FOR THE RECORD

New York City Council Committee on Governmental Operations

April 27, 2017

Intro. 1130

Written Testimony of Henry Berger, Special Counsel to the Mayor

Good afternoon Chair Kallos and members of the Committee on Governmental Operations. The Campaign Finance Board, or CFB, is a *nonpartisan, independent* City agency overseen by five members, each of whom is appointed to a five-year term. The Mayor and Speaker of the City Council each appoint two members, and the Chairperson is chosen by the Mayor in consultation with the Speaker.

The CFB is responsible for administering the New York City Campaign Finance Program, which was established in 1988 by the New York City Campaign Finance Act. Under the City's Campaign Finance Program, one of the strongest in the country, candidates for Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Borough President, and City Council who meet certain requirements are eligible to receive public funding for their campaigns.

This highly successful program provides candidates with a strong incentive to finance their campaigns by engaging with average New Yorkers instead of seeking large contributions from special interest groups. The program empowers more candidates to run for office, even without access to wealth. Anyone can build a viable, competitive campaign for office by relying on small donations from neighbors or colleagues. The City's voluntary public financing program matches small-dollar contributions. Currently, participating candidates may qualify to receive public matching funds at a \$6-to-\$1 rate for contributions up to \$175 from individuals who reside in New York City.

For example, if a New York City resident makes a \$100 contribution to a participating candidate, it is actually worth \$700 to the candidate's campaign. The matching funds program helps to amplify the voices of New Yorkers in City elections. Candidates desiring public funding are subject to strict contribution and expenditure limitations, and extensive record-keeping and disclosure requirements. In the 2013 elections, more than 44,500 New Yorkers — half of all New York City contributors to participating candidates — made a contribution to a City candidate for the first time. Three-quarters of them made small contributions of \$175 or less. In the aftermath of *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, and other campaign finance decisions that have made it more difficult to regulate money in politics, advocates of campaign finance reform have turned to New York City as a model worth emulating in other cities and states.

The matching funds program has transformed municipal elections in this City. In addition to public matching, the finance program also caps each individual contribution at \$2,750 for City Council candidates, \$3,850 for Borough President Candidates and \$4,950 for city-wide candidates, and establishes spending limits for each office. The current law caps the maximum amount of public matching funds a candidate may receive at 55% of the spending limit for that office. So, for example, the spending limit for a City Council candidate in a primary during an election year is \$182,000. That means that a candidate could receive up to \$100,100 in public matching funds for his or her primary race.

This bill would remove the 55% cap on public matching funds so that a candidate could receive, between the small matchable contributions they have raised and public matching funds, 100% of the spending limit, or in the case of that same City Council candidate, \$182,000.

After nearly three decades of experience with the City's matching funds program, this bill starts an important discussion about how to reduce the influence of money in elections. This is one good step in that direction, and we look forward to further discussions with the Council.



# Testimony of Amy Loprest Executive Director New York City Campaign Finance Board

# City Council Committee on Governmental Operations April 27, 2017

Good afternoon to the chair, Council Member Kallos, and to the members of the committee. I am Amy Loprest, Executive Director of the New York City Campaign Finance Board. With me today is Eric Friedman, Assistant Executive Director for Public Affairs.

New York City's groundbreaking public matching funds system was established by Local Law 8 of 1988, the Campaign Finance Act. This year, we are preparing for the eighth mayoral election covered by the Campaign Finance Program. While national and state elections have long been dominated by big-money interests, New York City has shown that a common-sense program built to support cleaner, fairer elections can succeed and thrive.

This remains true because our system has adapted over time to meet the shifting challenges of our rapidly-evolving politics. This committee and this City Council have returned again and again to the work of ensuring that the system serves candidates and voters well. We sometimes approach the task from different perspectives, and we do not always agree on the challenges or the solutions, but we are all invested in the continued success of the Program.

In that spirit, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Intro 1130-A.

Intro 1130-A would increase the maximum amount of public matching funds available to candidates for city office. As such, it is useful to consider the significant benefits the public receives for its modest investment in the political process.

First, matching funds get more New Yorkers involved in local elections. By matching small-dollar contributions with public funds, the Program makes it possible for candidates to finance their campaigns by engaging with everyday New Yorkers. Candidates don't need access to wealth to compete; they can build strong campaigns by relying on support from their neighbors. As a result, more candidates can step forward to run for office, and more New Yorkers get involved in the process of electing our leaders.

Second, the system provides a safeguard against corruption. Raising campaign funds in large sums from big-dollar donors can give rise to the possibility of an unspoken bargain, or lead to the perception of favor-trading. By providing incentives for candidates to raise small-dollar contributions instead of depending on large contributions from special interests, public matching funds diminish the potential for corruption and deepen trust between elected officials and the people they serve.

Based on a review of our most recent citywide election—the first full four-year election cycle conducted under the \$6-to-\$1 matching rate—the Program is meeting these aims.

The overwhelming majority of contributions to candidates come from individuals. In the last citywide elections in 2013, more than 92 percent of all contributions to city candidates came from individuals; only 8 percent from unions, political committees, or other entities.

Most contributors are small-dollar contributors. In the 2013 elections, for most offices—including mayor and City Council—the most frequent individual contribution size was \$100. While it continues to be true that large contributions make up a majority of the funds raised by candidates, more than two-thirds of all New York City contributors gave \$175 or less.

The matching funds program encourages more New Yorkers to engage meaningfully in local elections. Two-thirds of all contributions came from New York City residents. In the 2013 elections, an estimated 44,500 New Yorkers made a contribution to a candidate for the first time. Of those, three-fourths gave \$175 or less.

Those contributions come from every part of the city. A 2012 study by the Brennan Center for Justice and the Campaign Finance Institute showed that small-dollar contributors to Council candidates were spread across nearly 90 percent of census blocks across the city. By contrast, small donors to Assembly candidates came from only 30 percent of the city's census blocks.

City elections are more competitive than elections for state office. Access to matching funds allows more candidates in more districts to run competitive campaigns, which means that more incumbents face challengers and must engage their constituents to win re-election. During the last citywide election, 75 percent of Council seats had contested primaries. By contrast, only 32 percent of State Assembly and Senate seats representing New York City had a contested primary in 2016.

Even as advocates around the country look to New York City's system as a model, there are still ways the system can be improved. Intro 1130-A seeks to further diminish the influence of large, private contributions and empower candidates who stick to small-dollar donations by increasing the amount of public matching funds available to candidates.

My testimony will address the anticipated impact of the proposed legislation, propose some alternatives, and discuss some important practical considerations.

To ensure that the cost of the Program is predictable, there is a limit on the public's investment in cleaner campaigns. As a result, campaigns are funded by a mix of public funds and private contributions. Candidates who join the Program agree to limits on their overall spending, and the Act caps their public funds payments at 55 percent of the spending limit.

The public funds ceiling was last increased nearly 20 years ago. Prior to Local Law 48 of 1998, public funds payments were capped at 50 percent of the spending limit—except for payments to candidates for City Council, which were capped at \$40,000, about a third of

the spending limit. Local Law 48 of 1998 transformed the Program into the multiple-match model we use today: it effectively increased the matching rate to \$4-to-\$1, lowered contribution limits across the board, and set the public funds cap to the current 55 percent of the spending limit for all offices.

Intro 1130-A would remove the 55 percent public funds cap and limit public funds payments to an amount equal to the spending limit, less the amount of matchable contributions received. Under the current \$6-to-\$1 matching rate, the bill would, in effect, set a public funds cap of 85 percent of the spending limit. The higher cap would expand the current matching funds program to make more resources available to candidates who forgo large contributions.

As noted, the most common contribution size is \$100. Under current law, it takes 167 valid matching claims of \$100 for a Council candidate to receive the maximum amount under the 2017 limits, \$100,100. Assuming that the candidate raised no other private contributions, his or her total budget would be \$116,800. The spending limit for Council candidates is \$182,000.

After "maxing out" the public funds, a candidate who raises contributions exactly \$100 at a time can build a campaign to reach the spending limit by raising another 652 contributions. If that's too difficult, a candidate who raises large contributions can achieve the same benchmark by collecting only 24 contributions at the maximum amount of \$2,750.

If Intro 1130-A were in effect this year, a Council candidate who raises exactly 260 contributions of \$100 would "max out" his or her public funds at \$156,000; that candidate would have exactly \$182,000 to spend.

Data from previous elections suggests that Intro 1130-A would have a significant impact in City Council elections. In the 2013 elections, 129 candidates for Council received public funds. Of those, nearly two-thirds—83 candidates—received a public funds payment within 10 percent of the maximum in either the primary election, the general election, or both. This suggests that a significant proportion of Council candidates would qualify for larger payments of public funds if the cap were raised.

However, the impact of Intro 1130-A is likely to be minimal in the context of citywide offices, where the most competitive candidates are traditionally more dependent on large contributions. In the four citywide elections conducted under the multiple-match program since 2001, only one candidate for citywide office has ever maxed out their public funds payment in any election. That candidate, former Council Speaker Christine Quinn, had an additional four-year cycle to raise contributions for her 2013 campaign for mayor. To the extent that Intro 1130-A would impact citywide races, it is likely to help only more established and organized candidates, who can develop more robust small-dollar fundraising operations.

As a result, our analysis suggests that Intro 1130-A would cause a moderate increase in costs associated with public funds paid to candidates. Based on the anticipated ability of Council candidates to access higher payments, we estimate the overall amount would grow by 17 to 20 percent across the entire system.

We share the aims of Intro 1130-A to further empower small-dollar donors and reduce candidates' reliance on large contributions. There are some alternative policy ideas that would effectively help more candidates succeed with campaigns built on small-dollar contributions.

Ease the threshold for citywide candidates. The matching funds system gets candidates on the playing field, providing them with a baseline amount of resources to communicate with voters and get their message out.

To qualify for public funds, candidates must meet a two-part fundraising threshold. Currently, the threshold for mayor is \$250,000 in matching claims (\$175 or less), with 1,000 contributors of at least \$10. Candidates for public advocate and comptroller must raise \$125,000, with 500 contributors.

Following the 2009 election, the Board recommended lowering the monetary threshold – requiring \$125,000 for mayor, and \$75,000 for the other citywide offices. This would

keep the requirement to demonstrate a broad base of support to qualify, while setting a bar that is more attainable and realistic for less-established candidates.

Making it easier to qualify for public funds would make it easier for small-dollar fundraisers to run viable, competitive campaigns for citywide office. A reduced, more rational threshold requirement for citywide candidates is consistent with the spirit of Intro 1130-A.

Lower the contribution limit. Though the vast majority of contributors give small amounts, concerns about the overall relative impact of large contributions in the system are not misplaced. Many candidates still receive more money from maxed-out contributors than from small-dollar donors. Candidates for citywide office can be especially dependent on large contributions, as the contribution limit is significantly higher.

Limiting the size of contributions is a straightforward and effective way to increase the value of small-dollar contributions relative to the largest donations. As noted earlier, the law that created the \$4-to-\$1 multiple matching system also lowered the contribution limits for city candidates. We suggest the Council consider lowering contribution limits for all offices—or alternately, lowering the limit for all offices to the same amount as City Council's.

Create an optional small-dollar path. Some new matching funds systems created around the nation over the last few years combine matching funds with low contribution limits. The result is a system where all candidates operate under a system that looks more like a full public funding program. For example, Montgomery County, Maryland, which will run its first elections under its new public matching system in 2018, limits contributions to \$150. The first \$50 of contributions are matched at a higher rate than subsequent contributions.

The Board proposed a similar system for Council candidates after the 2003 and 2005 elections, with a low contribution limit, a lower spending cap, and streamlined compliance requirements.

In theory, one option is to offer a higher matching rate for candidates who choose to raise only small-dollar contributions—establishing an even more attractive incentive for candidates to change their fundraising habits and choose this small-dollar path. An optional small-dollar path is an idea we have not yet considered in detail, but it may be worth studying further.

The goals of Intro 1130-A are the right ones. However, were Intro 1130-A to become law, the higher public funds cap could create some unexpected and undesired consequences for candidates that would undermine the bill's intent. We urge the Council to consider these issues as it continues to discuss this legislation.

Payment schedule. The Act sets the schedule of public funds payments to candidates. Local Law 168 of 2016, which will take effect after the 2017 election, modified the payment calendar to provide for a single capped payment as early as June to candidates who meet the threshold early. Otherwise, the Act prohibits payments of public funds to candidates who fail to make the ballot, or to candidates without opposition. These prohibitions are an essential protection against waste in the Program.

New York State Election Law requires that county boards of election determine the candidates on the ballot for elections within their jurisdiction no later than 35 days before an election.<sup>3</sup> As a result, most public funds payments are made only after the ballot has been finalized, within five weeks of the election. The first payment for the 2017 primary election is likely to be made as late as August 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The early payment is capped at \$10,000 for Council candidates, and goes up to \$250,000 for mayoral candidates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See §3-703(1); §3-703(5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See §4-114.

If Intro 1130-A becomes law, the payment schedule may put candidates who choose to raise only small, matchable contributions at a significant disadvantage. Candidates waiting for public matching funds payments that could comprise as much as 85 percent of their budgets must limit their spending through the petitioning period and the beginning of August, or raise a significant amount of additional private funds to conduct campaign activities while waiting for payment.

Raising additional funds could expose candidates receiving large public funds payments to significant repayment liabilities, as funds that are left over must be returned after the election.<sup>4</sup>

Qualified expenditures. As you are all aware, the Act contains detailed restrictions on the use of public funds, and CFB rules require that candidates receiving public funds demonstrate that public funds are used for *qualified* purposes.<sup>5</sup> Candidates who cannot provide documents that show that their public funds were used for qualified purposes are liable to repay funds to the city.<sup>6</sup>

The strict definition of qualified expenditures is an important control on the matching funds allocated to candidates through the Program, and the Board's review gives the public assurance that those funds are being used "to further the participating candidate's nomination for election or election," as the Act requires.

Certain spending items that are legitimate and lawful campaign expenditures are not qualified for public funds. These can include spending before January 1 of the election year, spending related to ballot litigation, spending in cash, payments to family members, spending related to the holding of public office, and post-election spending.

Near-maximum payments of public funds under Intro 1130-A would dramatically limit the ability of candidates to spend in these categories. Candidates who start their campaign early or who are forced to defend their ballot petitions in court may be required to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See §3-710(2)(c).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See §3-704; CFB Rule 4-01(a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See CFB Rule 5-03(d).

demonstrate that practically all their remaining funds were spent on qualified purposes or repay significant amounts of public funds.

**Public funds limit formulation.** As drafted, the bill amends §3-705(2)(b) to limit public funds payments at an amount equal to the spending limit, less the amount of matchable contributions received.

Conceptually, this would help ensure that the cap will automatically adjust if the matching rate is modified again in the future. In practice, this formulation creates significant challenges for the administration of the Program.

For instance, §3-705(7) limits payments to candidates with only nominal opposition to "one quarter of the maximum public funds payment otherwise applicable." As drafted, Intro 1130-A would subvert this provision, providing higher payments to candidates with smaller amounts of matchable contributions.

We urge the Council to amend this bill to make the public funds cap a fixed percentage of the spending limit.

To close, I would like to reiterate that the partnership we've had with the City Council has helped make the Program a national model. Many of our proposals to improve the Program over the years have been received and acted on by this body. We've collaborated many times to refine ideas proposed by City Council members, and we appreciate the opportunity to testify and provide our feedback on this legislation.

We are happy to take your questions.



# Testimony on Int. No. 1130-A Full public match for small campaign contributions

# New York City Council Committee on Governmental Operations April 28, 2017

Good afternoon Chair Kallos and members of the Governmental Operations committee. My name is Alex Camarda, and I am the Senior Policy Consultant for Reinvent Albany. Reinvent Albany works for open, accountable New York State government and transparent New York City government. Thank you for the opportunity to share our views on Int. No. 1130 today.

Reinvent Albany supports this legislation and its goal of encouraging more small donations from a broader part of the public. We believe the legislation correctly recognizes the shift in campaign finance regulation over the last 15 years from restricting large campaign contributions to incentivizing small donations as a result of legal decisions culminating in the Citizens United ruling. The movement of money to outside groups and committees has changed campaign finance regulation and made it far more difficult for New York City to effectively limit the size and influence of large contributions.

The goal of the New York City campaign finance system is to create an even playing field, and to reduce the perceived or actual influence of a small number of wealthy contributors. Int. No. 1130-A will help do this by lifting the public funds cap beginning in 2018, allowing candidates to fundraise by relying more on large numbers of typical New Yorkers making publicly matched small donations. Candidates will also be able to compete more effectively should they face unlimited spending funded by a small number of wealthy interests.

Under current New York City law, candidates receive a 6:1 match in public dollars for every contribution up to \$175. However, the total amount of public matching funds is capped regardless of how many small donations candidates raise. The public matching cap is currently 55 percent of the campaign spending limit for the office imposed on candidates who receive public matching funds when they voluntarily opt into the

system. For the 2017 elections, the spending limit for City Council races is \$182,000 and the public funds cap is \$100,100; for Borough President \$1.5 million and \$862,950; public advocate and comptroller, \$4.3 million and 2.4 million; and mayor \$6.9 million and 3.8 million. These caps apply to each election, the primary and/or general election, but are different for run-off elections. While these caps are for this year's elections the public funds and spending caps were lower in past election cycles.

As shown on the charts below and on the next page, most of the funds raised for the mayor's race in 2013 were from private funds. While some may interpret that as indicating the current public match cap is not restricting small dollar fundraising, we believe it points to the need to incentivize more small dollar fundraising as part of a larger campaign finance strategy.¹ In the Democratic primary, just 26.79% of the money came from public matching funds.² Christine Quinn was the only candidate who reached the public funds cap. John Catsimatidis did not participate in the public matching program in the Republican primary, but public funds were critical to the campaign of Joe Lhota, both in the primary and general election for mayor. In the general election for mayor, public funds represented just 12.97% of campaign funds raised. In total, \$15 million of \$63 million raised for the mayor's race were public funds, or 23.81%. Further analysis done by Chair Kallos' Office reveals that nearly half the funds raised for the mayor's race were from donations of \$4,950, the maximum contribution. Just 5 percent were in small donations, \$175 or less, the threshold eligible for a public match.

# 2013 Democratic Primary Election for Mayor

Candidate	Private Funds	Public Funds
Bill de Blasio	\$4,926,756	\$2,903,840
John Liu	\$3,538,007	\$0
Christine Quinn	\$8,019,471	\$3,534,300
Bill Thompson	\$4,773,122	\$1,852,446

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Data for all the charts in this testimony is pulled from Section 1 of the very excellent New York City Campaign Finance Board, 2013 Post-Election Report which is very deserving of a thorough read. See: http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2013\_PER/2013\_PER.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> John Liu sought to participate in the public matching program but did not meet the requirements to participate in the program, as determined by the CFB. This likely resulted in a lower reliance on public funds by as much as \$3.5 million See:

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/john-liu-mayoral-campaign-denied-millions-dollars-public-funding-article-1.1417841

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Anthony Weiner	\$5,916,192	\$1,652,074
TOTAL	\$27,173,548	\$9,942,660

## 2013 Republican Primary Election for Mayor

Candidate	Private Funds	Public Funds	
John Catsimatidis	\$10,787,074	Did not participate in the public matching program	
Joe Lhota	\$2,255,895	\$1,943,076	
TOTAL	\$13,042,969	\$1,943,076	

# 2013 General Election for Mayor

Candidate	Private Funds	Public Funds	
Bill de Blasio	\$5,738,019	\$1,237,448	
Joe Lhota	\$2,255,895	\$1,943,076	
TOTAL	\$7,993,914	\$3,180,524	

In the Democratic primaries for Public Advocate and Comptroller, a total of \$19.6 million was raised by all major candidates in private funds, while \$6.9 million was allocated in public funds, or only 26.16% of the total. However, public funds for Dan Squadron, Tish James, and Reshma Saujani were larger than private funds each candidate raised in the primary, and for Squadron and James in the run-off election, with Squadron coming very close to approaching the public funds cap for the primary election.

For the Borough President's Democratic primary race in Manhattan, every major candidate came within \$25,000 of hitting the public match cap of \$795,300, with Robert Jackson reaching the cap and Julie Menin falling short by \$130. In the Borough President Democratic primary race in Queens, private funds represented 43.87% of total funds but no candidates came close to reaching the public funds cap.

A review of City Council races shows a greater reliance on raising small dollar donations by candidates, and the public match cap in 2013 was much more likely to be reached than for citywide or borough president races. Council candidates raised a grand total of \$13,814,785 in private funds and received \$10,764,984 in public funds during the 2013 election cycle, or 43.8% of funds raised. Reinvent Albany identified that of the 168 candidates running for City Council in 2013, 51 candidates reached the public matching funds cap of \$92,400 in the primary election (30 percent of candidates) and 15 candidates hit the cap in the general election.<sup>3</sup>

What does this data show us?

Reinvent Albany believes it reveals the City should further encourage candidates for citywide offices and borough president to raise small donations to balance the reliance on and influence of large contributions. For City Council contests, lifting the public matching cap would alleviate the fact that a significant number of candidates are reaching the cap, while bolstering the existing practices of many Council candidates to pursue small donations.

The Council and CFB should consider as a complement to this legislation in the coming year raising or lifting the spending cap for city offices to further encourage participation in the public matching system and enable candidates to compete with outside spending.

Lastly, on a technical note, the Council should consider amending section 2 of the bill because it amends subparagraph iii of subdivision 3 of section 3-706 of Chapter 7 of Title 3 of the City's Administrative Code. Subdivision 3 may be unconstitutional at least in part as a result of *Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett* because it appears to provide bonus public matching funds when a non-participating candidate has raised or spends more than 50 percent of the office spending limit. It should be reworked so the expenditure limit relief remains intact while the bonus matching public funds provisions are removed.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this legislation.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 3}$  NYC Campaign Finance Board, Data Library, Public Matching Fund Payments, 2013. See: http://www.nyccfb.info/follow-the-money/data-library/

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### **Testimony of Brent Ferguson**

#### Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law

#### Submitted to the New York City Council Committee on Governmental Operations

## April 27, 2017 Hearing

On behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss Introduction 1130-A before the Committee on Governmental Operations today. The Brennan Center supports this proposal, which will raise the limit on public funds distributed to city candidates. The bill will allow candidates to rely entirely on small contributions and public financing when running for office, and hopefully the change will provide an incentive for candidates to raise fewer large, private contributions. We also suggest consideration of additional reforms to the public financing program that would require citywide candidates to raise more small contributions and further increase the likelihood that all candidates focus on soliciting contributions from small donors. These suggested reforms include lowering contribution limits for citywide offices, adopting geographic fundraising requirements for citywide candidates, and providing enhanced matching for candidates who rely more heavily on small contributions.

### New York City's Matching Program

New York City's matching program has been a success because it allows candidates who are unable or unwilling to raise large contributions to fund their campaigns principally through small donations and public financing. Participating candidates are therefore less dependent on large, special interest donors that will inevitably ask for favors after the election is over. They are also more likely to raise money from lower-income donors from parts of the city that are often overlooked by political candidates and campaigns. And because most candidates participate in the system and the Campaign Finance Board (CFB) is willing to enforce the law diligently, the matching program serves as a model for other cities and states considering ways to reform their elections.

Yet there is room for improvement in the city's system. Despite high participation in the program, some candidates — especially candidates for mayor — still raise a significant portion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Elisabeth Genn, Michael J. Malbin, Sundeep Iyer, & Brendan Glavin, BRENNAN CTR FOR JUSTICE & CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., Donor Diversity Through Public Matching Funds 4 (2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/DonorDiversityReport WEB.PDF.

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of their money from high-dollar contributors. Research by the Campaign Finance Institute shows that in the 2013 election, 75% of mayoral candidates' campaign money came from donors that gave \$250 or more. When participating candidates raise so much of their money from those who can afford to give many hundreds or thousands of dollars, it can create a risk of corruption and its appearance. Further, candidates who know they can depend on contributions of \$4,950 from a smaller group of wealthy backers may be less likely to seek smaller contributions or meet constituents from low-income areas of the city that have fewer residents able to write big checks.

#### Support for Int. 1130-A and Suggestions for Additional Reform

For the reasons above, the Brennan Center supports Int. 1130-A because it would encourage candidates to raise more money through matchable, small contributions. This may become even more important in future elections, as spending from outside groups such as super PACs rises. More candidates may need to raise and spend money in an effort to compete with groups whose spending cannot be limited.

While the goal of increasing public funding available to candidates is laudable, the Council should explore with the CFB how Int. 1130-A could be written and implemented in a way to maximize efficiency of administration. Under certain circumstances, the bill would result in candidates raising more money than the spending limit. This is because the bill directs the CFB to provide full public financing "less the amount of matchable contributions received" — thus, any *non*-matchable contribution received by a candidate would not be included when the CFB calculates the amount of funds to be disbursed to a candidate, which could cause the total amount raised by the candidate to exceed the spending limit. This problem might be solved by adding language directing the Board not to provide public financing if a candidate's combined fundraising totals exceed the spending limit. Consulting with the CFB would help determine how best to address the issue.

In addition to passing Int. 1130-A, the Council should consider additional reforms to the city's system. While increasing the amount of available public funds is a positive step, it does not require candidates to change their fundraising habits. Therefore, there is some likelihood that candidates will continue to raise contributions at or close to the maximum allowed under the contribution limits: \$4,950 for citywide candidates, \$3,850 for borough president, and \$2,750 for member of the city council. Because candidates for mayor still rely heavily on large contributions, 4 the Council should consider a moderate reduction in the contribution limits for citywide candidates to reduce their reliance on large contributions and encourage them to raise more money from small contributors.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Michael J. Malbin & Michael Parrott, *How Policy Details Can Affect Major Outcomes: Comparing Small Donor Matching Funds in New York and Los Angeles* 18 (Campaign Fin. Inst., Working Paper, 2016), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/malbin\_comparing\_small\_donor\_matching\_funds\_in\_ne w york and los angeles.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The CFB explained that in the 2013 election, "independent expenditures grew well beyond anyone's expectations," reaching almost \$16 million. See N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Board, 2013 Post-Election Report 72 (2014), http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2013\_PER/2013\_PER.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Malbin & Parrot, supra note 2 at 18.

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Another way to decrease citywide candidates' reliance on large contributions is to introduce geographic requirements for fundraising, such that candidates could not rely solely on large contributions from wealthy residents of Manhattan. This could be achieved in several ways including (1) requiring that a certain amount of a candidate's contributions came from each borough; or (2) requiring that qualifying contributions be raised from a minimum number of city council districts. These are just two examples of methods to encourage candidates to vary their fundraising practices and seek contributions from diverse sources. If the Council pursues a geographic fundraising requirement, the Brennan Center is willing to assist by analyzing the effects of a proposal to ensure that it would accomplish its goals without discouraging candidates from entering the matching program.

Finally, the Council could encourage small contributions by increasing the matching amount for very small contributions or by providing higher matches to candidates who agree only to accept contributions at or below the matchable contribution limit. For example, in the Government by the People Act, introduced by Rep. John Sarbanes (D-MD), candidates who agree not to accept contributions exceeding \$150 receive a 9-to-1 match on eligible contributions. A system like this would provide an incentive for candidates to avoid large-dollar contributions and focus on the small contributions that should be central to the city's publicly-financed candidates.

\* \* \*

New York City's matching program should be commended for its success in encouraging candidates to participate, agree to spending limits, and focus on small donors and public financing. Yet this bill recognizes that some candidates are able use the system successfully while still raising much of their money from larger donors. Thus, the Brennan Center supports Int. 1130-A because of its potential to engender greater reliance on small donors and public money. However, because it is not yet clear how strong that incentive will be, the Council should consider additional reforms to help advance the program's goals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> H.R. 20, 115th Cong. § 501(b)(2) (2017).



## Testimony of Emmanuel Caicedo Senior Campaign Strategist, Demos Before the Committee on Governmental Operations, New York City Council Thursday April 27, 2017

#### Introduction

My name is Emmanuel Caicedo and I am a Senior Campaign Strategist with Demos, a New York-based public policy organization working for an America where we all have an equal say in our democracy and an equal chance in our economy.

I would like to thank the members of the Committee on Governmental Operations for the opportunity to speak today. I am delighted to testify today in favor of Introduction 1130-A, legislation introduced by Council Members Kallos, Lander, and Cabrera. Int. 1130-A increases the public matching funds available in New York City's trailblazing small donor matching program, making an effective and important system even better. Passing this legislation will ensure that New York stays a leader in addressing the power of big money in politics for years to come.

In my testimony I will briefly review the problem of big money in politics, New York City's leadership in addressing this critical challenge, how Int. 1130-A builds upon this leadership, and make a couple of suggestions for further improving the City's system.

## The Power of Big Money

As the Members of the City Council are well aware, big money has long played an outsized role in American politics. In federal, state, and local elections across the country large donors determine who is able to run for office, who wins elections, and what issues get attention from elected officials.<sup>1</sup>

This is not preordained, but rather the result of a combination of legislative inaction in many places and a challenging legal-constitutional landscape. Four decades of flawed Supreme Court rulings have gutted a series of common-sense protections

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Adam Lioz, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Rescuing Our Democracy and Our Economy By Transforming the Supreme Court's Flawed Approach to Money in Politics, DEMOS (2015), http://www.demos.org/publication/breaking-vicious-cycle-rescuing-our-democracy-and-our-

against big money, leaving lawmakers with few tools with which to combat the problem.  $\!\!^2$ 

The outsized role of money is most obvious at the federal level where the scale of spending is greatest. Just 25 people pumped more than \$600 million into last year's national elections through political action committees, Super PACs, and direct contributions to candidates and parties.<sup>3</sup> Less than 1 percent of the population provides the majority of the funds that fuel these contests.<sup>4</sup>

But, the role of money is a critical issue at the state and local levels as well. Michael Bloomberg spent more than \$250 million to become and stay mayor of New York City.<sup>5</sup> This spending was shielded from any possible limit by a 1976 Supreme Court case that eliminated federal caps on the amount wealthy candidates can spend on their own campaigns.<sup>6</sup> And in the wake of *Citizens United*, outside spending groups poured more than \$3 million in the 2013 mayoral race in New York.<sup>7</sup>

These big donors and spenders aren't reflective of the country—they're wealthier, obviously, but they are also less likely to be women or people of color, and they have starkly different priorities when it comes to core public policies such as fair wages or debt free college.<sup>8</sup>

Studies show that candidates of color are less likely to run for office due to the money barrier and raise substantially less amounts than white candidates when they do.<sup>9</sup> This is a key reason 90 percent of elected officials across the country are white—despite the fact that nearly 40 percent of Americans are people of color.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> *Id.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> "Top Individual Contributors: All Federal Contributions," CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (visited Mar. 21, 2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "Donor Demographics," CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (visited Mar. 21, 2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Michael Barbaro & David W. Chen, "Bloomberg Sets Record for His Own Spending on Elections," New York Times (Oct. 23, 2009), <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/nyregion/24mayor.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/nyregion/24mayor.html</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Adam Lioz, *Buckley v. Valeo at 40*, DEMOS (2015), <a href="http://www.demos.org/publication/buckley-v-valeo-40">http://www.demos.org/publication/buckley-v-valeo-40</a>.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> David W. Chen, "Outside Groups Have Spent \$3 Million on Mayor's Race," New York TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/nyregion/outside-groups-have-spent-3-million-on-mayors-race.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/nyregion/outside-groups-have-spent-3-million-on-mayors-race.html</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Sean McElwee, <u>Whose Voice, Whose Choice? The Distorting Influence of the Political Donor Class in Our Big-Money Elections</u>, DEMOS (December 2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Adam Lioz, <u>Stacked Deck: How the Racial Bias In Our Big Money Political System Undermines Our Democracy And Our Economy</u>, DEMOS 27-29 (December 2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Who Leads Us?, Women Donors Network (visited Mar. 21, 2017).

Figure 13. Candidates of color raise 47% less than white candidates overall, and 64% less than white candidates in the South (in 2006 state legislative races)



The result is that the deck is stacked, as Demos has shown in a series of reports with that name.<sup>11</sup> Our public policies are skewed towards top donors' preferences, and away from working families and people of color as a whole.

Princeton political scientist Martin Gilens has demonstrated that when the preferences of the wealthiest 10 percent of Americans conflict with those of the rest of the population, the 10 percent trumps the 90 percent. He concluded that "under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the government does or doesn't adopt" and that "patterns of responsiveness…often correspond more closely to a plutocracy than to a democracy." <sup>13</sup>

This combination of disparate preferences and differential responsiveness creates a vicious cycle: the wealthy translate their economic might into political power; this allows them to write rules for our economy that keep them on top while working families struggle to stay afloat; which in turn allows the wealthiest few to pump even more money into politics each year. Each turn of this vicious cycle takes our democracy ever farther from the vision of political equality embodied in the principle of one person, one vote.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> David Callahan & J. Mijin Cha, <u>Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of Politics by the Affluent & Business Undermines Economic Mobility in America</u>, DEMOS (February 2013); Adam Lioz, <u>Stacked Deck: How the Racial Bias in Our Big Money Political System Undermines Our Democracy and Our Economy</u>, DEMOS (December 2014).

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 12}$  Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (2012) at 83-84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 1; *Id.* at 234.

# New York City's Leadership in Fighting Big Money

With so many common-sense protections against big money taken off the table, providing public funds for election campaigns is currently the best way to reduce candidates' dependence on large donors and spenders.

New York City has been a leader in this area for decades, establishing the Campaign Finance Board and a pioneering public matching funds program in 1988. Ten years later, the City increased the matching ratio from one-to-one to four-to-one, and in 2007 this Council increased the match again to its current six-to-one ratio.

The program has sustained a high rate of participation, and research suggests that it has been successful at diversifying the donor pool in City races. And, the program has almost certainly contributed to the substantial racial diversity on the City Council. New York City and Los Angeles (which has a four-to-one matching program) have both had city councils that are even more diverse than their city populations. Don't have been successful at diversity and Los Angeles (which has a four-to-one matching program) have both had city councils that are even more diverse than their city populations.

The matching program fights the corruption and inequality inherent in big money politics in two essential ways. First, it reduces the fundraising barrier to entry, enabling candidates to raise sufficient funds to compete with big spenders without needing an extensive network of wealthy donors. Next, it shifts the incentives for sitting officeholders and other candidates away from focusing their outreach and attention exclusively on those who can afford to write large checks. The result is that the City Council is both more representative of and more accountable to the broad range of City residents than it would be without this essential program.

# How Int. 1130A Builds Upon This Leadership

Since New York created its matching program several localities have acted to empower small donors. The trend has picked up in recent years with innovative programs passed in Seattle, Washington and Montgomery County, Maryland; and programs under serious consideration in Miami-Dade County, Washington, DC, and other jurisdictions. New York must continue to improve its program to stay ahead of the curve.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See "History of the CFB," New York CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, <a href="http://www.nyccfb.info/about/history">http://www.nyccfb.info/about/history</a>.

<sup>15</sup> Id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See "Impact of Public Funds," New York City Campaign Finance Board, <a href="http://www.nyccfb.info/program/impact-of-public-funds/">http://www.nyccfb.info/program/impact-of-public-funds/</a>; Adam Lioz, Stacked Deck: How the Racial Bias in Our Big Money Political System Undermines Our Democracy and Our Economy, Demos (2014) at 22-23.

 $<sup>^{17}</sup>$  Designing Public Financing Systems to Advance Equity and Independent Political Power, DEMOS (2016).

Introduction 1130-A builds upon this historic leadership by allowing New York City candidates to run campaigns that are entirely driven by small donors, without the need to depend upon larger checks.

While innovative and successful, New York City's system is not perfect. One shortcoming is that public matching funds are capped at 55 percent of a participating candidate's total spending limit. This means that candidates must raise the other 45 percent from private funds. Some of this is accounted for through the small-dollar funds they raise to qualify for the public match—but much of it can be raised in contributions up to the current limit of \$4,950 for mayoral races and \$2,750 for city council races. This cuts against the program's biggest strength—incentivizing candidates to seek out and depend upon small contributions from constituents they might not otherwise prioritize. And, it provides a competitive advantage to candidates with access to networks of large donors.

By eliminating the 55 percent cap on public matching grants, Int. 1130-A allows and incentivizes candidates to run campaigns entirely focused on and funded by small donors. This is a natural step in the evolution of a program that has become more and more effective at fighting corruption and democratizing the influence of money on City politics.

Though this will add some cost to the program, this money is well spent since it directly serves the program's mission of fighting corruption and creating a municipal government that is directly accountable to all New York City residents regardless of wealth. Further, the overall program costs are insignificant in the context of the City's budget. Since 2005, the matching program has distributed \$89.3 million, for an average of \$30.0 million per election cycle or \$7.4 million per year. This is less than one hundredth of one percent of New York City's annual \$80 billion-plus budget. <sup>21</sup>

Even at an increased cost, the program remains an incredible bargain for the people of New York City—for far less than one percent of the City's budget, the public gets a substantially more accountable government and saves money by avoiding the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See "How it Works," NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, http://www.nyccfb.info/program/how-it-works/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See "Limits and Thresholds," NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, http://www.nyccfb.info/candidate-services/limits-thresholds/2017/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See "Impact of Public Funds," NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, <a href="http://www.nyccfb.info/program/impact-of-public-funds/">http://www.nyccfb.info/program/impact-of-public-funds/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Fact Sheet: Mayor De Blasio Releases FY 2017 Executive Budget, <a href="http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/396-16/fact-sheet-mayor-de-blasio-releases-fy-2017-executive-budget#/0.">http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/396-16/fact-sheet-mayor-de-blasio-releases-fy-2017-executive-budget#/0.</a>

countless special interest giveaways endemic to systems funded primarily with large private contributions.

## Suggestions for Further Improvements to the System

Beyond the current legislation, Demos recommends this Council consider two specific further improvements to the City's public matching system.

First, we urge you to consider lowering contribution limits—not just for candidates who choose to participate in the matching program, but for all candidates across the board. Only a tiny fraction of City residents can afford to make \$4,950, \$2,750, or event \$1,000 contributions to candidates for City office—and evidence shows that the diversity of the donor pool drops sharply as the size of contributions increases. This means that allowing large contributions tilts the system towards the preferences of the wealthy, white donor class. Contributions this large are not necessary for running an effective campaign for City office, especially with the City's robust matching fund system. <sup>23</sup>

Especially after passing Int. 1130-A, there is no good policy reason why candidates benefiting from public funds should be permitted to accept contributions that are much larger than most New Yorkers can afford to give. Lowering contribution limits across the board, however, is even stronger policy because it preserves the incentives to participate in the matching program.

Next, we urge you to consider matching *only* small contributions rather than the first \$175 of a larger contribution. The current system encourages candidates to reach out to constituents they might not otherwise prioritize absent a match, but still maintains the incentive to seek the largest possible contributions.

Currently, a \$1,500 contribution (which only a small fraction of New Yorkers are able to make) is worth \$2,550 to a candidate participating in the matching program, whereas a \$175 contribution is worth only \$1,225. The larger contribution is worth more than twice as much and a rational will spend significantly more time pursuing it. Matching only small contributions, however, can change the incentives dramatically. In this scenario, a \$1,500 contribution would be worth only \$275 more than a \$175 contribution (\$1,500 versus \$1,225). It makes more sense for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See e.g. Adam Lioz, Stacked Deck: How the Racial Bias in Our Big Money Political System Undermines Our Democracy and Our Economy, DEMOS (2014) at 22-23; Sean McElwee, Whose Voice, Whose Choice? The Distorting Influence of the Political Donor Class in Our Big-Money Elections, DEMOS (2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Even without a public financing program, candidates could run effective campaigns under much lower contribution limits. Colorado, for example, limits candidates for statewide office to contributions of \$575. State Limits on Contributions to Candidates: 2015-2016 Election Cycle, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/elect/ContributionLimitstoCandidates2015-2016.pdf$ 

candidates to spend time pursuing small contributions from a wider base of donors. The leading federal public matching funds legislation takes this approach.  $^{24}$ 

#### Conclusion

We are pleased to support Int. 1130-A and urge the Council to pass this important legislation to continue New York City's leadership on reducing the power of big money in politics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Adam Lioz, *The Government By the People Act*, DEMOS (2014), http://www.demos.org/publication/government-people-act.



# Testimony Susan Lerner, Executive Director of Common Cause New York Before the New York City Council Governmental Operations Committee In Support of Int. 1130-A April 27, 2017

On behalf of Common Cause New York, I appreciate this opportunity to share our views on Int. 1130-A, which would allow participants in New York City's well-regarded public matching fund system to lift the cap on matchable contributions for participating New York City candidates so that the combined total of private matchable contributions and matching funds is equal to the amount which candidates can spend.

I am Susan Lerner, Executive Director of Common Cause/New York. Common Cause fights to strengthen public participation and faith in our institutions of self-government and to ensure that government and political processes serve the general interest, and not simply the special interests. For nearly 50 years, we have worked at both the state and municipal level to bring about honest, open and accountable government. We have been a long-standing advocate for innovative campaign finance and ethics laws in New York, as well as throughout the country. Common Cause is a leading supporter of comprehensive campaign finance reforms and public funding of elections throughout the country. We have been involved in helping craft, ultimately pass and help implement virtually all of the public funding of election systems that are functioning at the state and national level, as well as numerous municipal level systems.

As we simultaneously work to reduce the role of unchecked super PACs and corporate special interest spending, we must also support small donors, who continue to have a diminished role in the political process. At the federal level, small donors (those defined as giving less than \$200) contributed slightly more than one-third of aggregate political money in the 2016 cycle, a modest increase over the ratio of small donors in 2014, according to an analysis by Common Cause. Furthermore, donors in the 2016 federal election cycle giving \$200+ consist of just 0.52 per cent of the U.S. adult population. These figures contrast starkly with the experience under New York City's campaign finance system of small dollar matching funds. As you well know, in 2013, more than two-thirds of New York City residents who made campaign contributions contributed in amounts of \$175 or less. Nevertheless, more can be done to further incentivize small donors under the City system.

The initial impetus for the New York City system was to fight corruption and help limit the influence of large private donors on public policy. As the founding Executive Director of the Campaign Finance Board, Nicole Gordon, wrote in a 1991 law review article:

"By instituting a campaign finance reform program in New York City, we are attempting to close the gap between the idealism that promotes reform and the actual practicality of implementing administrative mechanisms to diminish the influence of money on campaigns."



Gordon, N. & Wagner, H.P, <u>The New York City Campaign Finance Program: A Reform That Is</u> <u>Working</u>, Fordham Urban Law journal 19(3): 607 (1991).

Nevertheless, as currently configured, the New York City system has a gap of nearly one third between the total amount which participating candidates may permissibly spend and the amount of the public matching grant. In the case of the mayor's race, the gap is \$2.5 million. Council candidates face a gap of more than \$65,000. The City's campaign finance limits are currently \$2,750 for all Council candidates, \$3850 for all borough president candidates, and \$4,950 for all candidates for citywide office. The effect of the gap between the public matching grant and the spending limit is to put pressure on candidates to "fill the gap" with larger dollar contributions. One of the salutary strengths and achievements of the New York City system is to empower first time candidates, candidates of color and women. It is those candidates, many of whom do not have existing conne4ctions to donors who can write the larger checks, who may be disadvantaged under the current "gap" system.

A major strength of the New York City campaign finance system, and, we believe, a key to its continued success, is the continued evolution and improvement of the system. Where systems in other cities adopted around the time New York City set up its campaign finance system were not continually evaluated and improved, as New York City's system has been, they fell into disuse. The history of our system on the Campaign Finance Board website shows 18 changes to the campaign finance law adopted between 1988 and 2014. Further modifications to the system were adopted recently.

We believe that Int. 1130-A continues our City's commendable practice of evaluating and improving the campaign finance system. By allowing candidates to raise matchable funds up to the expenditure limit it furthers our City's public policy goal of diminishing the influence of money on campaigns, and, we argue, on public policy, as well as further empowers candidates of color, women and first time candidates. It allows candidates to rely entirely on small dollar contributions, thus fostering even greater public participation in our election system. It simplifies the system and makes it easier for the public and candidates to understand.

Common Cause/NY hopes that the passage of Int. 1130-A will be the first of several improvements to the system to strengthen it and further its goals, including lowering campaign contribution limits and increasing the amount of the match.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We note that the contribution limits for borough president and citywide offices are higher than the current federal contribution limit of \$2,700.

# FOR THE RECORD ? THE RECORD



## <u>Testimony to the Committee on Government Operations of the New York City Council</u>

Brandon West Vice President of Policy April 27th 2017

Thank you to Chair Kallos and members of the Committee for the opportunity to submit testimony regarding pending legislation related to campaign finance reform in New York City.

New Kings Democrats (NKD) is a progressive, grassroots political club committed to increasing transparency, accountability, and inclusionary democracy to the Kings County Democratic Party. To those ends, we strive to prioritize issues and advance policies that shape the conversation around local progressive politics and good government for all of New York City's residents.

As good government groups discuss the parts of our government that we can improve, one of the most important, and usually the first issue to come up in conversation, is the way we elect our public officials. Far too often, the refrain of the "three men in the room" explains away why a specific reform or idea does not get considered and instead dies in obscurity. Currently, our City is a leader in campaign finance, and after Local Law 8's creation of publicly financed campaigns in 1988, we have seen a more representative Council represent New Yorkers. Our campaign finance system decreases the barrier to entry for those who may be great leaders in their community, but don't have the financial resources to easily run a campaign. This fact only becomes more important as the median campaign expenditures of elections continue to increase in this country. New York City must continue to lead and be an example to the region, where Albany repeatedly falls short in enacting reforms.

We believe that one of the strongest components of our campaign finance system is the matching of small contributions. It encourages a candidate to prioritize broad contact, and to reach out and optimize their access to public funds by getting in contact with more people. This process will bring the potential candidate across a more representative subset of New Yorkers. In 2011, the Campaign Finance Institute published a report stating that our matching funds program is a model for the nation, and for states across the country.

Despite being a partisan political club, NKD is committed to advocating for ways to make government work better for all voters. We believe that encouraging an election process that is more open, and accessible to diverse communities will lead to better legislators, and in turn, legislation that is more reflective of "good government." We support Intro 1130 and the act of removing the current cap on matching funds available to candidates participating in the public

financing program. This will allow a candidate to receive matching funds equal to the full expenditure limit for that office, minus the amount of matching contributions raised, instead of the current 55% restriction. We hope this reform will continue to encourage robust local elections, when often across our state, elections are but a formality, and voter excitement and participation is at an all time low.

In September 2016, NKD adopted a policy position advocating for expanded access to voting rights for New Yorkers. This position focused on expanding voting access in New York state and New York City — particularly to those historically disenfranchised and underrepresented in the electorate. We would be happy to discuss these reforms with City Council, which included full online voter registration; automatic registration; same day enrollment; lowering the voting age to 16; noncitizen voting in municipal elections; an ability to correct registration errors at the polls; and full voting rights for those previously convicted of a felony, those awaiting trial, and those currently serving a sentence. We know these reforms will take a lot of work at the state and local level, but we urge the Council to consider them and work to make it easer to participate in our elections as well.

We thank you again for this opportunity and are open to discuss our reform ideas in detail at any opportunity.

# FOR THE RECORD

# **TESTIMONY**

# ON

Supporting increasing the amount of public funds available for local elections

## PRESENTED BEFORE:

THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL Committee on Governmental Operations

# PRESENTED BY:

Harvey Epstein

Community Development Project at the URBAN JUSTICE CENTER

April 27, 2017

Good afternoon. My name Harvey Epstein and I am the Associate Director and Director of Community Development at the Urban Justice Center. Thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. Thank you Chair Councilmember Kallos for introducing such an important piece of legislation.

The Urban Justice Center serves New York City's most vulnerable residents through a combination of direct legal service, systemic advocacy, community education and political organizing. I am providing this testimony on behalf of the Community Development Project at the Urban Justice Center, which formed in September 2001 to strengthen the impact of grassroots organizations in New York City's low-income and other excluded communities by winning legal cases, publishing community-driven research reports, assisting with the formation of new organizations, and providing technical and transactional assistance in support of their work towards social justice. CDP's work is informed by the belief that real and lasting change in low-income, urban neighborhoods is often rooted in the empowerment of grassroots, community institutions.

I am here today to speak in support of Introduction 1130-A. I am delighted to have been asked to testify on this important legislation. The public matching funds is great policy that allows new candidates to be on the same playing field as political insiders and incumbents. Increasing the matching funds to 100% will allow the program to be even stronger. While New York City is a national leader in matching fund programs, this legislation allows New York to open up elections to larger portion of the New York City population.

Fully funded local elections will allow for community leaders and organizers to be able to run for office. This will bring unprecedented class and racial diversity to the City Council. Imagine a City Council made up of tenant association presidents, PTA presidents, and block association captains. Imagine the level community investment they would propose and fight for.

Public matching funds also keep the special interests and conflicts of interest in check. Big money interests including Wall Street and Real Estate seek interests seek to influence city elected officials. The matching funds program, run by the New York City Campaign Finance Board creates access for regular New Yorkers who are not connected to millionaires and Billionaires to be able to run competitive elections. Private campaign financing sanctions these powerful interests to use the money to gain access to elected officials.

Expanding the campaign finance system to allow individuals who only collect small donor to get fully funded campaigns will make the difference in who will run for office, it already has. Committing taxpayer money to help candidates who do not have deep pockets or wealthy connections makes our City more just. It opens door for young people, new immigrants and working-class residents to run for office. Bringing these missing voices to City Hall to will mean a stronger, more vibrant and more equitable City for all.

In addition, in communities all over New York City, there are community leaders providing local support who would never think about the running for elected office because of the economic barrier that the current system puts in front of them. This bill would change all of that.

By addressing the inadequacy of the campaign financing system, we will locally elected representatives who truly represent our city. I urge you to support this legislation and look forward to its passage.

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify.

# **Get Big Money Out of City Politics**


# Match Every New York City Resident's Small Dollars

New York City's campaign finance system matches the first \$175 of contributions from residents by 6 to 1 and gives participating candidates a partial public matching grant of up to 55% of the spending limit in competitive races. This leaves more than 1/3 of the funds outstanding between the public matching grant and the spending limit, which must be reached to be competitive. The "big dollar gap" for Mayor is \$2.5 million.

Introduction 1130-A by Council Members Kallos, Lander, and Cabrera, increases the public matching grant from an arbitrary partial match of 55% to a full match. Every small dollar raised from city residents would be matched 6 to 1. Candidates could still raise contributions of \$4,950 for Mayor, but would be incentivized to seek small donations from many more residents by matching every small dollar.

- ✓ Reduce Big Money by filling the "big dollar gap" with small dollars matched with a full public matching grant.
- ✓ Increase the Number of Small Donors by a minimum of 50% for candidates seeking a full public matching grant.


**95**% of the amount contributed to 2013 Mayoral candidates were **Big Dollars** 



**5% of big dollar** contributions of **\$4,950** accounted for nearly **half** of the money in the 2013 race for Mayor.



Fundraising for Mayor		
Number of \$175 contributions necessary for Partial Public Match	3,650	
Amount raised for Partial Public Match	\$638,825	
Partial 55% Public Matching Grant	\$3,832,950	
"Big Dollar Gap" after Partial Public Match remaining to reach Spending Limit	\$2,497,225	
Minimum number of contributions under \$175 for <i>proposed</i> Full Public Match	5,689	
Total raised for proposed Full Public Match	\$995,571	





Good Afternoon Council Members, and thank you Council Member Kallos for holding this important hearing today. My name is Moira McDermott and I am the Executive Director of the newly launched 21 in '21 Initiative, a non-partisan effort with a goal to elect at least 21 women to the NYC Council by 2021. I'm here today to support Intro 1130a.

Across the nation, women are underrepresented in all levels of government, New York is no exception, especially when it comes to the NYC Council.

- The population of women in New York City is 52.3%, yet out of the current 51 Members in the NYC Council, only 13 of them are women or 25%.
- This year, 4 of the 7 Council Members Term Limited are women, leaving the Council vulnerable to a potential of 9 out of 51 or 18%.

Our initiative, not just aims for quantity but to recruit, and prepare women so those candidates and hopeful future Council Members are the most qualified. This is where money often becomes such a significant barrier.

For a first-time candidate to receive "buy-in" they have to prove their viability or "path to victory"- while there is no step 1, then step 2, then step 3, typically fundraising is involved at every point. Contributions come in, giving way for endorsements, which bring in more money, more endorsements, the momentum builds, causing a snow ball effect.

Creating that viability starts with small asks to friends, family, neighbors, co-workers and expanding on those networks. That's where the CFB Matching Funds program helps candidates by leveling the playing field, especially for women and minorities. Ideally, once a candidate maxed out on their public funds, fundraising is no longer necessary and they can focus solely on getting their message out-talking to voters. However, with public funds currently at \$100,100 that leaves a nearly \$82,000 gap.

This is a significant amount when that money can be used for additional mailers, robocalls, paid-canvassers, activities that potentially result in a win or loss. Additionally, it isn't conceivable to expect one to raise up to the spending limit through small individual contributions. This leaves wealthy donors, political institutions, PAC's, and/or special interests, which after decades of the male dominated structure, few women have the same connections to, and even fewer women of color.

To state the obvious, elections are essential to our government, so political campaigns are inevitable, and create a better democracy, however, fundraising is a necessary evil to run a successful campaign and also deters many qualified candidates from running. In fact, according to a 2014 study, 62% of women said they felt fundraising was the biggest barrier to running for office.

Thank you for your time.



# Testimony by Chair of the Patriotic Millionaires Morris Pearl April 27<sup>th</sup>, 2017

Chairperson Kallos and members of the committee,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I represent a group called the Patriotic Millionaires. One of our organization's central tenets is that our democracy works best for all of us, including our members who are wealthy businesspeople and investors, when everyone is fully able to participate in our political process. We are extremely concerned by the corrupting influence of money in politics, and we believe our democracy needs all citizens to have the same access and political power as now enjoyed by millionaires.

Politicians are, as you know well, all too often beholden to donors instead of their constituents, leaving them without the accountability that is a necessary part of all democratic societies. When money becomes speech, and candidates must spend their time fundraising from a small collection of wealthy groups and citizens, the voices of the common people are drowned out. Small donor matching systems, like ours here in New York City, are extremely effective in empowering normal citizens to engage in the political process and make their voices heard.

The New York City campaign finance system has done a great deal to shift power to the people, and has literally changed the face of this building -- or at least the faces in this building, but more must be done. Until a candidate can run with only small donor contributions, the influence of big money in New York City politics cannot be fully eradicated. Your bill, which equalizes the cap on expenditures and the total amount a candidate can receive from small donations plus matches, is a massive step forward towards ensuring our politicians are accountable to the people, not to wealthy donors and corporations.

For far too long, the influence of money in politics has distorted policy and, rightfully, diminished the public's trust in government. New York City has already been a leader on this important issue, and it is time for us to lead again. By passing this bill, you can lead the way to in increasing the political power of all of your constituents.

Thank you,

Morris Pearl
Chair of the Patriotic Millionaires



SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION
CTW, CLC

HÉCTOR J. FIGUEROA President

LARRY ENGELSTEIN
Executive Vice President

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National Conference of Firemen and Oilers 606.324.3445

New England District 615 617.523.6150

New Jersey District 973.824.3225

Western Pennsylvania District 412.471.0690

#### Testimony of Vie Mae Richardson-White

#### Member 32BJ SEIU

#### Committee on Government Operations, Int. 1130-2016

#### **April 27 2017**

Good afternoon Committee Chair Kallos and Committee members and thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. My name is Vie Mae Richardson-White; I'm a resident of Brooklyn, a commercial cleaner in mid-town Manhattan and a proud member of 32BJ SEIU.

32BJ represents 163,000 property services workers, including over 85,000 here in New York City. We are cleaners, janitors, doorman, supers, window cleaners and security officers. We are a diverse union with members coming from over 60 different countries.

In addition to fighting for good contracts on our jobs, our members are active campaigners in their communities.

To win economic justice and affordable housing, to protect and expand civil rights, and to make our neighborhoods healthy and safe, we need elected leaders who stand with us and not big money donors.

New York's public matching funds program works to boost the impact of small individual donations. The amendment proposed by bill 1130 will increase the cap on public funds available for participants of the program.

Under the change, candidates who rely on small contributions from local residents will be able to raise the same amount as candidates who receive large external donations.

This change will encourage candidates for city offices to pay attention to the needs of city residents and focus their campaign on building local support.

On behalf of my union brothers and sisters and all other active community members, I encourage the council to pass this bill and help give our voices a better chance at being heard.





#### Katie Goldstein, Executive Director

#### New York State Tenants & Neighbors

Testimony as Prepared

April 27, 2017

#### New York City Council Committee on Governmental Operations

#### Re: Introduction 1130-A

Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony today.

My name is Katie Goldstein and I am the Executive Director for New York State Tenants & Neighbors Information Service and New York State Tenants & Neighbors Coalition, two affiliate organizations that share a common mission: to build a powerful and unified statewide organization that empowers and educates tenants; preserves affordable housing, livable neighborhoods, and diverse communities; and strengthen tenant protections. The Information Service organizes tenants in at-risk rent regulated and subsidized buildings, helping them preserve their homes as affordable housing, and organizes administrative reform campaigns. The Coalition is a 501c4 membership organization that does legislative organizing to address the underlying causes of loss of affordability. Our membership organization has over 3,000 dues-paying members.

Tenants & Neighbors organizes in rent-regulated, Mitchell-Lama, and project-based Section 8 developments citywide. In the buildings where we organize, the story is the same. Low and moderate income tenants in New York City are regularly experiencing the pressures of displacement. Rents are climbing and tenants are concerned that they will not be able to afford to stay in their homes and communities. A major cause of the massive affordability and housing crisis is the power of the real estate industry to shape pro-landlord policies and laws.

Tenants & Neighbors is testifying today to support the measure Introduction 1130-A in relation to increasing the campaign finance system's public matching grant from a partial to a full match. This bill would be an improvement to the current system, and would ensure that there would be a more equal playing field for elected officials that receive small donations.

Currently, the real estate industry is one of the largest funders of elected officials in New York, and there is a direct correlation between real estate donations and anti-tenant policies. Anti-tenant policies then result in increased threats of displacement, loss of affordable housing, and increased homelessness. New York legislators should do as much as possible to limit landlord and real estate influence in elections through candidate donations. We commend the Council for proposing solutions to correct the power imbalance that exists between the millions of low and moderate income tenants in New York City and the powerful real estate industry.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today.





#### **Testimony of the New York Immigration Coalition**

## Committee on Governmental Operations: Hearing on Introduction 1130-A April 27, 2017 at 1 P.M.

Good afternoon, and thank you to the members of the Council for convening this hearing and in particular to Chairman Kallos for his continued leadership on ensuring fair elections. My name is Murad Awawdeh and I am the Director of Political Engagement at the New York Immigration Coalition. We are an umbrella policy and advocacy organization with over 140 members across New York State, and we aim to achieve a fairer and more just society that values the contributions of immigrants and extends opportunity to all.

The New York Immigration Coalition strongly supports the Council's important efforts to ensure that our elections are fair for all. I am here to testify in favor of Introduction 1130-A: A Bill to raise the cap on public funds received by candidates to a full match with the expenditure limit. At this very moment in history we are experiencing the extensive influence big money has on our election process, to the detriment of our nation. And it is at this very moment that I am proud to be a citizen of the great City of New York that stands as a model of campaign finance reform for the rest of the country. After the U.S. Supreme Court removed the limits on independent corporate political donations, other municipalities looked to us to lead the way towards more equitable elections.

As it stands, New York City empowers smaller donors by matching the first \$175 of contributions from residents 6 to 1 and gives participating candidates a partial public

matching grant in competitive races, but we must do more. I commend Council Members Ben Kallos, Brad Lander, and Fernando Cabrera for introducing this important piece of legislation that would increase the public matching grant from an arbitrary 55% to a full match. Not only would this legislation incentivize candidates to seek more small donations but this would also be a way to engage more New Yorkers in the political process so they, too, feel that they have a stake in these important races. But perhaps the most important potential impact of this legislation is that it would empower immigrants, low-income earners, people of color, and women to run for office and seek adequate representation of their communities. Despite our best efforts, New York City's current public matching grant system still prevents candidates from our communities from the very start because they cannot meet the fundraising threshold. I urge the New York City Council Committee on Governmental Operations to pass Introduction 1130-A this legislative session because our communities cannot afford to wait any longer for a more equitable election process.

We look forward to continuing our work with the Council to support fair elections in our City and we thank Council again for the opportunity to testify today.



THE ADVOCATE FOR NEW YORK CITY'S HISTORIC NEIGHBORHOODS

232 East 11<sup>th</sup> Street New York NY 10003 tel **(212) 614-9107** fax (212) 614-9127 email hdc@hdc.org

#### Statement of the Historic Districts Council

City Council Committee on Governmental Operations April 27, 2017 Regarding Introduction II30-2016: Amend Provisions of Campaign Finance Board's Small Donor Matching Program

The Historic Districts Council is the citywide advocate for New York's historic neighborhoods. HDC is dedicated to preserving the integrity of New York's Landmarks Law and to furthering the preservation ethic. It is in that service, the furtherance of the preservation ethic, that we are supporting this bill to reform New York City's campaign finance regulations and strengthen the voices of individual citizens.

As the Council members know too well, running for public office is not an inexpensive undertaking. Candidates are forced to compete in two separate arenas simultaneously; on one hand for votes without which they cannot be elected and on the other for contributions, without which they cannot run a campaign. This double competition can lead, at the very least, to a scattered attention, which doesn't well-serve the candidate or the constituency they hope to represent. At worst, it can lead to ethical conflict as a candidate is exposed to undue influences angling for personal gain in return for needed financial support. New York City's political history is unfortunately rife with examples of this. In 1963, journalist William Riordan wrote "Plunkitt of Tammany Hall", a series of dictated reminisces by legendary ward boss George Washington Plunkitt on "honest" and "dishonest" graft — the difference being whether or not the community was being served while the politician enriched himself. While it might seem unfair to judge the actions of a previous century by today's mores, we should start with the premise that these kinds of practices should not be encouraged or continued. Furthermore, it is only factual to observe that the serious money in New York City resides in the real estate industry, an industry with a vested and specific interest in gaining access and influence in elected government, as well as a long and continuous history of attempting to enhance that influence through perfectly legal financial contributions.

The preservation community is not reflexively at odds with the real estate community; in fact we are ultimately dependent upon property owners to care for the historic buildings New Yorkers hold so dear. However, the Historic Districts Council feels strongly that the scales of governance must be adjusted to better account for the common good in relation to the individual gain. This proposed amendment will go a long way toward meeting that goal. If passed, it will empower individual citizens to better compete with vested interests by enhancing the financial impact of small donations. It will also be a source of strength for candidates, enabling them to serve the two goals of community engagement and fundraising with the same audience, the voters.

#### Testimony in Support of City Council Bill 1130-A

In the 2013 mayoral race, I donated \$75 to candidate Bill de Blasio. That was \$65 short of the \$150 that I would have been allowed to give under New York City's Campaign Finance Program. But it was what I could afford on my pensioner income.

John Zuccotti, the real estate developer with the park that bears his name, donated \$4,950 to candidate de Blasio. Mr. Zuccoti was allowed to give this amount because the 55% cap on public funding had been reached for the mayoral race with a fixed cost set at \$2.5 million.

Fast forward to May 18, 2016. I wrote now Mayor de Blasio, to urge that he prioritize saving the vanishing stock of rent-regulated apartments. My rent-stabilized apartment (for the last 43 years) has saved me from joining the ranks of the homeless.

On July 20, 2016, I received a response to my letter. It was nicely printed on official City Hall stationary, and signed (robotically I assumed) by Mayor de Blasio. It contained not one word about the Mayor's position on or plans to protect vital rent regulations.

Would Mr. Zuccotti have gotten a staff-drafted "kiss off" letter or would he have gotten a phone call from the Mayor or a highly placed surrogate ready to explain the Mayor's position on rent regulations?

I urge you to pass 11-30 A to allow a full match with public funding for candidates. This will allow small donors like myself a better chance to participate in our "representative democracy.

Submitted by,

Kitty Williston April 27, 2017 Good afternoon. I would like to thank Council Member Kallos for introducing this important legislation and thank the committee for hosting today's hearing.

My name is Skipp Roseboro, and I'm a resident of Bedford-Stuyvesant and a member of New York Communities for Change.

This bill has the potential to have a profound long-term impact on future policy-making in New York City, and it comes at an urgent moment. For decades, New York has been a real estate town. The industry writes its own rules, and cashes its own checks, thereby having an unfair advantage in elections, rules and legislations.

New York City real estate moguls are some of the most powerful people in the country – including Donald Trump. Trump is repugnant in many ways, but there was a moment during a Republican primary debate that gave us a rare view into a developer honestly speaking about how they do business.

On the stage that night, Trump talked about how he gave donations to elected officials and candidates. He said, and I quote:

"I give to everybody. When they call, I give. And you know what? When I need something from them, two years later, three years later, I call them. They are there for me."

This is the real estate developers' modus operandi. Political contributions are part of the cost of doing business; they are down-payments on future projects and deals. They themselves know it, and in this case, said so publicly on a national stage. What has this system gotten us? Here in New York, we see record homelessness, massive displacement from communities like Crown Heights and Bed-Stuy, and huge amounts of public land being turned over for private profit.

We've seen deed-restricted nonprofit nursing homes allowed to be sold and turned into luxury condos. We've seen the wholesale rezoning of low-income neighborhoods where the majority of housing that is set to be build will not be affordable to neighborhood residents.

And now, in Crown Heights, we see exactly where the city's housing policies are headed in a tale of two developments: one – the Crown Heights Bedford Armory – that is on public land and is dominated by luxury condos for newcomers, and the other a homeless shelter, which is quickly becoming the only thing long-term residents can afford as they are pushed out by politically connected developers. The only hope for much of our population, is a dramatic change to New York politics that protects residents from the wealthy real estate interests that have ruled the roost for decades. This bill would go a long way toward shifting power to regular new yorkers and away from people like Donald Trump and other shady developers who are putting profit over the health of our neighborhoods, AND THE OUR CARROLL OF OUR CARROLL OF OUR CARROLL OF OUR CARROLL OF OUR CARROLL OUR C

Thank you.

#### Testimony of Mel Wymore, Candidate for City Council, on Campaign Finance Bill, April 27, 2017

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today in support of Introduction 1130-A, sponsored by Council Members Kallos, Lander, and Cabrera. I want to thank each of them for their leadership on this critical issue.

In the time of Trump, a time when our communities and families are increasingly under attack, encouraging civic participation is our single best recourse. There's nothing wrong with marches, rallies, and forums. But at the end of the day, the best and only answer is for people to run for office and win.

This is especially important for young people and minorities, voices we desperately need at all levels of elected government.

The good news is that we've seen an incredible outpouring of Americans of all stripes expressing interest in running for office. *Roll Call* recently reported that EMILY's List, which supports women running for office, has been contacted since the election by over 10,000 women interested in running more than ten times the number they heard from in all of 2015 and 2016 combined.

The bad news is that running for office presents difficult barriers to entry, especially if you're not a well-connected, affluent person to begin with. And let's be honest, in most cases that means that unless you're a straight, white, and male, you have major built-in handicaps.

And the most important of these handicaps is money. Raising money for a campaign is difficult. It is time consuming. And it puts heavy pressure on those running for office to give in to pressure from bigmoney special interests who can help them compete.

Here in New York, I've seen this firsthand, as have each of you. The power of the real estate industry is the power of the purse. The ability to sway elections is something with which every New York politician has to grapple.

Today we have a state senate in Republican hands because a group of Democrats decided they needed to sell their souls to get elected. It comes down to money.

There's a fundamental principle at stake: in a democratic republic, running for office should be available to anyone. Our elected officials should be chosen based on their ideas and their values, not on their pocketbooks or their rolodexes or their willingness to bend to special interests.

I live and am running for office in a mostly-affluent neighborhood, the Upper West Side. But even with that base of potential donors, it takes effort to avoid donations from the real estate industry, which I've made it campaign policy to refuse. Wherever you go, there are potential donors with money and agendas. Trying to compete with small donations and organic support is the right thing to do, but let's be honest: it's a handicap.

Every minute spent trying to raise money is a minute where a candidate is less accessible to their voters. Every minute of fundraising is a minute where our candidates should be making themselves available and accessible to the people they want to represent.

The more the city can match, the more accessible elections become - both to would-be candidates and to voters.

Increasing public matching to a full match would go a long way to closing this gap and making campaigns more accessible to every New Yorker. I strongly support this bill. Thank you.

Testimony to the Hearing of the New York City Council Committee on Governmental Operations in support of Introduction 1130-A of 2016 and the full funding of New York City's public financing system. APRIL 27, 2017

My name is Rosemary Faulkner, I am a local volunteer Democracy Leader for Public Citizen, a national nonprofit group engaged in a range of issues, including public financing of elections. I bring a Public Citizen Petition, signed by 583 New York City residents that has been submitted to the committee already.

The issue at hand is to improve the current New York City public financing system, by increasing public funds to cover 100% of the spending limits imposed by the system.

Income and wealth inequality in our nation is distorting and undermining our democracy. One important way in which big money works is by influencing our elections, our most basic democratic process. This results in legislatures that do not represent the people. The New York City election system is held up as a model for the country on how the pernicious effect of big money can be controlled, using a small donor matching system. Much evidence has accumulated to show that the system as it exists now already encourages voter participation, enables those without access to large funding to run for office, and encourages candidate engagement with voters, the very people they are supposed to represent. You have before you now a piece of legislation that will bring us to full realization of the power of this kind of system.

As it is now, almost half the funds to be spent on city elections must come from private unmatched donations. Considering City Council races only, individuals can give up to \$2,750; this is only 2.2 times larger than the amount the candidate receives from a small donation of \$175 which amounts to \$1,225 after matching funds are added, a quite good balance. But with only 55% of the spending limits covered by public funds, there is a gap of (\$182,000 minus \$100,100) of about \$82,000. This gap must be met by many small donors whose contributions are *not* matched, or by relatively few medium and large donors. In races for higher city office, the balance is much more in favor of the large donor, and the gap is much larger. Clearly the candidate will pursue large donations to fund the gap. So the risk of undue influence on legislators continues.

Thus the New York City Campaign Finance System now functions as a hybrid between a small donor system, and a system relying mainly on large donations. Passing the proposed change to a 100% small donor matching system would be a substantial improvement. We strongly urge passage of Introduction 1130-A of 2016 as an important reform.

The additional cost to the city will be paid back in full and more by having a government more responsive to the average voter and not the wealthy donors.

Rosemary Faulkner New York, NY 10028

### Testimony of Amanda Farias before The Committee on Governmental Operations of the New York City Council

#### Thursday, April 27, 2017

Chair Ben Kallos and Members of the Committee on Governmental Operations:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on Intro. 1130. I would like to start off by thanking Chair Ben Kallos for introducing this bill and to the seven other Council Members that have co-sponsored it.

Now more than ever before, we have seen a surge in activism throughout New York City. Being one of the most progressive cities in the nation, as well as, having one of the most progressive campaign financing systems- Int. 1130 is needed in order for interested people to run an impactful, competitive campaign.

Currently, I am a candidate running for local office and I come from a modest background. I do not necessarily have the financial background or the wealthy network to run a campaign without using the Campaign Finance Board's matching funds program. Though the 6-to-1 matching program is extremely beneficial and creates a space where I am able to compete with other candidates running, it ultimately does not set someone like me up to win their race without a financial burden.

Int. 1130 would amend provisions of the Campaign Finance Board's small donor matching program by raising the matchable amount of contributions from a donor from \$175 to \$250, which would increase the amount of public funds available to a participant. This could dramatically influence how competitive one can be in a race, whether in an open seat or against an incumbent because it would allow equal opportunity for reaching the spending limit.

Increasing this threshold would make a major difference in whether or not candidates have a substantial chance in running a competitive race against others that may already be politically established or have different means and financial networks. Candidates who are running to represent the true interests of their districts and who are only able to run grassroots, small dollar campaign efforts should be capable of running competitive campaigns without the pressure of being out raised and/or outspent by others running. The increase not only encourages candidates that come from lesser means to run for office but it also increases the power of low dollar contributors which, in turn, helps voter participation and activism.

This bill will also decrease the funding gap and limited access for women and minorities running for office. As we know, there are many difficulties women and minorities have while looking for funding and it's evident a greater push needs to be made to break down these barriers, where women and minorities repeatedly encounter closed doors.

Again, thank you Council Member's for your leadership and for introducing this bill, I hope this legislation will push the City and Campaign Finance Board to lead the path for women of color like myself to run for office in our city.





### **NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL**

On increasing the cap on public funds available for matching small-donor contributions

Committee on Governmental Operations Proposed Int. No. 1130-A

Testimony of Charles Khan Organizing Director Strong Economy for All Coalition



Good morning members of the Committee. My name is Charles Khan, and I serve as the Organizing Director of the Strong Economy for All Coalition. Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony today.

Strong Economy for All is a labor-community coalition working on issues of economic fairness, jobs, income inequality and effective government policies to promote broad prosperity, including reducing the power of big money over elections and increasing the voices of working and low-income New Yorkers.

We are made up of some of New York's most engaged and effective unions and community organizations, including SEIU Locals 1199 and 32BJ; the United Federation of Teachers, New York State United Teachers and the Professional Staff Congress of CUNY, NYSUT; the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union and the Communication Workers of America; the New York City Central Labor Council, the Municipal Labor Committee and the state AFL-CIO; and community groups including the Coalition for the Homeless, Citizen Action of New York, Make the Road New York, New York Communities for Change and the Alliance for Quality Education.

And we work with national partners including the American Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association, the Communications Workers of America, the Center for Popular Democracy, Peoples' Action and the Working Families Party.



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Strong for All was established to fight for policies and programs that will address income inequality, and we'd like to say clearly and directly that electoral and campaign finance reforms that increase the voices and votes of regular, everyday New Yorkers are essential to addressing economic inequality in New York City and New York State and assuring broader prosperity for all of us.

Our coalition urges the Council to pass legislation that would allow a full public match for contributions to candidates participating in the New York City's public financing system.

The New York City public financing system is a national model for reducing the impact of big-dollar campaign cash from the deep pocketed and powerful, increasing the impact of small contributions from regular people, and reducing both the perception and reality of government corruption.

The New York City system hasn't eliminated conflicts or corruption – but it has contributed to increasingly competitive elections, a broader



range of voices among candidates and public officials, and a reduction in criminal corruption cases, as have similar programs in other cities and states.

Campaign cash from Wall Street banks, hedge funds and private equity firms still has too much of an impact on New York City elections – you can see this in page after page of multi-thousand dollar contributions to candidates for city elections from the managers and top staff of these controversial institutions.

But the fact is that New York City is doing a much better job than New York State or the federal government at lifting up the voices of regular people so that they can be heard over the shouts of large checks – and public financing is the reason why.

We've put out dozens of reports on the corrosive and corrupting influence of hedge fund and private equity manipulation of elections and government as part of our role in the Hedge Clippers campaign – they're available for public review at hedgeclippers.org, and they're explosive.

We've detailed multi-million dollar hedge fund contributions to candidates, PACs, SuperPACs and dark-money attack efforts across New York – the kind of contributions that buy policies that benefit bigmoney donors and often harm poor people, working people, and



communities of color. We've demonstrated how hedge fund cash has bankrolled divisive, racist attacks on immigrants, people of color and marginalized groups – and how dark-money Super PACs hide hate and self-dealing behind a façade of philanthropy and purported interest in public policies.

The New York City public financing system is a bulwark against these attacks – but we need to improve it.

Our research shows that more money is flowing faster into more and more elections around New York, including congressional, state legislative, city, and county executive and legislative races around the state.

Right now white supremacist billionaire hedge fund manager Robert Mercer, who bankrolled Trump, Breitbart and the shady digital campaigns of Cambridge Analytica, is now funding an extensive campaign to deceive voters into backing a state constitutional convention that could rewrite our state constitution to their liking. His efforts and limitless cash could try to transcribe right-wing politics, pro-billionaire tax policies and hateful racial division into the New York State Constitution.

New York City residents deserve better. Expanding the New York City public match system to allow a full match of all contributions to participating candidates will help turn up the voices of regular New



Yorkers who can make small-dollar contributions – it will curb corruption and will help to liberate our elected officials from the influence of big money to make good decisions that benefit all of us.

Get big money out of city politics" April 27, 2017 testimony Ravi Batra

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman,

I am delighted and honored to have been invited to testify. All of us have a vested interest in keeping the greatest city in the world, in the greatest nation on earth, the very best forever.

Mr. Chairman,

Many decades ago, Big Daddy Unruh said "Money is the mother's milk of politics," and it surely is. Citizens United, relying upon our cherished the First Amendment, essentially said unlimited milk is even more welcome in politics.

The concentrated use of money-power to acquire concentrated-political power is now legal in America. The irony, however, is that American exceptionalism, the very reason why we are the beacon in human history, is our cherished separated powers regime - a constitutional rebuke of singular elected power for sooner or later it leads to tyranny. Our Founders determined that only by separating power, with each person's enlightened self interest working against the other's, would squeeze out the best public good for the republic and every day people. In addition, in civil society, as Americans, we embraced competition in the marketplace, be it goods and services, or ideas. We even passed antitrust laws to block the formation of monopolies.

Recent events have shown, despite now-terminated investigations by federal and state prosecutors, that big money is a big music to big ears who want to play big politics.

#### Mr. Chairman,

I wholeheartedly support this noble bill to "get big money out of city politics" and salute councilmember Ben Kallos and every member of the City Council that supports this bill.

President Trump is correct when he says the system is rigged - so far as every day hard-working New Yorker is concerned - and they show their disgusted resignation by not even bothering to vote. We have historically low voter participation. It's so bad, the could not be faulted for being nostalgic about the Boss Tweed days, when at least the public was more engaged and society got a beautiful Tweed courthouse.

While I wish for this bill to become law, the mere fact that this bill has been introduced is a welcome sign that American democracy is alive and well in the heart of some of our elected leaders, and that keeps the hope alive that sooner or later the citizenry will reengage - and demand an accounting from their elected government for having breached Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg covenant: a government of, by, and for the people. Curiously, President Theodore Roosevelt's American Museum of Natural History has an obelisk: the Hammurabi Code, which mandated that the mayor had to personally reimburse the homeowner, whose house was burglarized, for all losses. Obviously, Abraham Lincoln took that to heart.

Since this bill promote/greater political competition, how can anybody be against it? And those that are against it, do so for their personal interest at the expense of our great city and every hard-working New Yorker.

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

Ravi Batra





The Honorable Benjamin Kallos NYC Council Member, 5<sup>th</sup> District 244 East 93<sup>rd</sup> St. New York, NY 10128

RE: 1130-A of 2016 – Increasing cap on public campaign funds – SUPPORT

Dear Councilmember Kallos,

I am writing on behalf of Friends of the Earth U.S. to voice our support for the proposed change to the administrative code of the city of New York via 1130-A, in relation to increasing the cap on public funds available to candidates. Thank you for your leadership on this matter, which would strengthen our cities democracy by closing the existing gap in our cities public campaign funding program.

Specifically, 1130-A would increase the public matching grant from an arbitrary partial match of 55% to a full match. This would mean that the first \$175 of every amount raised from city residents would be matched by a ratio of 6 to 1.

The majority of Americans today agree that outside money has too much influence over our political system. Strengthening New York City's strong and popular public campaign finance program empowers the best candidates to run for office, and not just those with easy access to wealthy mega-donors to fund campaigns. This helps make New York's elected officials more diverse and accountable to everyday voters while also abating the influence of deep-pocketed anti-environment special interests.

In the decades since public campaign finance was introduced, New York City has seen public finance programs realign candidates' focus back to ordinary citizen voters and away from concentrated powerful private interests. An important element to this success is the city's 6 to 1 small donor matching program that de-incentivizes candidates from seeking outside money. Yet our current programs leaves a "big dollar gap" of more than one-third of a candidate's campaign spending limit that is not covered by this program. 1130-A would close this gap and create a fully funded public matching grant.

We urge the City Council to move forward and pass this important measure.

Sincerely,

Jon Fox

Senior Democracy Campaigner Friends of the Earth - United States A Voting Rights Project of the New York State Democratic Committee and the DNC

#### MEMORANDUM OF SUPPORT

#### Campaign Finance Reform Increasing the Cap on Public Matching Funds

Int. 1130-A (Kallos)

The New York Democratic Lawyers Council (www.NYDLC.org) strongly supports the enactment of New York City Council Int. 1130-A. This legislation raises the current 55% cap on the maximum public matching funds available for candidates who participate in the public financing program in New York City elections to a full match with the expenditure limit.1

This bill would amend section 3-706(3)(a)(iii) of the of the Administrative Code of the City of New York to eliminate the arbitrary "fifty-five percent" cap on matching public funds available to participating candidates. Instead, such candidate's principal committees would be able to raise funds eligible for matching up to the expenditure limitation for the office for which such candidate seeks nomination for election or election.<sup>2</sup>

The NYC Campaign Finance Board (CFB) explains that "New York City's landmark small-dollar public matching funds program helps candidates rely on New York City residents—not special interests—to fund their campaigns." The program encourages candidates to prioritize small contributions (up to \$175) from NYC residents, by matching their contribution at a 6-to-1 rate (up to \$1,050 per eligible contributor). The Program is designed to empower City residents by amplifying the value of their contributions sixfold, incentivizing candidates to engage constituents and be responsive to the concerns and priorities of average New Yorkers. CFB reports that the program encourages residents to tune in to municipal elections, such that in 2013, 44,500 New Yorkers made a first-time contribution to a city candidate (three-quarters of those were \$175 or less).<sup>5</sup>

The purpose of this legislation is to eliminate the "big-dollar gap" that remains once a candidate who pursues public financing has maxed out their participation under the current matching regime. The gap today leaves over one-third of permissible spending unfunded, which candidates pursue to remain competitive. For Mayor, the current gap is \$2.5 million. Without this legislation, even candidates who participate are incentivized to prioritize large-dollar prospective donors to fill the gap quickly and efficiently. Instead, full matching allows candidates to compete "without the cloud of corruption" from dependence on large outside funding and allows candidates with strong community ties to run competitive races, without personal wealth or access to major donors. 6

#### For the foregoing reasons, NYDLC strongly supports the enactment of Int. 1130-A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Summary of Int. No. 1130-A, 2/6/17, http://on.nyc.gov/2p7lrDa.
<sup>2</sup> Int 1130-2016 (Kallos), A Local Law to Amend the Administrative Code of the City of New York, in Relation to Increasing the Cap on Public Funds Available, http://on.nyc.gov/2p7lrDa.

NYC Campaign Finance Board, Matching Funds Program, www.nyccfb.info/program (visited Apr. 27, 2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Common Cause CA, *Public Financing of Campaigns*, http://bit.ly/2pCWDUZ.



# Make the Road New York Testimony New York City Council Committee on Governmental Operations Public Hearing Introduction 1130-A April 27, 2017

Good Afternoon. My name is Daniel Altschuler, and I am the Director of Civic Engagement and Research at Make the Road New York. Thank you to the City Council, Committee Chair Kallos and the Committee on Government Operations for creating this opportunity for testimony on the benefits of Introduction 1130-A for New York City's immigrant communities and working-class communities of color.

Make the Road New York is the largest grassroots immigrant organization in New York City working to build the power of Latino and working class communities to achieve dignity and justice through organizing, policy innovation, transformative education, and survival services. With a membership of over 20,000 low-income individuals and almost 20 years of history in the outer boroughs, we tackle the critical issues facing our community, including workers' rights, tenants' rights, language access, LGBTQ justice, heath care access, youth development and immigrant civil rights. Our vibrant community reaches from Jackson Heights, Queens to Bushwick, Brooklyn, to Port Richmond, Staten Island and our community centers draw upwards of 15,000 people annually for adult literacy classes, legal and support services, and thousands more for community education meetings and campaign planning.

As we are all aware, too often immigrant communities and working-class people, especially those of color, are shut out of the political process. The results of the last presidential clear make this all too apparent.

There exists a critical need in our communities for genuine democracy where people's voices can be heard. For too long, big money has dominated our politics at every level of government, drowning out the voices of ordinary people and often breeding disillusionment. In New York City, we have taken significant strides by passing and implementing a small-donor matching system, which has substantially reduced the barriers to running for office and opened up our local democracy in critical ways.

But now we have an opportunity to go further. Even under the current system, there remains a "big-dollar" gap, which for Mayor reaches \$2.5 million. This gap is completely out of reach for City residents like our members, who typically cannot contemplate raising such a sum given the lower socio-economic level of people in their personal and professional networks.

We have members who are interested in assuming positions of public leadership, including elected office. By expanding to a full matching system, Intro 1130-A would reduce the influence of big money in our City's politics and make it easier for our members and people like them across New York to seriously consider running for office and representing their communities. We therefore support this legislation.

Thank you for your leadership and continued dedication to these issues.

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#### CITIZENS UNION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

# Testimony to the New York City Council Government Operations Committee On Proposed Changes to the Campaign Finance Law Intro 1130-A April 27, 2017

Good afternoon Chair Kallos and members of the City Council. My name is Rachel Bloom and I am the Director of Public Policy and Programs at Citizens Union. Citizens Union brings New Yorkers together to strengthen our democracy and improve our City.

Nonpartisan and independent, we seek to build a political system that is fair and open to all, values each voice, and engages every voter. Citizens Union is an independent and nonpartisan democratic reform organization that organizes New Yorkers to strengthen our democracy and improve our city. We thank you for the opportunity to speak today about Intro 1130-A.

Over the last three decades, New York City's campaign finance program has positioned itself at the forefront of efforts to empower the electorate in the face of the ever increasing influence of big money in political campaigning. It is acclaimed throughout the country as a groundbreaking example of how a municipal campaign finance system can transform elections. It holds this position as a national model for two reasons: the principles of independence and populism, and by extension anti-corruption, that inform its mission; and the deliberative steps by which it has developed through Council action and within the Campaign Finance Board.

Intro 1130-A certainly embodies the first of these principles: By lifting the 55 percent public funds cap, it arguably creates a more level playing field for candidates who may have varying access to donors when fundraising and have the capacity to go beyond the cap, but many candidates already struggle to even meet the 55% threshold. It also brings us to a system of near full public financing, a goal that CU neither supports or opposes, involving the use of more taxpayer funds. CU currently supports and values the partial system as it has allowed many more candidates to run and has produced a more diverse and representative City Council. Changing the funding source mix may result in a more diverse range of candidates, but New York's experience in 2013 showed a very diverse field of candidates for Council. Changing the financing of the program is a significant matter that deserves more public analysis and scrutiny. We are not sure what specific data supported problem this legislation is seeking to solve.

Despite its intent, the introduction of the bill at this late stage in the municipal election cycle is a deviation of the carefully measured process by which the program is updated and revised. Traditionally, the Campaign Finance Board makes recommendations to the City Council in its

quadrennial report at the end of the first year following a municipal election, based on their evaluation of the program's recent performance and impact and the Council then conducts its own hearing to evaluate the program and consider the CFB's recommendations. Our program has succeeded in New York City because the Council and the CFB work together to improve the program every four years. Because Intro 1130-A would not go into effect until after the upcoming municipal elections, we see no reason why the Council should stray from its customarily deliberative approach and take up this reform outside the context of what will be the most recent election. For this reason, Citizens Union neither supports, nor opposes Intro 1130-A. Rather we are here today to express our concerns over the timing and potential impact of the proposed legislation, with the goal of preserving the integrity and mission of New York City's Campaign Finance Board and it's lauded matching funds program.

On an implementation level, Citizens Union has deep concerns about the financial constraints and documentation requirements that candidates will be subject to if matching funds rise from 55% to 85%, constituting a full match.

- Qualified Expenditures. Matching funds from the Campaign Finance Board can only be used for qualified expenditures as dictated by law. For instance, matching funds cannot be used in advance of the calendar year of an election, to pay family members or for ballot litigation. If a candidate relies entirely on matching funds, they will be left with only 15% of their budget for these costs and can potentially find themselves severely hamstrung. For a City Council race where the total cap is \$182,000, that would leave only \$26,000 to cover unqualified expenditures.
- Documentation Requirements. A candidate relying upon the CFB for matching funds is required to keep detailed receipts of all qualified expenditures that matching funds are used for and to submit them for review. Candidates must maintain and may be required to produce originals and copies of checks, bills, or other documentation to verify contributions, expenditures, or other transactions reported in their disclosure statements. Citizens Union has concerns that if the amount of matching fund rises, so will the justifiably heavy burden of submitting all required paperwork to the CFB. It will be a considerably heavier lift for candidates to maintain all of these needed records in smaller and smaller matchable amounts.

There are serious issues being raised by this bill that need greater time to evaluate. We would be better off looking at the issue to right after our 2017 city elections.

In an era of ever increasing money in politics, we believe that New York City's campaign finance program is more important than ever, and is a program all New Yorker should be proud of.

#### Eleanor Roosevelt Legacy Committee PO Box 20293 Greeley Sq. Station New York, NY 10001 www.eleanorslegacy.com

Testimony of Eleanor's Legacy
IN SUPPORT OF INTRO 1130-A, Increasing the Cap on Public Funds Available

Before the Committee on Governmental Operations

April 27, 2017

There are eight million people in New York City represented by 51 members of the City Council and three citywide offices. To serve on the New York City Council or in citywide office is a rare privilege enjoyed by a few, but the opportunity to try, the opportunity to run for office, should be available to all of us. For a healthy democracy, the barriers to running for office must be removed so that anyone with grit and good ideas has an equal shot. It is the function of the New York City Campaign Finance Board to level the playing field through public funding. Raising funds is the biggest barrier to entry for women in electoral politics. Increasing the cap on public funds available to candidates would reduce the barriers facing New York women when they decide to get off the sidelines and run for office.

And we need New York women to run and to have an equal shot at winning. There are four million women in New York City. But women currently hold just 13 of the 51 seats on the City Council, and just one of the three citywide offices. This is not good enough, not for women, not for our city, and not for our democracy.

Of all the components of a campaign plan, the premium put on fundraising persists in dissuading women from pursuing public office. It is not simply that women don't like to ask for contributions in comparison to their male opponents. It is that the network of wealth women have to draw upon is smaller than their male opponents. Wage equality does not mean that a women has less take home pay than her male colleagues, it means that all women take home less pay. Women are small donors. Women candidates are likely to rely on a network of small donors. Empowering small donors empowers women candidates and elevates women candidates to a level playing field with their male opponents.

Therefore, I urge the committee to support passage of INTRO 1130-A and in so doing to increase equality of opportunity for all New Yorkers.

Testimony

of

Gene Russianoff

Senior Staff Attorney

New York Public Interest Research Group

Before the

**Government Operations Committee** 

Of the New York City Council

on

Intro 1130

(lifting cap on public campaign funds)

April 27, 2017

250 Broadway

New York City

My name is Gene Russianoff and I am a senior attorney at the New York Public Interest Research Group, NYPIRG. NYPIRG is a non-partisan, not-for-profit, research and advocacy organization. Consumer protection, environmental preservation, health care, higher education, and governmental reforms are key areas of concern. We appreciate the chance to testify.

The genius of the New York City' campaign finance law Is that it has grown and changed as the city has grown and changed.

As the Campaign Finance Board said in its report on the program and the 2013 elections: "Since its inception in 1988, the Campaign Finance Program has set the conditions for City Council representation that reflects the demographic diversity of the city." The 2013 elections ushered in some new milestones with the election of the first African-American woman to citywide office and the first Mexican-American elected to the City Council."

NYPIRG believes that Intro 1130 would build on that tradition. Here's the background on Intro 1130:

Under NYC's widely well-regarded campaign finance law, candidates for city office are permitted to match the first \$175 donated by a NYC resident to such a campaign on a six-to-one basis. That means a \$175 contribution could yield up to \$1050 (\$175 times 6 = \$1050.) As in the past, the current law seeks to maximize the incentive for city candidates to rely on small contributions from city residents of modest means.

But it also permits citywide candidates, for example, to accept up to \$4,950 for an election cycle. In adding a 55% cap on public funds, the provision's authors were seeking to prevent criticism of program by those felt it was an overly generous at the time.

But in NYPIRG's view, of even greater concern, is the unintended enhancement of the influence of larger campaign contributions. Candidates can and do collect significant amounts of funding from maximum contributions allowed under the law. . Candidates can and do collect significant amounts from higher **big dollar** contributions of **\$4,950**. **These** accounted for nearly **half** of the money in the 2013 race for Mayor.

Costs may have been an issue back in the 2001 elections, but given the program's nearly unanimous approval from the public, NYPIRG does not see it is a major issue going forward. Indeed, many New Yorkers see it as a relatively small price to pay for competitive elections in the city.

Finally, NYPIRG notes that they are other ideas to create incentives for candidates to receive smaller contributions City residents. Among the ideas worth considering are:

- less forbidding thresholds than exist now; and
- differing matches of smaller/larger contributions.



# Testimony from the Street Vendor Project NY City Council Committee on Government Operations re: Intro 1130-A

#### **April 27, 2017**

Hello, my name is Sean Basinski, and I am the director of the Street Vendor Project of the Urban Justice Center. We have more than 2,000 members, overwhelmingly immigrants and people of color, who sell food and merchandise on the streets and sidewalks of our city.

There are few if any issues related to street vendors that are decided in Albany or in Washington, DC. The livelihoods of our city's vendors depend greatly on who is elected to the New York City Council and who is elected to be Mayor. How many vendors are given permits, where they are allowed to vend, which rules they must follow, how those rules are enforced – these are all dictated by City Council and the various agencies under the Mayor. Our community therefore has a great interest in the rules and procedures that govern local elections.

We are very supportive of Intro 1303-A because we believe it will enable our elected officials to be more accountable to regular New Yorkers, including street vendors and the millions of people who serve as their customers each day. Removing the cap on public matching funds will empower candidates to run who can depend on small donors, without the requirement to turn to donors to fund their campaign.

Many people ask us, "who doesn't support street vendors?" The answer is very simple – the real estate industry in New York City does not support street vendors. Yet the real estate industry has great power over what happens at City Hall, not because of the merit of their positions, but because of their ability to make large campaign contributions. The current cap on matching funds makes many candidates beholden to real estate developers and the large donations they have the ability to make.

We believe that Intro 1303-A will reduce the influence of the real estate industry in city affairs, to the benefit of everyone else. Every real estate developer should have their voice heard as much as anyone else. But they do not own our public streets and sidewalks and they should not get to determine who gets to use them, no matter how much money they have.

Thank you again for the chance to testify today.



April 26, 2017,

Re: Testimony in support of Introduction 1130-A of 2016 and the full funding of New York City's public financing system.

Esteemed Council Committee,

I would like to voice my adamant support for Int 1130-A 2016. In the late 1980's, New York City pioneered the exciting, and much-needed, small-donor matching fund system. Empowering candidates to run for elected office by decreasing their reliance on big donations was, and still is, a noble and worthwhile endeavor. Nationwide, cities look to New York City's small-donor matching fund program as a blueprint to institute their own, so they can **prioritize people over profits.** 

But for this system to work as intended, it must be fully funded. Pushing back against the moneyed interests that whittle away at our most basic democratic processes -- our elections -- has always been an uphill battle. New York City's small-donor matching fund is a tangible, proven tool used to diminish private influence in public matters and encourage ordinary citizens to engage in the political process. Supporting it half-heartedly is not enough.

Reports from the Brennan Center show that due to the current small-donor matching system that in up to 24 times the amount of small-donors participate in City Council races in neighborhoods that are a majority People of Color than those of State Assemblies in similar areas. Legislators who operate within a small-donor financing system decrease their fundraising time by two-thirds so they can spend more time leading and less time asking for money. Further, the small-donor system encouraged candidates to spend more time engaging with their constituents and less time chasing after large contributions. Even in the poorest neighborhoods, voters recognize the importance of their participation when public financing is involved, and participate accordingly. A more aggressive grant from the city stands to help New York City realize a more egalitarian and efficacious democracy.

The effects of small-donor financing on the increased presence of new candidates in electoral contests can also be enhanced. When a public financing system was instituted in New York City, far more elections went contested, and the racial and gender diversity of these challengers increased, as well. Not only are voters' voices elevated (and we stand to elevate them further) under public financing, but having more average citizens run for office means that the voice of that all New Yorkers have a greater chance of having their voice heard.



Taking power away from a wealthy few and empowering the ordinary majority is a cause that requires full commitment. There are no shortcuts. As is, a mayoral candidate using the small-donor matching system leaves \$2.5 million dollars on the table as a result of a program operating at only 55 percent of its capacity. Reducing the "big dollar gap" is in the best interest of everyday New Yorkers. When 95 percent of the money raised in the 2013 mayoral race comes from big money interests, it's clear that the city's arbitrary 55 percent public matching grant is insufficient.

I invite anybody to find a New York City teacher who would say 55 percent is an acceptable score on an exam. New York's City's public financing system must be fully funded.

In addition to fully funding the program, Int 1130-A 2016 proposes to increase the number of small-donors needed for a candidate to be eligible for public matching grants by a minimum of 50 percent. Any measure that incentivises candidates to engage with more of their constituents strengthens the democratic legitimacy of our elections. Once again, this has Public Citizen's full support.

Our nation's Founding Fathers spoke to the importance of a person's political influence being the same, regardless of economic bracket. To quote James Madison in the Federalist Papers:

"Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States."

For a majority of this city's residents, the prospect of needing to raise upwards of \$20,000 from their communities is an immediate disqualifier for their own political participation, and by extension that of their neighbors and constituents. However, it's things like New York City's public financing structure that work to uphold Madison's vision. And it's legislation like Introduction 1130-A 2016 that ensures these democratic tools function to their fullest capacity.

#### Thank You,

Jonah Minkoff-Zern Director, Public Citizen's Democracy Is For People Campaign



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## Statement on Proposal to Amend New York City's Public Matching Fund System for Elections

Presented to the
Committee on Government Operations
New York City Council
April 2017

Michael J. Malbin

Executive Director
Campaign Finance Institute
Washington DC

Professor of Political Science University at Albany, SUNY

Chairperson Kallos and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for asking me to testify on the proposal to amend the public matching fund program. Unfortunately, I shall be out of the country the day of your hearing. As a result, I am submitting this written statement and would be pleased to respond to any questions.

I am a Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany (SUNY). I am also co-founder and Executive Director of the Campaign Finance Institute (CFI) in Washington DC. CFI is a specialized and nonpartisan think tank committed to the idea that durable policy should be based on objective, fact-based research. For nearly fifteen years, CFI's federal, state, and local research has played a leading role in the effort to understand and enhance small-donor citizen empowerment. Several CFI publications have been about New York. One peer-reviewed article in 2012 was entitled "Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States". Another, also peer reviewed and scheduled for publication this summer, is called "It's all in the Details: Comparing Small Donor Matching Funds in New York City and Los Angeles." My statement will draw on the forthcoming article and other CFI reports.

Proposed Int. No. 1130-A would leave the existing matching funds system substantially unchanged, while increasing the cap on the maximum amount of public funds that a candidate many receive. The current cap is 55% of each candidate's spending limit. The proposal would let eligible contributions be matched until the full spending limit.

Our research suggests that this proposal meaningfully addresses a real problem, but that it would need to be coupled with additional changes to achieve the goals that sponsors say they want for citywide and borough-wide elections. Specifically, we would recommend coupling an increase in the public funding cap with (1) reducing the contribution limit for citywide candidates to the same level as council candidates, and (2) requiring citywide candidates to raise qualifying contributions in twenty of the city's fifty-one council districts.

CFI's 2012 journal article was an effort to determine the effectiveness of the city's then-unique multiple-matching fund system to heighten the importance of small donors. With multiple-matching first introduced in 2001, the article compared elections in the 1990s (under a one-for-one match) with those of 2001-2005 (four-for-one-match) and 2009 (six-for-one match). It concluded that multiple-matching was a highly successful incentive for candidates to raise money from small donors, resulting in a substantial increase in the number, proportional importance, and neighborhood diversity of such donors in city elections.

While we felt relatively comfortable with these conclusions, there were two sources of unease. First, New York then was alone with a small-donor multiple-matching fund system. What if the results were only specific to New York? Second, the article looked mostly at City Council candidates. Mayor Bloomberg's self-financing made it too difficult to analyze mayoral elections. The new journal article corrects both of these problems. First, with Los Angeles adopting a multiple-matching system in 2013, it was possible to look at more than one city. Second, having two cities and a longer time frame has made it easier to compare offices.

The next three sections of this statement summarize our findings, explanations, and recommendations.

#### **FINDINGS**

The following tables show some of the key results.

First, adding another election confirmed the basic conclusion that multiple matching funds resulted in an increase in the number and proportional role of small donors for New York City Council elections. City Council members raise proportionally more of their private money from small donors than do the state legislative candidates in all but a handful of states. When matching money is allocated to the responsible donors, small donors were responsible for 63% of all of the money in City Council elections – a percentage higher than any of the states, except for those with full public funding.

Candid Type	late	Avg. # of small donors per 100k constituents			Avg.% of funds from small donors (private only)			Avg. % of funds from small donors (private + public)		
			2001-	2009-			2009-		2001-	2009-
		<u> 1997</u>	2005	<u>2013</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u> 2001-</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u> 1997</u>	<u>2005</u>	<u>2013</u>
		1:1	4:1	6:1	1:1	<u>2005</u>	6:1	1:1	4:1	6:1
		match	match	match	match	4:1 match	match	match	match	match
Incumb	bent	155	173	215**	31%	31%	34%	42%	49%*	55%***
Non-										
Incumb	bent	200	215	222	38%	50%***	45%**	47%	67%***	68%***
Total		176	197	218***	35%	42%***	41%***	45%	59%***	63%***
Non- Incumb		1:1 match 155 200	4:1 match 173 215	6:1 match 215**	1:1 match 31% 38%	2005 4:1 match 31% 50%***	6:1 match 34% 45%**	1:1 match 42% 47%	4:1 match 49%* 67%***	6:1 mate 55%* 68%*

Note 1: Includes candidates with half as many votes as the winner in either a primary or general election.

Note 2: Independent samples two tailed t-tests calculated comparing candidates in 2001-2005 and 2009-2013, respectively to 1997. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

However, we learned in our newer study that merely having a matching fund system does not produce the results by itself. The Los Angeles program did not show the same effect after the city adopted a less generous multiple-matching system in 2013. Note that the following table combines the results for pairs of elections before and after multiple matching because Los Angeles elects half of its city council every two years.

Table 2: Los Angeles City Council Results for Incumbents, Non-Incumbents, and all Participating Candidates, Before and After Matching Fund Changes								
Candidate Type	Avg. # of small donors per 100k constituents		Avg. % of funds from small donors (private only)		Avg. % of funds from small donors (private + public)		Number of Candidates	
	2009-11	2013-15	2009-11	2013-15	2009-11	2013-15	2009-11	2013-15
<u>Participants</u>								
Incumbent	141	76**	16%	6%**	20%	11%*	6	4
Non-Incumbent	191	175	23%	19%	28%	28%	12	25
All Participants	174	161	21%	17%	25%	26%	18	29
Non-participants								
Incumbents	119	28	11%	2%*	11%	2%*	7	2

no data

12%

no data

2

no data

Note 1: Includes candidates with half as many votes as the winner in a primary or general election.

12%

no data

Non-incumbent

78

Note 2: The number of small donors includes an estimate for those who gave less than \$100. It assumes an average of \$33 per donor, which was the actual average in New York City.

Note 3: Independent samples two tailed t-tests calculated to compare post-reform elections to pre-reform elections by candidate type. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

As Table 2 shows, the switch to multiple-matching had no effect at all on non-incumbent candidates. It also coincided with a counter-intuitive *decline* in the role of small donors for incumbents. The program did not cause the unexpected decline, but neither did it do anything to reverse it.

At first, we were inclined to chalk up the results to underlying differences between the two cities. But that fails to account for the fact that the program in New York does not have the same impact on citywide and borough-wide races as it does for City Council. As a first step toward understanding, therefore, we analyzed the differences between offices in both cities.

Table 3: Los Angeles and New York: City Council and Mayor						
	# Small Donors per 100K constituents	% of contribution receipts from small donors (Private \$ only	% of \$ from small donors (Private + ) allocated match)			
LA Mayor, 2013	95	12%	17%			
NYC Mayor, 2013	61	9%	25%			
LA City Council, 2013-15	161	17%	27%			
NYC Council, 2013	207	41%	64%			

Note: Includes all participating candidates with half as many votes as the winner in either a primary or general election. Because only a handful of candidates run for Mayor, these data also include the third and fourth place finishers in Los Angeles in 2013, who earned 49% and 48% of the winner's vote total. As with previous tables, the number of \$100-or-less donors in Los Angeles was estimated by dividing the unitemized dollar total by an assumed \$33 per donor.

Table 3 shows that mayoral candidates in the two cities raised comparable portions of their private funds from small donors – only 9% in New York City and 12% in Los Angeles. In both cities, the mayoral candidates were less dependent on small donors than candidates for city council, but New York's City Council candidates raised much more from small donors than their counterparts in Los Angeles. The full article suggests that the results stem partly from differences between the two cities' larger politics, partly from differences between the two matching fund systems, and partly from the differences between council members and mayors. I return to this point in the conclusion after finishing the main findings.

Finally, we wondered whether more small donors simply meant smaller amounts of money from the same kinds of donors, or whether it pointed toward more participation in the system by a broader range of the city's inhabitants. For this analysis, we geo-coded the addresses of every one of the donors and placed them within their respective census block groups. A census block group (CBG) is a relatively small geographical space with an average population of about 1,500. We then tested how the demographic characteristics of the donors' CBGs compared to those for the city as a whole.

The next table expresses the comparisons as percentages. The comparable table in the full article includes both sets of city council candidates, mayoral candidates and state legislative candidates for districts that represented the two cities. In this statement we only include the New York City Council and Mayoral elections of 2013.

Table 4: Small Donor Diversity: NYC Census Block Groups (CBGs) with Small Donors in the 2013 Elections for City Council and Mayor						
City Council	Mayor					
90%	71%					
\$76	\$119					
99%	110%***					
100%	83%***					
98%	88%***					
	City Council 90% \$76 99% 100%					

One conclusion that leaps out from the table is how representative are the CBG's of small donors to New York City Council candidates. Ninety percent of the approximately 5,700 CBGs in the city have small donors living in them. This is remarkable. The districts are fully representative of the city's diversity, with median poverty rates, incomes and nonwhite populations virtually identical to those of the city as a whole. This is *not* normal in the campaign finance world.

p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*

p<0.01

a whole.

The mayoral small donors come from neighborhoods that are not as diverse. We also saw in Table 1 that less than 10% of the mayoral candidates' private funds in 2013 came from small donors. The incumbent mayor may increase the percentage this year, but the pattern is too well established to be ignored.

And the large donors to mayoral candidates emphatically did not come from all over the city. The top four candidates in 2013 raised 58%-68% of their money from individual contributions from city residents. Digging into those within-city contributions, about 65% of Bill de Blasio's money came from only six city council districts, 80% of Christine Quinn's from four districts, 66% of Bill Thompson's from six districts, and 70% of Joseph Lhota's from four districts. These candidates' financial constituencies were not nearly as diverse as the financial constituencies of city council members. The questions are why, and what might be done about it.

#### **EXPLANATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

What explains these sharp differences between mayoral and council candidate fundraising? There are a number of plausible explanations and it is not possible to weigh their relative importance with the information available. Since we expect that several factors contribute, the forthcoming article will simply list three.

• The office: Mayors are more powerful and more visible than individual city council members. Their decisions are more consequential for potential large donors, who therefore feel more of a stake in the election results and are more willing to give.

- Geographic qualification requirement: Neither city requires mayoral candidates to raise qualifying contributions from geographically dispersed neighborhoods. This frees mayoral candidates to focus their fundraising on wealthy neighborhoods or downtown business sectors. New York City Council candidates have to raise a minimum number of qualifying contributions within their districts to qualify for public matching funds. Los Angeles had no such requirement for city council candidates in 2013 but did have one in 2015. We believe the imposition of residential requirements helps explain the fact that small donors played a more important role in Los Angeles in 2015 than 2013.
- Interplay between contribution limit and funding cap: While the maximum public funds for New York's mayoral candidates is the same 55% of the spending limit as it is for New York's city council candidates, the sheer amount of money that mayoral candidates have to raise is much greater. With the contribution limit for mayoral candidates set at double the limit for city council candidates, it is easier for the mayoral candidates to raise what they need from large donors.

#### Recommendations:

The bill being considered by the Council would make it more feasible for candidates to rely on small donors *if* they want to do so. Raising the <u>public funding cap</u> would be useful. However, I expect that the bill will not be enough to change the incentive structure for most mayoral candidates. To accomplish that goal, I would recommend that the Council couple this provision with one or both of the following:

- Introduce geographic requirements for qualifying contributions for all offices. This works in New York and it appears to have worked in Los Angeles. In thinking about how broad such a requirement might be, one might take a cue from the presidential matching fund system. That system requires qualifying candidates to raise a threshold amount of money from twenty states (40% of all states). A proportionally equivalent requirement would be to require mayoral candidates to raise qualifying contributions from twenty of the city's 51 council districts.
- By setting higher <u>contribution limits</u> for mayor than city council, and matching the first dollars of
  every large contribution, the system gives mayoral candidates a strong incentive to look for
  donors who can max out. If the contribution limit were lowered to the same level as it is for city
  council candidates, there would be less distance between the maxing out donor and the \$1,225
  that a candidate can get from a \$175 donor.

Any of these three proposals would have an effect in line with the bill sponsors' goals. However, I predict that putting them all together would have a multiplying effect, creating incentives that would support the same goals more powerfully.

Thank you for asking me to participate. I would be happy to respond to your questions.

#### **Testimony of**

## The Working Group on Good Government of the Women's City Club of New York

New York City Council
Committee on Governmental Operations

In relation to Intro. 1130-A

**April 27, 2017** 

City Hall New York, New York

Contact: Padma Seemangal, Women's City Club of New York, (212) 353-8070 or pseemangal@wccny.org

#### INTRODUCTION

Thank you Chairman Kallos and members of the New York City Council's Committee on Governmental Operations for this opportunity to submit testimony in support of Intro. 1130-A on behalf of the Working Group on Good Government of the Women's City Club of New York.

The Women's City Club is a non-profit, non-partisan, multi-issue activist organization. For more than a century, our organization has been dedicated to improving economic, racial, and gender opportunities through education, issues analysis, advocacy, and civic participation. To this day, we remain committed to improving the quality of life for all New Yorkers.

#### **LEGISLATION**

Since our founding days, the Women's City Club has supported campaign finance reforms, and measures that promote good government and increase transparency, and we believe that Intro. 1130-A represents an essential step toward those goals.

For nearly three decades, New York City's landmark campaign finance system has served as a model of transparency and accountability in the United States. At the heart of this system is the core belief that an engaged, enlightened voting public is crucial to achieving a healthy democracy.

The City's campaign finance program –which drew participation from 92 percent of candidates on the primary ballot in 2013 - encourages more New York City residents involved in city elections through small-dollar contributions. 2013 saw the largest number of contributors, ever, to candidates in any of our city's elections; more than two-thirds of all city resident contributors to candidates gave \$175 or less that period, according a <u>post-election report by the New York City Campaign Finance Board</u>.

This multiple match on small donations led to more competition, more small donors, more impact from small contributions, more grass roots campaigning, and more citizen participation in campaigns, according to the <a href="Brennan Center for Justice">Brennan Center for Justice</a>.

This bill will allow more people, from different backgrounds and many for the first time, to run for office, and that will inevitably bring even greater diversity to our City Council.

Throughout our history, the Women's City Club of New York has advocated for greater civic engagement by women and people of color so that the composition of our elected bodies reflects the demographics of our city. Yet, disappointingly, our City Council only includes 13 women (a drop from 18 in 2009), and four of those members are term limited out of office at the end of this year.

By increasing the public matching grant, we believe this proposal would enable greater numbers of candidates, specifically women and minorities, to secure more funds through small-dollar donations while participating in the City's campaign finance system.

It also will diminish the influence of large, independent contributions, whose influence increased due to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Citizens United vs. Federal Elections Commission* in 2010. As a consequence of *Citizens United*, raising funds sufficient to match such independent spending can force candidates to spend substantial time away from campaigning, and make it difficult to communicate their messages when confronted with unlimited spending by outside groups.

Measures such as Intro. 1130-A help us address the realities of a *Citizens United* world. Our City – and, our State and other jurisdictions across our country – must respond by implementing measures that will attract more grassroots civic engagement through a transparent, accountable system.

While we support Intro 1130-A, we do caution: as with any other bill, there needs to be clarity about what this measure will cost the public, and where they money will come from. We urge that a thorough analysis be conducted to better inform all New Yorkers about the expected costs.

#### CONCLUSION

New York City prides itself on its diversity. That diversity must cross all sectors – in the workplace, in education, and in the highest echelons of government. In a truly democratic world,

those who serve us best represent our needs and our vision for a stronger, safer city. And as a result, our city, state and nation benefit.

We urge the New York City Council to support Intro. 1130-A. The people of our city deserve a government, and an electoral process, that they can trust.

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I represent: NY DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS COUNCIL 10028
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