



**NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL
COMMITTEE ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES JOINTLY
WITH THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ON
TECHNOLOGY, COMMITTEE ON CONTRACTS AND COMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS**

**TESTIMONY OF MARK G. PETERS
COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION**

**CONCERNING EXAMINING THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE CITY'S PROGRAM TO OVERHAUL
THE 911 SYSTEM**

February 25, 2015

Good morning Chair Gentile and members of the Committee on Oversight and Investigations, Chair Crowley and members of the Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services, Chair Gibson and members of the Committee on Public Safety, Chair Vacca and members of the Committee on Technology, and Chair Rosenthal and members of the Committee on Contracts. I am Mark Peters, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Investigation. I am joined here today by Inspector General Andrew Brunsden and Inspector General Andrew Sein. I am pleased to present testimony today on DOI's Report on the City's program to overhaul the 911 system.

Last May, upon learning about significant delays and cost overruns, Mayor de Blasio ordered a halt to work on the City's Emergency Communications Transformation Program ("ECTP"), pending a comprehensive review by DOI, the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications ("DoITT") and the New York City Comptroller's Office. Pursuant to the Mayor's request, DOI undertook our review of the system.

By way of background, the City launched ECTP in 2004 as an initiative to modernize New York City's 911 emergency communications system. Specifically, the effort to modernize the system came after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the blackout that affected the Northeast United States in August 2003, revealed significant deficiencies in the 911 system.

In ordering the temporary halt of ECTP, Mayor de Blasio cited the program's costs and delays, as well as "significant and long-standing technical design, systems

integration, and project management risks and issues that necessitate immediate corrective action."

As requested by the Mayor, DOI issued a preliminary investigatory report on August 6, 2014. Over the course of seven months in total, DOI reviewed tens of thousands of documents, including copies of contracts, bids, progress reports, invoices, budget documents, and electronic communications. DOI conducted more than 50 interviews with individuals involved with ECTP, conducted site visits and analyzed financial records related to the project's budget. The conclusion of this investigation has culminated in our final report which was released on February 6, 2015. Our report documents a number of management, oversight, and performance failures which caused the program to be years behind schedule and hundreds of millions of dollars over its original budget. As a result, the program to date has yet to fully deliver on its promise of a modernized 911 system that will more effectively respond to the health and safety needs of New Yorkers.

Specifically, DOI has identified a variety of management failures, internal control weaknesses, and contractor performance deficiencies that, between 2004 and 2013, created the conditions for the substantial delays and rising costs which have plagued the Program.

While no evidence of overt criminal conduct was discovered, DOI did identify inadequate Program controls permitting inflated price estimates by contractors, as well as attempts to hide the significance of problems facing the Program. For instance, with

respect to inflated price estimates by contractors, the sheer amount of sub-contractors involved in the program resulted in inflated price estimates of as much as 600 percent on a specific service. Ultimately, the project will be more than \$700 million over budget.

In addition, our investigation reveals that, as late as the end of 2013, senior program officials created an environment that discouraged truthfulness – seeking to “spin,” “soften” or “sanitize” negative information about the program in reports to create the impression that ECTP’s status was better than it actually was. We also found more than \$200 million in costs that were hidden in the budgets of other agencies and thus not reflected in ECTP’s total overruns. Our report detailed the Program’s deficiencies as follows--

First: a fundamental failure to adequately plan or sufficiently define the initial scope and direction of the Program;

Second: ineffective Program governance, both by officials at City Hall and at various agencies;

Third: inadequate contractor management, resulting in a failure to control consultant costs;

Fourth: undue pressure applied by Program officials upon employees to report positive information about the status of ECTP to City Hall;

Fifth: the failure to appoint an independent integrity monitor;

Sixth: a failure to present a clear picture of the Program’s total costs; and

Seventh: inconsistent recordkeeping practices at agencies involved in ECTP, including the NYPD, which did not have a document retention policy for Program records.

In order to mitigate the risks of similar management failures and internal weaknesses in the context of ECTP and other large-scale technology projects, DOI made the following recommendations--

First: ECTP's scope and direction going forward must be well-defined in a written plan that should be drafted and agreed upon by all stakeholders.

Second: The City must appoint a Program Manager empowered by the Mayor to lead large-scale technology projects such as ECTP.

Third: Where possible, the City should establish direct contractual relationships with vendors and avoid layers of subcontracting. The City should also seek to avoid ceding complete responsibility over projects to outside contractors.

Fourth: The City should set forth written criteria for any reporting of ratings or metrics intended to measure the progress of the Program or particular projects. Reporting should not take so much time and effort as to significantly detract from staff's ability to perform substantive Program work.

Fifth: The City should retain an independent integrity monitor for large scale technology projects.

Sixth: The City should account for all costs relating to large-scale technology programs like ECTP as costs of the program.

Seventh: The City should implement standardized recordkeeping practices on large scale, multi-agency technology projects. Agencies, including the NYPD, should create a document retention policy for ECTP and future large scale technology projects.

As noted in our report, the City has already made real progress on several of these recommendations. In the first instance, DoITT has begun efforts to analyze and redefine

ECTP's scope. In response to our recommendation that there be a Program Manager, empowered by the Mayor, to run a program such as ECTP, the City has appointed DoITT Commissioner Anne Roest, who has recently taken significant steps to centralize the process. As to ECTP, the City has begun steps to reduce sub-contractor involvement, including the removal of a number of consultants. The City has taken some preliminary steps to simplify the process around the reporting of ratings or metrics intended to measure program performance. Finally, the City has committed to install an integrity monitor for ECTP. The process for appointing an integrity monitor is underway, and we are working closely with Commissioner Roest to complete that process as expeditiously as possible.

DOI's final report, which spans 105 pages, contains a wealth of additional detail that I will not repeat here, but commend it to the Committees as important reading.

DOI stands ready to assist agency heads and the Mayor as they navigate the completion of this important project.

I am happy to take any questions you may have at this time.

UNIFORMED
FIRE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK
FIRE OFFICERS
LOCAL 854, INTERNATIONAL ASSN. OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO
ASSOCIATION

225 BROADWAY * NEW YORK, NY 10007 * SUITE 401
TEL: (212) 293-9300 * FAX: (212) 292-1560 * WWW.UFOA.ORG

**TESTIMONY BY BATTALION CHIEF JAMES LEMONDA,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
BEFORE FIVE CITY COUNCIL COMMITTEES ON WHAT MUST BE
DONE TO SALVAGE THE UNIFIED CALL-TAKING SYSTEM**

Wednesday, February 25, 2015

Ladies and gentlemen, Chairs and members of five City Council committees, thank you for the opportunity to once again offer the thoughts of every single Fire Officer (2,700 strong), who have been suffering for five years from this broken and mismanaged UCT system.

I have very little to offer about the 105-page report of the Department of Investigation on the cost overruns and mangled technology and huge amounts of wasted city funds. Most of what we saw in the DOI Report was a rewrite of what we've been reading in the newspapers since 2009.

The UFOA hoped DOI was also looking into approximately 10,000 complaints from Fire Officers in the field -- 10,000 incidents that included wrongful deaths, untold numbers of injuries that could have been prevented, loss of property that has run into hundreds of millions that might have been avoided if the people in charge of UCT had listened to a consultant who reported in 2011 that the system was dangerous to the 8.2 million citizens of New York City and dangerous to the city's Public Safety personnel. Apparently, the safety of the residents and their firefighters and police officers will have to wait a little longer.

Over and over, the UFOA, working with your committees and also with the Public Advocate, made the case that UCT was wrong for the City, wrong for its residents, commuters and visitors, and wrong for its firefighters and police officers. No one has heard our appeal for help, that is for sure.

The solution is so simple it cries out for adoption immediately. When a person calls 911 and specifies the emergency is a fire or a Medical Emergency, the call-taker should turn the call over to a Fire Department Dispatcher, who would be located in the Fire Department Borough Dispatch Office.

So I will say it once more -- the administration needs only to issue an order to return to the system that worked for all the years prior to 2009. The previous administration refused to admit a monumental mistake. We hoped this administration would be more attentive to this monumental scandal, but so far the problem does not seem to be one of a priority.

— AFFILIATED WITH —



NEW YORK STATE AFL-CIO
NEW YORK CITY CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL AFL-CIO * MARITIME PORT COUNCIL OF
GREATER NEW YORK & VICINITY * UNION LABEL & SERVICE TRADES COUNCIL OF
GREATER NEW YORK & LONG ISLAND * NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL

And I will say something even more troubling to the people of New York City. Over the last 13 years, your Fire Department has been dangerously down-sized, even as fire incidents have skyrocketed. In 2002, fire incidents totaled 426,000. In the year just ended, 2014, the FDNY responded to more than 519,000 incidents, a new record in the long and honorable history of your Fire Department.

That is almost 100,000 more annual incidents. On the morning of the attack on the World Trade Center, the FDNY had 11,332 Firefighters and Fire Officers when the terrorists struck. Today we are operating with only 10,600 uniformed personnel.

In the interim, we have lost six engine companies and the fifth firefighter on engine companies in High Risk neighborhoods. Why is it that High Risk neighborhoods are always targeted?

Thank you for allowing the UFOA to sound the alarm. Our experience over the years has convinced us that the only elected officials who listen to our pleas are the members of the City Council, the Public Advocate and the City Comptroller. We believe that's because you are closer to the people in the neighborhoods where Mayors rarely tread.

In conclusion, I would like to state that I, along with every member of the UFOA Executive Board, have spent most of our careers in some of the busiest neighborhoods of our city with the highest incidents of fire. We have first-hand witnessed the devastation of property, the loss of life, women, children, and the elderly; those images have been seared in our minds forever.

I would like to ask the members present here today to close your eyes for a minute, imagine being awakened to blinding, choking smoke, searing heat, being paralyzed by fright; the air being ripped from your lungs. Imagine if that was your mother, father, grandmother, sister, brother, daughter or son. Imagine if it was you. Would you not want a fire apparatus dispatched within seconds?

Most times within government when problems exist, the solution is expensive. The solution to this problem will not cost a single penny. The solution is free. I urge you to please help us to serve and protect the citizens of our great city. Their lives depend on it.

————— AFFILIATED WITH —————



NEW YORK STATE AFL-CIO
NEW YORK CITY CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL AFL-CIO * MARITIME PORT COUNCIL OF
GREATER NEW YORK & VICINITY * UNION LABEL & SERVICE TRADES COUNCIL OF
GREATER NEW YORK & LONG ISLAND * NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL



Uniformed Firefighters Association of Greater New York



204 East 23rd Street, New York, NY 10010 • Tel: 212-683-4832 • Fax: 212-683-0710 • www.ufanyc.org • [@ufanyc](https://twitter.com/ufanyc)

Stephen J. Cassidy <i>President Engine 236</i>	James M. Slevin <i>Vice President Ladder 7</i>	LeRoy C. McGinnis <i>Recording Secretary Engine 266</i>	Edward Brown <i>Treasurer Ladder 48</i>	Gerard Fitzgerald <i>Health & Safety Officer Sergeant-at-Arms Engine 318</i>	John G. Kelly, Jr. <i>Brooklyn Trustee Chairman, Board of Trustees Engine 201</i>	Matthew M. DesJardin <i>Queens Trustee Engine 325</i>	Eric Bischoff <i>Staten Island Trustee Engine 161</i>	Vincent Speciale <i>Manhattan Trustee Engine 55</i>	William Greco <i>Bronx Trustee Engine 68</i>	Steven Tagliani <i>Fire Marshal Rep</i>
--	--	---	---	--	---	---	---	---	--	---

Oversight - Examining the New York City Department of Investigation Report on the City's Program to Overhaul the 911 System. Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services Jointly with the Committee on Public Safety, the Committee on Technology, the Committee on Oversight and Investigations and the Committee on Contracts.

Testimony of Stephen Cassidy – February 25, 2015

Good Morning, my name is Steve Cassidy and I here to talk about ongoing issues with the 911 system. To say I am disappointed in the progress that has been made with the 911 system would be an understatement. The new administration has been in place for 14 months now and we are still waiting for simple improvements to be made to the 911/UCT system. We are asking for a simple protocol to be restored that ensures fire related calls are immediately transferred to an FDNY dispatcher. The UFA was the first to point out that the UCT system was flawed. It took many years of foil requests, press conferences, hearings and court cases to prove that the previous administration was lying about response times. They were deliberately underreporting the true end-to-end response times. In addition they continued to pour billions of dollars into a failed project despite the recommendation of Winbourne Consulting to "scrap it." They dug in and moved ahead. Additional recommendations for changes came from the Gartner Group. These reports were buried and were only brought to light through confidential sources and court battles. Now the most recent report from the NYC Department of Investigation verifies to us that the problems with UCT/911 were as bad as we imagined.

Last year we were optimistic when the new administration said they were going to put a stop to the out of control costs and take over the management of the project from the consultants. We were hopeful that a simple fix to cut down on response times would take place immediately, putting a stop to wasting precious minutes in end-to-end response times. This change doesn't require any change in technology or increased costs. Since the implementation of the UCT system there has been numerous problems with the call intake process. As we previously pointed out, the old system would immediately transfer a call to an FDNY dispatcher when the 911 operator would ask, "what is the emergency?" The new system requires the 911 operator to interrogate a caller to ascertain the location of an emergency, before the nature of the emergency. This costs critical time before it can be released to the FDNY dispatchers. The 911 operators do a great job but they are simply overworked and overstressed with the call volume they handle. The UFA knows that the response times can go down and NYC will get a better system by immediately asking the caller "what is your emergency?" before asking "Where is your emergency?" By immediately transferring a call to FDNY dispatchers the 911 operator will be released to handle another emergency call. The FDNY dispatchers are better able to handle fire related calls. Until this protocol is restored, precious time will continue to be added to the end-to-end response time matrix.

**DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE CITY COUNCIL COMMITTEES ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PUBLIC SAFETY,
CONTRACTS, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION, AND TECHNOLOGY
RE: EXAMINING THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE CITY'S
PROGRAM TO OVERHAUL THE 911 SYSTEM
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2015**

Good morning Chairs Crowley, Gibson, Rosenthal, Gentile, and Vacca, members of the committees on Fire and Criminal Justice, Public Safety, Contracts, Oversight and Investigations, and Technology. My name is Anne Roest and I am the Commissioner of the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications, or DoITT. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the City's Emergency Communications Transformation Program, or ECTP.

My first task after Mayor de Blasio appointed me as DoITT Commissioner in May was to assess, restructure, and manage ECTP. We completed a robust assessment in August¹ with partners from NYPD, FDNY, DDC, City Hall, OMB and OCEC and began to implement significant reforms throughout the fall, which I will share with you today. I also brought copies of the assessment in case anyone would like to review it. We believe the Department of Investigation's report reaffirms and validates the direction the de Blasio administration has pursued since its comprehensive technology review of the program last summer.

In 2004, the City of New York began ECTP, a multi-year, multi-agency initiative to modernize and consolidate the City's 911 emergency communication system, the most complex and expansive system in the nation. As you may recall, eight years later, in December, 2011, as part of ECTP, the NYPD and FDNY 911 operations were co-located into the first Public Safety Answering Center (PSAC). Since then, the City has been moving toward the development of the second PSAC, in the Bronx, to ensure fully-redundant 911 operations for the first time in its history.

By the end of 2013, the projected opening date for Public Safety Answering Center 2 (PSAC2) – the City's second emergency call-taking and dispatch center – was December 2015.

In May 2014, during an ECTP briefing, First Deputy Mayor Anthony Shorris was informed that the go-live date for PSAC 2 had slipped dramatically and would now be delayed to 2018. In addition to the delay, the cost was expected to increase by at least \$100 million. As a result, the de Blasio administration halted all new work on ECTP in order to conduct a thorough examination which I led and which assessed all facets of the program, including scope, budget, schedule, and governance.

The City's comprehensive review for the first time included representatives of all stakeholder agencies, and revealed a number of root causes for repeated program challenges and delays, including overreliance on external consultants and lack of communication with, and input from stakeholder agencies.

The report that DoITT published, in collaboration with our partner agencies, included dramatic recommendations to improve these deficiencies and charted a path forward for effective completion of major program components pulling the date into 2016, with residual items completed in 2017. The assessment was further able to add key requirements and remove

¹ <http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/reports/2014/ECTP-60-Day-Assessment-Final-140806.pdf>

those no longer needed, allowing for ECTP to be completed within the remaining established capital budget of \$2.03 billion and not escalate the cost.

Since releasing the 60-Day Assessment in August of last year, DoITT has been actively pursuing ECTP reform, and making real progress in meeting our goals. We have moved forward on many of the recommendations that resulted from our 60-day assessment which I will focus my testimony on. Many of these recommendations were validated by the DOI's investigation as best practices that should be in place to ensure project success; the DOI's report has still other recommendations that we support and are working to implement, which I will also address in my testimony.

Better Decision-Making and More Accountability

One of the deficiencies our review of ECTP exposed was the lack of clear governance principles. There were many stakeholders involved in the project, but no clear mechanisms for managing progress and ensuring accountability. A plan that offers clear accountability or direction for stakeholder decision making and escalation is a critical success factor for any project of ECTP's magnitude. It should enable, and require, sustained participation from all stakeholder agencies for the duration of the program, and include executive-level oversight with active and committed participation from agency heads.

We have fundamentally changed the project's governance. We created an ECTP Steering Committee, responsible for directing and advising the ECTP Management. The Steering Committee is comprised by City Hall, FDNY, NYPD, and DoITT. We meet weekly. In short, the Steering Committee was created and is used to monitor program progress and relay its decisions to the program. The committee's role is to understand the key issues, risks, and requested changes, approve or escalate budgetary-related changes, and to provide advice and decision-making for escalated items. We also have created an Executive Committee chaired by the First Deputy Mayor which included Commissioners from the NYPD, Fire Department and DOITT as well as the Mayor's Office of Operations which meets quarterly and deals with items that need escalation.

Scope and Schedule

The ECTP Steering Committee has also taken on the task of clearly defining the program's scope, and has for the first time broken the project into distinct workstreams, each with distinct goals. Breaking the project into workstreams has allowed us to restructure how the components will be delivered. Delivering in phases will allow us to deliver sooner and with less risk. In short, we have a better plan that clearly lays out the program's scope and direction. A workstream is a sub-project of ECTP; for example, Network, Telephony, and PSAC2 are all workstreams of ECTP.

Empowered Leadership

As noted in the DOI report, it is important that there is centralized authority over ECTP. Prior to the completion of DOI's report, the Mayor charged me as the single point of accountability for ensuring the program's success. While the governance model I described earlier is intended to enhance communication and collaboration, I am responsible for managing ECTP and have the authority to make decisions that could affect the scope, schedule, and budget. It is vital that I maintain an open line of communications with the stakeholder agencies and that the agency executives are engaged and supportive of final determinations. It is also worth noting that I am in the process of hiring an Associate Commissioner for ECTP to report directly to me, replacing the ECTP Director position which has been vacant for some time.

Bringing the Work In-House

Our findings in the 60-Day Review also indicated the value of appointing a Vendor and Contract Management lead, and providing staffing necessary to effectively oversee the numerous vendor engagements and contracts associated with the program. We eliminated layers of vendors, so that the vendor responsible for delivery is in turn directly communicating with stakeholders and City program management – not with other vendors. The City has reduced sub-contractor involvement, including the removal of a number of consultants managing delivery of PSAC2 from 137 to 23, and for the first time shifting much of their responsibility to City staff. We are filling all vacant and funded ECTP positions (there were many) and have approval to add 17 more city positions to the project. These city employees continue the work that had been being performed by outside consultants.

Improving and Simplifying Reporting

Standardized program reporting is also an area where we have sought to improve ECTP. ECTP Management now receives clear and concise weekly reports from each workstream, which are substantially shorter than earlier reports. Also, critically, the reports are prepared by City management staff, not by consultants.

Integrity Oversight

The DOI report also recommended the use of an Integrity Monitor that can independently assess the risks of a large-scale project such as ECTP. We agree with this recommendation, and DoITT is currently working with DOI on procurement of Integrity Monitoring Services. To further support a focus on improving program quality, DoITT has received approval to fill additional positions in our Quality Management Unit. These internal staff will be focused on quality review and reporting on ECTP management, program deliverables, and program processes.

Record-keeping and Retention Policies

DoITT is retaining all documents related to the ECTP program. Regarding record-keeping, ECTP uses a document management system within SharePoint which includes all project management documents such as management plans and processes, vendor and resource management docs, risk and issues repository, change control documents, action items, status reports, project-level working documents, and formal deliverables. ECTP Management is using the new site successfully.

By fundamentally altering the management approach toward ECTP – by re-establishing the City as the program lead, integrating stakeholders into the governance process and by eliminating layers of consultants, and breaking down large projects into smaller, more manageable ones – we have the key ingredients for successful completion of this vital initiative. I look forward to continuing our collaboration with stakeholder agencies and DOI to deliver the modern, updated 911 system New Yorkers deserve, which we intend to do on schedule and within budget.

I thank the Committee members for their time this morning, and am happy to take any questions you may have.

Thank you.



CITIZENS UNION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
Testimony to the NYC Council Committees on Contracts, Fire and Criminal Justice
Services, Public Safety, the Oversight and Investigations and Technology
On the 911 Contract and Department of Investigation Report
February 25, 2015

Good morning Chairs Rosenthal, Crowley, Gibson, Gentile and Vacca, and other members of the Council Contracts, Fire and Criminal Justice, Public Safety, Oversight & Investigations, and Technology Committees. My name is Rachael Fauss, and I am the Director for Public Policy for Citizens Union of the City of New York. Citizens Union is a nonpartisan good government group dedicated to making democracy work for all New Yorkers.

Thank you for holding this joint hearing today. We commend the Council for exercising its important oversight role to ensure that protocols are in place to protect taxpayers and ensure public trust in city government. This hearing, which echoes themes expressed at the hearing held in December on oversight of Technology contracts and the Department of Investigations (DOI) report on the CityTime scandal, shows a continued commitment of the Council to ensuring that contracts are managed properly. While the city has put in place some reforms in response to the CityTime scandal and the delays and mismanagement of the 911 Contract (the Emergency Communications Transformation Program, hereafter referred to as ECTP), continued diligence on these large scale technology projects is essential.

Before turning to the specific topic of today's hearing, we would like to reiterate our support for Intro 498 (Rosenthal), which would better vet contracts for conflicts of interest. The hearing in December raised many important ways to improve upon the legislation, and Citizens Union looks forward to seeing amended legislation.

CU Analysis of DOI Report on the Emergency Communications Transformation Program (ECTP)

Citizens Union has reviewed the DOI's final report on the implementation of ECTP, and would like to highlight certain aspects of the findings that relate to government efficiency, transparency and accountability – core tenets of Citizens Union's work. The comprehensive report highlighted the following areas that need to be addressed as the city moves forward on the project:

1. ***Inefficiencies related to lack of interagency coordination*** –The DOI report notes that governance problems contributed greatly to the mismanagement of the project. In particular, DOI noted that there was no central decision-making authority, and that redundancies at FDNY and NYPD, which had parallel systems and separate facilities, were not addressed. As a result, upgrades to the computer-aided dispatch systems (CADs) were pursued separately at each agency. This wasted taxpayer dollars, spent excessive government funds, and created unnecessary inefficiencies.

2. ***Lack of internal city resources and experience to conduct proper oversight of contractors and subcontractors*** – while agencies like the DOI and City Comptroller conduct important oversight after projects are completed (or delayed in the case of ECTP), it is essential that oversight be conducted continually. Increasing city resources to better manage contracts internally may be more cost effective in the end than outsourcing management to private contractors. It should be noted that management of the project had been rearranged several times in the past, and therefore, it is important to know how the new ECTP Steering Committee is learning from the mistakes of the past. It is also important to ensure there is buy-in from all agencies regarding the authority of DOITT to be the prime responsible manager of the project. We are also pleased that the city has agreed to put in place an independent integrity monitor for ECPT.

To this end, we recommend the Council:

- a. Evaluate the effectiveness of the new ECTP steering committee in managing the contract, rather than an outside system integrator.
 - b. Work with the administration to examine staffing levels of involved city agencies for oversight of this contract as part of the FY 2016 budget process.
 - c. Continue to monitor the city's agreement to put in place an independent integrity monitor.
3. ***Need for increased transparency*** – The DOI report noted several trends that perhaps could have been better spotted through fuller disclosure including the following:
- a. Excessive amendments of contracts and task orders, resulting in cost overruns;
 - b. Overreliance on subcontractors; and
 - c. Spreading out of costs through multiple agencies.

While the city has made strides to shed light on the contracting process, in particular subcontractors, the DOI ECTP report demonstrates the need for fuller disclosure. In 2013, Comptroller John Liu and Mayor Bloomberg announced that the City would begin collecting information regarding payments and contracts with subcontractors.¹ Just last week, Comptroller Scott Stringer announced that subcontractor data was live on the Comptroller's transparency website, Checkbook.² However, it is clear from reviewing the data and our conversations with the Comptroller's office that the data is incomplete, and most prime contractors are not yet reporting subcontractor data.

The Comptroller's Checkbook website provides in real time to the public detailed information about amendments to contracts and payments for both contractors and subcontractors, but the data is currently self-reported by prime contractors. Fuller public disclosure of this information would allow the city comptroller, city council, and others outside of government to spot trends and potentially flag issues related to particular contracts or spending areas so that the problems and overspending can be addressed.

¹ Office of the NYC Comptroller. "Comptroller Liu And Mayor Bloomberg Announce Sweeping Reforms To City Subcontracting Requirements," March 19, 2013. Available at: <https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/PR13-03-044.pdf>

² Office of the NYC Comptroller. "Comptroller Stringer Initiative Shines Spotlight on M/WBE and Subcontractor Spending," February 17, 2015. Available at: <http://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-initiative-shines-spotlight-on-mwbe-and-subcontractor-spending/>

The DOI report also highlighted the lack of record retention, particularly for the NYPD, regarding project management, and the lack of an NYPD agency document retention policy. This is particularly troubling, given that all public documents that are subject to the Freedom of Information Law should be retained.

To this end, we recommend:

- a. The Council to hold a separate oversight hearing on the city's efforts to bring prime contractors into full compliance with the 2013 agreement to provide subcontractor data.**
- b. The city report the full costs of ECTP, and ensure that all contracts and payments related to ECTP are coded appropriately so as to allow better tracking of the progress and costs of the program.**
- c. The city adopt standardized recordkeeping practices for multi-agency projects, including ECTP, as recommend by the DOI report.**

Thank you again for providing the opportunity for Citizens Union to provide its thoughts on the city's 911 Contract (ECTP) and DOI's report. I am happy to answer any questions you might have.

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: _____

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Commissioner Mark Peters

Address: with IG Andrew Brunsden and

I represent: Andrew Sein

Address: NYC Department of Investigation

◆ Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms ◆

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25/15

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Ralph Palladino 2nd Vice President

Address: 125 Barclay Street

I represent: Local 1549, DC37

Address: _____

◆ Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms ◆

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25/15

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Commissioner Anne Roest

Address: _____

I represent: DOITT

Address: _____

◆ Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms ◆

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25/15

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: RICHARD ALLES

Address: 225 BROADWAY

I represent: UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Address: 225 BROADWAY

◆ Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms ◆

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25/15

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Michael Chief Finken

Address: _____

I represent: FDNY

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25/15

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Inspector Rich Napolitano

Address: NYPP

I represent: NYPP

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25/15

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Commissioner Koster

Address: _____

I represent: Mayor's office of operations

Address: _____

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25/15

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Steve Cassidy

Address: UFA, President

I represent: _____

Address: _____

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: Rachael Fauss

Address: _____

I represent: Citizens Union

Address: 299 Broadway Suite 700

**THE COUNCIL
THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

Appearance Card

I intend to appear and speak on Int. No. _____ Res. No. _____

☐ in favor ☐ in opposition

Date: 2/25/15

(PLEASE PRINT)

Name: JAMES LEMONDO

Address: 225 B'WAY NY NY

I represent: PRESIDENT, UNIFORMED

Address: FIRE OFFICERS ASSOC

Please complete this card and return to the Sergeant-at-Arms