expertise, experience, and capabilities of 1,000 of the brightest legal minds. These 1,000 Legal Aid Society lawyers work with nearly 700 social workers, investigators, paralegals and support and administrative staff. Through a network of borough, neighborhood, and courthouse offices in 25 locations in New York City, the Society provides comprehensive legal services in all five boroughs of New York City for clients who cannot afford to pay for private counsel. The Society's legal program operates three major practices — Civil, Criminal and Juvenile Rights — and receives volunteer help from law firms, corporate law departments and expert consultants that is coordinated by the Society's Pro Bono program. With its annual caseload of more than 300,000 legal matters, The Legal Aid Society takes on more cases for more clients than any other legal services organization in the United States. And it brings a depth and breadth of perspective that is unmatched in the legal profession.

Our Civil Practice has offices in every borough of the City, and worked on more than 43,000 individual legal matters last year winning over 90 percent of the cases that go to court or an administrative hearing. An additional two million low-income children and adults benefit from the Civil Practice's pending class action litigation. The Civil Practice works to improve the lives of needy New Yorkers by helping vulnerable families and individuals on issues ranging from health care, housing, homelessness prevention, employment law, education, foreclosure

prevention, consumer law, community economic development, public assistance, immigration, family law and domestic violence and disability-related issues.

### **The Legal Aid Society - Summary of Efforts as Legal Services "First Responder"**

Beginning in the immediate aftermath of the storm, staff members of The Legal Aid Society have been providing comprehensive disaster relief legal assistance at the shelters for homeless and displaced New Yorkers, at the disaster centers, at community-based organizations, and through the Society's Mobile Justice Unit.

The Legal Aid Society has targeted disaster relief services in the most affected communities in Far Rockaway, Coney Island, Red Hook, and Staten Island as well as in parts of Lower Manhattan. New Yorkers in need of disaster relief legal assistance can also call The Legal Aid Society's toll-free disaster relief helpline at (888) 663-6880. Beginning immediately after the storm receded, Society staff members has been assisting affected New Yorkers with FEMA and Disaster Unemployment Insurance claims; replacing medications and access to health care; obtaining Food Stamps and public assistance; landlord-tenant, public housing, federal Section 8 matters, and homeowner/foreclosure help; assistance with loans and other small businesses matters; school transfers and transportation issues; and family law and immigration matters.

Since the storm died down, as of this date, we have provided assistance in 4,200 matters for individuals or families who have been desperately seeking our civil legal help. Before the Hurricane, because of lack of resources and increasing requests for our assistance due to the economic downturn, we could only help one out of every nine low-income families and individuals who sought our assistance. Since the storm, requests for our civil legal assistance have increased exponentially and low-income New Yorkers need our legal help more than ever.

### **The Legal Aid Society's Immediate Response To Help New Yorkers In Need**

During the storm and in the immediate aftermath, the managers, staff attorneys and support staff of The Legal Aid Society provided extraordinary services to clients. At the request of the Office of Court Administration and the City, we provided representation to adults and juveniles in the arraignment parts that operated on Monday, October 29th until they closed at 1 pm and then in the parts that resumed operation on Tuesday, October 30th at 5 pm just hours after the storm had died down. Then on Wednesday morning, October 31st, we resumed court representation at 9 am in criminal, civil and family court matters when the courts reopened across the City.

By Friday, November 2<sup>nd</sup>, Society staff, using personal tablet computers and cell phones, assisted public housing residents with FEMA and emergency food stamp applications and other legal needs at the Red Hook Initiative, a community-based organization close to the six public housing developments in Red Hook which were devastated by Hurricane Sandy. On Saturday and Sunday, November 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>, Society staff assisted public housing residents with FEMA and emergency food stamp applications and other legal needs in Coney Island and at the Red Hook Community Center. The Legal Aid Society coordinated this effort with the offices of

Congressman Jerrold Nadler, Assemblymember Hakeem Jeffries, and Councilmember Domenic Recchia.

On Sunday, November 4<sup>th</sup>, Society staff provided legal assistance to victims of Hurricane Sandy by helping with FEMA and food stamp applications at the Miller Field/New Dorp Lane FEMA Center in Staten Island, at the John Jay High School Shelter in Brooklyn, and with New York Communities for Change in Far Rockaway.

Since these early days, we have continued to provide disaster relief legal assistance to families and individuals as well as to small businesses in the most impacted communities.

### **Canvassing the Impacted Areas to Access Needs**

We knew that impacted families were without heat, food, telephone or cellular service. Many people had lost everything: shelter, clothes, food and other belongings. Many were displaced from their homes, lost medical equipment and suffered trauma. Others were trapped on upper floors of buildings without electricity, food or water. People with disabilities and the elderly suffered more. Many people told us that they lacked shelter; and some had been turned away from shelters because the shelters could not serve their special needs and were not accessible. They lacked food, medicine, medical care, transportation, durable medical equipment, and medical supplies (including daily necessities like hyperemic needles or adult diapers). Some people who before the storm had home health aides went without their aides because the health care providers could not travel to their homes or gain access to high rise apartments. People who had powered medical equipment like ventilators could not use them; there was no electricity, batteries could not charge and available batteries were in short supply. People ran out of medicine, including insulin. Some medicine spoiled without refrigeration and stranded or isolated people became very sick. People could not reach their doctors and many hospitals were evacuated. People needed the most basic of necessities like blankets because they were cold.

We understood that canvassing the impacted areas, especially those neighborhoods where some of the least resourced families and individuals in our client communities reside, was going to be the most effective way to assess the emergency needs and assist people in getting basic necessities and benefits assistance. These neighborhoods were devastated – and without access to media – and people had no idea what they could access. Then, armed with the information about available assistance, people soon discovered that their only way to apply for such relief was online or on the telephone – all mediums that cannot be accessed when cellular towers are down, telephone lines are inoperative and there is no electricity. Our staff used cell phones, and personal tablet computers to assist people to file emergency applications for food stamps, public assistance and emergency shelter; to locate medical mobile vans; to apply for disaster unemployment assistance or submit FEMA applications; and to access other essential services.

### **Toll-Free Helpline and Outreach Efforts Established**

Beginning on November 5<sup>th</sup>, The Legal Aid Society converted its Access to Benefits Helpline into our Disaster Relief Helpline to assist individuals with answering specific disaster

related questions pertaining to, but not limited to: FEMA, housing, insurance, employment, and health-related legal issues. Supervised by Society staff, public service fellows and volunteers from the private bar have answered hundreds of calls from disaster affected City residents. Notably, the Disaster Relief Helpline has become a resource for advocates and volunteers in the field as questions arise regarding eligibility for benefits and assistance referrals. Staff from Legal Aid's Homeless Rights Project, with the assistance of our social work staff, began our regular outreach to the evacuation shelters and hotels to meet with and help displaced victims of the storm. The social work intervention has been invaluable as many of the traumatized victims are in need of assistance coping with the emotional toll of the devastation before they can begin working towards obtaining the assistance needed for recovery.

On Tuesday November 6<sup>th</sup>, our individual ongoing outreach sites were established in Red Hook, Coney Island and Far Rockaway. While the locations have changed, often due to circumstances encountered by our community partners, or City policy regarding the staffing of the Restoration Centers, we have been able to maintain a consistent presence in each of these affected communities of the City. Beginning on January 7<sup>th</sup>, the Society has also had a weekly presence in the City Restoration Centers in Coney Island, Red Hook and Far Rockaway. In addition, Society staff has provided weekly intake services from our Mobile Justice Unit at the City's Prevention Assistance and Temporary Housing (PATH) office in the Bronx.

### *Trainings, Clinics, and Systemic Assistance*

In addition to outreach to individual New Yorkers in storm impacted areas, The Legal Aid Society has played a leading role in many initiatives to assist persons affected by the disaster including: providing trainings for *pro bono* lawyers assisting individuals and families in partnership with The City Bar Justice Center, Legal Services NYC, and the City Bar Committee on Pro Bono and Legal Services; developing a Disaster Relief Legal Assistance Manual for volunteers; and conducting disaster assistance training for small businesses in affected communities in the City. For example, our Community Development Unit has found the most effective way to assist small businesses and homeowners has been through offering legal clinics in partnership with local development corporations and elected officials. Consequently, the Society has held several clinics for small businesses, including clinics in Red Hook, Coney Island, Staten Island and the Lower East Side which were conducted at the request of the New York City Economic Development Corporation and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In addition, we have ongoing legal clinics planned in Coney Island and Lower Manhattan. We have established commitments from private law firms to assist us and provide *pro bono* legal representation on the complicated insurance, SBA and FEMA denial claims. x

Likewise, the Society has held clinics for affected families and individuals at the request of community-based groups, such as a clinic in Staten Island for immigrants that Society staff conducted at the request of Project Hospitality and El Centro del Inmigrante because many Staten Island immigrants have expressed their fear of seeking assistance at the disaster relief centers because of the presence of law enforcement and their fear of deportation. In addition, Society staff members have held evening clinics in Coney Island for impacted tenants in subsidized housing, clinics in Red Hook for tenants in NYCHA housing, and a free resource and information clinic on accessing legal assistance in Lower Manhattan requested by local elected

officials and community leaders. Society staff also presented a radio seminar on the *Building Bridges* program that covered housing, public benefits, employment, and immigration issues.

At the same time, The Legal Aid Society has also provided extensive systemic legal representation and advocacy on behalf of the thousands of children and adults who have been impacted by the storm. For example, on behalf of the residents in New York City Housing Authority developments, The Legal Aid Society has been the leading legal advocate for tenants without essential services, including electricity, heat, and hot water. Likewise, The Legal Aid Society's Homeless Rights Project has been the leading legal advocate for New Yorkers made homeless by the storm, including families and individuals placed in the evacuation shelters and hotels. Society staff members have also been at the forefront of legal advocacy involving access to disaster relief food stamps, unemployment benefits, Medicaid and FEMA aid as well as other ongoing public benefits and eviction protections. On behalf of vulnerable New Yorkers impacted by the storm, the Society had no choice but to commence litigation in late December to challenge the failure to provide reasonable accommodations for New Yorkers with disabilities in implementing the Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for eligible individuals and families who need emergency federal food stamp assistance. Last week, along with individual elected officials, we also challenged the City's decision to limit the program to impacted eligible people in 10 zip codes and parts of 2 others when another similar program in November included impacted eligible people in 82 zip codes.

### *Problems with New York City Emergency Planning After the Storm*

#### **Planning for Storm Evacuees**

While the City was generally prepared to handle the storm-related needs of current shelter residents, the planning and preparation for the wave of newly-displaced storm evacuees was vastly inadequate. In the first few days after the storm, thousands of people sought refuge in the emergency evacuation shelters, set up mostly in large spaces like school gyms. While these locations served the purpose of keeping thousands of men, women, and children out of harm's way during the immediate crisis of the storm, as the days wore on, it became clear that the City failed to prepare for food, medical, and other special needs; failed to avoid the co-location of children, adults, and seniors; and failed to anticipate and plan for the possibility of long-term displacement.

The Legal Aid Society and the Coalition for the Homeless began regular outreach in evacuation shelters shortly immediately after the storm. About a week in, the City started shutting down evacuation shelters located in schools because of the need to re-open for students. Families with children, single adults, and elderly people with disabilities were transferred to an array of sites, including armory drill floors in existing Department of Homeless Services shelters.

Hundreds of evacuees ended up on drill floors at the Franklin Armory in the Bronx, the Bedford Atlantic Armory in Brooklyn, and the Fort Washington Armory, all of which operate as DHS shelters. Aside from being far away from their home neighborhoods, conditions were terrible. A scathing *New York Times* article relayed the experience of those being moved and the conditions at Franklin<sup>[i]</sup>:

*"It's like you were being processed to go to jail," Mr. Etienne said, echoing many others who described waiting for hours in the cold to enter a vast sea of cots under constant fluorescent lights, with one shower for everybody and one toilet for men, where guards yelled into two-way radios all night and, Mr. Etienne and a Salvation Army official said, a couple had sex in the open.*

Indeed, Coalition for the Homeless monitors witnessed some of these unacceptable conditions. A lack of bathroom facilities for men at Franklin was a serious problem, even though dozens of men had been placed there. Families with young infants had no cribs and as a result, at least one child fell from a cot to the floor. Many other individuals were approaching weeks without access to medical care and essential prescription medication.

After the exposure of the conditions on drill floors, the City began moving households to hotels, YMCAs, and at least one decrepit rooming house. Lack of food, transportation, medical services, and social services, and looming FEMA and City hotel placement termination deadlines continue to be major problems for the thousands of storm evacuees who remain displaced.

### **Lack of Accountability**

Throughout this entire process, there was no accountability or transparency regarding the City's organization of relief efforts and who was in charge, leaving evacuees and advocates in the dark. Indeed, in many cases, it seemed no one was in charge. At the Brooklyn Tech High School evacuation shelter, a volunteer had taken over responsibility for coordinating food, services, and medical care to the frail evacuee population, which included over 200 patients with mental health issues evacuated from group homes. Indeed, a 52-year-old schizophrenic man went missing from this shelter and according to *The Daily News*<sup>iii</sup>:

*The two city agencies run the temporary shelter – the health and homeless services departments – declined to say how many staff from the city or from either of the group homes – Surf Manor or Chai - were on hand when Thomas wandered off.*

It was additionally unclear who was making decisions to move large groups of people to armory drill floors and why those groups included a mixing of single adults, families, children, elderly persons and individuals with disabilities. Repeated calls for clarification went ignored. When on-site staff was present, they indicated being given no information about the needs of the populations they were supposed to serve.

On November 30<sup>th</sup> with more than 1,000 families and individuals housed by the City in hotels, scores of frantic evacuees reached out to the Society because they were told they would be forced to leave their hotel rooms by the weekend. While most had FEMA checks in hand for the first month of a housing allowance, the money was not sufficient to cover a security deposit and the first month's rent, and the proposed summary removal from the hotels would have required that the homeless evacuees put down a security deposit, pay the first month's rent and be approved by the landlord in a 24- to 48-hour time frame. The Society's advocacy with FEMA helped to extend the hotel evacuees' approved and funded shelter stays.

In sum, the lack of preparation and coordination on the part of the City resulted in an increasingly chaotic and ever-shifting patchwork of shelters that failed to meet the basic needs of vulnerable evacuees, including children, seniors, and people struggling with disabilities. Apart from the use of drill floors, many of the same problems with food, transportation, and medical care continue to be present today amongst the thousands of remaining evacuees.

### **New Yorkers with Special Needs**

The City knew that many people with special needs – persons with disabilities, homebound persons and elderly New Yorkers – had not evacuated because the numbers in the shelters were too low to have included all of them. However, the City had a number of ways to identify people who needed help. Through the City's Medicaid program, the City knows who receives home care services. The City did not use this list to check on families after the storm. Likewise, the Human Resources Administration (HRA) had a list of 1,400 homebound people who received public assistance in the impacted areas. HRA failed to check or have other branches of City government check on any of these clients. Even after Legal Aid asked HRA to ensure the safety of these vulnerable people, HRA refused to take action. When Legal Aid asked for the list of homebound persons so that we could check on them, HRA refused to provide us with this list until ordered to do so by a federal court.

Many clients told us that they saw City workers before the storm, but after the storm no one from the City came to see if they had survived. Many told us that without their neighbors or the volunteers they would not have survived.

### **Lack of Coordination by Government Agencies**

The Legal Aid Society found a number of frail individuals, persons with disabilities or elderly clients stuck in high rise apartments. The City did nothing to ensure that these individuals could get out or access much needed assistance. The Society received calls from the Red Cross and FEMA giving the Society the names and addresses of persons with disabilities or elderly people who were running out of food, water and other supplies. Consequently, Society staff made rounds and worked with Society volunteers to go to the trapped residents and bring them food, medicine and other supplies.

For example, we spoke with a home attendant who stayed with her client through the storm and when we met her nine days after the storm, we found the home attendant was still with her client. The home attendant would not go home because the Medicaid Managed Care plan could not send anyone to relieve her so she had been providing care for all of the frail people in the upper floors of the 14 floor building. The home attendant also spent an enormous amount of time and energy bringing water and food to everyone shut in and unable to manage the steep and dark stairwells.

City health officials could have asked the Medicaid health plans do outreach to their members to see if they had access to a doctor or needed replacement medicine or equipment. Admittedly, this would only work for people they could reach, but it could have also served as a

way to assemble a list for targeted canvassing by the Red Cross. Our experience working with the health plans was inconsistent. On a few occasions, they worked closely with trapped individuals with disabilities to assist them to locate an alternative provider to help with filling prescriptions. Yet, in one instance we were called to address, they helped by sending a list of pharmacies that will deliver for Westchester County to a stranded woman in Brooklyn. These cases point to the overall lack of coordination by the government agencies in the early days post-storm.

Immediately after Sandy hit the City, nearly 80,000 public housing residents were without power, heat and hot water. In areas most heavily hit by Sandy (the Rockaways, Coney Island and Red Hook), residents were without *any* power or heat and hot water until November 14, 2012, and since that time many have been experiencing problems with intermittent utility service and elevator service.

Earlier in 2012, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) publicly confirmed that 30 percent of its households are headed by seniors. NYCHA also knew how many households in its developments throughout Zone A had evacuated before Sandy hit the City on October 29, 2012. Armed with this information, NYCHA's response to its most vulnerable residents who remained and were trapped in their cold, dark apartments after Sandy hit can only be described as grossly negligent. NYCHA maintains a list of 3,500 residents city-wide who have self-identified as disabled and claims that its staff went door-to-door throughout developments in Zone A both before and after Sandy hit to address the specific needs of residents with special needs. The reality is very different from NYCHA's portrayal of events. The Legal Aid Society was in these communities two days after Sandy hit and for weeks afterwards and we have been unable to find *one* resident who received a single visit from a member of NYCHA's staff in the days and even weeks after Sandy hit. Instead, we found many homebound tenants who had been trapped in their apartments, unable to navigate dark stairwells from upper floors and in desperate need of medical assistance who had no contact with the outside world until volunteers from community-based organizations doing disaster relief outreach knocked on their doors and got them the help they needed in the days after the storm hit. We also now know that even though NYCHA failed to send members of its staff to check in on its most vulnerable residents, they were able to serve eviction papers on several residents in developments in Coney Island.

One of the glaring deficiencies in NYCHA's response to Sandy was its lack of transparency and communication with residents and those involved in disaster relief efforts. This clearly needs to be addressed before NYCHA's residents experience another emergency situation.

We look forward to continued discussions with the City on ways we can together address the need for a comprehensive disaster relief response that focuses on all impacted New Yorkers and our communities, and especially the most vulnerable – low-income children and adults, elderly residents and persons with disabilities – so we can together achieve *human* as well as *economic* security for all.

### Conclusion

Once again, we thank the Council and its leadership for calling this hearing.

Respectfully Submitted,

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**Testimony of Joel Berg, Executive Director, New York City Coalition Against Hunger**

**Before The New City Council Committee on Public Safety jointly with the Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services, the Committee on Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services, the Committee on Aging, the Committee on Health and the Committee on General Welfare**

**Regarding Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm: Disaster Management and Hunger Response**

**January 16, 2013**

**Introduction Summary:**

Good morning, I'm Joel Berg, Executive Director of the New York City Coalition Against Hunger. My testimony today is on behalf of the more than 1,100 soup kitchens and food pantries in New York City, and the more than 1.4 million New York City residents who, even before Sandy hit, lived in homes that couldn't afford sufficient food.

My testimony today will focus on eight points:

- 1) Given that local poverty, hunger and food insecurity were soaring even before Sandy hit – and agencies that were serving low-income people were unable to keep up with the growing demand – the storm and its aftermath made a bad situation worse.
- 2) Evacuation plans did not adequately address the unique challenges in communicating with low-income populations.
- 3) Evacuation plans did not adequately protect supplies of food and water at soup kitchens and food pantries.
- 4) Non-profit groups who are “second responders” – tasked with providing help soon after a storm – were themselves hampered by lack of adequate post-storm infrastructure and communications.
- 5) There was an unacceptable delay in food relief reaching some of the hardest-hit, low-income neighborhoods.
- 6) Some of the food distributed immediately after the storm was unsuited to many of the people in need.

7) Recipients of SNAP benefits (formerly known as food stamp benefits) had serious difficulty using them at neighborhood retailers in the hardest hit neighborhoods.

8) Disaster-SNAP was unduly delayed and limited.

9) The greatest needs for low-income people are long-term.

### **Pre-Sandy Needs Made Worse**

“We’re still struggling. We’re still hungry. Don’t forget about us. We’re still here.”

Even before Hurricane Sandy hit New York, that’s the message we heard time and time again from low-income New Yorkers in all five boroughs, as well as from the staff and volunteers of the more than 1,100 food pantries that we represent. This message reflects the reality of the ongoing struggle in New York City. Federal data calculated by the Coalition found that even before the storm, more than 1.4 million New Yorkers lived in households than couldn’t afford enough food.

Economists claimed that the recession officially ended in June 2009. Between 2010 and 2011, the Dow Jones average rose by over 1,000 points. Poverty and hunger slipped out of the headlines.

Yet low-income New Yorkers generally did not see these signs of economic improvement in their own lives. During that same time, median family income in New York City declined from \$50,282 annually to \$49,461, and more than 100,000 additional New Yorkers slipped below the meager poverty line (\$18,530 for a family of three).

By 2011, fully 1.7 million New York City residents lived in poverty. That number is larger than the entire population of Philadelphia. The number of New Yorkers living in poverty equals 85 times the capacity of Madison Square Garden or the new Barclay’s Center in Brooklyn.

Yet even as New York’s minimum wage remains stuck at \$7.25 per hour –or about \$14,000 a year for full-time work – prices for rent, child care, health care, transportation, and yes, food, continue to soar.

Given the reality of rising costs and stagnating wages, it is no wonder that one in five city residents – and more than one in four of the city’s children – now live in households defined by the Federal government as food insecure, meaning they are unable to afford a consistent supply of sufficient food throughout the year.

That’s right, in the richest city in the history of the world, one in four children struggle against hunger, more reminiscent of the struggling in Oliver Twist’s London than of the city experiencing economic recovery portrayed in the news.

In this testimony, I am referring to three entirely different sets of data. The first is Federal food insecurity/hunger data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau on behalf of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and analyzed by the Coalition. This is based on three-year averages, with the most recent year being 2011. The second set of data was collected by the Coalition in the fall of 2012, from a survey of over 300 of the city’s soup kitchens and food pantries, requesting their year-long data. The third is a set of data based on responses from city soup kitchens and food

pantries to a one-page questionnaire regarding the direct or indirect impact of Hurricane Sandy on emergency food programs (EFPs), compiled in November 2012.

According to the Federal food insecurity data, in 2009-2011, an estimated average of 1.42 million, or approximately 17 percent of New Yorkers, were food insecure. That number, which represents one in six New Yorkers, also includes children and seniors over the age of 60. This number also represents a 300,000 person increase (27 percent) between 2006 – 2008 when there were approximately 1.12 million food insecure New Yorkers. In 2009-2011, nearly 474,000 children in New York City lived in food insecure households; households that did not have an adequate food supply throughout the year. This number represents 25 percent, or one in four, of the City's child population and also represents a 31 percent increase from 2006-2008, when 363,000, or one in five, New York City children lived in food insecure homes. In 2006-2008 there were more than 130,000 food insecure seniors over the age of 60. That number increased by 30,000 between 2009-2011 bringing the total to 163,183, or 11 percent of the senior population, up from 10.2 percent.

As a result of the increased need in 2012, food pantries and soup kitchens that responded to our annual survey faced a 5 percent spike in demand that year. This further added to surges in need in previous years: 12 percent in 2011, 7 percent in 2010, and 29 percent in 2009.

Yet the Federal government cut the main source of Federal cash for these agencies – the FEMA Emergency Food and Shelter Program – by a whopping \$3.7 million (51 percent less than the level of three years ago) because Congress and the President not only allowed extra funding for the program from the Federal recovery bill to expire, but also enacted further cuts in the program. While state funding for pantries and kitchens increased slightly, it did not come close to making up for the Federal cuts, and City funding stayed flat. As result, fully 63 percent of the city's pantries and kitchens lacked enough food to meet the growing demand. 56 percent were forced to ration food by reducing portion size, limiting their hours of operation and/or by turning away hungry New Yorkers.

Hungry children can't learn. Hungry adults can't work. Hungry senior citizens can't stay independent. All those problems cost the economy money. Extrapolating from national data produced by the Center for American Progress, I have calculated that hunger and food insecurity cost New York City's economy about \$5 billion per year. In contrast, the Coalition has also calculated that we could end the problem entirely by increasing the food purchasing power of food insecure and hungry New Yorkers by about \$1 billion per year. If you owned a home that had a hole in its roof that cost you \$5 per year in extra heating and cooling costs, but you could fix the problem for \$1, wouldn't you do so? Of course you would. It's common sense. Likewise, New York City should fix this problem, saving billions of dollars in the long-term.

Yet instead of making the investment needed to end this problem and aid our economy, some of our elected officials are doing the reverse.

Certain conservative leaders who played key roles in enacting policies that precipitated the nation's economic collapse were also the loudest voices for slashing food aid even more. In other words, the very people who sunk our nation's economic ship wanted to take life preservers away from the drowning.

In sum, low-income New Yorkers have long suffered mightily from this perpetual economic storm. That was all *before* Hurricane Sandy.

On November 8, 2012, the Coalition sent out a one-page supplemental survey to food pantries and soup kitchens asking about the impact of Superstorm Sandy on their programs. The survey was only one page in order to limit the extra burden on agencies and allow for a rapid response.

This post-Sandy survey found that, because low-income New Yorkers lost wages and their children lost access to school meals, the number of people forced to use food pantries and soup kitchens surged. Over 60 percent of responding agencies reported an increase in the number of people requesting food. Agencies that were directly impacted experienced a number of problems with operating their programs. Over 35 percent of agencies reported having food ruined either due to direct wind, water and/or a loss of power. Nearly 70 percent of emergency food programs had to deal with cancelled or late food deliveries. The largest number of agencies, almost 75 percent, were forced to close or limit their hours of operation. Although many were back to pre-storm service as of November 16th, 2012, some were not.

### **Evacuation Plans Impact On Low-Income People**

Evacuation plans pre-storm seemed to focus on communicating with impacted residents through the traditional mass media and new social media. However, as we warned the City last year, such efforts are bound to miss many low-income people, who are often too busy to regularly access mass media, and are less likely to utilize social media.

Consequently, many low-income people in hardest hit areas, especially in public housing, did not receive full and complete – or any information – about City evacuations plans. We suggest that future evacuation effort include mass door knocking and sound trucks.

### **Food and Water Supplies Not Protected in Evacuated Areas**

There didn't seem to be a plan in place to protect private and government-issued food at food pantries and soup kitchens in impacted areas. The City placed the responsibility for protecting such supplies on the non-profit sector, which simply didn't have the resources to do so. A great amount of food was ruined. Ironically, some food and water that was brought into the impacted neighborhoods in advance of the storm to aid storm response was itself ruined. I personally aided volunteers in Coney Island in discarding large amounts of bottled water – brought in just before the storm to aid those impacted by it – that were contaminated by the storm.

### **“Second Responder” Infrastructure Problems**

Rightfully so, first priority has been given to ensuring the continuance of working infrastructures and communications systems for first responders – police, fire fighters, EMS, etc. – but little effort seems to have been made in advance of the storm to ensure the continuance of working infrastructures and communications systems for what I term the “second responders” – groups such as ours that are expected, so after the storm hits, to help victims access food, shelter, clothing, etc.

Our main office is at 50 Broad Street in Lower Manhattan. Even though the building received no apparent wind or water damage, power was out in our building for nearly two weeks, as our landlord blamed Con Ed and Con Ed blamed our landlord. Given that key members of our staff

lacked electricity, heat, Internet connections, or working phones at their homes for extended periods of time – and further given that the power outage at our headquarters knocked out our Internet sever and our regular e-mail system – our operations were critically impacted for much of the two weeks following the storm.

Many of the key organizations involved in food-related response – City Harvest, the Food Bank for New York City, the Metropolitan Council on Jewish Poverty and many others – were unable to use their offices and/or their full communications system for some period of time after the storm.

We experienced grave challenges communicating with our own staff, no less coordinating with the appropriate people at partner agencies.

My recommendation is for the City to work with the non-profit sector on a special second responder protection plan, as well as to set up a special emergency response bunker for key representatives from key second responders to enable them to better work together following a storm.

### **Delays in Food to Hardest-Hit Low-Income Neighborhoods**

Immediately following the storm, myself and my team started visiting the hardest hit areas, including the Lower East Side, Coney Island, Staten Island and Red Hook. One member of our staff lives in Far Rockaway, and was not evacuated. For the lowest-income areas, the first wave of coordinated food relief didn't arrive until days after the storm, and in some cases, longer. When the food did eventually arrive in these neighborhoods, it was usually in mass quantities, so for the people who knew where distribution sites were, and could physically access them, there was eventually sufficient food. However, even in the longer term, many people in the impacted neighborhoods did not know about food distribution sites and/or (especially in buildings without power) could not easily get to the sites. Too many of the most vulnerable New Yorkers felt forgotten by the government and their society.

### **Problems with FEMA Meals Ready-to- Eat (MREs)**

Some of the Meals Ready-to- Eat (MREs) food packets distributed immediately after the storm were unsuited to many of the people in need. They included extensive, complicated instructions for using a chemical canister in the packet to heat the food, in small print, only in English. The packets would have been hard enough to use by native English speakers, with perfect eyesight, with full light. They were impractical to use for many families in impacted neighborhoods that has impaired vision, lack of fluency in English, and a lack of electricity.

### **Problems with Immediate SNAP (food stamp) Access**

On a positive note, the City, State, and Federal government worked together to rapidly and effectively ensure access to free school meals as soon as schools were back in operation, and also to grant a waiver to allow SNAP/food stamp recipients to temporarily buy hot food with their benefits.

Also on a positive note, the City, State, and Federal government worked together to rapidly and effectively implement a replacement SNAP program, and to help people in a large number of impacted zip codes obtain additional food stamp/SNAP benefits to make up for food lost in the

storm. (This contrasted greatly to the later Disaster SNAP program, which was slow and ineffective in targeting a small number of impacted zip codes to obtain new food stamp/SNAP benefits to make up for economic losses due to the storm.)

However, even in areas in which replacement SNAP benefits were issued, many recipients still has great difficulty accessing them, since food stores often did not have working electricity and/or phone lines necessary to access the Electronic Benefits (EBT) system. Many stores and customers were unaware of the legal option to use manual, paper vouchers.

We urge USDA, the State, and the City to work together with the food industry to better advertise and provide technical assistance on the SNAP options for retailers when power and/or phone lines are out.

### **Disaster SNAP Unduly Delayed and Limited**

I understand that this hearing is focused on the immediate response to the storm, but I must at least place into the written record my grave concerns about the implementation of the Disaster SNAP Program which is designed to aid families who were economic victims of the storm.

News reports have indicated that the application rate for the Disaster SNAP Program was extraordinarily low. The low turnout was likely because of limited application sites, a small geographic area covered by the program, a short application time period, and a lack of publicity from City officials.

New York City Council Speaker Quinn, U.S. Senators Schumer and Gillibrand, Public Advocate de Blasio, Borough President Stringer, and numerous members of the U.S. Congress, State Senators, and City Council members called upon the City to rectify these problems. Elected officials have been particularly critical – rightfully so – of the City’s refusal to open an application site in the Rockaways.

The New York City Coalition Against Hunger strongly urged the City to increase participation in this vital, federally-funded, program by: Extending the application date, increasing the number of zip codes included, opening additional application sites (including one in the Rockaways), and conducting more public outreach. The City lost perhaps \$100 million Federal dollars that could have helped feed families who suffered from Sandy, as well as boosted the City’s economy. The City’s reluctance to provide this help is a truly baffling lose-lose situation. Yet the Bloomberg Administration ignored all these requests.

### **The Greatest Needs Are Long-Term**

The greatest need for food aid is long-term. Of the food pantries and soup kitchens that reported an increase in the number of people served as a result of the storm, half reported that they would only be able to meet food needs for a short period of time unless more food and funding became available. I worry greatly that, as TV cameras and many elected officials migrate to the next disaster, low-income, hungry New Yorkers will again face neglect.

I hope that the feelings of goodwill immediately following the storm can be expanded to include the understanding that no one should go without food for years and years at a time, due to human-made disasters like recessions and social service cut-backs. The time is long overdue to end the perpetual storm of food insecurity and hunger facing low-income New Yorkers.



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Testimony prepared by

**Triada Stampas**

for the

**Committees on General Welfare; Fire and Criminal Justice Services;  
Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and  
Disability Services; Public Safety; Aging; and Health**

on

**Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm:  
Disaster Management**

**January 16, 2013**

on behalf of

**Food Bank For New York City**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Good afternoon and thank you, Speaker Quinn, Chairpersons and members of the Committees on General Welfare; Fire and Criminal Justice Services; Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services; Public Safety; Aging; and Health. My name is Triada Stampas, and I am the Senior Director of Government Relations at Food Bank For New York City. The Food Bank appreciates the opportunity to present testimony today to the City Council regarding emergency preparedness and management in the days before and immediately following Super Storm Sandy.

Food Bank For New York City thanks the City Council for bringing attention to food access issues in emergencies and disasters, and for your ongoing efforts to ensure all New Yorkers have access to affordable, nutritious food. The City Council's consistent support for protecting

and improving access to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; formerly known as the Food Stamp Program) and expanding the in-classroom School Breakfast Program, as well as providing funding for emergency food available are especially appreciated and needed in this post-recession economy, which has seen New York City's food poverty problem become only more deeply entrenched.

Food Bank For New York City works to end hunger and food poverty by increasing access to nutrition, education and financial empowerment. Every year, approximately 1.5 million New York City residents rely on our programs and services. We distribute food and provide support services to approximately 1,000 emergency and community food programs citywide; manage nutrition education programs for schools and community-based organizations (CBOs); operate income support programs including food stamp outreach & enrollment assistance and one of the largest Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) programs in the country; and conduct research to inform community and government efforts to end hunger in New York City.

When Super Storm Sandy hit New York City on Monday, October 29, 2012, it devastated communities, left thousands of New Yorkers newly jobless and 40,000 New Yorkers newly homeless. To meet the short- and long-term needs created by the storm, New York City's emergency food network of hundreds of food pantries and soup kitchens across the five boroughs has been an integral part of all three phases of disaster response: immediate, sustained, and long-term recovery. As the focus of this hearing is the period before the storm through the first three days after Sandy, I will limit my testimony today to a discussion of Food Bank's disaster preparedness and immediate response.

## **PRE-SANDY PREPARATIONS**

Nearly a week before Sandy struck, weather forecasters were predicting a major storm could hit New York City, and they tracked its progress as it approached. With this early warning, we did what we could to ensure our food distribution system could continue uninterrupted, and we knew to anticipate that the disruptions caused by a major event would have . As the City's main supplier of emergency food, we help meet the survival needs of vulnerable New Yorkers – a mission that becomes more urgent and important in emergencies.

The 2005 transit strike, when striking bus and subway workers resulted in the closure of New York City's public transportation system for two and a half days, provided us key lessons for business continuity planning, and as a result we had a plan in place. On the Friday before the storm, our operations team set up a carpool system to ensure our warehouse professionals could make it to our warehouse in the Hunts Point Market in time to get Monday morning's deliveries out. We contacted all member agencies scheduled to receive deliveries on Monday to confirm they would be there to receive them.

The New York City Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) group, which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the New York City Office of Emergency Management (NYC OEM) and several non-profit and government agencies, began conference calls in the week before Sandy to share information about the storm's approach and to urge members to be prepared. An email from NYC OEM in the days before the storm reinforced that message.

During the weekend before the storm, the New York State Office of Emergency Management (NYS OEM) made contact and began ongoing communications with us about transporting food, water and other products after the storm that had been staged at the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center on the far West Side of Manhattan and Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn.

## **DURING THE STORM (OCTOBER 29-30, 2012)**

By Monday, October 29, 2012, the New York City subway system had been shut down, a mandatory evacuation order had been issued for residents in Zone A coastal areas, some bridge and tunnel closures took effect, and other precautionary measures had been taken. Monday also marked the first day of what would be a week-long school closure. Food Bank For New York City's trucks began making their scheduled deliveries early that morning.

While the Food Bank's main offices in lower Manhattan were closed, thrice daily Business Continuity Planning calls began to ensure key staff working remotely were staying connected and coordinated. Daily NYC OEM calls began as well for participating organizations to report out their activities.

In preparation for the next day, contact by phone and email was attempted with all Food Bank member agencies scheduled to receive food deliveries on Tuesday, October 30, 2012, but as expected, many emergency food organizations – like many businesses throughout the five boroughs – were closed. A substantial number of emergency food providers suspended operations during and through the immediate aftermath of the storm, only to find the lines at their doors even longer when they re-opened.

By Tuesday, bridge and tunnel closures prevented food delivery to sites in Brooklyn and Queens from our food distribution center in the Bronx. Food Bank For New York City's main offices in lower Manhattan lost all communications abilities when Con Edison cut off power to the area south of 39<sup>th</sup> Street, which came to be known as the "Dark Zone."

## **IMMEDIATE POST-SANDY RESPONSE**

As bridges and tunnels reopened, incoming deliveries resumed, including our first loads of disaster relief supplies from our national partner Feeding America. We are very grateful that within days of the storm, the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) released the Emergency Food Assistance Program (EFAP) supplies already in our warehouse for use in disaster response. We were thus able to quickly get needed and nutritious products like shelf-stable milk to affected communities. We are hopeful that HRA will now be able to replenish those supplies now that Congress has passed a disaster relief package.

While we were able to distribute a million pounds of food within the first week of the storm, our distribution capacity was constrained by the lack of additional trucks for rental or donation. Had additional trucks been available, our team would have been able to do more.

We are also very grateful that our trucking partner Benfica had prepared for a potential fuel shortage, which meant food deliveries were never impacted by the fuel shortage. Gas shortages, however, quickly became a concern for a number of staff at the Food Bank in mission-critical roles – those who were playing a key part in ensuring that food would get out to

New Yorkers in need day after day. While a small number of fueling stations were made available to emergency responders, rumors of shortages and their location at such a distance from our Hunts Point center of operations discouraged staff from expending their limited fuel supplies to avail of them. In addition, fuel shortages became a concern for the mobile pantries on which we were relying to deliver needed food, water and supplies to communities in need.

In the days following Sandy, Food Bank For New York City continued outreach to its network, both to confirm scheduled deliveries and to ascertain whether sites were open and able to resume operations. Food Bank field teams were deployed to flooded coastal communities to make contact with food pantries and soup kitchens and to assess needs. In addition, Food Bank identified and ascertained the availability of mobile units within our network for deployment to the hardest hit areas.

Food pantries and soup kitchens in all five boroughs reported longer lines. While many had to interrupt operations during the storm, most emergency food providers were back in operation within five days of the storm. The emergency food network immediately appreciated that coming at the end of the month as it did, Sandy intensified food poverty throughout the city. For New Yorkers relying on SNAP, the end of the month marks a time when benefits are routinely exhausted; indeed, more than 80 percent of emergency food participants who receive SNAP report running out of benefits by three weeks into the month.<sup>1</sup> The closure of schools and many workplaces while the subways were down meant many New Yorkers had no income at the same time that benefits and school meals were unavailable and rent was coming due. The desperation many food pantry and soup kitchen directors witnessed on their lines should come as little surprise in light of these circumstances.

Phone calls began coming in to the Food Bank and other emergency food providers from various government and community leaders to report local food needs and ask for assistance. It quickly became clear that without a central clearinghouse for these requests, it was impossible to insure against duplication of efforts and limited resources.

## LESSONS LEARNED

While currently engaged in food distribution and benefits access for long-term recovery in Sandy-stricken communities, Food Bank For New York City is working simultaneously to use the lessons learned from Super Storm Sandy to better prepare ourselves and our network for the next emergency. I believe the lessons most relevant for this discussion are as follows:

- **There's no need to reinvent the food distribution wheel.** New York City's network of hundreds of food pantries and soup kitchens across the five boroughs have some important assets that serve vulnerable New Yorkers day to day and proved invaluable when deployed in this disaster situation:
  - *Citywide reach and presence* – approximately 750 food pantries and soup kitchens are spread throughout the five boroughs, reaching more than 1.4 million New Yorkers.
  - *Staff trained in food preparation and distribution* – every emergency food organization knows how to prepare food for mass distribution, step by step: from

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<sup>1</sup> NYC Hunger Safety Net 2007, Food Bank For New York City.

receiving food, water and supplies by the pallet-load to repacking for individual or household consumption.

- *A committed volunteer base* – emergency food organizations are heavily reliant on volunteers for their regular operations, and as a result have cultivated a committed core of individuals who know how to do the work.
- *Existing community relationships* – emergency food organizations are a trusted local presence, and often have strong relationships with other social service organizations within their communities.

Similarly, the organizations serving this network have an existing framework for collaboration in the Policy Committee on New York City Hunger Resources, which includes both the governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in emergency food distribution who meet regularly for joint information-sharing and policy-making with respect to emergency food distribution. The potential of this group for facilitating coordination in food distribution during disaster was evidenced when this group met one week after Sandy. The member organizations discovered that many were trying to ascertain the same information – which agencies in the hardest hit communities were functional, and how much damage had they sustained? – and they quickly were able to put an end to duplication of efforts by establishing data-sharing tools that were helpful to all partners.

This is analogous to bringing star musicians together in an orchestra – however skilled each musician is individually on his or her own instrument, it's unlikely the orchestra will play well until they've had some practice. Rather than pull together individual players in an *ad hoc* way in an emergency, the City's disaster response would do well to call in this well-rehearsed group.

- **Coordination and the right resources are key.** While the emergency food infrastructure is in place to serve in times of disaster, it needs the right resources to do so. While food donations in the immediate aftermath of the storm were plentiful, for example, the food needed in disaster response is of so specific a nature that wholesale purchasing was still needed. When individuals have lost access to their kitchens and cooking supplies, only food that needs no preparation, like tuna salad kits with pop-top lids, can actually be consumed.

Some of the resource needs we identified to strengthen the emergency food infrastructure are already being addressed. With support from the American Red Cross, two new mobile units will be deployed to conduct benefits outreach in SNAP and free tax assistance to better enable hard-hit communities to recover. These same mobile units, which are equipped for food distribution and benefits outreach, will enable our network to be nimble and responsive during future emergencies.

A greater level of information sharing and coordination is possible and would be enormously helpful. The example of Occupy Sandy shows how on-the-ground information can be shared widely and effectively in real time. Occupy Sandy was a key source of information on need for many of our member agencies who were providing disaster relief services in hard-hit areas.

- **Our emergency plans must include contingencies for fuel shortages and communications systems failures.** We, like many in the city, did not anticipate the

fuel shortages that occurred post-Sandy, nor for the sustained outage of many communications systems. Building these contingencies into our emergency response playbook will be critical, and with support from the American Red Cross and the Mayor's Fund to Advance New York City, we have been able to hire a disaster response coordinator who is developing these strategies now.

Thank you once again for the opportunity to testify. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

UNIFORMED  
FIRE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK  
FIRE OFFICERS  
LOCAL 854, INTERNATIONAL ASSN. OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO  
ASSOCIATION

225 BROADWAY \* NEW YORK, N. Y. 10007 \* SUITE 401  
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**Uniformed Fire Officers Association (UFOA)**  
**Testimony on Hurricane Sandy and FDNY's Response**  
**Before the City Council**  
**January 16, 2013**

- 1. Maintain the "Fabric of Fire Service" in NYC by restoring the 20 companies to permanent status in the Executive Budget and prevent the closing of any fire units in the foreseeable future**

During and in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the FDNY units, staffing, equipment and resources were extremely overtaxed yet performed heroically in spite of these limitations and the storm's extreme conditions. For example, of the 75 serious incidents (mostly fires) that occurred between Oct 29 and Nov. 1<sup>st</sup>, we estimate that 33 incidents did not receive adequate unit assignments compared to the requirements set by the Fire Department's Alarm level for staffing incidents. In 3 cases, incidents did not receive the proper alarm assignment level either, leading to even more drastic shortages in units on the scene in addition to overall problems maintaining situational awareness for the City as a whole (See Table 1).

NO serious incidents between October 29<sup>th</sup> and November 1<sup>st</sup> received a proper First Alarm Assignment of 4 Engines and 3 Ladders within NFPA guidelines of 480 seconds. Of the 75 serious incidents that occurred, only 39 (52%) even received the full alarm resource levels. The remaining 37 incidents functioned with less than 7 companies (See Table 2).

Thanks to the City Council under the leadership of Speaker Quinn and the support of the Fire and Criminal Justice Committee and its Chair Elizabeth Crowley, we had at least a fighting chance to save lives during this devastating storm.

- 2. Adequate Supervision**

Anytime there is a major incident like a hurricane, tornado, blackout, earthquake, etc. a plethora of complex emergencies occur with a host variables that adversely affect the safety for both responders and civilians. These emergencies require a tighter "span of control" due to the imposing dangers and technical complexity faced by the operating units. The normal span is one supervisor per five firefighters but in emergencies created by Hurricane Sandy, the span of control need to be tighter. Several units were operating without supervision to fulfill special assignments during the hurricane. This created an extremely dangerous situation for our firefighters and the civilians they were assisting. We were extremely lucky that we did not lose more civilians and any FDNY members. The UFOA strongly recommends that an officer be present anytime an FDNY unit is deployed during future major incidents. No FDNY units should operate without adequate supervision during these major events.



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Additionally, there should be serious consideration of reopening a Division in Southern Brooklyn which is currently served by Division 8 in Staten Island. Due to the increase in population, housing and Fire Department workload, especially during major incidents like Hurricane Sandy and throughout the Brush Fire seasons, it's imperative to keep Division 8 dedicated to adequately service the citizens of Staten Island. A new Battalion should also be opened in South Queens because the workload has increased significantly and there has been a tremendous housing and population boom in the Rockaways which adds to the complexity of delivering adequate fire service because it is an isolated peninsula. For example, during Hurricane Sandy Battalion 47, which covers the entire Rockaway peninsula, was operating at a major fire at Beach 130 Street when the Breezy Point fire was reported. The first arriving Battalion to the Breezy Point fire responded from Grand Avenue in Elmhurst which was over 20 miles away.

### 3. UCT/ Dispatch Problems during the storm

#### A. Inefficiencies in *resource assignments, travel times and travel distances* happened throughout the hurricane.

On average, it took 27 minutes for the first 7 companies to arrive on the scene of an emergency, where the NFPA recommends that this should occur within 8 minutes to 90% of incidents. At the worst incidents during the storm, the time it took to fill the first alarm assignment was unacceptable. For example,

Breezy Point Box 8300: It took 1:35:26 for just 7 companies to be in place to the Breezy Point incident where 110 homes were lost. Of the first 7 companies, 5 travelled between 18 and 25 miles to get to Breezy Point, as most first arriving companies came from Manhattan.

At Beach 115<sup>th</sup> St. in Queens Box 1377: Up to 9 buildings were involved, it was not until 2 hours, 25 minutes and 44 seconds after the incident was first reported that a 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> company were even *assigned* to the incident. It took 4 hours and 33 minutes for the 5<sup>th</sup> company (Engine 326) to arrive on scene.

At Beach 130<sup>th</sup> St. Bell Harbor Box 1407: Only 9 companies appear to have been dispatched to multiple buildings on fire, with the first arriving company, L012 was driving from West 19<sup>th</sup> St in Manhattan 20 miles to get to the incident for a response time of over 42 minutes.

*These three incidents are prime examples of drastic inadequacies in staffing levels, response times, and the amount of time it took to bring in the first Alarm Assignment of 7 companies, that a basic All-Hands working fire would get on a normal day in New York City. To make a comparison, according to data on over 15,000 structural responses between 2002 and 2010 for New York City, there were 310 fires that involved more than one building. On average, these incidents received 26 fire companies, and up to 223 companies total, yet the fires on Beach 130<sup>th</sup> and 115<sup>th</sup> street did not even receive a full first alarm assignment of 7 companies.*

#### Hurricane Average Response Times

- The worst response times occurring between noon on Monday October 29<sup>th</sup> and noon on Tuesday October 30<sup>th</sup>, with response times to serious incidents averaging over 10 minutes.
- For the 75 serious incidents that occurred between Oct 29 and Nov 1<sup>st</sup>, the average response time was 7 minutes, 43 seconds



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## B. Lack of Situational Awareness and Priority Setting

### a. Alarm levels were not properly classified

Some serious incidents during the hurricane were under-classified by alarm level leading to incident staffing shortages and increased risk to firefighters, officers and the public.

For example:

Box 1407/1408 at Beach 130<sup>th</sup> St: Several buildings were involved, yet the incident was only ever classified as an initial alarm which by definition is *less than a 1<sup>st</sup> alarm*, requiring 5 companies.

Box 1377 at Beach 115<sup>th</sup> St: Several buildings were involved, yet this incident was also only classified as an initial alarm (*less than 1<sup>st</sup> alarm*)

Box 8300 At Breezy Point: With 110 buildings involved, this incident was classified as a 6<sup>th</sup> Alarm by the department. In July of 2012, there were two 7<sup>th</sup> Alarms in Brooklyn, one involving a single multiple dwelling, and the other involving an abandoned factory, both of these incidents received higher staffing levels than the Breezy Point and Beach 115/130<sup>th</sup> St fires, although they were far smaller in size and impact. By the way, other than the WTC fire on September 11, 2001, this was the worse fire in NYC in 100 years.

### b. Poor resource tracking

During the hurricane, there were several reports of companies passing one another to get to incidents in opposite directions. In addition, incident data show cases where resources were assigned but never arrived, or resources were reportedly working incidents, yet they do not exist in the incident history data. Understandably, companies were so strapped to assist, that the logistics of notifying their arrival to dispatch was not always feasible. However, the tracking of resources by whether or not they were available in *real time* must become a goal for the FDNY. Getting adequate resources to the people of New York in a timely matter became extremely difficult because of severe problems tracking and assigning resources during the hurricane.

For example:

NOBODY knew how bad Staten Island was. The availability of fire units in Staten Island were near zero during the storm. For an isolated island, this creates an even dire situation in providing the necessary resources to assist civilians in danger. When the FDNY is under stress, there is a communication breakdown as Boroughs are operating relatively independently of each other. This leads to a break down in situational awareness into the full extent of the crisis Citywide.

Combined, problems tracking resources and setting priorities under the current UCT system led to a tremendous lack of situational awareness and foresight CITYWIDE during the storm. Earlier incidents had adequate staffing, such as the crane collapse in Manhattan, but critical incidents through the night of Oct 29-30<sup>th</sup> had drastic shortages.

Lessons Learned:

1. Critical need to maintain the "fabric of fire service" in this City and keep all existing fire companies open. In fact, this incident again showed that we need more companies, not less.



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For example:

- a. There is a need to open an Engine Company in the Starrett City section of Brooklyn which would not only solidify the fire service in that community but support Coney Island and the Western Rockaway Peninsula (43% of the serious fires in this area in the last ten years had response times greater than 4 minutes);
  - b. There is a need to open a Battalion in South Queens to provide better coverage for the Beach Channel and Rockaway Peninsula.
  - c. There is a need for another Division in Brooklyn to better cover South Brooklyn and to provide the ability to keep the 8<sup>th</sup> Division in Staten Island.
2. Our members are truly remarkable! Under the most adverse of conditions, our members proved once again their level of commitment, sacrifice, heroism, ingenuity, resourcefulness to serving the citizens of the City. What our members lacked in resources they made up in sheer determination to save lives no matter the situation. Again we are lucky we did not lose a single member, but proper supervision aids greatly in safer, more effective operations.
  3. Incident Management Team (IMT) performed a remarkable job and once again proved its invaluable worth to this City and Country. Our IMT was activated after Hurricane Katrina and received national recognition for its exemplary job after that disaster. NYC and OEM recognize the knowledge and abilities of our IMT and its time to increase the team and its availability to other communities in this country. FEMA pays for the training, activation and the backfill of staffing in the FDNY when deployed which is a win-win for the City. The more trained FDNY members we have in the IMT, the overall improvement to the entire Department.
  4. The Universal Call Taking System (UCT) failed once again! This extremely expensive system is broke and needs a serious overhaul. The success of an effective operation of saving civilian lives and property is the proper prioritization of dispatching of our fire units to the correct emergency and the correct location of that emergency.




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Alarm Date/ Time	Boro	Address	Box	FDNY Alarm Class By Incident History Timeline Data	Proper Alarm Level (UFOA Estimate)	Response Time	First Unit on Scene	Required Unit Staffing	Actual Units Responded (UFOA Estimate)	# Units Under- Staffed
10/30/2012 0:55:12	QN	ROCKAWAY BEACH BLVD & BEACH 115 ST	1377	Initial Alarm	4-4	0:01:52	L137	25	6	-19
10/29/2012 23:34:46	QN	ROCKAWAY BEACH BLVD & BEACH 130 ST	1407_9/ 1408_14 /1406_4 /1408_8 /1407_1 8	Initial Alarm	6-6	0:42:36	L012	37	9	-28
10/30/2012 6:12:19	QN	419 BEACH 129 ST	1407_19	7-5		0:10:49	L121	7	3	-4
10/30/2012 12:59:08	SI	242 Hurlbert St	1429	7-5		0:09:25	E161	7	3	-4
10/31/2012 16:52:47	BKL YN	66 DOVER ST	3629	7-5		0:02:01	L122	7	3	-4
11/1/2012 20:36:06	BX	2500 WATERBURY AVE	2883	7-5		0:03:21	E064	7	3	-4
10/29/2012 19:57:57	BX	1 City Island Ave	4565	3-3		0:10:21	L061	19	16	-3
10/29/2012 15:17:54	BKL YN	1122 51 St	2702	7-5		0:21:11	L148	7	4	-3
10/30/2012 11:20:48	SI	628 MIDLAND AVE	2063	10-75		0:12:48	L085	7	4	-3
11/1/2012 0:05:00	BKL YN	190 York St	0418	7-5		0:02:46	E207	7	4	-3
10/29/2012 1:34:07	SI	NOME AVE & STEINWAY AVE	2787	Initial Alarm		0:09:00	L086	5	3	-2
10/30/2012 1:33:21	BKL YN	2655 E28 St	3201	7-5		0:06:55	L169	7	5	-2
10/30/2012 6:26:15	BKL YN	JOHN DEWEY HIGH SCHOOL	8564	10-75		0:06:14	E253	7	5	-2
10/30/2012 6:29:40	BX	1 Carroll St	4546	7-5		0:12:41	L053	7	5	-2
10/30/2012 8:20:11	QN	ROCKAWAY BEACH BLVD & BEACH 116 ST	1379	Initial Alarm	7-5	0:03:25	L162	7	5	-2

**Hurricane Sandy**  
**Only 52% of Incidents Between Oct. 29 and Nov. 1 Received the Full Alarm Assignment**  
**(7 Companies)**



# Hurricane Sandy Serious Incidents

## 49% of Incidents were Under-Staffed

### According to FDNY Alarm Assignment Guidelines

October 29- Nov. 1, 2012

#### Reserve Apparatus

23 Engines

6 Ladders

1 Squad

*Even with an additional 30 Reserve Units and 77 Firefighters added to regular Engines, the FDNY did not provide minimum Alarm levels for 37 serious incidents during the hurricane*

#### UNDER STAFFED INCIDENT



-19 Units



-7 to -3 Units



-2 to -1 Units



Serious Incident



Reserve Companies (5 Firefighters)



Engines with 5 Firefighters



Regular Companies (Engines have 4 FF's)



#### Battalion

#### Serious Incidents

4 - 6

7 - 8

9 - 13



# Box 8300 Breezy Point Fire

Start Date: October 29th 23:03:33 PM

Order of Arrival  Unit Time Elapsed (h:mm:ss)

- 1  L124  0:33:56
- 2  E329  0:44:47
- 3  L702  0:51:25
- 4  E014  1:13:33
- 5  E023  1:26:00
- 6  L012  1:27:17
- 7  L159  1:35:26



Box 8300

Battalion

Serious Incidents

4 - 6

7 - 8


9 - 13




Box 8300 Companies



Other Companies



***L 124 Travelled an estimated 18 miles to be the first company on scene. Three units travelled as far as 25 miles from Manhattan.***





The City of New York

# Manhattan Community Board 1

Catherine McVay Hughes CHAIRPERSON | Noah Pfefferblit DISTRICT MANAGER

New York City Council Committee on Public Safety Jointly with the Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services, the Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Disability Services, the Committee on Aging, the Committee on Health and the Committee on General Welfare

## Oversight Hearing on Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm: Disaster Management

Testimony by Catherine McVay Hughes  
Chairperson, Manhattan Community Board 1

Wednesday, January 16, 2013, 10:00 a.m.  
City Hall, Council Chambers

Good morning, Chairpersons Vallone Jr., Crowley, Koppell, Lappin, Arroyo and Palma. I am Catherine McVay Hughes, Chairperson of Manhattan Community Board One (CB1). Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm: Disaster Management.

Like other districts in the City, residents and workers of CB1 experienced hardship during and in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. I applaud the responsiveness of the City and am happy to see Lower Manhattan recovered and thriving again. However, despite the tremendous progress, we must not overlook the closed small businesses, the displaced residents, the closed South Ferry subway station and the ongoing phone and data outage that continue to impose hardships on the community. Equally important, we must learn from our missteps in this past disaster to properly plan for the future so that we can maintain the revitalization of Lower Manhattan.

CB1 is working on an Emergency Preparedness Lessons Learned report that provides a synopsis of the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy and recommendations for improved planning for the future. I would like to share with you today a few points from this document.

### **Vulnerability of Lower Manhattan to Storm Surges:**


As depicted in the attached map, Lower Manhattan is extremely vulnerable to storm surges; all of CB1 is classified within an evacuation zone with nearly 58% of the district in Zone A. The Storm surge, furthermore, extended beyond the boundaries of Zone A into Zone B, as depicted in Figure 2. This discrepancy between the storm surge and the zone boundaries warrants a study and redrawing of the evacuation zones. However, regardless of future improvements in flood protection, understanding the vulnerability of Lower Manhattan is of the utmost importance in proper emergency management especially for our utility and transportation systems.


**First Responders**

We greatly appreciated the performance by the NYPD, FDNY and other agencies prior to and during the storm and subsequent blackout and we especially noted the effective patrols by the NYPD.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I hope that CB1 will continue to be part of a dialogue leading to improved emergency preparedness for the future of this community and the city.




Figure 1: Community Board 1 and Evacuation Zones



 CB1 Boundary


**OEM Evacuation Zone**

**Zones**

-  A
-  B
-  C

For informational purposes only  
Created by Arielle Goldberg  
using 2012 NYC OEM Hurricane Evacuation Zone data  
Zones are based on "varying threat levels  
of coastal flooding resulting from storm surge."

Figure 2: CB1 Land Use Patterns and Evacuation Zones



Christian Burgess, Mental Health Association of New York City

NYC City Council Testimony – Wednesday January 16, 2013

Chairman Vallone, other distinguished Committee Chairs and members of the Committees, thank you for giving us the opportunity to testify before you today on the critical issue of disaster management. My name is Christian Burgess, and I am the Director of the Disaster Distress Helpline, a national network of crisis centers providing 24/7 hotline and text support for people struggling with difficult emotions before, during or after any disaster in the U.S. The Helpline is a program of the federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and is administered by Link2Health Solutions, a not-for-profit subsidiary of the Mental Health Association of New York City (MHA-NYC). MHA-NYC, a major voice for the cause of mental health for over 40 years, also operates LifeNet, New York City's only 24/7/365, accredited, multi-lingual mental health crisis, information, referral and support hotline. LifeNet also covers FEMA Region II (which includes New York and New Jersey) for the Disaster Distress Helpline and was recently selected as the primary point of contact for *Project Hope*, the post-Sandy FEMA-funded Crisis Counseling Program set up in partnership with the NYS Office of Mental Health and the NYC DOHMH.

I am here today to call attention to the importance of addressing mental health in all aspects of emergency planning and management. Regarding disaster, material 'basic needs' are understandably being planned for, distributed and measured at all stages of preparedness, but it's essential that we remember: mental health is *also* a basic need.

Persistent mental health and substance abuse issues affecting individuals and families following natural and human-caused disasters have been well-documented for decades, from 9/11 and the Newtown shootings to of course, Hurricane Sandy. Regarding Sandy, a recent Gallup survey was conducted among residents of New York and New Jersey,<sup>i</sup> with findings that those living in ZIP codes most directly affected by the storm experienced a 25% increase in depression diagnoses in the six weeks after impact. (I have shared a copy of this report as an attachment to my written testimony.)

The Gallup study recommends that to minimize long-term mental health risks in the face of future disasters, "leaders should not overlook resources for enhanced psychological and emotional assistance both before and after the event", further echoed in FEMA's *National Disaster Recovery Framework* (NDRF), which advises all levels of government to account for the provision of mental health support, counseling, screening and treatment in disaster management<sup>ii</sup>.

And so in light of the Gallup report, FEMA's National Framework and most importantly in reflection of our own experiences serving New Yorkers in emotional distress following Hurricane Sandy, MHA-NYC urges the Disaster Management Oversight Committee to:

- 1) Continue and expand funding for mental health services that play vital roles in disasters such as LifeNet, which coincidentally was identified as the “perhaps single most important asset”<sup>iii</sup> in the 9/11 mental health response;
- 2) Ensure that mental health experts, providers and consumers are invited to the Emergency Planning and Management table via committees, task forces & other opportunities for inclusion; and
- 3) Address the mental health needs of *all* affected individuals, including response and recovery workers and other high-risk populations: children, seniors, people with disabilities, ESL/immigrant communities, adults with serious and persistent mental illness and other underserved populations, all of whom have members that have unique needs.

A city that supports year-round, comprehensive, culturally-inclusive mental health initiatives in disaster planning is a stronger, more *resilient* city, one that is better equipped to bounce back after devastating disasters such as Hurricane Sandy and so thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Please feel free to call on us at any time for background information or for help in developing strategies to address mental health in disaster planning.

Submitted by Christian Burgess, Director, Disaster Distress Helpline  
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[cburgess@mhaofnyc.org](mailto:cburgess@mhaofnyc.org) / 212-614-6346

#### Supporting Document Attachments:

1. Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, “Depression Increases in Areas Superstorm Sandy Hit Hardest”
2. Disaster Distress Helpline (Informational Flyer)
3. MHA-NYC LifeNet Program Brochure
4. FEMA National Disaster Recovery Framework: Overview

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<sup>i</sup> [http://www.gallup.com/poll/159704/depression-increases-areas-superstorm-sandy-hit-hardest.aspx?utm\\_source=tagrss&utm\\_medium=rss&utm\\_campaign=syndication&utm\\_source=twitterfeed&utm\\_medium=twitter](http://www.gallup.com/poll/159704/depression-increases-areas-superstorm-sandy-hit-hardest.aspx?utm_source=tagrss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=syndication&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter)

<sup>ii</sup> <http://www.fema.gov/national-disaster-recovery-framework>

<sup>iii</sup> Norris, et. al. quoted in Draper, J., McCleery, G., and Schaedle, R. (2006). Mental health services in response to September 11: the central role of the Mental Health Association of New York City. In Neria, Y., et. al. (eds.) *9/11: Mental Health in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks* (ch. 18, p. 282), Cambridge University Press.

January 4, 2013

## Depression Increases in Areas Superstorm Sandy Hit Hardest

Daily worry and anger also increase in most affected areas

by Dan Witters and Steve Ander

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- While federal and state government authorities identified Superstorm Sandy as the second costliest storm in U.S. history at over \$71.3 billion in damages, this figure does not reflect the emotional costs. Residents in the ZIP codes most affected by Superstorm Sandy experienced a 25% increase in depression diagnoses in the six weeks immediately following the storm. Similarly, those living elsewhere in New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut also saw an increase in depression diagnoses of 17% compared to pre-storm levels.

### *Clinical Diagnoses of Depression Before and After Superstorm Sandy*

	<b>Before Sandy: Sept. 15-Oct. 28</b>	<b>After Sandy: Nov. 1-Dec. 15</b>	<b>Change (pct. pts.)</b>	<b>% Change</b>
Most affected ZIP codes (N.J., N.Y., and Conn.)	11.7%	14.6%	2.9	25%
Remaining areas in N.J., N.Y., and Conn.	15.5%	18.2%	2.7	17%
Other 47 states	16.6%	17.1%	0.5	3%

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

GALLUP®

Given the adult population of the states most impacted by Sandy, increases in depression of this magnitude could represent over 540,000 new diagnoses in the most affected areas and over 160,000 new diagnoses in the less affected areas

These findings are based on daily interviews conducted as part of the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index from Sept. 15-Dec. 15.

For this analysis, Gallup included a total of 6,414 interviews with residents of New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut. Gallup further broke out these interviews into two groups -- **ZIP codes hardest hit by Sandy** - those receiving individual assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency -- and the **remaining ZIP codes in those three states**. Gallup's analysis includes:

- For areas hardest hit: 1,713 interviews occurred before the storm (Sept. 15-Oct. 28) and another 1,690 after the storm (Nov. 1-Dec. 15).
- For the remaining areas that were not hit as hard: 1,433 interviews before the storm and 1,578 after the storm.

During the same period, Sept. 15-Dec. 15, Gallup also conducted 71,265 interviews in the remaining 47 states.

The depression question is posed as a diagnosis occurring *at any point* in the respondent's life, and the results do not necessarily imply that the storm itself created new depression cases. Still, the notable increase depression in the areas most impacted by Sandy occurred at a time when there was no statistically significant change throughout the remainder of the country.

**Worry, Anger Also Increase in Sandy-Affected Areas**

Residents living in the ZIP codes most impacted by Sandy -- as well as those living elsewhere in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut -- also report a significant increase in worry after the storm. For comparison, those living in the nation's other 47 states experienced no change in their level of worry before and after Sandy.

Those living in the ZIP codes most affected saw a significant increase in anger as well after the storm. While worry increased by 14% throughout the three states overall -- both in more affected and less affected ZIP codes -- increases in daily anger were limited to the most impacted areas and characterized by no significant change elsewhere in the three states or around the country.

*Daily Worry and Anger Before and After Superstorm Sandy*

	<b>Before Sandy: Sept. 15-Oct. 28</b>	<b>After Sandy: Nov. 1-Dec. 15</b>	<b>Change (pct. pts.)</b>	<b>% Change</b>
<b>% WORRY YESTERDAY</b>				
Most affected ZIP codes (N.J., N.Y., and Conn.)	32.1%	37.1%	5.0	16%
Remaining areas in N.J., N.Y., and Conn.	30.0%	33.5%	3.5	12%
Other 47 states	32.8%	32.9%	0.1	0%
<b>% ANGER YESTERDAY</b>				
Most affected ZIP codes (N.J., N.Y., and Conn.)	11.9%	14.4%	2.5	21%
Remaining areas in N.J., N.Y., and Conn.	14.1%	13.3%	-0.8	-6%
Other 47 states	14.1%	13.8%	-0.3	-2%

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

**GALLUP**

These data may provide a conservative estimate of the emotional toll of the storm. It is unclear, for example, how residents who received direct aid were emotionally affected compared with residents who did not; it may be that those who received aid would have higher emotional costs. Depression diagnoses also require being examined by a mental health expert, which may be an activity that could be suppressed in the aftermath of the storm of this nature, as the victims address more immediate needs.

Additionally, these survey responses are only from adults over the age of 18, and thus do not reflect the effects the storm had on children. Mental health experts and federal authorities say that children may be even more at risk for emotional trauma after a disaster.

## Implications

As Congress considers disaster relief for the victims of Superstorm Sandy, the storm's impact on the mental health of those suffering its aftermath provides significant evidence for the larger consequences of major natural disasters. Taken together, these data document the direct emotional impact of Superstorm Sandy.

Increased depression, worry, and anger can have significant long-term effects for individuals, their families, and their communities, including increased healthcare costs, morbidity rates, and risk of substance abuse. To minimize these deleterious consequences when facing future predicted disasters, like a hurricane or a snowstorm, leaders should not overlook resources for enhanced psychological and emotional assistance both before and after the event. In addition, getting ahead of the disaster with the proper preparedness messaging will also be likely to ease these emotional effects.

For those who Sandy -- or any major disaster -- affected, life may never return to the way it was, but addressing these emotional costs will be an important step along the path to recovery.

## About the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index

The Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index tracks wellbeing in the U.S. and provides best-in-class solutions for a healthier world. To learn more, please visit [well-beingindex.com](http://well-beingindex.com).

### Survey Methods

Results are based on 6,414 interviews conducted from Sept. 15-Dec. 15, with adult residents of New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut. Of these interviews, 1,713 occurred before the storm (Sept. 15-Oct. 28) and another 1,690 after the storm (Oct. 31-Dec. 15) in areas most impacted by Sandy, with another 1,433 before the storm and 1,578 after the storm among remaining residents of the three states. During the same period, 35,184 interviews were completed before the storm and 36,081 after it among residents of the remaining 47 states.

For results based on the three sample types for either before or after the storm, one can say with 95% confidence that the typical margin of sampling error is  $\pm 2.1$ ,  $\pm 2.4$ , and  $\pm 0.5$  percentage points, respectively, for the depression

The most affected ZIP codes that received individual assistance were listed by FEMA on Nov. 5.

Interviews are conducted with respondents on landline telephones (for respondents with a landline telephone) and cellular phones (for respondents who are cellphone only)

In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

For more details on Gallup's polling methodology, visit <http://www.gallup.com/>.

### [Back to Top](#)

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## Disaster Distress Helpline

PHONE: 1-800-985-5990 TEXT: "TalkWithUs" to 66746

When disaster strikes, often people react with increased anxiety, worry and anger. With support from community and family, most of us bounce back. However, "Some may need extra assistance to cope with unfolding events and uncertainties," said U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) Administrator Pamela S. Hyde, J.D.

The **Disaster Distress Helpline (DDH)** is the first national hotline dedicated to providing year-round disaster crisis counseling. This toll-free, multilingual, crisis support service is available 24/7 via telephone (1-800-985-5990) and SMS (text 'TalkWithUs' to 66746) to residents in the U.S. and its territories who are experiencing emotional distress related to natural or man-made disasters.

Callers and texters are connected to trained and caring professionals from the closest crisis counseling center in the network. Helpline staff provides counseling and support, including information on common stress reactions and healthy coping, as well as referrals to local disaster-related resources for follow-up care and support.

Visit <http://disasterdistress.samhsa.gov> for additional information and resources related to disaster behavioral health.

### **Disaster Distress Helpline: 1-800-985-5990**

- Toll-free
- Multilingual
- Available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, year-round to all U.S. states & territories
- TTY for deaf and hearing impaired: 1-800-846-8517

### **SMS: Text 'TalkWithUs' to 66746**

- Standard text messaging / data rates apply (according to each subscriber's mobile provider plan)
- Spanish-speakers in the U.S. can text 'Hablanos' to 66746
- Available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, year-round
- Palau, Marshall Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia text 'TalkWithUs' or 'Hablanos' to 1-206-430-1097
- US VI and Puerto Rico text 'TalkWithUs' or 'Hablanos' to 1-212-461-4635



## About the Mental Health Association of New York City


By developing innovative service models, raising awareness, promoting improved policies, and disseminating best practices, the Mental Health Association of New York City (MHA-NYC) has been a local and national leader for over 40 years in helping people achieve good mental health.

Serving as a local organization with national impact, our three-part mission of service, advocacy, and education influences all we do.

**1-800-LIFENET**  
**(1-800-543-3638)**  
**www.800lifenet.org**

Find us on Facebook and Twitter:

 [www.facebook.com/mhaofnyc](http://www.facebook.com/mhaofnyc)

 [@mhaofnyc](https://twitter.com/mhaofnyc)

**English LifeNet:**  
1-800-LIFENET (800-543-3638)

**Spanish LifeNet:**  
1-877-AYUDESE (877-293-3373)

**Asian LifeNet (available in Cantonese  
and Mandarin):**  
1-877-990-8585

**Deaf/Hearing Impaired:**  
TTY 1-212-982-5284

See how you can support LifeNet and other vital programs of MHA-NYC by visiting our web site at  
<http://www.mhaofnyc.org/donate-now.aspx>



**MHA-NYC**  
50 Broadway, 19<sup>th</sup> Floor  
New York, NY 10004  
Tel: (212) 254-0333 / Fax: (212) 785-1910  
[www.mha-nyc.org](http://www.mha-nyc.org)



\*LifeNet is a program of MHA-NYC. LifeNet is funded through contracts with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.

# Coping with life can be difficult.

# Getting help is easy.

LifeNet provides free and confidential mental health and substance abuse information, referral, and crisis hotline services for New York City residents 24 hours a day / 7 days a week.




**1-800-LIFENET**  
**(1-800-543-3638)**

[www.800lifenet.org](http://www.800lifenet.org)



## How can LifeNet help me?



### By Phone

Many of us have concerns about emotional, mental, or substance abuse problems. These can seem overwhelming and leave us feeling helpless. LifeNet is available to help people who are:

- Feeling sad or depressed
- Concerned about problem gambling, alcohol and/or drug abuse
- Feeling worried, nervous, or stressed
- Experiencing a troubling change in mood or behavior
- Feeling suicidal
- Concerned about family or other relationships
- Experiencing trauma or loss
- Afraid of hurting themselves or others
- Seeking mental health care and substance abuse referrals

### Online

LifeNet Network of Care ([www.800lifenet.org](http://www.800lifenet.org)) is a comprehensive online resource for individuals, families, and agencies in need of help and information.

Compiling community-based resources from across the New York City region, LifeNet Network of Care allows anyone with access to the Internet to locate needed services in their area, recent studies, and information on common mental health issues.

Go online to:

- Search our extensive database of mental health services
- Email crisis counselors for information
- Find articles about mental health topics
- Create a confidential, personal health record

## What happens when I call LifeNet?

You will be connected to a trained behavioral health professional, who will pay attention to your needs. An experienced crisis counselor will respond to your concerns and help you to decide on a comfortable next step in getting help, providing information and a referral in your area.

Translation services are available for over 140 languages, ensuring that everyone who calls will be able to access all resources and treatments.

**"Thank you so much. This (call) made me feel better. The crisis counselors made me feel like I am not crazy. They showed me the compassion and respect that I needed."**

**–LifeNet Caller**

**"Being a LifeNet counselor is a very rewarding experience. Every day we help people from all walks of life with widely varying situations and needs. Part of the satisfaction of working with callers, lies in identifying ways to help in each unique experience and personalizing the call to specifically address the caller's needs."**


**–LifeNet Crisis Counselor**

## Can LifeNet assist people in crisis situations?

Yes, and we do so every day.

Our crisis counselors are trained in assessing the problem and its severity. If a serious risk is present, our crisis counselors will work with the caller to keep them safe, including connecting them to crisis or emergency services if needed.

**A federally-funded evaluation of LifeNet and seven other crisis call centers, published in 2007, showed that callers to LifeNet were less emotionally distressed and/or suicidal after the call. When evaluators followed-up with suicidal callers three weeks after the call, nearly 12% of the suicidal callers spontaneously stated that the call kept them from killing themselves.**



**"A lot of callers reach out to us with very painful situations. Our goal is to comfort and respect the caller while helping them find treatment, counseling, ongoing support and also stepping in to advocate on their behalf when needed. The best feeling in the world is when a caller feels better at the end of the call and we have given them some relief and hope that they will be able to get help."**

**–LifeNet Crisis Counselor**

**If you cannot locate the information online, or are in crisis, please call 1-800-LIFENET.  
Individuals: Call 1-800-LIFENET Providers: Visit [www.800LIFENET.org](http://www.800LIFENET.org)**



# FEMA

## National Disaster Recovery Framework: Overview

### The National Disaster Recovery Framework

The National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) is a conceptual guide designed to ensure coordination and recovery planning at all levels of government before a disaster, and defines how we will work together, following a disaster, to best meet the needs of states, local and tribal governments and communities and individuals in their recoveries. For the first time, the framework establishes coordination structures, defines leadership roles and responsibilities, and guides coordination and recovery planning at all levels of government before a disaster happens. It involves better utilization of existing resources.

### Recovery Support Functions

The National Disaster Recovery Framework introduces six recovery support functions that are led by designated federal coordinating agencies. The Recovery Support Functions (RSFs) comprise the coordinating structure for key functional areas of assistance. Their purpose is to support local governments by facilitating problem solving, improving access to resources and fostering coordination among state and federal agencies, nongovernmental partners and stakeholders. The Recovery Support Functions and designated federal coordinating agencies are:

- **Community Planning and Capacity Building:** Federal Emergency Management Agency
- **Economic:** U.S. Department of Commerce
- **Health and Social Services:** U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
- **Housing:** U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

- **Infrastructure Systems:** U.S. Army Corps of Engineers



**Natural and Cultural Resources:** U.S. Department of Interior

FEMA

## Leading Recovery

The framework identifies and recommends key recovery positions designed to allow for more concentrated focus on community recovery. These positions include a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (when warranted in large-scale or catastrophic disasters), State/Tribal Disaster Recovery Coordinators and Local Disaster Recovery Managers.

## Addressing the Needs of the Whole Community

The framework incorporates whole community values, with emphasis on core principles, such as individual and family empowerment and partnership and inclusiveness. The National Disaster Recovery Framework outlines how important state, local and tribal leadership and participation of community members in decision-making and coordinated engagement of a wide array of supporting organizations is critical for successful recovery.

## Stakeholder Review and Comment

The framework was developed in partnership, and through extensive outreach, with Federal, state, local and tribal governments, private and non-profit partners who have a stake in immediate and ongoing recovery following a disaster. Outreach sessions that began in fall 2009 resulted in thousands of comments and recommendations from more than 600 stakeholders representing Federal, Tribal, state and local governments, public and private organizations, including communities recovering from disasters. This feedback informed the development of the draft National Disaster Recovery Framework.

In January 2010, the draft National Disaster Recovery Framework was published in the Federal Register for public comment. FEMA reviewed the more than 2,000 comments to further refine the final version of the National Disaster Recovery Framework.

## Summary

This framework, which helps to better define how we, as a Nation, will approach recovery, is not a finish line, but just one part of our ongoing mission to better meet the needs of disaster survivors. We will continue to work with all of our stakeholders on ways to improve our programs, and better partner with the entire team, in our common goal to support communities as they recover.



**New York City Council**

**January 16, 2013**

**Oversight Hearing: Emergency Planning and Management During and After the Storm**

**Testimony of Metropolitan Council on Jewish Poverty**

---

As a citywide agency with a unique expertise in crisis intervention and with community based organizations and infrastructure in the hardest hit areas, Met Council became a leader in Hurricane Sandy relief and recovery efforts from day one. We have been on the front-lines, working tirelessly, in Far Rockaway, Bayswater/Wavecrest, Belle Harbor, Coney Island, Seagate, Gravesend, Brighton Beach, and Staten Island.

We are here testifying, because nonprofit organizations like Met Council have and continue to play a vital role in disaster relief and recovery efforts. We are particularly adept at addressing local needs due to our in-depth knowledge of the community, trusted relationships with community leaders and partners, and strong organizational infrastructure and capacity. We are desperately needed to fill ongoing government service gaps.

Our ability to quickly mobilize and deploy staff and resources to the most devastated communities is largely owed to continued support from the New York City Council through discretionary funding. By funding our Crisis Case and Social Workers, emergency food assistance and leveraging privately raised dollars, City Council, strengthens our organizational infrastructure and increases our capacity to respond speedily to emerging needs, natural disasters, and other unexpected crises. Because we were strong on October 28<sup>th</sup>, we were ready on October 29<sup>th</sup>!

In the immediate aftermath of the storm, we provided 150,000 pounds of bulk food and 85,000 hot meals, food vouchers, security force, clean-up crews, volunteers, water, blankets, generators,

clothes and Crisis Social Workers. We helped displaced victims forced to evacuate their homes, which were severely damaged, and in some cases irreparable. We assisted in evacuating residents without transportation, and relocated them to temporary housing sites and shelters. For clients who did not need to evacuate their homes, but lost power and electricity, Met Council distributed thousands of hot meals and non-perishable food staples that do not require cooking or preparation.

Our workers and volunteers have gone door to door, block by block (and in some cases up 20 floors in darkened stairways) to ensure that elderly New Yorkers, had access to medications while pharmacies and doctors' offices were closed. 30 Crisis Social Workers were deployed to meet immediate needs and offer mental-health counseling to alleviate post-traumatic stress, and later to assist with FEMA applications and D-SNAP enrollment. In the past 8 weeks alone, we have distributed over \$1 million in emergency cash assistance.

To meet the long-term recovery needs of Sandy survivors, we have launched several new programs. We have hired 20 new field workers in state-designated areas to reach out to those struggling for the foreseeable future and work with them to develop more long-term recovery plans. We are strategically placing mobile recovery units, with benefit enrollers and pro bono attorneys, in neighborhoods with devastated community-based service providers. We are recruiting and coordinating volunteers to provide truthful cost estimates of hurricane damage to homeowners vulnerable to fraud. We are also strengthening our Network's hurricane support system, including a roving Sandy Career Counselor, handymen, and full-time Recovery Coordinators. Additionally, we are the lead agency in coordinating relief efforts in Coney Island and are staffing Restoration Centers in Gravesend and Far Rockaway.

Once again, we could not continue providing critical social services to over 100,000 needy New Yorkers each year without the vital partnership of New York City Council. We deeply value your leadership and partnership and look forward to working together to help the needy throughout the New York area.

Thank you.

Sarah Felsenthal

Metropolitan Council on Jewish Poverty

[www.metcouncil.org](http://www.metcouncil.org)

80 Maiden Lane, 21<sup>st</sup> Floor

New York, New York 10024

Phone: 347-839-0106

Email: [sfelsenthal@metcouncil.org](mailto:sfelsenthal@metcouncil.org)

(212) 453-9500 · 80 Maiden Lane · 21<sup>st</sup> Floor · New York, NY 10038 · [www.metcouncil.org](http://www.metcouncil.org)

As a citywide crisis intervention agency, Met Council has been a leader in Hurricane Sandy relief and recovery from day one. For nearly 40 years, Met Council has helped people in crisis find immediate relief and long-term self-sufficiency with a comprehensive range of services all under one roof. Through our 25 Jewish Community Councils, we serve 100,000 clients each year in every ZIP code in the city.

Since the storm, we have leveraged our day-to-day services to the most devastated communities, providing:

- **\$1 million in emergency cash assistance** to help hurricane survivors make repairs, replace vehicles, and fill other gaps not covered by FEMA or other programs.
- **170,000 pounds of food staples** to families struggling to make ends meet in neighborhoods that lost supermarkets and other food suppliers.
- **85,000 prepared meals**, that do not require cooking, for displaced families and those without gas or kitchen appliances.
- **30 case workers** deployed to the front lines to provide case assistance, expertise on disaster relief applications, and connections with shelter, mental health support, and other critical resources. We are also providing vital staffing to two of the City's Restoration Centers.
- **800 volunteers**, recruited by Met Council and our JCC Network, to help clean out damaged houses, package and distribute supplies, and canvass door-to-door.
- **Emergency casework and advocacy to dozens of domestic violence clients** in hard-hit areas who became particularly vulnerable and isolated from the storm.
- **Generators, laptops, security patrols, and other infrastructure supports** to CBOs in high-need areas, boosting their abilities to respond to crises on the ground.



To fully serve our highest-need communities, we have launched several new programs for hurricane survivors:

- **FEMA Case Management** – 20 new field workers in state-designated areas to reach out to those struggling for the foreseeable future and provide more long-term recovery plans.
- **Mobile Recovery Units** – Two trailers, with benefits enrollers and pro bono attorneys, in neighborhoods with devastated community-based service providers.
- **Honest damage appraisal** – Recruiting, deploying, and coordinating volunteers to provide truthful cost estimates of hurricane damage to homeowners vulnerable to fraud.
- **Other new supports** – Strengthening our Network's hurricane supports, including a roving Sandy Career Counselor, handymen, and full-time Recovery Coordinators.

Met Council is one of New York's largest human services agencies, providing 100,000 New Yorkers of all races, religions, and backgrounds with critical services in their fight against poverty each year. Learn more at [metcouncil.org](http://metcouncil.org).

# Hurricane Sandy Timeline

**Bryan Norcross**

Sr. Executive Director of Weather Content  
Sr. Hurricane Specialist  
The Weather Channel

**New York City Council**

January 16, 2013


**The  
Weather  
Channel**

# Characterizing the Threat

- Threat is POSSIBLE
- Threat is an INCREASING POSSIBILITY
- Threat is LIKELY IF NO CHANGES
- Threat is LIKELY
- Threat is IMMINENT

Each level of THREAT has a MESSAGE.


# Sunday – October 21



European & Canadian models show a storm near the Northeast early the following week

- Threat: POSSIBLE strong storm early week
- Message: Cautionary, if any


# Monday – Wednesday



European Center computer model and other forecasts continue to show a significant storm near the Northeast early the following week

- Threat: POSSIBLE dangerous storm Monday
- Message: Cautionary, if any

# 11 AM Thursday




National Hurricane Center forecasts storm track into New Jersey

WORST CASE track for storm surge in the NYC region

- Threat: **INCREASING POSSIBILITY** of storm
- Message: Forecast shows a storm worse than Irene Monday. Evacuations possible.


# 5 PM Thursday



National Hurricane Center forecasts storm track into New Jersey

WORST CASE track for storm surge in the NYC region

# 5 PM Thursday




National Hurricane Center forecasts storm track into New Jersey

WORST CASE track for storm surge in the NYC region. Water on right side of storm pushed into New York bight.

- ❑ Threat: **INCREASING POSSIBILITY** of storm
- ❑ Message: Forecast continues for storm worse than Irene. Evacuations more likely.

# Friday



National Hurricane Center:

USERS ARE REMINDED TO NOT FOCUS ON THE DETAILS OF THE TRACK FORECAST...AS SANDY IS EXPECTED TO BRING IMPACTS TO A LARGE PART OF THE U.S. EAST COAST INTO EARLY NEXT WEEK.

- Threat: **LIKELY IMPACT** if no forecast change
- Message: Forecast continues for storm surge worse than Irene. Evacuation orders likely Saturday. Begin preparation of property.

# Saturday

National Hurricane Center **11 AM** Forecast:

**Storm Surge 4 - 8 FEET** above ground

Irene surge: 4.36 FEET

- Threat: Inundation of coastal sections LIKELY**
- Message: Storm surge worse than Irene LIKELY. Perhaps much worse. Evacuation ordered for Sunday morning.**

# Key Questions

- What is the **WORST PLAUSIBLE THREAT** based on what we know now?
- When will we know more?
- What is the **EVACUATION COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE** to allow for *mental* and *physical* preparations by residents and visitors?



# UNIFORMED EMS UNIONS

LOCAL 3621 & LOCAL 2507



On November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012 the members of The FDNY EMS command represented by locals 2507 & 3621 convened a special meeting for the purpose of a no confidence vote in the leadership of EMSC Chief Abdo Nahmod. After much discussion and consideration on the state of management in the EMS Command, the members voted by overwhelming majority to raise our concerns and lack of confidence in Chief Nahmod with city officials. This statement outlines our position. While the facts and beliefs presented reflect the significant problems within the department, we remain committed to providing the highest quality pre-hospital services. Collectively the Locals have recognized that in order to continue to provide these services, administrative change needs to occur. The series of items that follow represent an accumulation of events that have put front line officers and responders in an embarrassing and life threatening position. Lacking faith in the current leadership, especially confidence in Chief Nahmod's ability to make key administrative and logistical decisions, and guidance to ensure success in our future has resulted in an overwhelming desire for the EMT's Paramedics, Captains and Lieutenants of the FDNY EMSC to vocally request change.

*Whereas* Chief Abdo Nahmod has jeopardized the safety of the public, and EMT's, Paramedics, Lieutenants and Captains by not preparing for evacuation of personnel and equipment from known flood zones in anticipation of Hurricane Sandy:

*Whereas* Chief Abdo Nahmod has jeopardized the safety of the public and his front line EMT's, Paramedics, Lieutenants and Captains by not ordering evacuation of personnel and equipment from flooded stations during Hurricane Sandy.

*Whereas* Chief Abdo Nahmod has jeopardized the safety of the public, and EMT's, Paramedics, Lieutenants and Captains by ordering units to remain on the street in unsheltered evacuated areas during Hurricane Sandy

*Whereas* Chief Abdo Nahmod has drafted department policies that limit the ability of members to respond to emergencies;

*Whereas* Chief Abdo Nahmod has ignored federal standards of the span of control as contained in Homeland Security Directives.

*Whereas* Chief Abdo Nahmod has instructed shift supervisors to disregard the department policy outlining when to recall off-duty personnel during declared major emergencies hence putting the health and well-being of his subordinates and the public at higher risk

*Whereas* Chief Abdo Nahmod has instructed shift supervisors to disregard the department policy contained in the Emergency Action Plan;

*Whereas* Chief Abdo Nahmod has tendered policies that cut the position of Duty Captain who is responsible for borough level operations in the absence of a superior officer;

*Whereas* it is the responsibility of all EMS chiefs to adhere to the terms and conditions outlined in collective bargaining agreements, Chief Abdo Nahmod repeatedly fails to abide by the agreement.

*Therefore be it resolved* that the members of Local 2507 and 3621, by unanimous vote of the delegate body, declare no confidence in EMSC Chief Abdo Nahmod. In the absence of immediate reform, or close oversight from the Mayor and City Council we respectfully request a letter of resignation from Chief Abdo Nahmod.

Izzy Miranda  
President  
Uniformed EMT's & Paramedics  
Local 2507

Vincent Variale  
President  
Uniformed EMS Officers  
Local 3621

Exhibit 1






Exhibit 2  
Apparatus Floor Sta 4 (Post Fire)




Exhibit 3



Exhibit 4



Exhibit 5  
Cross Street at Bellvue

Exhibit 6



Search Criteria:  
Date: 102912  
From time: 2000  
To time: 2359

Exhibit 7

*Dropped Calls*

*Down  
graded  
or*

*Cancelled*

*15 min  
ELAPSED  
TIME  
8PM - 8:15PM*

CH #123033086	2000/2600	6/OTHER	NSNT	B1/040H	150 ST/21 AV ,QN
CH #123033087	2000/2000	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	E 161 ST/DEEGAN XW ,B
CH #123033088	2000/2000	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060H	181 HETT AV ,SI
CH #123033089	2000/2000	6/OTHER	NSNT	B3/043F	W 21 ST/NEPTUNE AV ,B
CH #123033090	2000/2107	4/INJURY	82B	S1/120A	1690 GLEASON AV ,BX
CH #123033091	2000/2000	6/OTHER	NSNT	K4/075B	51 AGNES PL ,SI
CH #123033092	2000/2104	5/INJURY	82B	S2/122G	962 JAMAICA AV #MC ,B
CH #123033093	2000/2000	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	655 QUINCY AV ,SI
CH #123033094	2000/2000	6/OTHER	NSNT	S1/120A	30 FINLEY AV ,SI
CH #123033095	2001/2001	6/OTHER	NSNT	S1/120A	175 CAPODANNO BL ,SI
CH #123033096	2001/2001	6/OTHER	NSNT	S1/120A	356 SAND LN ,SI
CH #123033097	2001/2001	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/061A	106 PEARSALL ST ,SI
CH #123033098	2001/2001	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060A	30 LESTER CT ,BK
CH #123033099	2001/2001	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060G	136 NORFOLK ST ,BK
CH #123033100	2001/2001	6/OTHER	NSNT	B3/045I	2783 W 16 ST ,BK
CH #123033101	2001/2146	2/MCI23P	91 20A3	B3/043K	4565 BELDEN PT/CITY ISLAND
CH #123033102	2002/2027	4/UNKNOW	91 03F3	S2/122G	2007 NEWBOLD AV #B19
CH #123033103	2002/2002	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060B	722 BUEL AV ,SI
CH #123033104	2002/2002	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100B	123 COLERIDGE ST ,BK
CH #123033105	2002/2002	6/OTHER	NSNT	S1/120M	171 BEACH 60 ST ,QN
CH #123033106	2002/2002	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	DUNCAN RD/EDDY ST ,SI
CH #123033107	2002/2002	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060J	60 PELICAN CR ,SI
CH #123033108	2003/2003	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	3839 NEPTUNE AV ,BK
CH #123033109	2003/2003	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122B	33 CEDARGROVE CT ,SI
CH #123033110	2003/2003	6/OTHER	NSNT	K6/088J	145 BAY TR ,SI
CH #123033111	2003/2040	6/SICK	82B	Q1/101G	200 TILLARY ST ,BK
CH #123033112	2003/2003	6/OTHER	NSNT	M5/019D	BEACH 59 ST/ROCKAWY B
CH #123033113	2003/2012	8/STNDBY	90 10E3	M8/032P	425 E 58 ST ,MN
CH #123033114	2004/2058	5/INJURY	82B	S2/122C	2991 8 AV ,MN
CH #123033115	2004/2004	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	332 MILTON AV ,SI
CH #123033116	2004/2004	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	230 ROMA AV ,SI
CH #123033117	2004/2004	6/OTHER	NSNT	S1/120A	255 MILL RD ,SI
CH #123033118	2004/2031	6/OTHER	CANX	Q1/100D	88 ROBIN RD ,SI
CH #123033119	2004/2004	6/OTHER	NSNT	B3/045I	139 BEACH 121 ST ,QN
CH #123033120	2004/2006	2/MCI22P	DUP	S1/120A	BELDEN ST/CITY ISLND
CH #123033121	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	M2/010D	481H CAPODANNO BL ,SI
CH #123033122	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	M1/001D	527 W 22 ST ,MN
CH #123033123	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122G	354 WEST ST ,MN
CH #123033124	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	K4/063B	993 OLYMPIA BL ,SI
CH #123033125	2005/2107	2/DIFFBR	82B	S1/120A	2220 BURNETT ST #4B ,
CH #123033126	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q2/113B	54 WENTWORTH AV ,SI
CH #123033127	2005/2131	6/SICK	93 54F3	S2/122C	155-15 N CONDUIT AV #
CH #123033128	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	K4/063J	40 MICHELLE LN ,SI
CH #123033129	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/062C	2426 E 70 ST ,BK
CH #123033130	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122E	2214 W 5 ST ,BK
CH #123033131	2005/2005	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q2/105C	851 PATTERSON AV ,SI
CH #123033132	2006/2109	4/UNKNOW	90 54B3	Q1/101E	MEYER AV/ROCKAWAY BL
CH #123033133	2006/2006	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/061B	29-17 LEWMAY RD ,QN
CH #123033134	2006/2026	6/OTHER	90 33F3	Q1/101A	2721 VOORHIES AV ,BK
CH #123033135	2006/2006	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	816 MEEHAN AV ,QN
CH #123033136	2006/2006	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122I	127 MARINE WY ,SI
CH #123033137	2006/2121	2/DIFFBR	82B	B1/041I	140 DUTCHESS AV ,SI
CH #123033138	2006/2050	5/INJURY	82B	S2/122C	865 E 167 ST #6B ,BX
CH #123033139	2006/2006	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	47 TOPPING ST ,SI
CH #123033140	2007/2007	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	77 TARLTON ST ,SI
CH #123033141	2007/2010	3/CARD	87 33Z3	K1/060B	3623 157 AMHERST ST ,BK

CH #123033142	«2007/2106	6/SICK	82B	✓	K2/068H	231 88 ST ,BK
CH #123033143	«2007/2021	5/INJURY	87	52F3	Q7/109F	140-40 SANFORD AV ,QN
CH #123033144	«2007/2007	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061B	KNAPP ST/SHORE PW ,BK
CH #123033145	«2007/2100	4/DRUG	82B		M5/023C	313 E 95 ST #22 ,MN
CH #123033146	«2007/2007	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/113N	115-42 MEXICO ST ,QN
CH #123033147	«2007/2007	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	728 BUEL AV ,SI
CH #123033148	«2007/2007	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	537 MERKEL PL ,SI
CH #123033149	«2007/2007	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061A	73 BEACON CT ,BK
CH #123033150	«2008/2103	6/SICK	CANX		S1/120A	37 DOTY AV ,SI
CH #123033151	«2008/2008	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A	75 MC LAUGHLIN ST ,SI
CH #123033152	«2008/2216	2/OBCOMP	87	47X3	Q1/101E	214 BEACH 32 ST ,QN
CH #123033153	«2008/2008	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063J	2148 E 69 ST ,BK
CH #123033154	«2008/2008	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122B	41 ARMSTRONG AV ,SI
CH #123033155	«2008/2008	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100A	333 BEACH 67 ST ,QN
CH #123033156	«2008/2008	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	165 FINLEY AV ,SI
CH #123033157	«2008/2008	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061B	3165 EMMONS AV ,BK
CH #123033158	«2008/2008	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A	148 MILLS AV ,SI
CH #123033159	«2008/2008	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	651 QUINCY AV ,SI
CH #123033160	«2008/2020	2/UNC	87	32X3	K6/076B	1215 135 RICHARDS ST #4J ,
CH #123033161	«2009/2009	6/OTHER	NSNT		S3/123C	150 FINLAY AV ,SI
CH #123033162	«2009/2009	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/069F	1181 E 105 ST ,BK
CH #123033163	«2009/2009	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	659 MILL RD ,SI
CH #123033164	«2009/2009	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	660 QUINCY AV ,SI
CH #123033165	«2009/2009	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106A	161-38 96 ST ,QN
CH #123033166	«2009/2009	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100E	144-03 NEPONSIT AV ,Q
CH #123033167	«2009/2009	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106A	158-27 102 ST ,QN
CH #123033168	«2009/2009	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061B	2827 BROWN ST ,BK
CH #123033169	«2010/2027	4/MVAINJ	87	53A3	Q2/105M	8385 CROSS ISLD PW/UNION T
CH #123033170	«2010/2010	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101A	BEACH 9 ST/SEAGIRT BL
CH #123033171	«2010/2010	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J	W 37 ST/CANAL AV ,BK
CH #123033172	«2010/2010	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	739 OCEANSIDE AV ,SI
CH #123033173	«2010/2010	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A	108 OCEANSIDE AV ,SI
CH #123033174	«2010/2010	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106A	99-12 159 AV ,QN
CH #123033175	«2010/2136	5/INJURY	82B		B3/043J	81 METROPOLTN OV #8H
CH #123033176	«2010/2010	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	229 COLONY AV ,SI
CH #123033177	«2010/2010	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100F	1001 CHANNEL RD ,QN
CH #123033178	«2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060A	1502 SHORE BL ,BK
CH #123033179	«2011/2258	3/CARD	82B		S2/122C	2293 294 WEED AV ,SI
CH #123033180	«2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061A	19 BEACON CT ,BK
CH #123033181	«2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063A	2140 E 66 ST ,BK
CH #123033182	«2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	142 GRIMSBY ST ,SI
CH #123033183	«2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061B	2800 E 29 ST ,BK
CH #123033184	«2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100A	436 BEACH 64 ST ,QN
CH #123033185	«2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J	3594 CANAL AV ,BK

Additional records on file but not displayed

Search Criteria:

3

Date: 102912

From time: 2011

To time: 2359

CH #123033178	<2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060A		1502 SHORE BL ,BK
CH #123033179	<2011/2258	3/CARD	82B		S2/122C	2293	294 WEED AV ,SI
CH #123033180	<2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061A		19 BEACON CT ,BK
CH #123033181	<2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063A		2140 E 66 ST ,BK
CH #123033182	<2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G		142 GRIMSBY ST ,SI
CH #123033183	<2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061B		2800 E 29 ST ,BK
CH #123033184	<2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100A		436 BEACH 64 ST ,QN
CH #123033185	<2011/2011	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J		3594 CANAL AV ,BK
CH #123033186	<2012/2109	2/DIFFBR	87		K4/063J		2430 E 70 ST ,BK
CH #123033187	<2012/2012	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100D		183 BEACH 114 ST ,QN
CH #123033188	<2012/2052	5/INJURY	93	03L3	B3/045D		801 VINCENT AV ,BX
CH #123033189	<2012/2012	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060H		2875 W 23 ST ,BK
CH #123033190	<2012/2121	3/SEIZR	82B		Q2/113D		144-16 181 PL ,QN
CH #123033191	<2012/2012	6/OTHER	NSNT		M1/001A		180 WATER ST ,MN
CH #123033192	<2012/2012	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060F		2951 W 8 ST ,BK
CH #123033193	<2012/2012	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063A		2303 E 66 ST ,BK
CH #123033194	<2012/2012	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		116 FINLEY AV ,SI
CH #123033195	<2012/2134	5/INJURY	CANX		S1/120W		22 CONFEDRTON PL ,SI
CH #123033196	<2013/2013	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		762 TYSENS LN ,SI
CH #123033197	<2013/2103	2/DIFFBR	82B		K7/081E		177 PATCHEN AV #45 ,B
CH #123033198	<2013/2013	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		157 DUGDALE ST ,SI
CH #123033199	<2013/2123	2/DIFFBR	82A		K2/068K		5516 4 AV #3L ,BK
CH #123033200	<2013/2013	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101F		40-03 ROCKAWY BE BL ,
CH #123033201	<2013/2013	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106B		159-45 92 ST ,QN
CH #123033202	<2013/2017	8/STNDBY	90	10E3	M5/019D		425 E 58 ST ,MN
CH #123033203	<2013/2013	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A		78 PEARSALL ST ,SI
CH #123033204	<2013/0133	6/OTHER	CANX		Q1/100C		92-24 ROCKAWY BE BL ,
CH #123033205	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061B		2825 BRAGG ST ,BK
CH #123033206	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		308 HETT AV ,SI
CH #123033207	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G		421 SLATER BL ,SI
CH #123033208	<2014/2139	3/CARD	82	31S3	K5/077H	9993	766 CLASSON AV ,BK
CH #123033209	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		M3/017A		E 30 ST/ROOSEVELT DR
CH #123033210	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101F		343 BEACH 47 ST ,QN
CH #123033211	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100C		92-50 HOLLAND AV ,QN
CH #123033212	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A		153 ARTHUR AV ,SI
CH #123033213	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100D		161 BEACH 117 ST ,QN
CH #123033214	<2014/2014	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		323 HETT AV ,SI
CH #123033215	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100F		20-50 CROSS BAY BL ,Q
CH #123033216	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		M9/030B		W 146 ST/RIVERSIDE DR
CH #123033217	<2015/0601	6/OTHER	CANC		Q1/100D	1372	110-02 ROCKAWY BE BL
CH #123033218	<2015/2016	6/OTHER	CANC		B5/050E		01 W 225 ST ,BX
CH #123033219	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		S3/123G		70 ANNADALE RD ,SI
CH #123033220	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120B		95 ROME AV ,SI
CH #123033221	<2015/2030	6/OTHER	CANX		Q1/100E		01 BEACH 221 ST ,QN
CH #123033222	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A		39 OLYMPIA BL ,SI
CH #123033223	<2015/2015	4/OTHER	NSNT		Q5/107H		75-06 192 ST ,QN
CH #123033224	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		117 CEDARGROVE CT ,SI
CH #123033225	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		M2/009B		E 14 ST/C AV ,MN
CH #123033226	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122E		299 COLONY AV ,SI
CH #123033227	<2015/2015	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		531 AMHERST AV ,SI
CH #123033228	<2016/2108	4/HYPTN	93	63A3	K5/079C		701 GATES AV ,BK
CH #123033229	<2016/2016	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060A		127 OXFORD ST ,BK
CH #123033230	<2016/2016	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100B		247 BEACH BREEZE LN ,
CH #123033231	<2016/2016	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063A		2183 E 65 ST ,BK
CH #123033232	<2016/2016	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061C		2711 E 23 ST ,BK
CH #123033233	<2016/2123	4/INJURY	82B		M4/020D		175 W 73 ST #9K ,MN

CH #123033234	«2016/2016	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	64 GARIBALDI AV ,SI
CH #123033235	«2016/2016	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/061A	105 NOEL AV ,BK
CH #123033236	«2016/2016	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100D	109-24 ROCKAWY BE BL
CH #123033237	«2016/2016	6/OTHER	NSNT	M1/007C	177 NORFOLK ST ,MN
CH #123033238	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100D	175 BEACH 114 ST ,QN
CH #123033239	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122Q	ARTHUR KILL RD/RICHMO
CH #123033240	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	238 WEED AV ,SI
CH #123033241	«2017/2144	1/ARREST	87 54Y2	Q2/106B	8952 159-45 92 ST ,QN
CH #123033242	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	107 TARLTON ST ,SI
CH #123033243	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100E	417 BEACH 143 ST ,QN
CH #123033244	«2017/2055	5/OBLAB	87 21C3	S1/120A	27 CRESTWATER CT ,SI
CH #123033245	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060J	3586 CANAL AV ,BK
CH #123033246	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060B	51 BEAUMONT ST ,BK
CH #123033247	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	159 CEDARGROVE CT ,SI
CH #123033248	«2017/2017	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100C	300 BEACH 101 ST ,QN
CH #123033249	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	K7/094C	540 KINGSLAND AV ,BK
CH #123033250	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	M1/001A	111 WALL ST ,MN
CH #123033251	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100C	320 BEACH 98 ST ,QN
CH #123033252	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122E	LINCOLN AV/MORELAND S
CH #123033253	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/062D	1899 SHORE PW ,BK
CH #123033254	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122G	15 JAY ST ,SI
CH #123033255	«2018/2138	7/EDP	82B	M3/014H	625 8 AV ,MN
CH #123033256	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100A	434 BEACH 65 ST ,QN
CH #123033257	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100C	305 BEACH 90 ST ,QN
CH #123033258	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	B5/050I	4617 WALDO AV ,BX
CH #123033259	«2018/2018	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q2/106A	98-07 165 AV ,QN
CH #123033260	«2019/2209	3/ELECT	83D 54U3	Q3/106G	8804 105 AV/134 ST ,QN
CH #123033261	«2019/2019	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122G	216 COLONY AV ,SI
CH #123033262	«2019/2019	6/OTHER	NSNT	S3/123A	440 MANHATTAN ST ,SI
CH #123033263	«2019/2110	6/OTHER	82B	M6/026E	1430 AMSTERDAM AV ,MN
CH #123033264	«2019/2019	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060B	40 COLERIDGE ST ,BK
CH #123033265	«2019/2019	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100E	142-04 NEPONSIT AV ,Q
CH #123033266	«2019/2019	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100C	308 BEACH 101 ST ,QN
CH #123033267	«2019/2312	8/STNDBY	82B	S2/122C	03 TOPPING ST ,SI
CH #123033268	«2019/2019	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/101F	40-15 ROCKAWY BE BL ,
CH #123033269	«2019/2019	6/OTHER	NSNT	K1/060G	2716 W 16 ST ,BK
CH #123033270	«2019/2019	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122G	565 HUNTER AV ,SI
CH #123033271	«2019/2137	3/CARD	82A	M1/001D	0353 354 WEST ST ,MN
CH #123033272	«2020/2020	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	361 MILTON AV ,SI
CH #123033273	«2020/2020	6/OTHER	NSNT	S1/120A	90 SEA GATE CT ,SI
CH #123033274	«2020/2020	6/OTHER	NSNT	S2/122C	20 CENTER PL ,SI
CH #123033275	«2020/2020	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/100A	353 BEACH 70 ST #2B ,
CH #123033276	«2020/2154	4/RESPIR	82B	M8/032E	108 W 141 ST #2F ,MN
CH #123033277	«2020/2020	6/OTHER	NSNT	Q1/101E	210 BEACH 29 ST ,QN

Additional records on file but not displayed

Search Criteria:

Date: 102912

From time: 2100

To time: 2359

CH #123033789	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	737 LIBERTY AV ,SI
CH #123033790	<2100/2126	4/DRUG	93	10E3	M3/017D	225 E 45 ST ,MN
CH #123033791	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	230 ROMA AV ,SI
CH #123033792	<2100/2209	4/DRUG	82B		Q7/109K	149 PL/NORTHERN BL ,Q
CH #123033793	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J	3524A BAY VIEW AV #2
CH #123033794	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A	421 CAPODANNO BL ,SI
CH #123033795	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	677 SEAVER AV ,SI
CH #123033796	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		K6/076D	DOUGLASS ST/NEVINS ST
CH #123033797	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A	275 OLYMPIA BL ,SI
CH #123033798	<2100/2109	5/INJURY	CANX		S1/120J	LAFAYETTE AV/RICHMOND
CH #123033799	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122H	437 QUINTARD ST ,SI
CH #123033800	<2100/2100	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101A	12-06 PLAINVIEW AV ,Q
CH #123033801	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/069F	10538 K AV ,BK
CH #123033802	<2101/2105	6/OTHER	87	41L3	K2/072E	2 AV/29 ST ,BK
CH #123033803	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	423 HAMDEN AV ,SI
CH #123033804	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/069H	10833 SEAVIEW AV #34B
CH #123033805	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101E	25-22 SEAGIRT AV #1 ,
CH #123033806	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	69 WEED AV #SIDE ,SI
CH #123033807	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	529 LYNN ST ,SI
CH #123033808	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100F	09 W 11 RD ,QN
CH #123033809	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	331 HUNTER AV ,SI
CH #123033810	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106A	161-32 99 ST ,QN
CH #123033811	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J	2649 W 36 ST ,BK
CH #123033812	<2101/2101	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	642 PATTERSON AV ,SI
CH #123033813	<2101/2112	4/UNKNOW	90	61A3	M2/013D	364 3 AV #5 ,MN
CH #123033814	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106B	160-56 89 ST ,QN
CH #123033815	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061A	69 BARTLETT PL ,BK
CH #123033816	<2102/2204	4/RESPIR	82B		M2/009G	334 E 6 ST #8 ,MN
CH #123033817	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	176 FREEBORN ST ,SI
CH #123033818	<2102/2236	4/SICK	82B		M1/007B	154 BROOME ST #6C ,MN
CH #123033819	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120N	24 AMELIA CT ,SI
CH #123033820	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106A	163-50 96 ST ,QN
CH #123033821	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		M2/013B	E 23 ST/ROOSEVELT DR
CH #123033822	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	115 ROMA AV ,SI
CH #123033823	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106A	159-36 100 ST ,QN
CH #123033824	<2102/2146	6/SICK	82B		M7/025D	2390 2 AV ,MN
CH #123033825	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063A	2247 E 66 ST ,BK
CH #123033826	<2102/2102	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A	JACKSON AV/ROBIN RD ,
CH #123033827	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	103 BEACHVIEW AV ,SI
CH #123033828	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100B	336 BEACH 87 ST ,QN
CH #123033829	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122E	376 COLONY AV ,SI
CH #123033830	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J	2868 W 31 ST ,BK
CH #123033831	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100E	409 BEACH 140 ST ,QN
CH #123033832	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060D	18 BRIGHTON 8 PL ,BK
CH #123033833	<2103/2139	2/UNC	87	23C3	S1/120A	9952 262 NORWAY AV ,SI
CH #123033834	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122E	493 MIDLAND AV ,SI
CH #123033835	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100E	312 BEACH 146 ST ,QN
CH #123033836	<2103/2131	2/DIFFBR	87	33U3	K1/060C	191 BRIGHTON 10 ST ,B
CH #123033837	<2103/2103	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060D	201 BRIGHTON 1 RD #6B
CH #123033838	<2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106A	162-26 99 ST ,QN
CH #123033839	<2104/2104	3/CARD	NSNT		S1/120A	0698 165 CAPODANNO BL ,SI
CH #123033840	<2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060I	W 28 ST/NEPTUNE AV ,B
CH #123033841	<2104/2109	4/RESPIR	87	65B3	K1/061D	SHORE PW/WEST ST ,BK
CH #123033842	<2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100B	309 BEACH 88 ST ,QN
CH #123033843	<2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		S1/120A	16 DOTY AV ,SI
CH #123033844	<2104/2159	6/SICK	82B		K6/078E	ATLANTIC AV/FLATBUSH

9PM-9:07

2 min  
ELAPSED  
TIME

> CH #123033845<	2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	87 MAPLETON AV ,SI
> CH #123033846<	2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	186 KISWICK ST ,SI
> CH #123033847<	2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	421 SLATER BL ,SI
> CH #123033848<	2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100A	69-26 GOUVERNEUR AV ,
> CH #123033849<	2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063J	2180 ROYCE ST ,BK
> CH #123033850<	2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060G	1409 MERMAID AV ,BK
> CH #123033851<	2104/2104	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	121 WEED AV ,SI
> CH #123033852<	2105/2145	4/OBMIS	82B		B2/046H	2327 GRAND CC ,BX
> CH #123033853<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	763 NUGENT AV ,SI
> CH #123033854<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	575 RIGA ST ,SI
> CH #123033855<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		M5/023C	1830 1 AV ,MN
> CH #123033856<	2105/2208	2/ASTHMB	82B		K4/073B	1669 281 DUMONT AV ,BK
> CH #123033857<	2105/2235	5/INJURY	CANX		Q1/100C	01 BEACH 105 ST #7X ,
> CH #123033858<	2105/2304	6/SICK	82B		K4/073G	10 AMBOY ST #13E ,BK
> CH #123033859<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063J	7007 V AV ,BK
> CH #123033860<	2105/2203	3/INJMAJ	82B	C401	K2/072B	1469 4015 5 AV ,BK
> CH #123033861<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J	3582 CANAL AV ,BK
> CH #123033862<	2105/0600	5/INJURY	CANC		Q1/100C	01 BEACH 105 ST #7X ,
> CH #123033863<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	238 WEED AV ,SI
> CH #123033864<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122F	224 JEFFERSON AV ,SI
> CH #123033865<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	146 GRIMSBY ST ,SI
> CH #123033866<	2105/2105	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q6/114A	32 AV/60 ST ,QN
> CH #123033867<	2106/2106	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106B	91-07 157 AV ,QN
> CH #123033868<	2106/2116	4/DRUG	96	09A3	M4/020A	445 W 59 ST ,MN
> CH #123033869<	2106/2148	3/CARD	90	50U3	Q5/107D	5324 85-91 PALERMO ST #1FL
> CH #123033870<	2106/2106	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J	3126 NEPTUNE AV ,BK
> CH #123033871<	2106/2106	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	172 KISWICK ST ,SI
> CH #123033872<	2106/2106	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063A	2641 NATIONAL DR ,BK
> CH #123033873<	2106/0609	6/OTHER	90	54F1	Q1/101A	711C SEAGIRT BL ,QN
> CH #123033874<	2106/2125	4/UNKNOW	90	04H3	M2/009B	765 ROOSEVELT DR #2B
> CH #123033875<	2106/2106	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100E	167 BEACH 126 ST ,QN
> CH #123033876<	2106/2106	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C	26 MICHELLE LN ,SI
> CH #123033877<	2106/2106	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101C	15-40 DUNBAR ST ,QN
> CH #123033878<	2107/2239	2/DIFFBR	CANC		Q1/100E	1445 428 BEACH 139 ST ,QN
> CH #123033879<	2107/2107	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060H	2826 W 24 ST ,BK
> CH #123033880<	2107/2107	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061B	3652 SHORE PW ,BK
> CH #123033881<	2107/2107	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060H	2824 W 19 ST #2F ,BK
> CH #123033882<	2107/2107	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	170 MORELAND ST ,SI
> CH #123033883<	2107/2107	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	504 DONGAN HIL AV ,SI
> CH #123033884<	2107/2107	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106B	158-06 88 ST ,QN
> CH #123033885<	2107/2107	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122F	218 STOBE AV ,SI
> CH #123033886<	2107/2107	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/069H	10550 N AV ,BK
> CH #123033887<	2107/2219	2/DIFFBR	82A		B2/046M	1630 UNDERCLIFF AV #7
> CH #123033888<	2107/0159	6/OTHER	CANX		Q1/101F	478 BEACH 43 ST ,QN

Additional records on file but not displayed

Search Criteria:

Date: 102912

From time: 2300

To time: 2359

CH	#123035302	<2300/2355	3/CARD	93	49V3	Q6/114P	7451	14 ST/30 RD ,QN
CH	#123035303	<2300/2300	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101G		334 BEACH 54 ST ,QN
CH	#123035304	<2300/2355	3/STAB	82B		M7/025A		1 AV/E 116 ST ,MN
CH	#123035305	<2300/2300	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106B		157-50 92 ST ,QN
CH	#123035306	<2300/0118	2/MCI22P	82A	C391	K4/069G	2294	1438 E 88 ST ,BK
CH	#123035307	<2300/0119	4/UNKNOW	96	21B3	S1/120A		EBBITS ST RD/MILLS AV
CH	#123035308	<2300/0028	2/DIFFBR	82A		Q2/103R		104-05 201 ST ,QN
CH	#123035309	<2300/2300	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/105B		147-31 229 ST ,QN
CH	#123035310	<2300/2300	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100E		311 BEACH 148 ST ,QN
CH	#123035311	<2300/2300	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/069H		1215 E 102 ST ,BK
CH	#123035312	<2301/2301	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G		122 BEACHVIEW AV ,SI
CH	#123035313	<2301/2301	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063J		2348 E 74 ST ,BK
CH	#123035314	<2301/2301	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G		HYLAN BL/SEAVAR AV ,S
CH	#123035315	<2301/2301	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G		319 DONGAN HIL AV ,SI
CH	#123035316	<2301/2301	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101F		339 BEACH 43 ST ,QN
CH	#123035317	<2301/2346	4/SICK	82B		K4/075F		488 FOUNTAIN AV #1FL
CH	#123035318	<2301/2324	7/EDP	87	41D1	K1/061M		CONEY ISLD AV/KINGS H
CH	#123035319	<2302/2302	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G		651 QUINCY AV ,SI
CH	#123035320	<2302/2302	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		167 FOXBEACH AV ,SI
CH	#123035321	<2302/2302	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/105C		254-26 CRAFT AV ,QN
CH	#123035322	<2302/2333	6/OTHER	CANC		K1/060J		W 32 ST/NEPTUNE AV ,B
CH	#123035323	<2303/2304	9/STUCK			S3/		HYLAND BL/MAPLEWOOD P
CH	#123035324	<2303/2303	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G		577 MIDLAND AV ,SI
CH	#123035325	<2303/2303	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122F		224 JEFFERSON AV ,SI
CH	#123035326	<2303/2303	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G		308 HUNTER AV ,SI
CH	#123035327	<2303/2303	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J		3851 LAUREL AV ,BK
CH	#123035328	<2304/2304	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		107 TARLTON ST ,SI
CH	#123035329	<2304/2304	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/069G		1217 E 87 ST ,BK
CH	#123035330	<2304/2304	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106B		157-42 92 ST ,QN
CH	#123035331	<2304/2304	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/062D		127 27 AV ,BK
CH	#123035332	<2304/2304	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/069E		1159 E 81 ST ,BK
CH	#123035333	<2305/2305	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106A		163 AV/95 ST ,QN
CH	#123035334	<2305/0025	1/ARREST	82A		Q6/114C	7475	31-59 42 ST ,QN
CH	#123035335	<2305/0116	4/RESPIR	96	22C1	S3/123D		19 NORTH EDO CT ,SI
CH	#123035336	<2305/2305	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122C		100 CUBA AV ,SI
CH	#123035337	<2305/2305	6/OTHER	NSNT		M1/001A		125 BROAD ST ,MN
CH	#123035338	<2305/2305	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122E		21 MAPLEWOOD PL ,SI
CH	#123035339	<2306/2306	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J		3813 POPLAR AV ,BK
CH	#123035340	<2306/0213	4/INJURY	82B		S3/123G		89 SYLVIA ST ,SI
CH	#123035341	<2306/2344	8/STNDBY	CANX		K1/060D		BRIGHTON 2 ST/BRIGHTO
CH	#123035342	<2307/2307	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060B		42 AMHERST ST ,BK
CH	#123035343	<2307/0041	9/MECHE			K1/		543
CH	#123035344	<2307/2307	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/105C		149-82 WELLER LN ,QN
CH	#123035345	<2307/2307	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100E		177 BEACH 137 ST ,QN
CH	#123035346	<2307/0027	2/DIFFBR	82B	33Z3	K1/061B		2634 HARING ST #1FL ,
CH	#123035347	<2307/2307	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060I		2926 W 25 ST #215D ,B
CH	#123035348	<2307/2350	4/DRUG	82B	C461	Q6/110P		77-05 37 AV ,QN
CH	#123035349	<2307/0000	2/DIFFBR	93	42X1	K1/061B		2455 BRIGHAM ST ,BK
CH	#123035350	<2308/2308	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063A		13 BASSETT AV ,BK
CH	#123035351	<2308/2308	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060F		2951 W 8 ST ,BK
CH	#123035352	<2308/2308	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061C		2677 E 23 ST ,BK
CH	#123035353	<2308/2308	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060H		2832 W 23 ST #7L ,BK
CH	#123035354	<2309/0437	1/ARREST	82	22V1	S2/122E	2049	344 LINCOLN AV ,SI
CH	#123035355	<2309/0437	9/MECHE			K1/		OCEANVIEW/CIA
CH	#123035356	<2309/2323	4/OTHER	90	09B3	M4/020A		30 W 63 ST ,MN
CH	#123035357	<2309/2309	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061D		2549 E 1 ST ,BK

> CH #123035358	<2309/2309	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/100A	411 BEACH 66 ST ,QN
> CH #123035359	<2309/2309	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q7/109Q	4-17 128 ST ,QN
> CH #123035360	<2310/2310	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/105B	235-42 147 DR ,QN
> CH #123035361	<2310/2310	6/OTHER	NSNT		K3/071D	E NEW YORK AV/TROY AV
> CH #123035362	<2310/2310	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q1/101F	343 BEACH 47 ST ,QN
> CH #123035363	<2310/0001	9/BBP			Q2/	ST54 ALSRES
> CH #123035364	<2311/0453	5/INJURY	82B		S2/122D	2211 HYLAN BL ,SI
> CH #123035365	<2311/0034	2/DIFFBR	82A		M2/006E	26 GROVE ST #3B ,MN
> CH #123035366	<2311/2311	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061B	2518 VOORHIES AV ,BK
> CH #123035367	<2311/0854	9/STUCK			S2/	HYLAND/MIDLA
> CH #123035368	<2311/0014	5/INJURY	DUP		S2/122D	2211 HYLAN BL ,SI
> CH #123035369	<2311/2311	6/OTHER	NSNT		B3/045C	04 PENNYFIELD AV ,BX
> CH #123035370	<2311/2330	2/DIFFBR	87		K4/063A	13 BASSETT AV ,BK
> CH #123035371	<2311/0356	4/OTHER	96	23C1	S2/122C	847 TYSENS LN ,SI
> CH #123035372	<2311/2311	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061A	59 CANTON CT ,BK
> CH #123035373	<2311/0004	4/SICK	82B		K1/062F	2014 81 ST ,BK
> CH #123035374	<2311/2311	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122F	189 JEFFERSON AV ,SI
> CH #123035375	<2312/2312	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060H	2106 NEPTUNE AV ,BK
> CH #123035376	<2312/0005	9/BBP			M4/	H 20
> CH #123035377	<2312/0030	3/ALTMEN	82B		K4/075E	1025 HENDRIX ST ,BK
> CH #123035378	<2312/2334	4/UNKNOW	90	15F3	B4/047K	4020 HARPER AV ,BX
> CH #123035379	<2312/0022	3/SEIZR	96	23V1	S1/120G	01 FERRY TERMINAL DR
> CH #123035380	<2313/2313	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060I	2701 MERMAID AV ,BK
> CH #123035381	<2313/2349	6/OTHER	87	58G3	K4/069F	1142 E 102 ST ,BK
> CH #123035382	<2313/0004	2/UNC	83D	17W3	B2/046I	4770 1750 DAVIDSON AV #4E
> CH #123035383	<2313/2313	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/106B	89-18 156 AV ,QN
> CH #123035384	<2313/2313	6/OTHER	NSNT		B3/045E	HUTCH RIVR PW/E TREMO
> CH #123035385	<2314/2336	8/STNDBY	91	58I3	K4/063J	2252 E 72 ST ,BK
> CH #123035386	<2314/0012	2/DIFFBR	96	23C1	S2/122K	232 TYSENS LN ,SI
> CH #123035387	<2314/0022	3/INBLED	82	53X3	Q5/107F	67-28 PARSONS BL #2A
> CH #123035388	<2314/2314	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/060J	3804 POPLAR AV ,BK
> CH #123035389	<2314/0004	6/SICK	82B		M3/014H	W 43 ST/7 AV ,MN
> CH #123035390	<2314/2320	6/OTHER	91	42A3	K1/062D	2701 HARWAY AV ,BK
> CH #123035391	<2315/2315	6/OTHER	NSNT		Q2/105B	147-29 235 ST ,QN
> CH #123035392	<2315/2315	6/OTHER	NSNT		K1/061D	3157 SHORE PW ,BK
> CH #123035393	<2315/2315	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	459 MIDLAND AV ,SI
> CH #123035394	<2315/0011	6/OTHER	DUP		Q1/100C	01 BEACH 105 ST #7X
> CH #123035395	<2315/2316	8/STNDBY	CANC		Q6/114G	23-14 29 ST ,QN
> CH #123035396	<2315/2315	6/OTHER	NSNT		K3/067C	1324 ROGERS AV ,BK
> CH #123035397	<2316/0015	4/RESPIR	82B		M3/014A	35 E 30 ST ,MN
> CH #123035398	<2316/2316	6/OTHER	NSNT		S2/122G	131 KISWICK ST ,SI
> CH #123035399	<2316/2316	6/OTHER	NSNT		K4/063J	2422 E 70 ST ,BK
> CH #123035400	<2316/2350	7/EDP	CANX		K1/060I	3030 SURF AV #6E ,BK
> CH #123035401	<2316/0323	6/OTHER	90	53I1	Q2/105C	2805 253-54 148 AV ,QN

Additional records on file but not displayed

ambulance Call # 123035242 NYPD Job # P1230319732 NYFD  
Entered 10/29/12 22:51:08 by AR00/8704  
Used NSNT 10/29/12 22:51:08

Exhibit 8

Type: OTHER (UNKNOWN CONDITION) Segment: 6 Area: S2 Atom: 122G  
Address: 1025 OLYMPIA BL Low Xst: HEMPSTEAD AV, SI  
Time: FC Source/Relay: R  
Pct: 122G PD Loc: 1025 OLYMPIA BL  
Low: MAPLETON AV PD High: MAPLETON AV PD Type: 54R1  
2:50:47 PDCOMP (T104F) TRAPPED IN HOUSE---FC STS HER BROTHER IS ON THE 2 FLR+ (8704)  
2:50:47 PDADR-OK Verified: 1025 OLYMPIA BL ,SI From: 1025 OLYMPIA BL,SI (8704)  
2:50:51 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T104F) ANI-ALI-9117083551 VERIZON WIRELESS 88 OLD TOWN RD SW ST  
TEN ISLAND COS:WPH1 LAT:040.595351 LON:-074.090745 OPER DAVID, MAURICE-C-MTCCP104+ (87  
2:50:55 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T104F) + (8704)  
2:50:55 CHANGED-PDPHONE (T104F) NAME: "" TO "FC" (8704)  
2:51:00 PDADR-VIEWED (8704) AR00 F (8704)  
2:51:08 NOT-SENT (8704) NO MORE INFORMATION  
2:51:08 FINAL ACK SENT TO PD (8704) - JOB FIRST SENT TO RELAY  
3:16:35 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D37C) FAX+

Balance Call # 123040020 NYPD Job # P1230400211 NYFD Job #  
tered 10/30/12 00:06:39 by AR00/8661  
osed NSNT 10/30/12 00:06:39

14B

pe: OTHER (UNKNOWN CONDITION) Segment: 6 Area: S2 Atom: 122G  
dress: 1025 OLYMPIA BL Low Xst: HEMPSTEAD AV, SI  
me: FC Phone: (646)417-1992 Source/Relay: R  
Pct: 122G PD Loc: 1025 OLYMPIA BL  
Low: MAPLETON AV PD High: MAPLETON AV PD Type: 54R1  
:05:34 PDCOMP (T65C) ATTIC FC STS HER AUNT HSE IS FLOODED ALL THE WAY TO THE ATTIC+ (61)  
:05:34 PDADR-OK Verified: 1025 OLYMPIA BL ,SI From: 1025 OLYMPIA BL,SI (8661)  
:06:14 PDADR-VIEWED (8661) AR00 F (8661)  
:06:15 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T65C) ----FC STS HER AUNT CANNOT GET OUT STS FEM FEM ELDELY FEM  
I STS CANT GET OUT THE ATTIC FC HU WHILE CONNCETING TO THE FD OPR 2462+ (8661)  
:06:21 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T65C) ANI-ALI-6464171992 AT T MOBILITY 3500 VICTORY BLVD STATEN  
ISLAND COS:WPH2 LAT:040.557522 LON:-074.171147 OPER WEBSTER, TAMARA-C-PP043OPR 2462+ (61)  
:06:39 NOT-SENT (8661) NO MORE INFORMATION  
:06:39 FINAL ACK SENT TO PD (8661) - JOB FIRST SENT TO RELAY  
:06:49 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T65C) +  
:06:49 CHANGED-NAME NYPD (T65C) "" TO "FC"  
:06:49 CHANGED-PHONE NYPD (T65C) "( ) " TO "(646)4171992"  
:06:59 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T65C) ----CB 646 417 1992+  
:10:51 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T65C) ----FD ADVISE NOTHING THEY CAN DO N HU NO NUMBER PROVIDED  
OPR 2462+  
:09:57 PDCOMP (T75C) FEM STUCK IN ATTIC CB6464171992+ (8661)  
:09:57 PDADR-OK Verified: 1025 OLYMPIA BL ,SI From: 1025 OLYMPIA BL,SI (8661)  
:10:47 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T75C) WATER RISING TO ATTIC FEM TRAPPED UNABLE TO GET OUT---FC  
OT AT LOC CALLING FOR HER AUNT----ANI-ALI-6464171992 AT T MOBILITY 3500 VICTORY BLVD S  
ATEN ISLAND COS:WPH2 LAT:040.552640 LON:-074.160891 OPERLANGLEY, RAEHELLE-C-PP029 OPR  
512+ (8661)  
:10:56 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T75C) + (8661)  
:10:56 CHANGED-PDPHONE (T75C) NAME: "" TO "FC" PHONE: " " TO "6464171992"  
8661)  
:12:13 PDADR-VIEWED (8661) AR00 F (8661)  
:12:22 SUPPLEMENT (8661) FC( 646) 417 - 1992 PD#: P1230400211  
:12:29 FINAL ACK SENT TO PD (8661) - JOB FIRST SENT TO RELAY  
:13:58 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T75C) FC STS FEM BEEN STUCK FOR HRS---FD 288 NTFD--OPR1512+  
:41:25 SUPPLEMENT-PD (B11C) FAX 2 BORO+  
:43:03 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D37C) FAX+

ambulance Call # 123071835 NYPD Job # P1230707060 NYFD Job #  
Entered 11/02/12 12:54:27 by SI1P/0827  
Assigned 12:54:27 by SI1P/0827  
J-63 12:54:27  
J-88 12:54:27

140

Report: DDOA (DEATH CONFIRM BY MEDICAL AUTH) Segment: 9 Area: S2 Atom: 122G  
Address: 1025 OLYMPIA BL Low Xst: HEMPSTEAD AV, SI  
Source/Relay: U  
Pct: 122G PD Loc: 1025 OLYMPIA BL  
Low: MAPLETON AV PD High: MAPLETON AV PD Type: 54U1  
2:54:05 ENTRY-INIT (0827) INITIAL CALL ENTRY  
2:54:27 ENTRY-AVOK (0827) ADDRESS VERIFICATION COMPLETE  
2:54:27 SELF (0827) NO MORE INFORMATION  
2:54:27 ASSIGNED/ONSCNE (0827) 23D2 #2492 MEDINA EMT., RAFAEL DIV 3 #3242 IRELAND EMT  
WENDI 98  
2:54:27 ETA-88 (0827) 23D2=125427 122G 122E  
2:54:32 \*DMSG-RECEIVED (2492) 23D2  
2:54:50 MISC (0827) , BEING FLAGGED BY NATIONAL GUARD FOR DOA'S WILL ADV LOCATION  
2:55:34 CONTACT (0827) 23D2 UCR+020 , 1025 OL BL  
2:55:45 CHANGED-LOC (0827) MIDLAND AV/OLYMPIA BL ,SI TO 1025 OLYMPIA BL ,SI  
2:55:45 CHANGED-ATOM (0827) 122E TO 122G  
2:55:45 CHANGE (0827) MULTIPLE DOA'S  
2:56:24 MISC (0827) , ROUTE.CWGP,DC1P  
2:59:14 MISC (0827) , TO.FNOT. FD FOR ENTRY 23D  
3:00:14 MISC (8751) , FD/285/NTFD  
3:03:08 ASSIST/ENROUTE (0827) B65 #9880 ROUSSO CAPT., ROBERT DIV-05 97 @ 1025 OLYMPIA  
BL ,SI , ,11/02/12 13:02:24 TO SI1P FROM DV5E (0623):PLEASE ASSIGN B65 TO 23D2 ASSIGNM  
NT AS PER DIV 5 CAPT  
3:03:08 ETA-88 (0827) B65=130608 122G 122G  
3:03:14 \*DMSG-RECEIVED (9880) B65  
3:13:47 ASSIST/ONSCENE (0827) C212 #0173 CAMERON LT, STEVEN STA-22 98 @ 1025 OLYMPIA  
L ,SI , ,ENTER FROM MIDLAND ON OLYMPIA  
3:13:47 ETA-88 (0827) C212=131347 122G 122G  
3:13:49 \*DMSG-RECEIVED (0173) C212  
3:17:44 CONTACT (0827) C212 UCR+020 , 1 CONF 83. FD SEARCHING FOR 2ND VICTIM...CREW IS  
SAFE...  
3:17:51 ONSCENE (0827) B65  
3:17:58 CONTACT (0827) 23D2 UCR+020 , X  
3:20:09 CONTACT (0827) B65 UCR+020 , 1 CONF BT... FD SEARCHING..WILL HOLD. WILL ADVISE  
3:19:31 PDCOMP (T54F) DOA PVT HSE CALL VIA FD 285 OPR 2499 ANI-ALI-3472506125 INFORMAT  
ION TECHNOLOGY TELECO 11 METROTECH CTR FLR 4 BROOKLYN COS:CNCTX LAT:LON:OPER THOMAS, ALI  
LIA-C-MTCCP054+ (8713)  
3:19:31 PDADR-OK Verified: 1025 OLYMPIA BL ,SI From: 1025 OLYMPIA BL,SI (8713)  
3:19:46 PDADR-VIEWED (8713) AR00 F (8713)  
3:19:58 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T54F) + (8713)  
3:19:58 CHANGED-PDPHONE (T54F) NAME: "" TO "FD 285" (8713)  
3:19:55 SUPPLEMENT (8713)() - PD#: P1230707060  
3:20:51 FINAL ACK SENT TO PD (8713) - JOB FIRST SENT TO RELAY  
3:22:08 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D35C) --XMITED+  
3:24:36 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D35C) 122G ASSIGNED+  
3:30:40 CONTACT (0827) B65 UCR+020 , 2 BT SO FAR...  
3:35:05 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D35C) 122ST1 ASSIGNED+  
3:35:36 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D35C) 122G 84 +  
3:38:56 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D35C) 122ST2 ASSIGNED+  
3:39:00 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D35C) 122ST2 84 +  
3:39:06 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D35C) 122ST1 98 +  
3:49:29 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D35C) SGT REQ 122G---TO LOC-----D1350+

ambulance Call # 123035354 NYPD Job # P1230318929 Fire Job # 1

Exhibit 9

Entered By PD 10/29/12 22:15:??

Entered 10/29/12 23:09:01 by SI1P/0821 as type DIFFBR

Assigned 01:24:20 by SI1P/0878

0-63 01:25:01

0-88 01:32:07

0-82 03:43:17

0-81 03:53:41

Closed 82 10/30/12 04:37:04 by 22V1 (#4888, #4311)

Flags: Preempted Type Changed

Type: ARREST (CARDIAC OR RESPIRTORY ARREST) Segment: 1 Area: S2 Atom: 122E Box: 2049

Address: 344 LINCOLN AV Low Xst: BOUNDARY AV, SI

PD Pct: 122E PD Loc: 344 LINCOLN AV

PD Low: HYLAN BL PD High: BOUNDARY AV PD Type: 54C1

03:09:01 COPY-CALL (0821) #123034899 , FLOOD

03:09:50 CHANGED-TYP (0821) {DIFFBR TO OTHER} — *Down GRADE*

03:09:50 CHANGED-PRI (0821) 2 TO 4

03:10:13 MISC (0884) , NO ANSER

03:14:05 HELD (0821) , DD

03:14:05 SUGG-UNITS1 (0821) .Dual ~22B1 !23C1 !65G1

03:14:05 SUGG-UNITS2 (0821) ~23W3 .Dual ~22V3

03:14:05 SUGG-UNITS3 (0821) ~23W3 .Dual ~22V3 ~22B1 !23C1 !65G1

10:06:58 HELD (0790) , DD

10:06:58 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) .Dual %75A1

10:06:58 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) ~22Z1 .Dual >22X3

10:06:58 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) ~22Z1 .Dual >22X3 %75A1

10:54:20 HELD (0790) , BLS

10:54:20 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) .Dual

10:54:20 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) .Dual

10:54:20 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) .Dual

10:56:48 HELD (0790) , BLS

10:56:48 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) .Dual

10:56:48 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) .Dual

10:56:48 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) .Dual

11:00:56 HELD (0790) , BLS

11:00:56 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) .Dual

11:00:56 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) ~22V1 .Dual

11:00:56 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) ~22V1 .Dual

11:06:02 HELD (0878) , NO BLS

11:06:02 SUGG-UNITS1 (0878) .Dual

11:06:02 SUGG-UNITS2 (0878) ~22V1 ~65U1 .Dual

11:06:02 SUGG-UNITS3 (0878) ~22V1 ~65U1 .Dual

11:24:20 SUGG-UNITS1 (0878) .Dual >21B1

11:24:20 SUGG-UNITS2 (0878) %21W3 ~22V1 .Dual ~21X3

11:24:20 SUGG-UNITS3 (0878) %21W3 ~22V1 .Dual >21B1 ~21X3

11:24:20 ASSIGNED (0878) 21B1 #7414 GAMBARO 3RD EMT, JOHN HN:60 #7603 JACKSON EMT-B, TR  
Y HN:60 97.

11:24:20 ETA-88 (0878) 21B1=013420 120C 122E

11:24:41 \*DMSG-NOT-RCVD (7603) 21B1 LAT: 40615030 LONG: 74084740 GPS ATOM: 120C AREA:

52

11:25:01 \*ENROUTE (7603) 21B1

11:32:07 \*ONSCENE (7603) 21B1

11:39:31 PREEMPT (0883) 21B1 , UNABLE TO ACCESS LOC FLOODING

11:39:44 HELD (0883) , DD UNABLE TO ACCESS LOC

11:39:44 SUGG-UNITS1 (0883) ~65D1 ~21B1 .Dual

11:39:44 SUGG-UNITS2 (0883) ~22V1 .Dual %21X3 ~22X3

11:39:44 SUGG-UNITS3 (0883) ~65D1 ~21B1 ~22V1 .Dual %21X3 ~22X3

12:58:43 HELD (0878) , HP

12:58:43 SUGG-UNITS1 (0878) ~21B1 .Dual ~23H1

*ACTUAL CALL TYPE*

12:58:43 SUGG-UNITS2 (0878) ~22X3 .Dual  
 12:58:43 SUGG-UNITS3 (0878) ~21B1 ~22X3 .Dual ~23H1  
 13:05:26 SUGG-UNITS1 (0878) ~21A1 ~75A1 ~21B1 .Dual ~65D1 ~23H1  
 13:05:26 SUGG-UNITS2 (0878) .Dual  
 13:05:26 SUGG-UNITS3 (0878) ~21A1 ~75A1 ~21B1 .Dual ~65D1 ~23H1  
 13:05:26 ASSIGNED (0878) 21A1 #7439 SGRO EMT, RENEE HN:62 #6979 POWELL JR EMT, DAVID HN:  
 12 98  
 13:05:26 ETA-88 (0878) 21A1=030826 122F 122E  
 13:05:27 \*DMSG-RECEIVED (7439) 21A1  
 13:05:31 \*ENROUTE (7439) 21A1  
 13:14:24 ONSCENE (0878) 21A1 , VB  
 13:31:20 SUGG-UNITS1 (0878) .Dual  
 13:31:20 SUGG-UNITS2 (0878) ~22V1 .Dual %23W1 >21X3 %22Z1  
 13:31:20 SUGG-UNITS3 (0878) ~22V1 .Dual %23W1 >21X3 %22Z1  
 13:31:20 ASSIST (0878) 22V1 #4888 SCHECTER MEDIC, JONATHAN STA 22 #4311 GONZALEZ MEDIC,  
 DANIEL STA 22 98 @ 344 LINCOLN AV ,SI  
 13:31:20 ETA-88 (0878) 22V1=033420 122F 122E  
 13:31:22 \*DMSG-RECEIVED (4888) 22V1  
 13:31:30 \*ENROUTE (4888) 22V1  
 13:31:34 CHANGED-TYP (0878) {OTHER TO CARD}  
 13:31:34 CHANGED-PRI (0878) 4 TO 3  
 13:31:34 CHANGE (0878) AP BLS CARD  
 13:35:59 SUGG-UNITS1 (0878) ~22X3 .Dual %23W1 >21X3 %22Z1 ~23V1  
 13:35:59 SUGG-UNITS2 (0878) \*22D1 \*75A1 .Dual \*23C1 \*21B1  
 13:35:59 SUGG-UNITS3 (0878) \*22D1 ~22X3 \*75A1 .Dual %23W1 \*23C1  
 13:35:59 ASSIST (0878) C221 #0412 CURATOLA LT, FRANK STA-22 98 @ 344 LINCOLN AV ,SI  
 13:35:59 ETA-88 (0878) C221=034558 122J 122E  
 13:36:05 \*DMSG-RECEIVED (0412) C221  
 13:36:09 CHANGED-TYP (0878) {CARD TO ARREST}  
 13:36:09 CHANGED-PRI (0878) 3 TO 1  
 13:36:29 \*ENROUTE (0412) C221  
 13:41:12 ASSIST/ONSCENE (0878) C211 #0435 SOTO LT., PHILIP STA-22 98 @ 344 LINCOLN AV ,  
 SI  
 13:41:12 ETA-88 (0878) C211=034112 122D 122E  
 13:41:14 \*DMSG-RECEIVED (0435) C211  
 13:42:33 CLEAR (0878) C221 87 , AP C21  
 13:43:00 \*SUGH-MASK (7439) 21A1 GED/62 CADULT/62 CPEDS/62 OBS/62 STROKE/62 BURNS/62 ARR  
 EST/62 STEMI/62 CABUSE/NONE SAFE/60 PEDP/65 AEDP/65 PTRAU/51 ATRAUM/62 HBARIC/14 PGED/  
 13P CLOSEST/62 AREA/62 60 59 51  
 13:43:17 \*HDSP-MASK (7439) 62 SI 21A1 ALS FOR CADULT /SUGH  
 13:43:17 \*GIVE-DISPO (7439) 21A1 82A  
 13:50:18 CLEAR (0878) C211 87 , SELF  
 13:53:41 \*10-81 (7439) 21A1  
 13:53:41 MILEAGE 21A1 1.3  
 14:33:11 \*10-97 (7439) 21A1  
 14:37:04 CLEAR (0789) 22V1 82 , H62  
 14:37:04 CLOSED  
 19:49:33 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D37C) FAXED+

RESPONSE TIME  
 2:20 MIN

ambulance Call # 123033965 NYPD Job # P1230317365 Fire Job # 12303.4175.01.4.2614  
Entered By PD 10/29/12 21:17:??  
Entered 10/29/12 21:14:59 by FD1P/8629  
Cancelled CANX 10/29/12 21:28:27

Type: OBOUT (BABY OUT OR IMMINENT BIRTH) Segment: 3 Area: K4 Atom: 063J Box: 4175  
Address: 2430 E 71 ST Low Xst: Y AV, BK  
Name: HATZOLA F150 Phone: (917)538-8184  
PD Pct: 063D PD Loc: 2430 E 71 ST  
PD Low: X AV PD High: Y AV PD Type: 54S1  
!1:14:59 ENTRY (8629) CSP FEM 32 .....BABY'S COMING OUT ....PVT HOUSE...NFI  
!1:14:59 FIRE-SENT (8629) CALL SENT TO FIRE BASED ON MEDICAL CALL TYPE  
!1:15:04 FIRE-ACK 29OCT12211500 1230341750142614  
!1:15:33 MISC (8629) , PDL 1209 NTFD  
!1:15:33 E911 (8629) Vesta call #V21029007347 received at time: 21:13:26  
!1:16:38 HELD (0887) , DD  
!1:16:38 SUGG-UNITS1 (0887) ~58F3 ~58D3 >58G3 >63I3 >58E3 .Dual  
!1:16:38 SUGG-UNITS2 (0887) ~38W3 >58Z3 %33W3 .Dual %39V3 !39R1  
!1:16:38 SUGG-UNITS3 (0887) ~38W3 ~58F3 ~58D3 >58Z3 >58G3 >63I3  
!1:17:01 PDCOMP (A01F) GIVNG BIRTH ...AUTHO.OF..R08629.....PH.....AIDED..FM.....32..  
YO..LIASON..OPR1209+ (8629)  
!1:17:01 PDADR-OK Verified: 2430 E 71 ST ,BK From: 2430 E 71 ST,BK (8629)  
!1:17:35 PDADR-VIEWED (8629) FD1P G (8629)  
!1:17:58 SUPPLEMENT (8629)() - PDL PD#: P1230317365  
!1:18:00 FINAL ACK SENT TO PD (8629)  
!1:20:09 HELD (0887) , DD  
!1:20:09 SUGG-UNITS1 (0887) ~58D3 >58G3 >63I3 >58E3 .Dual ~58F3  
!1:20:09 SUGG-UNITS2 (0887) ~58V3 ~38W3 >58Z3 %33W3 .Dual ~63T3  
!1:20:09 SUGG-UNITS3 (0887) ~58V3 ~38W3 ~58D3 >58Z3 >58G3 >63I3  
!1:26:48 MISC (0887) , OU 9175388184  
!1:26:48 E911 (0887) Vesta call #V21029007441 received at time: 21:18:39  
!1:27:59 MISC (0887) , OU 9175388184 ---CLR ADVS AREA FLOODED  
!1:28:27 CANCELLED (0887)() - CXL AREA FLOODED  
!6:25:46 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D38C) 063PP2 ASSIGNED+  
!6:26:31 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D38C) 063PP2 99 FAX TO BORO +

no ems response

Ambulance Call # 123040076 NYPD Job # P1230320886 Fire Job #  
Entered By PD 10/29/12 23:44:??  
Entered 10/30/12 00:20:05 by SI1P/0790 as type ASTHMB  
Cancelled CANX 10/30/12 08:41:27  
Flags: Type Changed  
Type: OTHER (UNKNOWN CONDITION) Segment: 6 Area: S2 Atom: 122G  
Address: 233 COLONY AV Low Xst: HEMPSTEAD AV, SI  
Phone: (718)331-2117

Exhibit 10

PD Pct: 122G PD Loc: 233 COLONY AV  
PD Low: MAPLETON AV PD High: HEMPSTEAD AV PD Type: 54D4  
00:20:05 COPY-CALL (0790) #123035627 , FLOOD  
00:21:33 HELD (0790) , FLOOD  
00:21:33 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) \*22B1 !22C1 .Dual %75A1 !22D1 \*23H1  
00:21:33 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) .Dual ~22Z1 >22X3  
00:21:33 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) \*22B1 !22C1 .Dual %75A1 ~22Z1 !22D1  
00:30:58 CHANGED-TYP (0790) {ASTHMB TO OTHER}  
00:30:58 CHANGED-PRI (0790) 2 TO 6  
00:31:10 HELD (0790) , DD  
00:31:10 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) ~21B3 .Dual %75A1 ~22C1 >22D1 ~23C1  
00:31:10 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) .Dual ~23V1 ~22V1 %22Z1 !23R1  
00:31:10 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) ~21B3 .Dual ~23V1 %75A1 ~22V1 ~22C1  
00:55:03 HELD (0790) , BLS  
00:55:03 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) .Dual  
00:55:03 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) .Dual  
00:55:03 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) .Dual  
00:57:29 HELD (0790) , BLS  
00:57:29 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) .Dual  
00:57:29 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) .Dual  
00:57:29 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) .Dual  
04:40:08 CALL-BACK (8662) VM  
04:41:46 CALL-BACK (8662) VM  
06:08:26 HELD (0790) , UGA  
06:08:26 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) %65E1 %65D1 .Dual >23B1 %23D1 %75A1  
06:08:26 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) >21W2 %22V1 .Dual %21X3 %23W1 >22Z1  
06:08:26 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) >21W2 %22V1 %65E1 %65D1 .Dual >23B1  
06:27:18 HELD (0790) , UGA  
06:27:18 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) %65E1 %65D1 .Dual %23D1 ~21A1 %75A1  
06:27:18 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) >21W2 %22V1 .Dual %21X3 %23W1 %22X3  
06:27:18 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) >21W2 %22V1 %65E1 %65D1 .Dual %23D1  
07:06:27 HELD (0790) , UGA  
07:06:27 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) %23B1 ~65D1 ~65E1 .Dual %65G2 ~22C1  
07:06:27 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) ~21W2 ~22V1 .Dual %23W1 %22X3 !23V2  
07:06:27 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) %23B1 ~65D1 ~65E1 ~21W2 ~22V1 .Dual  
07:13:50 HELD (0790) , UGA  
07:13:50 SUGG-UNITS1 (0790) %65E1 .Dual ~22C1 %65G2 >23J1 ~23H2  
07:13:50 SUGG-UNITS2 (0790) >21W2 ~22V1 .Dual ~65U1 %23W1 %22X3  
07:13:50 SUGG-UNITS3 (0790) >21W2 %65E1 ~22V1 .Dual ~65U1 %23W1  
07:54:20 MISC (8662) , CB STS WILL CB IF NEEDED IS 3D PRY CLR  
08:41:27 CANCELLED (8702)( 718) 331 - 2117 CB ST WILL CB IF NEEDED  
10:42:58 SUPPLEMENT-PD (D38C) FAX+  
12:19:39 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T05D) USED CB ANSWERING MACHINE PCT MCDONALD+  
12:37:08 SUPPLEMENT-PD (T126F) CHECK CB ANSWERING MACHINE KAUR RUPINDER OPER 2380+

NO EMS RESPONSE  
7:54 ELAPSED TIME



## UNIFORMED EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE OFFICERS UNION, FDNY

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**DC-37 Representative**

Tracey Ziemba

# Testimony of Vincent Variale

## President of Local 3621

# New York City Joint Oversight Committee

## Hurricane Sandy 2012



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Alison D'Angelone

Jack Schaefer

### DC-37 Representative

Tracey Ziemba

Good Afternoon, Chair Woman Elizabeth Crowley and distinguished members of the City Council. My name is Vincent Variale. I am president of Local 3621, The Uniformed EMS Officers Union. I represent the 500 EMS Lieutenants and Captains of the New York City Fire Department EMS Command (FDNY-EMSC). I thank you for this opportunity to testify here today.

In 2011 I testified before the City Council regarding the lack of prowess, short sighted planning and span of control requirements that contributed to the operational catastrophe that marked the blizzard of 2010. While the main problem was snow clogged streets, the situation was exacerbated by a lack of any definitive command and control of EMS resources.

During Hurricane Sandy EMS officers endured many of the same issues they experienced during the blizzard of 2010. The absence of a span of control matrix and failure to adequately plan coupled with inept decision making, fostered chaos and compromised the ability for officers of the EMS Command to conduct EMS operations.

Shortly after the hurricane a majority of members came forward, at an emergency Local 3621 General Membership meeting, and expressed their heart felt rage concerning storm operations. The members detailed how Chief Nahmod's Command orders severely hampered their ability to manage storm operations. The micromanagement emanating from FDNY EMS Command headquarters, directly issued by EMS Chief Nahmod, appeared to be totally disconnected from the reality of what was occurring in the field. Chief Nahmod didn't believe reports from officers in the field. When stations and areas of the city were being flooded, he ordered all EMS members to remain in Stations and areas that were flooded putting their lives at risk. The members then motioned for a vote of no confidence in the leadership abilities of EMS Chief Abdo Nahmod. It was unanimously passed.

**Planning;** Stations in Zone A, which was a mandatory evacuation zone, should have been evacuated at least a few hours preceding the storm as was done by a nearby firehouse. What happened?

EMS stations in Zone A were not evacuated before the storm instead they were forced to evacuate during the hurricane without plan. This inept course of action resulted in command anarchy and directly placed the lives of EMS members in danger.

One example was EMS Station 4 which is located on pier 36 near the South Street Seaport in lower Manhattan. The station flooded in the evening hours and the rising waters started an electrical fire. The EMS Chief in the station notified EMS Chief Nahmod of the situation. Chief Nahmod ordered them to remain in the station and move to higher floors. EMS officers called for firefighters to respond and just before they arrived the fire extinguished itself once the water level rose to four feet inside the station. Fearing for their safety EMS members evacuated the station while the electrical power remained active. They traveled through a raging river mixed with raw sewage grabbing whatever equipment they could save on the way out. When they finally reached the outside of the station the water level rose to approximately seven feet.

- There were four out of five stations flooded in Division One (Manhattan). Once the stations were flooded the following questions needed to be answered.
- **Where does EMS relocate?** According to the FDNY Incident Action Plan (IAP) stations should have relocated to the nearest fire houses but EMS officers were told by the EMS Command not to follow the FDNY IAP.
- **Why are we performing tour changes during a hurricane?** In Manhattan the Chief ordered crews who worked 8 hour tours to change tours in the street during the hurricane. This decision created several problems. **First**, it was unsafe to conduct tour changes outdoors in a hurricane. **Second**, the electric, cell towers and land line phones were down making it difficult to communicate with off duty members. **Third**, since many members personal vehicles were flooded and there were no trains or buses operating, off duty members from tour changes required safe shelter from the storm.

**Span of Control;** According to the National Incident Management System (NIMS), NY State Incident Management System, the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) and the FDNY Incident Command System (ICS), **safety and sound management practices dictate that a ratio of seven individuals to one supervisor should be maintained for a span of control to exist. Maintaining an effective span of control is important to ensure safety, coordination and support to the members operating in the field.**

In Fire suppression the span of control is an optimum ratio of one Fire Lieutenant for every four to five firefighters. The Firefighters all remain in one location in the firehouse with their Lieutenant.

In EMS, the average ratio is one EMS Lieutenant for every twenty EMTs and/or Paramedics spread throughout several neighborhoods and communities. Many times during major incidents or emergencies such as a fire, train derailments, bus accidents and/or storms the ratio will increase to one officer for every thirty or forty EMTs and/or Paramedics.

I have attached an arbitration decision from an impartial arbitrator who has ruled. The FDNY is not in compliance with the span of control requirement regarding the management of EMS operations for everyday incidents or major emergencies. The arbitrator stated if the Department continues to be non-compliant FEMA may audit the FDNY and they could lose future funding from the federal government.

**Division Captain:** This Captain position was created to resolve the lack of span of control especially at fires, major accidents and incidents that occur throughout the City. Prior to the creation of this position the Captain's job description required them to manage the day to day operations of an EMS station. The EMS Command expanded and increased the duties of the Captain which was a great idea until they began doing the same work as a Deputy Chief. The union tried many times to talk to the Department and the EMS Command but our grievances fell on deaf ears. We filed for arbitration and won. The union again tried to negotiate with the Department and the EMS Command to keep the Division Captain position. However, EMS Chief Nahmod stated "I would rather save money and remove the Captains from the streets". I reminded him of the important role the Captains perform for the City but he refused to keep the Division Captain position. He stated he would promote 10 Deputy Chiefs to **replace the 15 full time and 30 part time Division Captain positions.** These promotions never materialized and on the night of Hurricane Sandy the support and leadership provided by the Division Captain was sorely missed and yet badly needed. This decision exacerbated the span of control ratio and was another step in a sequence of inept decisions made by EMS Chief Nahmod.

**Civil Service Exams and Protection:** During the storm no additional Deputy or Division Chiefs were called in to assist. Those who were on duty were reluctant to make a decision. Why?

The police and fire departments maintain several officer ranks that require a civil service merit and fitness exam to test for competency. Those who pass these exams are promoted to officer ranks such as Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion Chief, Deputy Chief and Division Commander. These ranks all enjoy the benefits of civil service protection. These officers can think outside the box and manage in ways that would provide the best benefit to the communities they serve.

In EMS the rank of Lieutenant is the first and last civil service officer rank. All officer ranks above Lieutenant which are Captain, Deputy Chief and Division Chief are picked. There is no merit and fitness exam to test the competency of those who perform these duties. There are no civil service protections for the members of these ranks. These members can not think out of the box or try different management styles that may benefit the service and/or our communities. Anyone who does could be demoted and in the case of Division Chief that would be a demotion back down several ranks to the rank of Lieutenant and include a \$60,000 cut in annual salary. That is a pretty good incentive for someone to keep quiet and do whatever is ordered even if the decision endangers lives or hinders the ability to provide an effective and efficient EMS operations.

In conclusion, we are saddened by any lives that were lost during the storm. If not for the commitment and dedication of the front line members in the EMS Command many more lives may have been lost. I look forward to the implementation of these recommendations, so tragedies and incidents like these are not repeated in the future.

Thank you.

NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF  
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

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In the Matter of the Arbitration X  
between X

LOCAL 3621, DC37 AFSCME, AFL-CIO X SPAN OF CONTROL GRIEVANCE  
"Union" X OCB Case No. A-13271-09

-and- X

NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT X

"City" or "Department" X

----- X

Hearing Dates: June 11, 2009  
June 24, 2010  
August 23, 2010

APPEARANCES

For the Union  
Aaron S. Amaral, Assistant General Counsel

For the Department  
Steven Banks, Assistant General Counsel

Before: Earl R. Pfeffer, Esq., Arbitrator

## BACKGROUND

This grievance involves a claim by the Union that the New York City Fire Department has violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement by its failure to adhere strictly to mandated ratios of supervisors to subordinates ("manageable span of control") stated in the Fire Department's Incident Command System ("FDNY ICS"), as codified in its Incident Command System Manual, Chapter 1, EMS OGP 112-01 (hereinafter, "OGP 112-01").<sup>1</sup>

The Union argues the Department is required to maintain levels of supervision during emergency events that are within the range of ratios stated in OGP 112-01. It contends the Department's acknowledged failure to deploy supervisory personnel for all response activities, in particular the non-assignment at some incidents of any supervisors at all, results regularly in violations of the allowable span of control and is grievable as a violation of a Departmental written policy affecting terms and conditions of employment, and as a breach of the parties'

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<sup>1</sup>With respect to the OGP, the parties entered into the following stipulation:

**The EMS OGP is a set of rules and policies the EMS officers are bound by, and any deviation from those rules may subject an officer to discipline. For violations deemed not major, it is within the discretion of the Department not to seek discipline.**

Agreement.<sup>2</sup>

The City counters that the Union's grievance represents a prohibited attempt to dictate and regulate the staffing decisions of Fire Department management, and therefore constitutes a prohibited use of collective bargaining. In any case, the Department argues, its interpretation of its own regulations, and the span of control ratios it maintains thereunder, are reasonable and therefore beyond the purview of an arbitrator. According to the City, the record here is devoid of any evidence the span of control at any serious, multiple casualty incidents has fallen below the ratios mandated under OGP 112-01, and it argues, therefore, the Union's grievance must be dismissed in its entirety.

The basic facts of this case are not in dispute.

The Union represents Lieutenants and Captains who work in the New York City Fire Department's Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") Command. The Department's EMS Command consists of thirty-five (35) stations within five (5) divisions which roughly correspond to the City's five (5) boroughs.<sup>3</sup> Captains, who are

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<sup>2</sup>Under Article VII, Section 1(b) of the Emergency Medical Services Agreement, the term "grievance" includes "[a] claimed violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of the rules or regulations, **written** policy or orders of the Employer applicable to the agency which employs the grievant affecting terms and conditions of employment." Joint Exhibit 1 (emph. supp.).

<sup>3</sup>Division 5 includes portions of south Brooklyn along with all of Staten Island.

in charge of the stations, supervise the lieutenants, and these officers are in charge of the Paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians ("EMTs") who man the Department's ambulance fleet ("Municipal Units"). In addition, the EMS Officers supervise the emergency responses of the Paramedics and EMTs who staff the numerous voluntary ambulance units ("Voluntary Units") operated by New York City's private hospitals. See Union Exhibits 4 and 5.

The number of lieutenants per station ranges from approximately six (6) to fifteen (15), depending largely on whether the station is classified as "station-based" or "battalion-based."<sup>4</sup> In station-based stations, there ordinarily are two (2) lieutenants on duty, one being an administrative officer who performs roll call and other duties which confine him to the station for the balance of the tour, and the other being a conditions officer who spends his tour of duty in the field, supervising both the EMS Command ambulance units in his assigned Battalion and the voluntary hospital units in his response area.<sup>5</sup> See Union Exhibit 16 ("Duties and Responsibilities: Conditions Officers"). The Department operates with the flexibility and

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<sup>4</sup>Of the thirty-five stations, twenty-three (23) are station-based and twelve are battalion-based.

<sup>5</sup>The EMS Lieutenant's car has equipment necessary to conduct an ambulance call. In contrast, the Captain's car is geared more for tracking and communication, according to Captain Martin Miller, a witness for the Union.

fluidity necessary to permit station-based stations to run as battalion based, and vice versa.

The EMS ambulances (both Municipal and Voluntary) generally are staffed either with two (2) Paramedics (Advanced Life Support ("ALS") Units) or with two (2) EMTs who provide Basic Life Support ("BLS"). Both provide emergency care to ill and injured persons, including CPR, defibrillation, spinal immobilization, etc., but Paramedics alone can run IVs and give injections.

The standard EMS response is one (1) or two (2) ambulances, with the majority involving a single unit. The number of units, and whether the response is BLS or ALS, or both, depends upon the nature of the emergency, according to EMS Chief John Peruggia. For the highest priority calls, a dual response (ALS and BLS) is required. For the most urgent, such as for cardiac arrests and traumas, there exist orders for an Officer response. It is conceded by the City, however, that Officers are not always available in such cases.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, Chief Peruggia testified that in cardiac arrests, and similar medical emergencies, OGP 112-01 does not apply, notwithstanding the urgency of the incident.

Thus, although current Fire Department policy states there shall be an Officer response to every cardiac arrest incident,

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<sup>6</sup>The highest category of EMS emergencies, called Segment One, involve cardiac arrest and choking. See Union Exhibit 18, ¶3.11. Segment Two emergencies include anaphylactic shock, drowning, unconsciousness, multiple seizures, difficulty breathing and "multiple trauma." Id.

undisputed record documentation states that from January 2008 through August 28, 2009, an Officer was on the scene at a cardiac arrest only twenty-seven percent (27%) of the time. Union Exhibit 21.<sup>7</sup> It is important to note, however, that a Fire Engine crew certified as first responders with defibrillation equipment ("CFR-D") will be sent, when available, to the scene of a cardiac arrest.<sup>8</sup> The parties dispute whether the presence of a Fire Officer who lacks EMT certification satisfies the guidance of OGP 112-01 in that circumstance. But even if it did, the Union points out, the ratio of supervisor to subordinates would exceed 1:7 and therefore fall outside the span of control range established under the Department's written Policy.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, record evidence demonstrates that at "multiple casualty incidents," which include all hands fires, 2<sup>nd</sup> alarm fire signals and higher, medical facility and correctional facility incidents, explosions, rapid transit or rail incidents,

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<sup>7</sup>The Department similarly requires Officers to respond to certain Segment Two traumas, but the record is silent on the degree of adherence to that directive.

<sup>8</sup>The CFR-D unit will provide care until the arrival of an ambulance unit and a determination in consultation with the ambulance crew the CFR-D's assistance is no longer needed. See generally Union Exhibit 18.

<sup>9</sup>If the response is an ALS unit, a BLS unit and a CFR-D crew, the supervisor to subordinate ratio, in the absence of an EMS officer, would be 1:8, even allowing that an officer who is not medically trained might be included in the calculation of the span of control ratio.

structural collapses, construction incidents, marine and aircraft incidents, civil disturbances and hostage situations, power failures and haz-mat emergencies, the ratio of supervisors to subordinates routinely falls within the span of control dictated by OGP 112-01. Chief Peruggia testified that "incident" in OGP 112-01 means the latter types of "large scale or complex incidents."

The question before me, as both sides agree, is whether adherence to the span of control requirements of OGP 112-01 properly may, as determined by the City, be confined to multiple casualty events, or whether, as claimed by Union President, Lieutenant Vincent Variale, the ratios must be followed in the case of all emergency responses, regardless of size.<sup>10</sup> Further, in the event I give OGP 112-01 the broader meaning subscribed to by the Union, there remains the issue of my authority to issue a remedy which may arguably infringe upon the City's well-acknowledged discretion to make decisions related to staffing.

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An evaluation of the issues presented in this case must begin with Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, "Management of Domestic Incidents," under which the United States

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<sup>10</sup>The Union does not claim on-duty staffing ratios must meet span of control requirements, but only that the ratios must be adhered to in the course of an "incident," as defined in the guidelines. See Union Brief at 11 ("from dispatch to the conclusion of the call").

Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") directed the creation and administration of the National Incident Management System ("NIMS") for the purpose of developing "a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, tribal and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location or complexity." City Exhibit 1 at ii.

NIMS in its original version was issued on March 1, 2004. Thereafter, on or about April 6, 2005, the City, pursuant to its obligation to implement NIMS, adopted the Citywide Incident Management System Protocol ("CIMS Protocol") as "an incident management doctrine for managing emergency incidents and planned events in New York City." Union Exhibit 9 at 6. While CIMS was developed to ensure that it is "fully interoperable" within the National Incident Command System ("ICS"), and meets "the federal requirements for implementing NIMS," *id.*, it was crafted "to address New York City's specific incident management requirements." *Id.*<sup>11</sup>

As such, New York City adopted many modifications to the NIMS ICS standards, and these are stated in Annex C of the CIMS

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<sup>11</sup>The governing document for CIMS, the CIMS "Protocol," Union Exhibit 9 explains that the NIMS ICS "is an all-hazards system" which provides "a generic template for use by all local and state jurisdictions and federal agencies without regard to [their] size or resources." Union Exhibit 9, Annex B at 2.

Protocol. Notably, Annex C is silent on span of control. See generally Union Exhibit 9, Annex C. Thus, while CIMS "modifies many elements of the NIMS ICS template," id., Annex C at 3, it does not alter the span of control guidelines set forth in NIMS. For the span of control issues at the core of the instant dispute, there is no apparent conflict between the CIMS and the NIMS incident command protocols.<sup>12</sup>

In short, CIMS, except where expressly modified, incorporates NIMS ICS and the Federal requirements for NIMS implementation. Union Exhibit 9 at 6-7. Accordingly, the Fire Department promulgated OGP 112-01 on or about March 23, 2006, for the efficient and organized management of its incident response

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<sup>12</sup>It bears mentioning that the New York State 2009 Strategy for NIMS Implementation ("NYS Strategy"), Union Exhibit 8, essentially mirrors the guidelines and principles stated in NIMS, often simply adopting the language of the DHS document. Thus, both NIMS and the NYS Strategy state that:

**NIMS is based on the premise that utilization of a common incident management framework will give emergency management/response personnel a flexible but standard system for emergency management and incident response activities. NIMS is flexible because the system components can be utilized to develop plans, processes, procedures, agreements, and roles for all types of incidents; it is applicable to any incident regardless of cause, size, location or complexity. Additionally, NIMS provides an organized set of standardized operational structures, which is critical in allowing disparate organizations and agencies to work together in a predictable, coordinated manner.**

City Exhibit 1 at 6; Union Exhibit 8 at 3 (emph. supp.).

operations under the standardized structures and principles of NIMS, as well as in accordance with the incident management protocols of CIMS. Indeed, in its statement of policy, the Fire Department asserts that its Incident Command System, as set forth in OGP 112-01, "is in full compliance with the guidelines set forth by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the New York City Incident Management System (CIMS)." OGP 112-01, ¶1.1. Chief Peruggia testified, "ICS was put together to ensure rules, regulations and operational policies at incidents comply with National and City security mandates."

It is not surprising, then, that the requirements for a "manageable" and "reasonable" span of control stated in OGP 112-01 are drawn nearly verbatim from the Federal standard, which states: "the span of control of any individual with incident management supervisory responsibility should range from 3 to 7 subordinates, with 5 being optimal." City Exhibit 1 at 47.<sup>13</sup> As the NIMS guidelines explain, "[s]pan of control is key to effective and efficient incident management. Supervisors must be able to adequately supervise and control their subordinates, as well as communicate with and manage all resources under their supervision." Id. Thus, OGP 112-01 acknowledges, in terms taken

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<sup>13</sup>Under NIMS, the "optimal" span of control for "large-scale law enforcement operations" may be eight (8) to ten (10) subordinates. City Exhibit 1 at 47.

nearly verbatim from NIMS, that "[t]he kind of incident, nature of the tasks, safety factors and communications will affect the span of control considerations." OGP 112-01 at ¶3.2.3. Cf. City Exhibit 1 at 47.

OGP 112-01 explains the factors which should govern the adoption of low versus high ratios within the allowable span of control range: "If tasks are simple and routine, take place in a limited or small area, communications are good, no unusual safety hazards are present and the incident is reasonably stable, then one individual may supervise up to seven subordinates. Conversely, if tasks are demanding, take place over a large area, and the incident is escalating, the span of control might be reduced to three or four." OGP 112-01, ¶3.2.3.<sup>14</sup>

It is noteworthy that the span of control guidelines, expressed as a range of ratios, anticipate that the response requirements of an incident may change. Indeed, core principles of NIMS include standardization, flexibility and scalability. NIMS "is applicable to any incident regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity." City Exhibit 1 at 6. DHS explains

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<sup>14</sup>Chief Peruggia testified the Department measures span of control as a ratio of supervisors to ambulance units. He made this assertion notwithstanding the plain language in OGP 112-01, ¶3.2.3, concerning span of control ratios of supervisors to "subordinates." Likewise, it is clearly stated in the National Guidelines and the City Protocol that span of control is measured as a ratio of supervisors to individuals under their direction. See, e.g., City Exhibit 1 at 47; Union Exhibit 9 at Appendix 2, p. 17.

that the NIMS ICS "is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents." Id. at 140. Its components "are adaptable to any situation, from routine, local incidents to incidents requiring the activation of interstate mutual aid to those requiring a coordinated Federal response." Id. at 6. It is "[s]calable, so it may be used for all incidents (from day-to-day to large-scale)." Id. DHS stresses repeatedly throughout the NIMS document that "preparedness" requires a "unified approach" for all events within a jurisdiction's "incident response structure." Id. at 9.<sup>15</sup> See also id. at 13, 16-17. Indeed, DHS expressly states that "[e]very incident must have an action plan," although "not all incidents require written plans." Id. at 47.<sup>16</sup>

Accordingly, at every incident, that is, at every occurrence requiring an emergency response to protect life or property, City Exhibit 1 at 140, "span of control" is a "principle[] of accountability, which must be adhered to." Id. at 49. The recommended span of control guidelines should be followed. Id. at 91. As such, OGP 112-01 states that the span of control ratios should be adhered to even at "routine incidents." OGP

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<sup>15</sup>CIMS, likewise, governs both small- and large-scale incidents. Union Exhibit 9 at 7 of 51. CIMS also states that "[a]ll agencies operate within a CIMS ICS structure." Id. at 9 or 51.

<sup>16</sup>The New York State Implementation mirrors these principles. Union Exhibit 8 at 3, 15, 17.

112-01, ¶3.3. It explains that if an incident grows, and span of control becomes "excessive" or "unmanageable," resources may be combined into sectors, groups or branches in order to bring the ratio of supervision into the acceptable range. City Exhibit 1 at ¶¶ 4.3.1, 4.3.2.<sup>17</sup>

NIMS is thus based upon "modular expansion." City Exhibit 1 at 92. OGP 112-01 describes the "modular organization" of ICS structure which permits seamless expansion of the emergency response to an escalating incident. OGP 112-01, ¶3.3. The command guidelines for routine and simple emergencies are the structural building blocks for more complex responses to larger incidents which cross geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. NIMS in effect produces a unified emergency response network with the capacity to respond to any size incident by consolidating resources and command according to coordinated and scalable organizational principles. Local, regional and national emergencies require identical procedures and protocols.

DHS explains that "NIMS integrates existing best practices into a consistent, nationwide, systematic approach to incident

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<sup>17</sup>NIMS clearly provides that its guidelines for incident management apply, regardless of the cause, size or complexity of the occurrence. City Exhibit 1 at 140, 143. The CIMS Protocol states the "the ICS is applicable across a spectrum of incidents differing in size, scope and complexity." Union Exhibit 9 at 67. "CIMS addresses small- and large-scale incidents. . . ." Id. at 7. It is applicable "at all incident regardless of the size and nature of the incident." Id. It "will be implemented at all responses." Id.

management that is applicable at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, and across functional disciplines in an all-hazards context." City Exhibit 1 at 7. As such, "[t]he components of NIMS were not designed to stand alone, but to work together in a flexible, systematic manner to provide the national framework for incident management." Id. As explained in the New York State Implementation, the "consistency" required under NIMS provides "the foundation" for its "implementation" at "all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response." Union Exhibit 8 at 3. In short, "NIMS provides a systematic, proactive approach to guiding departments and agencies at all levels of government . . . to work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location or complexity . . . ." Union Exhibit 8 at 3 (emph. supp.).

Here, the parties do not dispute the applicability of NIMS (and CIMS) to the preparedness and management of the Fire Department or its EMS Command. As noted above, this controversy, rather, centers on the relatively narrow disagreement over whether the span of control ratios established under NIMS, adopted under CIMS and operationally required under OGP 112-01, apply to all emergency responses involving EMS units, or only to

serious, multiple casualty incidents.

Accordingly, in its grievance, the Union asks that the Department "[c]ease and desist from assigning bargaining unit members to supervise more than 7 individuals per tour." Joint Exhibit 1. The City, at the Step III Conference, responded that OGP 112-01 "does not apply in the day-to-day operations of the Agency but sets forth guidelines and concepts to manage an incident in an efficient organized manner." Id. (September 2, 2009 Step III Reply). According to the Department's Step III decision, it is only required to maintain a "reasonable" span of control that is "situationally specific." Id. It asserted that NIMS and CIMS "envision up to a 1:10 span of control ratio." Id.<sup>18</sup> Thus, the City countered the Union's grievance with its contention the NIMS span of control guidelines "apply only to specific incidents, such as where there may be multiple casualties, not to day to day operations, and certainly not to situations where the Department's 360 ambulances are merely waiting and not otherwise engaged." Id. In short, the City's Step III reply asserted that in the case of multiple casualty incidents, "the guidelines are generally adhered to if not exceeded." Id.

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<sup>18</sup>Actually, the Federal, State and City standards each make clear ratios between 1:8 and 1:10 apply only to "large-scale law enforcement responses," City Exhibit 1 at 47, 147, and the City has not pressed this argument at arbitration.

When the parties were unable to resolve the dispute, the Union demanded arbitration, and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining ("OCB"), I was appointed to hear and decide the controversy. Hearings were held on June 11, 2010, June 24, 2010 and August 23, 2010, at OCB's offices.

At the hearings, the parties each took full opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of their respective positions. Following the hearing the parties each submitted written briefs followed by reply briefs. Upon my receipt of same the record was closed.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>In early 2011 the parties jointly requested that the matter be held in abeyance while they attempted once more to work out a resolution of their dispute. In the fall of 2011, those efforts proved unsuccessful, and the parties thereupon asked that I issue my award.

## DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

### Issues Presented

At the June 11, 2010, hearing, the parties stipulated to the following issues for arbitral determination:

1. Did the Employer, the New York City Fire Department, violate Article VII, Section 1(b) of the Emergency Medical Services Agreement, and its own rules and regulations, specifically EMS OGP 112-01 and the FDNY Incident Command Training Program?<sup>20</sup>
2. If so, what shall be the remedy?

### Positions of the Parties

The Union argues that the Department is in violation of OGP 112-01 by its "regular and constant" failure to maintain a manageable span of control ratio of EMS officers to subordinate emergency medical responders "at various serious incidents." Union Brief at 9. The Union asserts that the acceptable range of officers to subordinates is regularly violated, especially and most routinely during common, critical calls, such as for cardiac arrest, when no officers are available. According to the Union, OGP 112-01 requires a range of one (1) officer to seven (7) subordinates during simple and routine incidents, and for escalating, demanding or geographically expansive incidents, it

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<sup>20</sup>The Union has since withdrawn its claim the Department's actions are a violation of the FDNY Incident Command Training Program, although it continues to draw upon the substance of the manual to support its grievance.

mandates a ratio of one (1) Officer to three (3) or four (4) subordinates. Union Brief at 2, 8.

The Union depicts an "evolving crisis" within the Fire Department which is rooted in a shortage of EMS officers to carry the "heavy workload that is required of their title." Id. at 3. Thus, in addition to there being a failure "to meet the ostensible standards articulated in the EMS rules and regulations," there exists "a threat to the quality of patient care" the FDNY EMS provides to the general public, according to the Union. Id. The Union argues that the span of control requirements are violated most egregious by the Department's routine failure to meet the officer response mandates for cardiac arrests set forth in EMS Command Order 2008-051, Union Exhibit 12, as well as the broader requirement to "[r]espond immediately and proactively" to numerous life-threatening emergencies identified in EMSC OGP 101-04 (Duties and Responsibilities: Conditions Officer). Union Exhibit 16.

The cornerstone of these violations, according to the Union, is the Department's daily disregard for the span of control rules and policy set forth in OGP 112-01. The Union points out that the FDNY ICS, as spelled out in OGP 112-01, is the "official policy" of New York City "for the management of all incidents and the development of standard operating procedures." OGP 112-01, ¶1.6. On the issue of span of control, the Union argues, OGP

112-01 "provides a clear and incontrovertible protocol." Union Brief at 9. For "all FDNY incidents and operations," according to the Union, the Department must keep span of control of any individual with management responsibility within the range of 1:3 to 1:7, with 1:5 "being ideal." Union Brief at 9-10, quoting OGP 112-01, ¶¶ 1.6, 3.2.2.

According to the Union, managing span of control within the permissive range is a requirement, regardless of whether the incident is "single command," that is, within a single jurisdiction, or "Unified Command," or occurring with jurisdictional and/or agency overlaps. Union Brief at 10, citing OGP 112-01, ¶4.1. The Union asserts that the maintenance of a proper span of control "drives the operational parameters established in Ops Guide 112-01," and is central to the organization, structure and function of FDNY ICS. Union Brief at 11. Allowing that the "span of control protocol is not meant to control ratios other than during the period from dispatch to the conclusion of the call," the Union highlights "the understanding" within OGP 112-01 that the FDNY ICS "is the official policy for the management of all incidents." Union Brief at 11, quoting OGP 112-01, ¶1.6 (emph. in brief).

The Union points to FDNY ICS's origins within NIMS and CIMS. It observes the fact, explicitly stated in the DHS guideline, that NIMS ICS applies "across the full spectrum of potential

incidents and hazard scenarios." Union Brief at 12, quoting Union 7 at 5 (emph. in brief). Observing that NIMS was adopted by the State of New York via the Executive Orders of two governors, see Union Exh. 8a, the Union stresses that NIMS has been implemented by New York State "for all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal Response." Union Brief at 13, quoting Union Exhibit 8 at 3 (emph. in brief). The Union notes that the State's implementation of NIMS "is applicable to any incident regardless of cause, size, location or complexity," Union Brief at 13, quoting Union Exhibit 8 at 3 (emph. in brief).

The Union further observes that the CIMS Protocol directs that "ICS will be implemented at all emergency responses" in New York City. Union Brief at 12, quoting Union Exhibit 9 at 7. According to the Union, it is not accidental that OGP 112-01 mirrors the ICS structures described in NIMS and CIMS, Union Brief at 13, and it argues, therefore, that I must give substantial weight to the fact none of the governing ICS documents even arguably support the City's contention the span of control ratios are required only at multiple casualty incidents.

Moreover, the Union argues, the "complete rupture of the span of control mandates" within the FDNY ICS has had a devastating impact on the EMS Command's ability to serve the public. Union Brief at 14. According to the Union, Department

data shows the presence of an officer on the scene of cardiac arrests only 27.04% of the time. Id. Similarly, according to the Union, for a majority of emergency incidents involving traumas and other life-threatening events, there is commonly no officer response. Apart from violating span of control mandates, the Union argues, these practices have a profound, negative impact on the survival rate of patients. Id.

The Union paints what it calls a "frightening story," which begins with the simple review of the Departments Vital Statistics. According to the Union, and the arithmetic, in 2009 there were on average fifty-one (51) life-threatening incidents every hour, and yet under the most ideal conditions, only thirty-four (34) conditions cars to supervise those responses. Union Brief at 15.

The Union argues that this shortfall, which it calls "an unmanageable span of control," Union Brief at 16, is exacerbated by the Department's increasing use of battalion-based stations at which a sole administrative officer is in charge of both field and voluntary units, resulting in the potential span of control ratio of 1:30. Union Brief at 16. "This is disastrous in its implications," the Union argues. Id. According to the Union, if Officers from one geographic area are moved to address staffing shortages in another, the obvious result is there will be no officers at all to respond to emergencies they are mandated to

supervise. Union Brief at 17.<sup>21</sup>

The Union stresses that its grievance "centrally concerns the management of life-threatening incidents, and the requisite span of control at such incidents." Union Reply at 2. It insists that it does not ask me to substitute my judgment on matters of staffing, geographical coverage, station resources, and other matters traditionally reserved for management, yet it points out the Department's allocations of personnel and resources do impact the span of control that supervisors exercise over their subordinates. If, on the basis of that impact, the City contends the Union has treaded on managerial discretion, the proper course for the City, according to the Union, would have been to bring a challenge to arbitrability before the Board of Collective Bargaining. Union Reply at 2.

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<sup>21</sup>Captain Miller testified that during a typical tour in the Bronx (Division 2), ten (10) officers supervise 164 EMTs and Paramedics manning eighty-two (82) City and Voluntary ambulance units. The Union additionally estimates, based on Fire Department Vital Statistics showing the number of average daily tours of Municipal and Voluntary ambulance units, 626 and 340 respectively, see Union Exhibit 15b, that the approximately one hundred and two (102) Officers managing 1932 subordinates out of thirty-four (34) conditions cars, yields a static ratio of one (1) supervisor to nineteen (19) subordinates. The Union does not contend that these raw numbers alone constitute a violation of OGP 112-01. Rather, it stresses the Fire Department's consequent inability to maintain the published span of control ratios during emergency responses. In particular, the Union protests the Department's inability at the vast majority of single- and dual-ambulance responses to ensure the presence of any Officer at all, resulting in what the Union calls "no span of control." Testimony of Captain Miller.

In short, the Union asserts the City is in violation of its own rules and policy regarding span of control in the management of life-threatening emergencies. It asks that I find the City in violation of its own rules and policy and order an appropriate remedy. Minimally, the Union asks that I direct the Fire Department to comply with its own rules and policy regarding span of control.<sup>22</sup>

The City, on the other hand, contends that the span of control ratios stated in OGP 112-01 properly and fairly apply only in the event of a multiple casualty incident. It argues that “[c]learly and unequivocally the Incident Command system applies only at serious incident scenes.” City Brief at 10 (emph. in orig.). It asserts that Chief Peruggia “was intimately involved in drafting the language of the operating guide,” and that I therefore cannot substitute my judgment for his determination that “the provisions of EMS OGP 112-01 are meant to apply at multiple casualty incidents, not during periods when

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<sup>22</sup>Although it makes a case that the underlying problem is inadequate staffing, the Union acknowledges my lack of authority to direct the Department how to manage or staff its operations. It asserts that within my proper jurisdiction is the lawful ability to “grant any relief reasonably fitting and necessary to a final determination of the matter . . ., including equitable and legal relief.” Union Brief at 19, quoting City of New York v. District Council 37, Supreme Court New York County, Index No. 407245/07. It adds, quoting Elkouri & Elkouri, that “[i]n some cases, where an arbitrator has found a violation of the agreement, the case has been returned to the parties to allow them to negotiate the terms of the remedy.” How Arbitration Works, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition, 2003, at 1193.

ambulance units are at a corner waiting to respond." City Brief at 7-8 (emph. in orig.). The City claims that Chief Peruggia's decision the ICS shall apply only at the scene of multiple casualty incidents has been in effect since 2006, "establishing a clear past practice." City Brief at 8.

The City insists, moreover, that the Department's interpretation "of its own document" - "a unilaterally-based regulation" - "is subject to a less stringent standard of arbitral review than a negotiated collective bargaining agreement." City Brief at 8, citing Lieutenants' Benevolent Ass'n (LBA) and New York City Police Department, OCB No. A-4682-93 (Stein, Arb.) (1994) (public employer's construction and application of its own rules, regulations and policies extrinsic to a collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitral review only for reasonableness). According to the City, the Department's determination the ICS "applies only at serious incidents" is "an eminently reasonable determination of its own policy." Id. at 9.

The City stresses language in OGP 112-01 which it contends permits the Chief to implement the Incident Command System "based on the needs of the incident." City Brief at 9 (emph. in orig.), quoting OGP 112-01, ¶1.5. The City contends OGP 112-01 gives the Department "tools" which it may use or not use based on need. City Brief at 9.

In contrast, according to the City, the Union has offered an inconsistent and unreasonable interpretation of the Operating Guide. Indeed, the City argues, the Union has flip-flopped throughout the arbitration on the question of whether ICS mandates officer responses to routine EMS runs. The City posits that officers fairly cannot be required at every incident, since "it would be remarkably inefficient and unnecessary to send EMS Officers to each ambulance run." City Brief at 11. The City argues, therefore, that any claim by the Union OGP 112-01 requires that level of response must be denied.

The City explains that at multiple casualty incidents, the Department adheres to a response matrix, Union Exhibit 6, which demonstrates its compliance with ICS's "suggested" span of control "one hundred percent of the time." City Brief at 11-12. The City contends that is so whether a supervisor's span of control is measured by units (ambulances) or by individuals. City Brief at 12.<sup>23</sup> In fact, the City argues, the Union's principal witnesses, President Variale and Captain Miller, could not point to or even recall a time the span of control at a

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<sup>23</sup>The City omits the source of Chief Peruggia's asserted authority to measure span of control based on the number units under an officers supervision, rather than on the number of persons being supervised. OGP 112-01, ¶3.2.3, references the supervision of "subordinates," as do the NIMS Guidelines, City Exhibit 1 at 47, and the CIMS Protocol. Union Exhibit 9 at 9. Moreover, the CIMS Protocol expressly defines "span of control" as the supervision of "individuals." Union Exhibit 9, Appendix 2, at 17.

multiple casualty incident ever exceeded a ratio of 1:7. Those admissions, the City argues, constitute a concession the Department has not violated the ICS Protocols. According to the City, therefore, the Union's grievance must be denied in its entirety.

In any case, the City argues, the Union's grievance must be denied as an infringement upon the Fire Department's managerial prerogative to deploy its personnel "to best achieve its mission of providing emergency medical care to the public." City Brief at 13. The Union's grievance is improper, according to the City, to the extent it purports to place in my hands the issue of how best to allocate EMS personnel. That determination by law is the prerogative of the Department in its exercise of its managerial right to determine the methods, means and personnel by which government operations are to be conducted, and to take all necessary actions to carry out its mission in emergencies. City Brief at 13.

The City acknowledges the propriety of the Union's initial challenge to an internal written policy, but it contends that the Union's case-in-chief "went much further and traversed into areas of management's rights." City Brief at 14. The City points to Union evidence which purports to show that the Department's policy decisions are costing human lives and that EMS responses are more successful when an Officer is present. See Union

Exhibits 11, 17, 21.

The City additionally points to the large part of the Union's presentation devoted to questioning the wisdom of running stations as battalion-based instead of station-based, or complaining about the large geographic areas which must be covered by EMS units. These issues all constitute non-arbitrable claims which fall within the Department's right to staff and allocate employees, the City argues. City Brief at 14, citing various decisions of the Board of Collective Bargaining.

The City highlights the Board's determination in City v. Local 1180, CWA, 27 OCB 11 (BCB 1981) that the City has the "statutory right to establish unilaterally staffing levels and span of supervision." City Brief at 15. According to the City, span of supervision and other staffing decisions "have always been interpreted as management rights." Id. It argues that the Department "has the unfettered right to determine how many and which employees most efficiently carry out [its] obligations." According to the City, therefore, this grievance, which attempts to give an arbitrator authority to make Fire Department staffing decisions, "is inherently flawed and must be denied." Id. The City asks I hold that the Union's grievance "constitutes a non-arbitrable infringement on the Department's management right," City Reply at 3, and dismiss it in its entirety.

## Opinion

Preliminarily, I make the following observations: My role as arbitrator is a limited one. I am required to interpret the parties' Agreement as written. Where the parties' chosen words are clear and unambiguous, where their intentions are manifest from their agreed upon language, where the meeting of their minds is evident from the provisions they have drafted to memorialize their bargain, then I must give full force and effect to the product of their negotiations without regard for anyone's judgment after the fact, my own included, regarding the wisdom or efficacy of the contractual terms. That is my limited role.

At the same time, and especially in the public sector, to the extent there is any flexibility or ambiguity in the terms the parties have entered into, I have no jurisdiction to delve into the formulation of policy. Of relevance here, decisions concerning staffing, particularly where matters of public health and safety are involved, are the province of government.

I stress I am not a policymaker, and it is not within my authority to determine how the City's Emergency Medical Service might best allocate and manage its resources, unless of course there is an enforceable promise under a lawful collective bargaining agreement which the parties have empowered me to affirm through an arbitral directive. So, too, it is not my role to make judgments concerning health policy and I therefore

decline to be drawn into any controversy concerning the quality or efficiency of the City's EMS practices, including those impacting patient outcomes in cases of cardiac arrest.

With those principles in mind, I turn to the facts of this case, in which the Union has placed before me the commonplace claim the Department has violated, misinterpreted or misapplied its written policy set forth in OGP 112-01, in particular the requirement under ¶3.2 to maintain a "manageable span of control" dictated by "[s]afety and sound management practices." OGP 112-01, ¶3.2.1.

Paragraph 3.2.1 clarifies that "[t]he organizational options within the ICS are designed to provide span of control ratios that meet [the] requirements" of safety and sound management. Paragraph 3.2.2 provides that as a general practice, "during the active operational period," a reasonable span of control "of any individual with management responsibility should range from three to seven with five being ideal." In other words, during the active operational period of an "incident," which in both the NIMS Guidelines and the CIMS Protocol is defined the same, although in slightly different words, the span of control of an individual with management responsibility should range from 1:3 to 1:7, with 1:5 being "ideal."

The CIMS Protocol, citing NIMS, defines an incident as "an occurrence, caused either by human action or natural phenomena

that requires action by emergency service personnel to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources." Union Exhibit 9, Appendix 2 at 7. Minimally, at least according to the plain terms of OGP 112-01, span of control ratios should be adhered to at Segment One, Two or Three responses, see Union Exhibit 18 at 5, as these are without question occurrences which require action by emergency service personnel to prevent or minimize loss of life. There is nothing in any of the guidelines which defines a threshold incident which triggers span of control requirements. While type of incident, the nature of the tasks, the safety factors and scope of the emergency response "all influence span-of-control considerations," City Exhibit 1 at 47 (NIMS), none of the guidelines or protocols allow that span-of-control requirements may be selectively applicable based on particular factors, including the size of the emergency or the number of potential casualties.

On the contrary, NIMS "is applicable to any incident regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity." City Exhibit 1 at 8 (emph. supp.). Indeed, "the components of NIMS," id. at 6, which include "Command and Management," id. at 8, 45, which in turn include "manageable span of control," id. at 47, apply "to any situation, from routine, local incidents to incidents requiring the activation of interstate mutual aid to

those requiring a coordinated Federal response." Id. at 6.<sup>24</sup> Such "flexibility is essential for NIMS to be applicable across the full spectrum of potential incidents." Id. (emph. supp.).

Perhaps most tellingly, the NIMS Guidelines, which for this point I stress is a City Exhibit, expressly emphasize that "NIMS is **NOT** . . . [o]nly used during large-scale incidents." City Exhibit 1 at 6 (emph. in orig.). This proclamation by DHS appears to undercut the City's central contention the ICS guidelines allow it to determine a threshold emergency to which span of control ratios apply. Indeed, DHS explains why the NIMS Guidelines apply to all incidents, even routine ones, regardless of size. According to DHS, the "flexibility" built into the NIMS components "facilitates scalability of emergency management and incident response activities." Id. In simple terms, readiness for routine everyday incidents creates preparedness for large scale and complex emergencies.

Accordingly, under CIMS, too, "ICS will be implemented at all responses." Union Exhibit 9 at 7. "CIMS addresses small- and large-scale incidents." Id. CIMS, which is "interoperable with NIMS and New York State's ICS," id. at 7, recognizes that span of control management may change as an incident escalates,

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<sup>24</sup>Likewise, "accountability of resources," which is "essential" and "must be adhered to" during incidents "at all jurisdictional levels," includes following the span of control guidelines. City Exhibit 1 at 49.

but it makes no allowance for discounting span of control requirements below a defined threshold.

Nevertheless, and despite the principles of scalability and preparedness which define ICS, it is undisputed in this record that the span of control ratios of Officers to subordinates, enumerated in the Federal, State and City protocols, as well as in the Fire Department's procedural guideline, are not followed by EMS at "the full spectrum" of incidents. Indeed, even at Segment One incidents involving cardiac arrests, undisputed record evidence places Officer responses at only 27% of occurrences, effectively meaning that at nearly three-quarters of cardiac arrest incidents, there is no direct supervision. The Union argues the span of control under those circumstances is zero, and squarely violates OGP 112-01.

Asking that I not leap to the conclusion from these plain arithmetical truths that grievable violations of OGP 112-01 are regular fare in the City's daily delivery of emergency medical services, the City insists that I am precluded from adopting the broad reading of the span of control guidelines advanced in this case by the Union. Rather, according to the City, I must defer to the reasonable interpretation of the Department's written policy offered by Chief Peruggia. Indeed, not only must his interpretation of policy be given dispositive weight because he is the highest authority within the Emergency Medical Services

Division of the Fire Department, but even more compelling, the City argues, is the fact he "was intimately involved in drafting the language of the operating guide." City Brief at 8.

In the ordinary case, such facts would be compelling and might necessarily dictate the arbitral result. As noted, on matters of policy, it is the judgment of the policymakers which must govern. If the City, with no constraints other than to adhere to its own policies, determined that the Department's span of control guidelines applied only at serious emergencies, and more particularly at multiple casualty incidents, I expect I would follow the City's interpretation of its own rules consistent with sound arbitral practice.

This, however, is not the ordinary case, and the facts here are not as clear cut as the City describes them. Indeed, one of the City's central claims, that Chief Peruggia drafted OGP 112-01, does not withstand scrutiny, at least with regard to the provisions at issue here.

The prevailing span of control ratios, and the policy guidelines directing their application at all "incidents" are, in actuality, Federal in origin. They are contained within the NIMS Guidelines, the NYS Strategy, and the CIMS Protocol. There simply is no reasonable record basis for me to defer to Chief Peruggia's interpretation of the Federal, State and City Incident Management System guidelines, as there is no evidence linking him

to the development of the doctrines, concepts, principles and organization processes which constitute the National Incident Management System that has been presented by DHS for adoption by the Federal, State and local government entities as a condition for Federal support.<sup>25</sup>

In my final analysis, the weight of record evidence demonstrates the Department has not adhered to the manageable span of control guidelines stated in NIMS, CIMS and OGP 112-01, and adopted by reference in the New York State Implementation. That non-adherence by the Department to OGP 112-01, in particular to ¶3.2, constitutes a breach of the City's Agreement with the Union.

In making this determination, I stress the narrowness of my jurisdiction. The parties' Agreement merely states that the Union may grieve the Department's violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of a written policy or order affecting terms and conditions of employment. In the exercise of my arbitral authority, I sustain the Union's grievance asserting a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of OGP 112-01.

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<sup>25</sup>In the NIMS Preface, the Department of Homeland Security explains: "**NIMS is not an operational incident management or resource allocation plan.** NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management. . . . The directive requires Federal departments and agencies to make adoption of NIMS by State, tribal, and local organizations a condition for Federal preparedness assistance." City Exhibit 1 at 3 (emph. in orig.).

With regard to remedy, which is the second issue presented to me in this case, I exercise my authority with great care. The span of control ratios are guidelines. According to record evidence, the consequence for non-adherence is the possible loss of Federal funding opportunities in connection with emergency management and response programs. As arbitrator, I obviously have no power to impose those kinds of consequences.

Nor, I find, do I have the ability to direct the City to adjust its emergency response practices to ensure adherence to the stated ratios. To do so would be, potentially at least, to assume policing powers even greater than those of the emergency management agencies charged with implementing ICS.

The power I do have under the parties' Agreement, when read in conjunction with the various guidelines and instructions, is to direct the City to take steps necessary to determine if its departure from the express span of control ratios in the Federal, State and City protocols constitutes compliance with the NIMS framework. In short, it is compliance with the Federal framework, as adopted through CIMS and, more specifically, OGP 112-01, which the City has promised in its Agreement with the Union.<sup>26</sup> And it is that compliance with the NIMS framework which

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<sup>26</sup>I reiterate the fact the NYS Strategy and the CIMS Protocol contain express commitments by the State and the City to implement the NIMS framework, absent a proper waiver. Thus, the State Strategy expressly states that Executive Order 26.1, which was continued by former Governor Paterson's Executive Order No. 9

I have the authority to direct the City to seek through appropriate procedures.

In fact, procedures for "ongoing management and maintenance" of NIMS are a core "component" of the NIMS Guideline. City Exhibit 1 at 75-82. As the Guideline explains, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a mechanism for ensuring the ongoing management and maintenance of NIMS, including regular consultation with other Federal departments and agencies; State, tribal and local stakeholders . . . ." Id. at 75 (emph. supp.). "To this end," the Secretary of Homeland Security has established the National Integration Center ("NIC") "to serve as an informational assistance resource for government agencies at all levels." Id. (emph. supp.).

Directly related to the remedy I direct in this case, the Federal Guideline states that "the NIC administers NIMS compliance requirements" and that "[r]evisions to NIMS and other issues can be proposed [to NIC] by all NIMS users (including . .

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on March 20, 2008, incorporates NIMS as the State's "Management System for Emergency Response." Union Exhibit 8a at 3; Union Exhibit 8 at 29. The State Strategy acknowledges that NIMS establishes "a uniform set of processes, protocols, and procedures that all emergency responders, at every level of government will use to conduct response actions." Union Exhibit 8 at 30. The CIMS Protocol states that it follows the NIMS "federal requirements" except for "NYC-specific modifications," none of which are applicable here. See Union Exhibit 9 at 6 of 51 and Annex C.

. local governments).” Id. (emph. supp.). In short, “[t]he NIC provides strategic direction for and oversight of NIMS, supporting routine maintenance and continuous refinement of the system and its components over the long term.” Id. (emph. supp.).

Pursuant to this fluid and dynamic process, “all users and stakeholders - including all levels of government . . . - are given the opportunity to participate in NIC activities. The NIMS management and maintenance process relies heavily on lessons learned from actual incidents and incident management training and exercises, as well as recognized best practices across jurisdictions and functional disciplines.” Id. (emph. supp.). Through a review and revision process in which DHS engages in “regular consultation with other Federal departments and agencies and State and local governments,” NIC will develop “compliance requirements and timelines for Federal, State, tribal, and local governments regarding NIMS standards and guidelines.” Id. at 76. (emph. supp.).

I find the City through its adoption of NIMS, its publication of the NIMS span of control guidelines and, of central importance to this controversy, its agreement that its adherence to those guidelines under OGP 112-01 is a grievable issue, is obligated to seek appropriate compliance instruction from the NIC in the event there is a clear and undeniable

disparity between those Federal guidelines and the City's practice, as is the case here. It is for DHS, through the NIC, to determine whether the Department's span of control ratios during emergency responses are "manageable," and therefore in compliance with the Federal NIMS guidelines which have been adopted by New York State, New York City and, most relevant here, the Fire Department. My arbitral authority in this case, following my determination the City has not followed the letter of OGP 112-01, and therefore has misinterpreted or misapplied a "written policy," is to instruct the City to seek clarification and instruction from NIC on whether its span of control practices, although inconsistent with the letter of the NIMS Guidelines, are nevertheless effectively compliant with NIMS or, if not, whether a modification of the span of control guidelines applicable to the Department is appropriate.

\* \* \*

The City shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this Award to initiate review by and/or consultation with NIC regarding the span of control issues raised in this proceeding, and thereafter, as instructed by the NIC, it shall implement any revisions or modifications necessary for compliance with NIMS span of control requirements and for adherence to the span of control guidelines in OGP 112-01.

The City shall, at least every ninety (90) days until NIC's

review is complete, provide to a designated representative of the Union, a brief report stating its communications with the NIC on span of control issues, and a summary of known actions by the NIC in response to those communications, if any.

I shall retain jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the City's adherence to its obligations under this Opinion and Award. Extensions of the timelines established herein shall be granted upon request, for good cause only.

AWARD

1. The Employer, the New York City Fire Department, violated Article VII, Section 1(b) of the Emergency Medical Services Agreement, and its own rules and regulations, specifically EMS OGP 112-01.

2. The City shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this Award to initiate review by and/or consultation with the NIC regarding the span of control issues raised in this proceeding, and thereafter, as instructed by the NIC and consistent with NIC procedures, it shall implement any revisions, modifications or practices necessary for compliance with NIMS span of control requirements and for adherence to the span of control guidelines in OGP 112-01.

2. The City shall, at least every ninety (90) days until NIC's review is complete, provide to a designated representative of the Union, a brief report stating its communications with the NIC on span of control issues, and a summary of known actions by the NIC in response to those communications, if any.

3. I shall retain jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the City's adherence to its obligations under this Opinion and Award. Extensions of the timelines established herein shall be granted upon request, for good cause only.

September 23, 2012

  
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Earl R. Pfeffer, Esq., Arbitrator

STATE OF NEW JERSEY            )  
  ) ss.:  
COUNTY OF ESSEX                )

I, EARL R. PFEFFER, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described herein and who executed this instrument, which is the Award of the Board.



September 23, 2012

Earl R. Pfeffer, Esq., Arbitrator

TESTIMONY FORM BRONX COMMUNITY BOARD #10  
BEFORE THE JOINT CITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE  
CONCERNING THE RESPONSE  
HURRICANE SANDY  
JANUARY 16, 2013

Hon. Peter Vallone, Jr., Chair of the New York City Council's Public Safety Committee; Hon. Elizabeth Crowley, Chair of the New York City Council's Fire and Criminal Justice Services Committee, Hon. Oliver G. Koppell, Chair of the New York City Council's Mental Health, Mental Retardation, Drug Abuse & Disability Services Committee; Hon. Jessica Lappin, Chair of the New York City Council's Committee on Aging; Hon. Maria del Carmen Arroyo, Chair of New York City Council Committee on Health; Hon. Annabel Palma, Chair of the New York City Council General Welfare Committee and all of the members of these respective Committees:

Good Afternoon, my name is John Marano and I am the Chairman of Bronx Community Board #10. I would like to thank the City Council for providing the community boards from the areas adversely affected by Hurricane Sandy, with the opportunity to comment on the City's response to the storm.

Bronx Community Board #10 serves the shoreline, northeastern Bronx communities of Throggs Neck, Country Club, City Island, Edgewater Park, Locust Point and Silver Beach. These were the communities that were adversely affected by the storm. All of these communities saw homes and businesses destroyed, seawalls damaged, street flooding, old growth trees downed, which caused power lines to snap, resulting in power outages. The resultant damage took weeks to repair, causing our Board office to expend countless hours speaking with 311 operators and Con Ed.

The Board found that the private insurance companies did not serve their clients well, often charging large premiums to their customers, and when those customers submitted legitimate claims, those claims were denied. The Board feels that the State regulatory agency in charge of insurance companies should make a special effort to investigate storm related claims that have been denied.

In the days leading up to Hurricane Sandy, the residents of Bronx Community Board #10 were apprised of the severity of the storm, the emergency services and the utilities were ready to be of assistance. The Notify New York messages were sent with updates and the Board was contacted by its liaisons from the Mayor's Office, the City Council and the utilities. When the storm hit, there was regular and frequent communication between the aforementioned agencies and the Board's staff.

The evacuation center for these areas is Harry S. Truman High School, located within Co-op City. In the past, when these areas, particularly City Island were evacuated, those who went to this site felt that it was inadequate to meet their needs. Therefore, when a large senior citizen housing development was offered the chance to evacuate, they chose to remain in their homes. The 45<sup>th</sup> Precinct, our local

Council member and the Mayor's CAU Office, Bronx Liaison, all cooperated in ensuring that the seniors were given emergency services at their building, and thankfully no adverse incidents occurred. However, the small number that chose to go to the evacuation site cited a lack of a handicapped bathroom facility on the first floor, and the distance that they had to travel from areas like Locust Point and Edgewater Park to the Co-op City site. The residents of these communities would much prefer the evacuation center to be located in a facility that is equally safe, such as Herbert H. Lehman High School or one of the primary schools, located upland from the shoreline.

As to OEM's outreach services, the Board feels that a special effort should have been made to reach the shoreline communities of the Bronx. It seems to us that a considerable effort was expended in other areas of the City like the Rockaways, and rightfully so, but that effort should have been evenly applied to all shoreline communities of the City. As to clean-up and renovation efforts, our Board has numerous sea walls, the ownership of which are not clear, some are private and others are public. All seemed to be in some state of disrepair before and after the storm. There should be a concerted effort to identify the publically owned seawalls and those that are private, and they should all be examined and repaired. After all, they are shoreline's basic protection against tide swells. Additionally, over 70% of Bronx Community Board #10 is covered by trees. When these trees came down, they tore down the power lines. For many years our Board has requested a robust tree pruning program that if put in place, may have minimized the damage caused fallen trees to power lines.

Lastly, the Board feels that OEM should have enlisted its support, in the provision emergency services during the storm. Community Boards are the first line of City government in the neighborhoods that comprise our city. They have an intricate knowledge of their neighborhoods, trouble spots and a network of community based groups with which to disseminate information. The District Managers and staff of these boards are well versed in City procedures and practices. They could have been brought into the warning effort and would have enthusiastically participated.

Thank you for your attention and consideration.

Speaker Quinn and the Chairs and Members of the City Council Committees on Public Safety, Fire & Criminal Justice Services, Aging, General Welfare, Health, and Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse & Disability Services:

Thank you for holding this first in a series of important hearings on the City's Emergency Planning and Management During and After Hurricane Sandy. I am submitting this testimony on behalf of the almost 200 members of the Human Services Council (HSC). While many of you know the work of HSC, additional information can be found in the attachment.

When this unprecedented disaster struck, HSC and our member agencies were called on by the Governor's Office, the Mayor's Office, and the Speaker's Office to respond immediately to the needs of those impacted -- and we did. Without thought as to cost, nonprofit human services providers got to the scene as quickly as humanly possible and provided food, blankets, counseling, and more -- as we do every day for the poor and needy in the City. In some cases, provider staff stayed overnight or longer with the vulnerable people in their care in hurricane-damaged residences. HSC and NASW recruited social workers to staff the recovery centers, and HSC began (and continues) a regular compilation of information that is distributed to hundreds of providers, government agencies, philanthropies, and other stakeholders.

And providers remain in the impacted areas, doing what they do best -- giving compassionate care to those who need it.

What didn't work is that providers at the beginning were not prepared and, even now, are not coordinated in their care-giving.

After 9/11, the sector came together to form 9/11-USG (United Services Group), and worked in a coordinated way with each other and with the State and City to provide for immediate needs and longer-term case management for the victims of this tragedy. The Human Services Council inherited USG as a corporate shell, ready to be reactivated if necessary. Our Disaster Preparedness and Response Committee, comprising the former USG board members and others, and chaired by Msgr. Kevin Sullivan, Executive Director of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New York, maintained the vital network of disaster responders. This work, including tabletop exercises, simulations, and the preparation and updating of a comprehensive manual of over 100 pages, was made possible through funding from the State under Governor Spitzer; this funding was eliminated under Governor Paterson. We tried, with some philanthropic help and by stretching our own budget, to keep this going, but it ultimately proved impossible. We laid off our disaster staff, closed the committee, and terminated the program.

Needless to say, this short-sightedness on the part of the State is now all too obvious. Just as the State and City fund disaster preparedness for other first responders such as police and firefighters, and have entire agencies dedicated to disaster response, including the State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services and the City Office of Emergency Management, it is the government's responsibility to provide the funding that will ensure that human service providers are ready to respond in a more coordinated and professional way.

With climate change and terrorism making the world a more dangerous place, the need for the human services sector to be prepared for disaster response is unquestionable.

I would, respectfully, urge the Council to impress upon the Governor and the Mayor the vital need for funding this effort. I would also urge the Council to include "human services" as one of the topics for a separate hearing in the Sandy-related series that began with the January 16 hearing.

I would be happy to provide you with any materials you desire concerning the sector's work after 9/11, Katrina, and Sandy, and would welcome a meeting with you to answer any questions you may have and to discuss this further.

Again, my thanks for allowing me to address this issue.


Michael Stoller

Michael Stoller | Executive Director  
Human Services Council  
130 East 59th Street, NY, NY 10022  
Phone: (212) 836-1230 | Fax: (212) 836-1368 [stollerm@humanservicescouncil.org](mailto:stollerm@humanservicescouncil.org)  
[www.humanservicescouncil.org](http://www.humanservicescouncil.org)



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 @HSC\_NY

 Human Services Council of NYC

The Human Services Council (HSC) represents the providers of human services to New York's vulnerable populations, from aging/child care and mental/physical health services to community development, employment and training, and homelessness programs. Among HSC's many focus areas are public policy and advocacy, technology improvement, and government contracting. These efforts enhance public recognition for the sector, improve its financial stability, and have a long-term positive impact on the well-being of New Yorkers in need.

As the economy continues to struggle, cuts in government funding are compounding. In the last three years, cuts to human services by New York State and localities totaled approximately \$1 billion, while poverty, hunger, and homelessness are near all-time highs. Human service programs are constantly at risk of being cut because of budget constraints and lack of funding. These services are integral and profoundly important to those who are subsisting just above the poverty line, hoping to make ends meet.

**Human services organizations reinvest in New York by not only providing services, but also 1.25M jobs, many for low- to middle-income workers. HSC supports and advocates for these services that fill basic human needs and bridge income disparities that many of us take for granted.**

## What We Do

- Mobilize organizations inside and outside the sector to ensure that programs, services, and organizations are maintained – so the individuals, families, and communities we serve can reach their full potential.
- Serve as a “one-stop” advisor for government officials: HSC has shaped reports and programs to improve the sector's ability to provide high-quality services. Our input has been sought and recognized by the Governor, Mayor, Attorney General, City and State Comptrollers, and Legislative Leaders.
- Work with State- and City-wide coalitions to advocate for a more progressive tax structure; HSC has already seen successes in its advocacy as a NY State tax reform and job creation package was announced by the Governor in December 2011.
- Effectively lobby for legislation to revamp and streamline the government's procurement processes and leading negotiations toward the City's standard human services contract, implemented in July 2011.
- Provide technical assistance, discounted/free trainings, and timely communications to members, the sector, partners, and the public.
- Obtain media placements for sector issues, including with the Associated Press, NY Times, NY Daily News, Wall Street Journal, and Chronicle of Philanthropy, as well as ABC, Fox, NY1, and NPR.

*HSC thanks The Clark Foundation, IBM, Mutual of America, New York City Council, New York Community Trust, UJA-Federation, United Way of New York City, and our members for their generous support.*

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Judith Goldiner

Address: 199 ~~St~~ Water St NYC

I represent: The Legal Aid Society

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Joe Levine

Address: At 360 Lexington

I represent: Alzheimer's Assoc. NYC

Address: 360 Lexington Ave

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 10:00 AM

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Catherine McVay Hughes 4v+h

Address: CBI Chair

I represent: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: JESSICA ROFF

Address: 595 President St Bklyn

I represent: Occupy Sandy, Restore the Rock, YANA

Address: Rockaway

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Leah Feister

Address: 5355 Henry Hudson Pkwy Br

I represent: JASA

Address: 247 West 37th St NYC

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Catherine Abate

Address: ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

I represent: Community Healthcare Network

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/17/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: JEREMY SAUNDERS

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: VOXAL - N.Y. ORG

Address: 80 A 4th Ave 11217

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/17

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: TRIADA STAMPAS

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: FOOD BANK FOR NEW YORK CITY

Address: 39 BROADWAY, 10TH FLOOR NYC 10006

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Susan Dooha

Address: 24th Broadway #301

I represent: CIDNY

Address: above

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/2013

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: YETTA KURLAND

Address: 161 W. 16<sup>th</sup> St.

I represent: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Caron Atlas

Address: 88 Prospect Park West Brooklyn 11215

I represent: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: 88 Prospect Park

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: DAVID PEREZ, COALITION OF

Address: PO BOX 1130 HOPE FOUNDATION  
DEER MARCA 92044

I represent: COALITION OF HOPE FOUNDATION

Address: People of NYC

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: Sarah Felsenthal (PLEASE PRINT)

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: Met Council

Address: 30 Maiden Lane 21<sup>st</sup> Floor

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: Vincent Variale (PLEASE PRINT)

Address: 4709 30<sup>th</sup> St. LIC, N.Y. 11101

I represent: Local 3621 Uniformed EMS Officers Union

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: Michael Stoller (PLEASE PRINT)

Address: 136 E 59<sup>th</sup> St. NY, NY

I represent: Human Services Council

Address: 136 E 59<sup>th</sup> St. NY, NY

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 11/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Harvey Epstein

Address: 172 E 4<sup>th</sup> St

I represent: Urban Justice Center

Address: 123 Williams Street

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Ed. Eagle Boles

Address: Uniformed Fire Officers Association

I represent: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: ISRAEL MIRANDA

Address: 47-09 30<sup>th</sup> St F.R.C. L.I.C. N.Y. 11101

I represent: Uniformed EMT'S Paramedics and

Address: Inspector L. 2507 F.D.N.Y.

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: MICHAEL STOLLER (PLEASE PRINT)

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: HUMAN SERVICES COUNCIL

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: PRETINA MADON (PLEASE PRINT)

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: Miriam Roca (PLEASE PRINT)

Address: 388 Midwood street

I represent: People's Medical Relief

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

◆ Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms ◆

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: G. L. Tyler

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: District Council 1707

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: 1-16-13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: DEPUTY CHIEF CHARLES DOWD

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: NYPD

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: LETICIA REMAURO

Address: 2 EDGEWATER PLAZA RM 217 SFNY 10305

I represent: COMMUNITY BOARD 15F

Address: ADORE

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: 1-16-13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Christian Burgess

Address: 50 Broadway 19<sup>th</sup> Fl NY 10004

I represent: Mental Health Association of New York City

Address: 400 Ft. Washington Ave. 4D NY NY 10073

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/2013

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: BRYAN NORCROSS

Address: 300 INTERSTATE N PRAY

I represent: THE WEATHER CHANNEL

Address: ATLANTA GA 30339

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: JUDITH ARROYO

Address: LOCAL 436 125 BARCLAY ST. 10007

I represent: PUBLIC HEALTH NURSES + EPIDEMIOLOGISTS

Address: 125 BARCLAY ST.

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: Robert Boyer (PLEASE PRINT)  
Address: Chief of Communications  
I represent: FDNY  
Address: 9 Metropolitan Bklyn

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: Joel Berg (PLEASE PRINT)  
Address: 1. Plain Street West, Brooklyn  
I represent: New York City Coalition Against Hunger  
Address: 50 Broad Street NYC

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

[ ]

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: ALLAN FEINBLUM (PLEASE PRINT)  
Address: 1342 E 18th St Bklyn NY  
I represent: JAIL ACTION COALITION  
Address: 125 Williams St - (Urban Justice)  
16th Flr

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

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THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: PATRICIA M SMITH

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: Human Resources Administration

Address: 180 Water St 25th Fl NY NY

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Barbara Edmunds

Address: 125 Barclay St NY NY 10007

I represent: Director of Field Services, DC37

Address: (Representing Lillian Roberts, Exec. Dir, DC37)

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Judith Arroyo

Address: 125 Barclay Street, NY NY 10007

I represent: President, L436, DC37

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

◆ Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms ◆

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Alma Roper

Address: 125 Barclay St NY NY 10007

I represent: VP, L. 1549, DC37

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Ralph Palladino

Address: 125 Barclay Street NY NY 10007

I represent: 2<sup>nd</sup> VP, L. 1549, DC37

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Tracy Whitehead

Address: 125 Barclay Street, NY NY 10007

I represent: Vice-Chair PCT / SPCT, L. 1549, DC37

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: John Armstrong

Address: 125 Barclay Street, NY NY 10007

I represent: Chapter Chair PCT/SPCT Chapter, L1549,

Address: DC37

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Israel Miranda

Address: 125 Barclay Street, NY NY 10007

I represent: President, L12507, DC37

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1.16.13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: KATE MACKENZIE

Address: 301 DEGRAU, BR LYN

I represent: CITY HARVEST

Address: 6 E 32nd St NYC

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

on panel

# THE COUNCIL THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. 415 Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Claudette Duff

Address: 2381 Hylan Blvd ST 10303

I represent: Serving on Staten Island

Address: Advocate

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

on panel  
as per

# THE COUNCIL THE CITY OF NEW YORK

City Council  
Speaker Quinn

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Rev Terry Troia

Address: 100 Park Ave S 10302

I represent: SI Interfaith Disaster Response Network

Address: 100 Park Ave S 10302

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Name: PAUL FERR (PLEASE PRINT)

Address: 225 B'WAY

I represent: UFOA Sgnt AT ARMS

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

▶ Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms ◀

**THE COUNCIL  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. \_\_\_\_\_ Res. No. \_\_\_\_\_

in favor  in opposition

Date: 1/16/13

Name: Rev. Daniel Delgado (PLEASE PRINT)

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

I represent: Staten Island Recovery Task Force

Address: + Third Day Missions, Inc.

▶ Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms ◀